NZDF General discussion thread

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Not entirely true. War Plan Orange was adopted by the US Army & Navy in 1924 for a potential conflict between the US and Japan. IIRC plans had started getting drawn up a few years after President Theodore Roosevelt mediated the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth which formally ended the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese victories and Russian defeats during the conflict led to the balance of power in the Pacific region being reevaluated, TBH though I suspect a degree of institutionalized bigotry against the "Yellow Peril" also played a role.

It is also surprising (in hindsight) that more aggressive action was not taken in 1937 following the Japanese invasion of China and subsequent attacks upon US and British forces within China.

While people are historically poor predictors of the future, what NZ does need to make sure of is that the NZDF is properly trained and kitted out to cover a broad range of scenarios. Also of crucial importance IMO is for the NZDF to have the flexibility change it's response capabilities and/or re-role some assets if/when needed. Relating to that, NZ needs to not only get away from being so parsimonious with the NZDF budget as a whole, but also when selecting the types and numbers of specific pieces of kit. The entire Project Protector is an unfortunately great example of trying to do too much, with too little, and all on the cheap. The original SH-2G(NZ) Seasprite buy is another good example, as is the 8+1 NH90 TTH buy.

A little more thought, a little more planning, and a bit more coin up front can reduce the cost and/or pain & loss in the future.
The fact that there was a war plan is of little relevance as the US have been inclined to have war plans to cover just about everything. (probably a trait of most major militaries ) I remember many years ago that there was much consternation when some old documents, from the 1920-30's were found which included a war plan against the UK .
The rest of what you say is very relevant and I agree with with you on that.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
The fact that there was a war plan is of little relevance as the US have been inclined to have war plans to cover just about everything. (probably a trait of most major militaries ) I remember many years ago that there was much consternation when some old documents, from the 1920-30's were found which included a war plan against the UK .
The rest of what you say is very relevant and I agree with with you on that.
It was called War plan Red
http//:www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-20...TAIN-1930-bombing-raids-chemical-weapons.html
 

danonz

Member
Sorry to bring up Ron Mark again but seams he is already getting involved in his new role.

Whirlwind start off the mark - Times Age

Interesting paragraph below

Mr Mark flew in and out of the Hood Aerodome to attend and was predominately briefed on operations, with discussions only touching on some of the strengths and weaknesses of some of the equipment.

Be interesting to see how far he can throw his toys when asking for $ from Labour led cabinet .
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I think this is Ron Marks first big speech as MinDef and he didn't follow the script. It is good that he's holding the current Labour PM to a promise made over 9 years ago by the previous Labour Govt of Helen Clark.

This is the song that he got emotional through. Poppy and Pohutukawa by singer Rebecca Nelson an AB Musician in the RNZN Band.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
This is a continuation of a discussion started in the RNZAF thread, I moved it here because the topic itself is more a general NZDF discussion than RNZAF specific.

What you say is correct in conventional terms, but we must keep in mind that conflicts do not always follow our rules. Also keep in mind that in the greater South East Asian region we are a ethnic ,cultural, racial and religious minority and would be treated as such. If for instance the US was tied up else were say NATO versus Russia, then the door is very open. as I have said before at the current defence level we have anyone could simply fly in then use commercial shipping types to provide the heavy stuff, food and fuel could be sourced locally so it would not be a significant task to maintain such a group and the other point I made is it does not necessarily need to be a nation but could simply be an opportunistic, rogue group of the ISIS type who would basically live of the land and subjugate the population by extreme brutality. Due to our current low level of defence abilities there is no need for all the conventional assault equipment, basic civil transport will suffice. We need to stop thinking in only conventional terms or we could get badly burnt in the future.
An additional thought regarding local resistance, Logistically it would be extremely difficult as there is no handy Ho Chi Min trail or other supply options, so you would be at best left with an equipment level of bolt action rifles of various calibers each with a small handful of ammunition against modern auto weapons, a bit like the french resistance taking on the Germans in WW2 with muskets. The French resistance in WW2 did reach 100,000 after 4 years in june 1944, with significant help from G.B.including arms ,ammunition, explosive radio's, trained leadership and significant other support and backing which would not be available to us. There were at one stage almost as many informers as there were resistance.
IMO there are a number of major flaws with some of the thinking presented here, as well as earlier in the discussion back on the RNZAF thread.

One of the first is that if a force (whether it is a state-sponsored force or that of a non-state actor) is attempting to seize ground, hold territory, and subjugate the local/native population, the actions by their very nature are elements of conventional warfare. Asymmetric or guerrilla warfare can be a useful and effective tactic used by a native population to contest or resist attempts to exert control on the native population and/or local territory by a conventional force, most often a non-native force at that.

Part of the reason why these asymmetric tactics can work is because the conventional force is unable to ID which people in an area are regular members of the native population and which are members of the insurgent forces.

This does not work if the "insurgent forces" are non-natives who are attempting to take ground and rule over the native population, especially when the defending conventional forces are composed of natives.

To put things into context, consider the following scenario.

How difficult does one think it would be for personnel from the NZ Police, NZDF, and/or NZSAS to pick out ~122 ISIS-type 'insurgents' who arrived in a B737 from Mopah International Airport in Indonesia that landed at Kaitaia Airport and then managed to seize control of the nearby towns of Kaitaia and Awanui?

I chose those specific start and end points for specific reasons. The Mopah International Airport is the closet airport in Indonesia to NZ that I could find that has a runway (2500 m) long enough to potentially permit a civilian airliner with a passenger capacity of 100+ and the potential range to reach part of NZ. Depending on a host of variables (actual takeoff weight, air temp & density, fuel load, flight route, etc.) several different types of jetliner could make such a flight. These would be examples of the Airbus A320, Boeing B737, and the Bombardier C-series families respectively.

I also chose the Kaitaia Airport (1,402 m runway) in Kaitaia for several specific reasons, the main one being that it is the northernmost and closest airport I could find to Indonesia/Asia, at 4,458 km to Mopah Int'l Airport. However, the airport itself was upgraded in 2005 to handle turboprop ATR 72 and Q300's operated by Air NZ.

A few key things to remember as such a flight would be fraught with risk due to how close things would be to the operating envelope. The range of ~4,500 km could be too great forcing the aircraft to ditch in the ocean. It could also be that due to the aircraft load and/or weather & runway conditions, the Kaitaia runway is too short. Some aircraft load profiles suggest that the aircraft could skid off the runway by 500+ m if the runway was wet or conditions were rainy. There is also the potential issue of the runway paving failing due to the weight of the incoming aircraft. As mentioned above, the airport was upgraded in 2005 to permit Air NZ ATR 72's and Bombardier aircraft, which I have since determined are Q300 turboprops and not any of the Bombardier jets. The MTOW's are ~23,000 kg and 19,000 kg respectively, while the lightest of the jetliners from the series I listed has a MTOW that starts at ~58,000 kg...

I have a commercial airline pilot and ATC that I know checking some of the data to get his take, but I suspect trying to launch an attack in this fashion would fail because the aircraft would either crash, or crash land, and the armed ISIS-type fighters would all be either injured or killed before they could engage in any sort of ground attack.
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
I have a commercial airline pilot and ATC that I know checking some of the data to get his take, but I suspect trying to launch an attack in this fashion would fail because the aircraft would either crash, or crash land, and the armed ISIS-type fighters would all be either injured or killed before they could engage in any sort of ground attack.
Regarding using Kaitaia airport and the Far North district. It would be a bad choice actually. It is a very mobbed up town with 5 gang killings over the last year alone and 12 missing persons and suspicious deaths on the local Police district books. It is the 'drug garden' for Auckland - from cannabis cultivation through to meth labs. Literally patched gang member is the most common job occupation amongst males of 'working' age .... ;)
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Regarding using Kaitaia airport and the Far North district. It would be a bad choice actually. It is a very mobbed up town with 5 gang killings over the last year alone and 12 missing persons and suspicious deaths on the local Police district books. It is the 'drug garden' for Auckland - from cannabis cultivation through to meth labs. Literally patched gang member is the most common job occupation amongst males of 'working' age .... ;)
I have also started looking into information about flights into NZ's international airports, to check the viability of using an expected international flight as a method of entry to establish either a beachhead or landing zone to land additional personnel.

So far, the information does not look promising, at least for would-be invaders or conquerors of NZ that is.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
This is a continuation of a discussion started in the RNZAF thread, I moved it here because the topic itself is more a general NZDF discussion than RNZAF specific.



IMO there are a number of major flaws with some of the thinking presented here, as well as earlier in the discussion back on the RNZAF thread.

One of the first is that if a force (whether it is a state-sponsored force or that of a non-state actor) is attempting to seize ground, hold territory, and subjugate the local/native population, the actions by their very nature are elements of conventional warfare. Asymmetric or guerrilla warfare can be a useful and effective tactic used by a native population to contest or resist attempts to exert control on the native population and/or local territory by a conventional force, most often a non-native force at that.

Part of the reason why these asymmetric tactics can work is because the conventional force is unable to ID which people in an area are regular members of the native population and which are members of the insurgent forces.

This does not work if the "insurgent forces" are non-natives who are attempting to take ground and rule over the native population, especially when the defending conventional forces are composed of natives.

To put things into context, consider the following scenario.

How difficult does one think it would be for personnel from the NZ Police, NZDF, and/or NZSAS to pick out ~122 ISIS-type 'insurgents' who arrived in a B737 from Mopah International Airport in Indonesia that landed at Kaitaia Airport and then managed to seize control of the nearby towns of Kaitaia and Awanui?

I chose those specific start and end points for specific reasons. The Mopah International Airport is the closet airport in Indonesia to NZ that I could find that has a runway (2500 m) long enough to potentially permit a civilian airliner with a passenger capacity of 100+ and the potential range to reach part of NZ. Depending on a host of variables (actual takeoff weight, air temp & density, fuel load, flight route, etc.) several different types of jetliner could make such a flight. These would be examples of the Airbus A320, Boeing B737, and the Bombardier C-series families respectively.

I also chose the Kaitaia Airport (1,402 m runway) in Kaitaia for several specific reasons, the main one being that it is the northernmost and closest airport I could find to Indonesia/Asia, at 4,458 km to Mopah Int'l Airport. However, the airport itself was upgraded in 2005 to handle turboprop ATR 72 and Q300's operated by Air NZ.

A few key things to remember as such a flight would be fraught with risk due to how close things would be to the operating envelope. The range of ~4,500 km could be too great forcing the aircraft to ditch in the ocean. It could also be that due to the aircraft load and/or weather & runway conditions, the Kaitaia runway is too short. Some aircraft load profiles suggest that the aircraft could skid off the runway by 500+ m if the runway was wet or conditions were rainy. There is also the potential issue of the runway paving failing due to the weight of the incoming aircraft. As mentioned above, the airport was upgraded in 2005 to permit Air NZ ATR 72's and Bombardier aircraft, which I have since determined are Q300 turboprops and not any of the Bombardier jets. The MTOW's are ~23,000 kg and 19,000 kg respectively, while the lightest of the jetliners from the series I listed has a MTOW that starts at ~58,000 kg...

I have a commercial airline pilot and ATC that I know checking some of the data to get his take, but I suspect trying to launch an attack in this fashion would fail because the aircraft would either crash, or crash land, and the armed ISIS-type fighters would all be either injured or killed before they could engage in any sort of ground attack.
I am off to the Naki soon so must keep this short.
In regard to guerilla ops I have a few problems some I have already mentioned. Any force that takes over NZ would quickly control or destroy any bulk weapons and ammo supplies and due to our isolation it would be extremely difficult to get any more. successful guerilla operations usually are supported by a third party, difficult in our case.
The use of extreme violence, say the public beheading of a number of men, women or children for every occupier killed would quickly dampen enthusiasm to continue.
If we have to resort to guerilla ops we have already lost and the damage has been done. we need to avoid this scenario.
On the aircraft scenario. the possibilities are numerous, including if Indonesia is rogue coming from Jakarta it self or taking Noumea on the way and using it as a refueling stop and you would be using multiple aircraft. Boeing and Airbus both produce multiple aircraft that have ranges in excess of 10,000 km and some over 16,000km, this makes the list of possible start points enormous. Without the range payload figures and the runway to weight requirements of individual aircraft it is impossible to say where they could originate from.
As i have maintained that we need a good basic defence which must include he ability to know what is going on in our area and the ability to control or neutralize that which we don't want in our area.
Really. dissecting individual scenarios while interesting does not solve anything as what we may think of will only be a fraction of the possibilities and what we think cannot be done someone will figure a way of doing it. Military history is full of instances were someone did what everyone else thought could not be done and because of that became a winner.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I am off to the Naki soon so must keep this short.
In regard to guerilla ops I have a few problems some I have already mentioned. Any force that takes over NZ would quickly control or destroy any bulk weapons and ammo supplies and due to our isolation it would be extremely difficult to get any more. successful guerilla operations usually are supported by a third party, difficult in our case.
The use of extreme violence, say the public beheading of a number of men, women or children for every occupier killed would quickly dampen enthusiasm to continue.
If we have to resort to guerilla ops we have already lost and the damage has been done. we need to avoid this scenario.
On the aircraft scenario. the possibilities are numerous, including if Indonesia is rogue coming from Jakarta it self or taking Noumea on the way and using it as a refueling stop and you would be using multiple aircraft. Boeing and Airbus both produce multiple aircraft that have ranges in excess of 10,000 km and some over 16,000km, this makes the list of possible start points enormous. Without the range payload figures and the runway to weight requirements of individual aircraft it is impossible to say where they could originate from.
As i have maintained that we need a good basic defence which must include he ability to know what is going on in our area and the ability to control or neutralize that which we don't want in our area.
Really. dissecting individual scenarios while interesting does not solve anything as what we may think of will only be a fraction of the possibilities and what we think cannot be done someone will figure a way of doing it. Military history is full of instances were someone did what everyone else thought could not be done and because of that became a winner.
One of the things I have been doing is getting the ACN and PCN for various civilian airliners and airports/runways. Such information provides guidance on where aircraft can depart from as well as whether they can safely make it to the ground at an airport.

A major part of what I have been examining is the logistics involved, as the availability (or lack thereof) of logistics is one of the major conditions which can make or break a campaign. Assertions have been made several times about how an insurgency carried out by Kiwis in an occupied NZ would be ineffective due to lack of arms, the ability of occupiers to hold hostages and carry out reprisals etc. What all of that is assuming though is that NZ has already fallen to some outside force. What I have been looking at is what would be needed to get such an occupation force to NZ, how large it would be, what sort of support would be needed, how it might be able to arrive, and where it might come from.

So far, the obstacles to establishing a force large enough IMO to seize control of portions of NZ have been formidable if the attackers have the element of surprise. Without the element of surprise, the obstacles become overwhelming IMO.

I have to head out to take of a few things, but I will have more input later on.
 

kiwipatriot69

Active Member
I am off to the Naki soon so must keep this short.
In regard to guerilla ops I have a few problems some I have already mentioned. Any force that takes over NZ would quickly control or destroy any bulk weapons and ammo supplies and due to our isolation it would be extremely difficult to get any more. successful guerilla operations usually are supported by a third party, difficult in our case.
The use of extreme violence, say the public beheading of a number of men, women or children for every occupier killed would quickly dampen enthusiasm to continue.
If we have to resort to guerilla ops we have already lost and the damage has been done. we need to avoid this scenario.
On the aircraft scenario. the possibilities are numerous, including if Indonesia is rogue coming from Jakarta it self or taking Noumea on the way and using it as a refueling stop and you would be using multiple aircraft. Boeing and Airbus both produce multiple aircraft that have ranges in excess of 10,000 km and some over 16,000km, this makes the list of possible start points enormous. Without the range payload figures and the runway to weight requirements of individual aircraft it is impossible to say where they could originate from.
As i have maintained that we need a good basic defence which must include he ability to know what is going on in our area and the ability to control or neutralize that which we don't want in our area.
Really. dissecting individual scenarios while interesting does not solve anything as what we may think of will only be a fraction of the possibilities and what we think cannot be done someone will figure a way of doing it. Military history is full of instances were someone did what everyone else thought could not be done and because of that became a winner.
Really mate, scenario with a few hundred armed insurgents, even if they could land an illegal plane or ship unregistered unchecked without raising alarm from any ship,plane or flight control area it passes,civilian or military?

Also where terrorism seems to succeed best are in countries that are unstable politically and suffer greatly from poverty, crime etc,Nz and Australia, even USA don't have anywhere near the mess Muslim countries like Iraq,Afghanistan, Syria,Iran have.


We don't have radical religious groups in large numbers, or religious leaders with political clout and influence. Also, you are discounting the large numbers of private gun owners in this country,not to mention unregistered ones. Hunting game is a big hobby here, after all.

Im sure any terror group trying to take root wouldn't have a snowball's chance in hell doing more than a little mayhem before they met Allah.There simply isn't enough numbers of refugees coming from said 'flagged countries' on a terror watch list anyway.

And why would they become radicalized, then few percent of the hundreds we do let in ,given all the govt assistance they get, that as a kiwi born here, most of us don't get as easy?
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
On the aircraft scenario. the possibilities are numerous, including if Indonesia is rogue coming from Jakarta it self or taking Noumea on the way and using it as a refueling stop and you would be using multiple aircraft. Boeing and Airbus both produce multiple aircraft that have ranges in excess of 10,000 km and some over 16,000km, this makes the list of possible start points enormous. Without the range payload figures and the runway to weight requirements of individual aircraft it is impossible to say where they could originate from.

As i have maintained that we need a good basic defence which must include he ability to know what is going on in our area and the ability to control or neutralize that which we don't want in our area.

Really. dissecting individual scenarios while interesting does not solve anything as what we may think of will only be a fraction of the possibilities and what we think cannot be done someone will figure a way of doing it. Military history is full of instances were someone did what everyone else thought could not be done and because of that became a winner.
Okay, there are a bunch of important points here.

1st the aircraft scenarios.

With the various aircraft scenarios, they can be broken down into two basic flight profiles. These are scheduled flights and unscheduled flights.

I do not see an unscheduled international civilian airliner flight as a viable method of delivering armed combatants intending to seize control of NZ. As a possible, albeit unlikely method of carrying out a terror attack, yes. Not as a way to deliver troops, even irregular or Taliban/ISIS-type troops. For starters, an unscheduled flight is subject to detection by the ATC systems of NZ, and likely one or more other nations during the flight, with the number depending on the point of departure, the intended destination within NZ and the route followed. This holds true even if the aircraft's transponder was turned off and the aircraft flown over open ocean at low altitudes. Flying on the deck would likely permit the aircraft to get closer to the intended target and make it harder to detect, but it would also likely subject the aircraft (and passengers) to greater stresses and turbulence, as well as negatively impact the aircraft's efficiency and fuel consumption.

In addition to detection by civilian ATC radar systems, the hypothetical airliner is subject to detection by numerous military air search/surveillance radars. In fact, there are a number of rather interesting surveillance radar systems providing coverage of the approaches to Australia, New Zealand, and portions of the S. Pacific and ASEAN areas. While these systems and their operators are not infallible, they do provide a very real capability to detect and track a rogue civilian airliner. Such capabilities provide a potential 'tripwire' early warning when the would-be attackers would still be several thousand km's away from NZ, and providing several hours for NZ to prepare an armed response.

Further, IMO the notion of an attacking (scheduled or non-scheduled) flight conducting a stopover en route to NZ would be more likely to cause such a campaign to fail. All it would take is a single message to get out from wherever the stopover occurred to reveal the existence of a rogue or possibly hijacked aircraft. Unless the would-be attackers, prior to arriving, managed to secure the cooperation of everyone that would have some involvement in the aircraft's stopover so that no information leaks occurred. The other alternative if cooperation was not secured is if an attack was launched to seize control of where the stopover occurred and prevent any/all messages about the seizure of the stopover point from getting transmitted. As a practical matter that would mean gaining control of or cutting the connections to the international telephone network, the Internet, and all radio transmitters which can transmit either to aircraft, on marine channels, or anything able to transmit further than a few km's.

Failure to achieve either complete cooperation or complete control of comms would only serve as further warnings that there was a threat, or threats in the ASEAN/S. Pacific region.

More will follow regarding using a scheduled flight.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
More will follow regarding using a scheduled flight.
Now for discussion on potentially using a scheduled flight.

One of the key points to remember about using a scheduled flight, is that such a flight would need to be a direct flight. If the aircraft had to do an intermediary stopover somewhere prior to traveling on to NZ, it could (and likely would) be detected as 'odd' and dealt with either in the air or on the ground by the stopover nation. As a side note, Australia is the most likely stopover for non-direct international flights to NZ. IMO it is unlikely that Australian personnel would not detect something suspicious about an entire airliner (passengers and aircrew) that was being used to transport a group of people and weapons to launch an assault on NZ, report their suspicions or otherwise take action.

I have looked at lists of direct international flights to NZ, and only one seems to be a possible candidate, and that is a daily flight from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to Auckland, NZ on an A330-300 that can carry up to ~283 passengers + aircrew. IMO the security forces of other nations with direct international flights to NZ are too capable, and have too much accountability, to permit the activities needed to enable the airliner cabin to be loaded with weapons and munitions for the passengers and aircrew. I just cannot see a scenario where a group of ~300 people were permitted to board an airliner loaded with weapons could occur in the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, or Singapore. Also none of these nations have active insurgencies or volume traffic to or from areas with such insurgencies.

At present, this leaves only that single daily scheduled direct international flight from Kuala Lumpur to Auckland which could bring in ~300 attackers in a trip to start a campaign to seize control of NZ. The first objectives would have to be to establish either a landing zone for flying reinforcements in, or a beachhead to land troops aboard vessels. Frankly, I do not believe that 300 attackers armed with small arms would be enough. Within the Auckland area there are over 1.5 mil. people, plus nearby NZDF bases with RNZAF, RNZN, NZ Army, and NZSAS personnel.

I do not see how 300 such combatants could effectively take and hold even just Auckland Airport for more than a short duration after having flown for 10+ hours.

Options to get reinforcements into NZ would be limited, as would the time the attacking force had to get reinforced. These would amount to either additional unscheduled NZ-bound flights with the risks of detection detailed in the previous post. Such reinforcing flights would need to already be en route (most likely almost at the airport) prior to the scheduled flight landing as a security cordon to contain the attackers at the airport could be setup fairly quickly with potentially as few as five barricades. In addition, quick thinking personnel at the airport could quickly and easily take the runways and taxiways out of service temporarily. All that would be needed is for a few large, heavy, or hazardous materials vehicles (fire apparatus, construction vehicles, fuel trucks, etc) to be driven out onto the runways and taxiways and then parked and disabled. An impact between a fire or fuel truck and an A330-300 traveling at 137 kts might not destroy the aircraft, but I am certain the crash would render the people aboard in no condition to engage in hostilities immediately.

OTOH if the plan was for the ~300 attackers to establish a beachhead for reinforcements that way, that too is very problematic IMO. First they would need to get clear of the airport itself with their weapons and equipment, while the alarm is being raised about the attack. Immediately afterwards they would need to secure sufficient transportation to move enough attackers and equipment to where they plan on establishing their beachhead. Meanwhile the ship(s) carrying reinforcements would need to already be almost at the beachhead. As a side note, much earlier in this thread IIRC there were a series of posts discussing a whole host of potential problems that a hostile force would encounter if they were to attempt to use a merchant or cruise vessel to land a body of troops on NZ.

From what I have been able to determine, the best place to establish a beachhead for reinforcement by sea would be somewhere along Quay St in Auckland so that reinforcing ships could have a wharf to dock alongside and unload personnel and equipment. If this is correct, then it would mean the attackers would need to drive across the metro Auckland area from the airport and arrive in sufficient numbers to seize an area for the ship(s) to dock and have the reinforcements disembark, and hold that area until it was no longer needed.

Aside from the difficulties that would likely be encountered getting attackers from the airport to the area around North, Princess and Queens Wharf, that area is also almost directly across the harbour from the Devenport Naval Base. Depending on what vessels were in port at the time of the attack, it is quite possible that the reinforcing vessel(s) and/or the beachhead itself could come under attack from either vessels deploying from the base, or from vessels within the base.

The basic conclusions I have reach based off the information I have come across is that without a hostile nation-state able to deploy and sustain an amphibious assault task force, there is no practical means for sufficient forces to get to NZ to contest control, never mind conduct an occupation.

To use the invasion of the Falklands Islands by Argentina as a rather poor example, consider this. The British and Falkland forces that responded to defend the islands had a total strength of 100-110. These were composed of personnel from the Royal Marines, RN, FIDF (a volunteer militia) and civilian volunteers, from a total population on the island of ~1,800. The Argentinian invasion force had ~600 troops, including marines landed in Amtracs, special forces, and tactical divers. The Argentinian force also had naval components including a sub and a Sheffield-class destroyer. Also the Falkland Islands were within the range of land-based Argentinian strike aircraft, only being ~500 km from the mainland.

The reason I say the Falklands War is a poor example is that New Zealand is considerably (20x) larger, has a much larger comparative population ( ~2,300x), and NZ is more remote (3x) with ~1,500 km being between the closest points in NZ and mainland Australia. Also there are basically only two nations with land-based strike aircraft which could reach NZ, namely RAAF aircraft from Australia, or long-ranged USAF strike/bombers.

One of the other important considerations to keep in mind. It would require something very serious and/or strange for either Australia or the US the be either unable to unwilling to provide NZ with direct military assistance in the face of a potential invasion. While I do not deal in certainties (Death and Taxes aside) the likelihood of the various conditions and events occurring around the at the right time and in the proper sequence to render such attack plans potentially viable is IMO very remote.
 

Kiwigov

Member
Now for discussion on potentially using a scheduled flight.

While I do not deal in certainties (Death and Taxes aside) the likelihood of the various conditions and events occurring around the at the right time and in the proper sequence to render such attack plans potentially viable is IMO very remote.
I fully take on board all your points, which of course appear completely right in respect of any terrorist-type scenario. I think there could be value in thinking through the implications of a direct State-backed subversive strike - in the context of a scenario whereby access to unpolluted (relatively) farmland and maritime resources are extremely valuable resources to an undemocratic governing elite with no qualms about using military force.
For example - institute a scheduled (heavily subsidised) air service to Auckland under the control of a national carrier. At some point, surreptiously replace a commercial passenger loading with a special forces group (including a contingent of specially trained pilots and aircrew), and undertake two 'emergency landings' at Whenuapai and Ohakea RNZAF bases.
Even a rough landing by the end of the runways would still deliver overwhelming military force, given neither base would have warning to alert mobile armoured or air defence forces.
Use the available air mobility assets at each base to rapidly move force components to take over Linton's LAVIIIs and the weapons stored at Waiouru. Use the Seasprites to strike the Papakura SAS base, loading Maverick-type missiles.
Sure, major problems in logistic sustainment - and assumes no Aust or USA intervention - but the invader would have air and armoured dominance by taking control of local assets, and by eliminating most local military hardware. Fully expect resistance by NZ personnel, but they would operate at an immediate disadvantage without LAVs, Javelin, or Mistral (or much ammunition). Invader simply flies in more personnel and supplies to suit...
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Now for discussion on potentially using a scheduled flight.

One of the key points to remember about using a scheduled flight, is that such a flight would need to be a direct flight. If the aircraft had to do an intermediary stopover somewhere prior to traveling on to NZ, it could (and likely would) be detected as 'odd' and dealt with either in the air or on the ground by the stopover nation. As a side note, Australia is the most likely stopover for non-direct international flights to NZ. IMO it is unlikely that Australian personnel would not detect something suspicious about an entire airliner (passengers and aircrew) that was being used to transport a group of people and weapons to launch an assault on NZ, report their suspicions or otherwise take action.

I have looked at lists of direct international flights to NZ, and only one seems to be a possible candidate, and that is a daily flight from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to Auckland, NZ on an A330-300 that can carry up to ~283 passengers + aircrew. IMO the security forces of other nations with direct international flights to NZ are too capable, and have too much accountability, to permit the activities needed to enable the airliner cabin to be loaded with weapons and munitions for the passengers and aircrew. I just cannot see a scenario where a group of ~300 people were permitted to board an airliner loaded with weapons could occur in the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, or Singapore. Also none of these nations have active insurgencies or volume traffic to or from areas with such insurgencies.

At present, this leaves only that single daily scheduled direct international flight from Kuala Lumpur to Auckland which could bring in ~300 attackers in a trip to start a campaign to seize control of NZ. The first objectives would have to be to establish either a landing zone for flying reinforcements in, or a beachhead to land troops aboard vessels. Frankly, I do not believe that 300 attackers armed with small arms would be enough. Within the Auckland area there are over 1.5 mil. people, plus nearby NZDF bases with RNZAF, RNZN, NZ Army, and NZSAS personnel.

I do not see how 300 such combatants could effectively take and hold even just Auckland Airport for more than a short duration after having flown for 10+ hours.

Options to get reinforcements into NZ would be limited, as would the time the attacking force had to get reinforced. These would amount to either additional unscheduled NZ-bound flights with the risks of detection detailed in the previous post. Such reinforcing flights would need to already be en route (most likely almost at the airport) prior to the scheduled flight landing as a security cordon to contain the attackers at the airport could be setup fairly quickly with potentially as few as five barricades. In addition, quick thinking personnel at the airport could quickly and easily take the runways and taxiways out of service temporarily. All that would be needed is for a few large, heavy, or hazardous materials vehicles (fire apparatus, construction vehicles, fuel trucks, etc) to be driven out onto the runways and taxiways and then parked and disabled. An impact between a fire or fuel truck and an A330-300 traveling at 137 kts might not destroy the aircraft, but I am certain the crash would render the people aboard in no condition to engage in hostilities immediately.

OTOH if the plan was for the ~300 attackers to establish a beachhead for reinforcements that way, that too is very problematic IMO. First they would need to get clear of the airport itself with their weapons and equipment, while the alarm is being raised about the attack. Immediately afterwards they would need to secure sufficient transportation to move enough attackers and equipment to where they plan on establishing their beachhead. Meanwhile the ship(s) carrying reinforcements would need to already be almost at the beachhead. As a side note, much earlier in this thread IIRC there were a series of posts discussing a whole host of potential problems that a hostile force would encounter if they were to attempt to use a merchant or cruise vessel to land a body of troops on NZ.

From what I have been able to determine, the best place to establish a beachhead for reinforcement by sea would be somewhere along Quay St in Auckland so that reinforcing ships could have a wharf to dock alongside and unload personnel and equipment. If this is correct, then it would mean the attackers would need to drive across the metro Auckland area from the airport and arrive in sufficient numbers to seize an area for the ship(s) to dock and have the reinforcements disembark, and hold that area until it was no longer needed.

Aside from the difficulties that would likely be encountered getting attackers from the airport to the area around North, Princess and Queens Wharf, that area is also almost directly across the harbour from the Devenport Naval Base. Depending on what vessels were in port at the time of the attack, it is quite possible that the reinforcing vessel(s) and/or the beachhead itself could come under attack from either vessels deploying from the base, or from vessels within the base.

The basic conclusions I have reach based off the information I have come across is that without a hostile nation-state able to deploy and sustain an amphibious assault task force, there is no practical means for sufficient forces to get to NZ to contest control, never mind conduct an occupation.

To use the invasion of the Falklands Islands by Argentina as a rather poor example, consider this. The British and Falkland forces that responded to defend the islands had a total strength of 100-110. These were composed of personnel from the Royal Marines, RN, FIDF (a volunteer militia) and civilian volunteers, from a total population on the island of ~1,800. The Argentinian invasion force had ~600 troops, including marines landed in Amtracs, special forces, and tactical divers. The Argentinian force also had naval components including a sub and a Sheffield-class destroyer. Also the Falkland Islands were within the range of land-based Argentinian strike aircraft, only being ~500 km from the mainland.

The reason I say the Falklands War is a poor example is that New Zealand is considerably (20x) larger, has a much larger comparative population ( ~2,300x), and NZ is more remote (3x) with ~1,500 km being between the closest points in NZ and mainland Australia. Also there are basically only two nations with land-based strike aircraft which could reach NZ, namely RAAF aircraft from Australia, or long-ranged USAF strike/bombers.

One of the other important considerations to keep in mind. It would require something very serious and/or strange for either Australia or the US the be either unable to unwilling to provide NZ with direct military assistance in the face of a potential invasion. While I do not deal in certainties (Death and Taxes aside) the likelihood of the various conditions and events occurring around the at the right time and in the proper sequence to render such attack plans potentially viable is IMO very remote.
I am sorry to say this but you appear to be either avoiding the point or missing the point I was trying to make. The Falklands for instance was to show how quickly a situation can change and how much time you may have to react to a deteriorating situation and was grouped with others which I thought made this clear. The situations that I mentioned as possible have been minimised, partly ignored or downplayed.
The size of any aggressive op against use would in all likelihood be sized to ensure success.
It is not the most likely scenario that you need to fully focus on but you need to guard against the most damaging even if they are far less likely.
You mention the only probable ability to strike against NZ by land based aircraft as the RAAF or USAF which is very true, Excluding carrier based of course, as I have mentioned in the past this what makes a modest ACF in NZ so effective as there is no land based opposition to this and combined with a good surveillance ability is a huge deterrent, more than the rest of the armed forces combined. As I have said before, deterrence is the primary goal. I also mentioned that military history is full of instances where it was thought that something could not happen only for a way to be found for it to happen and that to be turned into a winner. I also mention the likelihood that the likelihood that if the situation deteriorated to the stage that we were under threat that Australia would also be under threat and they with the huge area they need to cover would not have spare assets to help us. It would also be natural for any initial help by the US would go to Australia first so we need to be able to look after ourselves at least initially.
I am of the type that thinks that you need to take responsibility for ourselves both on a personal basis and a national basis and while to help others should always be an important part of what we do and to be helped by others is always welcome and appreciated, to rely on such help to the point where you don't take the trouble to help yourself is just bludging. So IMO you need to first of all put yourself in a position to look after yourself first as I don't like to be seen to be a bludger and if you cannot look after yourself you cannot help others. As I have stated before, we need to know what is going on in our area and to be able to appropriately deal with whatever that may be.
As an addition to the previous items, I think we must keep in mind that a lot of terrorist organizations appear to have no strategic plans ( apart from to take over the region or world in some indeterminate way), rather a tactical plan that is simply to create as much havoc to the recipient as possible with little thought to their own casualties. It has been correctly stated that in the event that a smaller scale attack happened to NZ ( a landing or a plane or two into an airfield ) that the current forces could deal with it . The problem with this approach is the significant risk of both military and civilian casualties. Far better to have good surveillance ( both military and intelligence ) and destroy any such problem before it reaches our shores, for which and ACF is the ideal method.
 
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htbrst

Active Member
There is an article in the NZ Herald today about the new defence minister disappointing various groups by wearing his medals incorrectly and without technically needed permission - though such groups don't particularly want to speak on the record as to not get offside with the new minister.

I'm adding it to the thread for context related to earlier discussion on the new minister but will respectfully leave discussion to those more fitting to comment if needed.

Medals off Mark for new defence minister - says he will 'seek advice' after questions raised - NZ Herald

New defence minister Ron Mark has been wearing military medals in a way which puts his foreign service above that which he performed for New Zealand.

The way Mark has his medals arrayed across his chest is in breach of NZ Defence Force protocols and not permitted for soldiers over whom he holds sway.

And it has led to questions about whether he is even entitled to wear the four medals awarded while in the service of the Sultan of Oman in the Middle East.

Mark would not answer those questions yesterday, but provided a statement in which he said: "I have the greatest respect for military service, and the way in which it is recognised. I am proud of the people I served alongside in both the New Zealand and Omani Defence Forces.

"I have sought advice from the Honours Unit on the wearing of the medals I was awarded, and will take that advice when it's received."....

The wearing of medals from a foreign country are strictly governed, with sets of rules for NZDF personnel and all New Zealand citizens...

The wearing of medals from a foreign country are strictly governed, with sets of rules for NZDF personnel and all New Zealand citizens.

Anyone wanting to wear medals from a country which does not have the Queen as head of state needs the permission of the Governor-General.

If permission has been granted, their names and the concession are listed on a register held by the Cabinet Office.

The Cabinet Office would not disclose whether Mark's name was on the register. It directed queries to Mark...
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
First, I have a request. When posting, could people please break their posts apart into paragraphs and have breaks between paragraphs. Doing so, and avoiding a wall of text, makes posts easier to read, as well as digest and respond to specific points posters are trying to make.

I am sorry to say this but you appear to be either avoiding the point or missing the point I was trying to make. The Falklands for instance was to show how quickly a situation can change and how much time you may have to react to a deteriorating situation and was grouped with others which I thought made this clear. The situations that I mentioned as possible have been minimised, partly ignored or downplayed.
Please point out what specific points that you feel I have been either avoiding, missing, or minimizing, as I would be interested to see what others feel these are.

Not to dive down the whole Falklands War rabbit hole, but IMO with hindsight, there was literally years of advanced warning. Argentina established a base on Thule Island in the South Sandwich Islands in late 1976, which the British became aware of in December of that year. From that point until the Falklands War, the British had been trying to reach a diplomatic solution to an Argentine base on a British overseas territory. Additionally, two weeks before the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina, a group of ~50 civilian metal workers were landed by an Argentinian Navy transport on South Georgia and they raised an Argentine flag there. While this is somewhat OT for a NZDF discussion, I do feel it worth mentioning that if the UK had made a more forceful response to either/both precursor events then Argentina might never have started the Falklands War in the first place.

The size of any aggressive op against use would in all likelihood be sized to ensure success.
I agree that a condition of launching an operation would be that it have sufficient forces to most likely be successful. In fact, that is one of the points I have been attempting to make and apparently failing. The other related point to that which I have also apparently been failing to convey is that very few groups (state or non-state) could project sufficient force to overwhelm the NZDF to the point that NZ was subject to occupation.

It is not the most likely scenario that you need to fully focus on but you need to guard against the most damaging even if they are far less likely.
You mention the only probable ability to strike against NZ by land based aircraft as the RAAF or USAF which is very true, Excluding carrier based of course, as I have mentioned in the past this what makes a modest ACF in NZ so effective as there is no land based opposition to this and combined with a good surveillance ability is a huge deterrent, more than the rest of the armed forces combined. As I have said before, deterrence is the primary goal. I also mentioned that military history is full of instances where it was thought that something could not happen only for a way to be found for it to happen and that to be turned into a winner. I also mention the likelihood that the likelihood that if the situation deteriorated to the stage that we were under threat that Australia would also be under threat and they with the huge area they need to cover would not have spare assets to help us. It would also be natural for any initial help by the US would go to Australia first so we need to be able to look after ourselves at least initially.

I am of the type that thinks that you need to take responsibility for ourselves both on a personal basis and a national basis and while to help others should always be an important part of what we do and to be helped by others is always welcome and appreciated, to rely on such help to the point where you don't take the trouble to help yourself is just bludging. So IMO you need to first of all put yourself in a position to look after yourself first as I don't like to be seen to be a bludger and if you cannot look after yourself you cannot help others. As I have stated before, we need to know what is going on in our area and to be able to appropriately deal with whatever that may be.
I would be very interested to see what scenario you have in mind where NZ sovereignty over the home waters & soil would be seriously threatened or lost. I would want to know who (which state or non-state actor) was responsible for such an event occurring. Where they were operating from and where they were initially having an impact in NZ? What assets (types and quantities) were they utilizing, where they were being utilized, and how were they being supported? Also, for whoever is attacking or attempting to invade NZ, why are they doing so?

I would also like an explanation of what would be occupying Australia so completely that they could not render aid to NZ. Given the sensor footprint available to Australia from systems like JORN, SECAR, the P-8's, E-7's, MH-60R's, and then Aegis aboard the AWD's, there is a great deal Australia could pick up. All it might take is something as simple as a phone call, email, or radio message to advise of something coming. Relating to an explanation about Australia, I would be very interested to know if NZ would move to a higher state of readiness, and if not, why? Relating to that, if the NZDF was at a heightened alert status, I would be interested in an explanation on why it would not make a difference in the supposed outcome.

To address the threat mentioned of a carrier-based strike on NZ... That IMO is something ridiculous at this point. There is only one nation which currently operates fixed wing carriers in the Pacific on a regular basis. China has a carrier which it is starting to experiment with in carrier operations, but it has yet to really develop a carrier doctrine, never mind build up proficiency in carrier operations. Russia also has a single carrier which has operated in the Pacific, but has recently been operating in the Med for operations into Syria. Now 20+ years down the track, if Russia, China, or India develops expeditionary warfare capabilities, then the story would be different.

Now for what I consider threats that are more likely and would be IMO more damaging than most other things short of a full-scale invasion, would be either a ballistic missile launch at NZ, or LACM strikes. The LACM launch platform could be aircraft, surface or subsurface vessels. There is also the whole cyberattack threat as well.

It is wasteful to allocate significant resources to cover a potentially damaging scenario when it is so unlikely and there are so many others which are both much more feasible (to occur and prevent) and nearly as damaging.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There is an article in the NZ Herald today about the new defence minister disappointing various groups by wearing his medals incorrectly and without technically needed permission - though such groups don't particularly want to speak on the record as to not get offside with the new minister.

I'm adding it to the thread for context related to earlier discussion on the new minister but will respectfully leave discussion to those more fitting to comment if needed.

Medals off Mark for new defence minister - says he will 'seek advice' after questions raised - NZ Herald
Yep it's not a good look for him and as an ex Kiwi army he should've been aware of that, but as time goes by there are some things that you forget, and I am sure that it's an innocent oversight; easily enough done. I am sure that CDF or WONZDF (Warrant Officer of NZDF) will say something. I do know that it has been brought to the WONZDF's notice because ex service have commented about it on his Facebook page.
 
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