The time taken to get the army to the threat area would inevitably mean that they would be too late as the insurgents would by then control the area and this would involve multiple aircraft possibly doing round trips. So their build up could be quite rapid. the point is that there are many possible scenarios where the ability of an ACF to respond quickly to a threat anywhere in our area of concern makes it the first line of defence. the army with 2 battalions can only cover a very small fraction of possible entry points. and 2 frigates are not in any better position. The reality is that if we are serious about our 's and our children's future freedom and security and the sovereignty of our country we had better bite the bullet and spend more, say 2% GDP should do it.
NZDF General discussion thread
- Thread starter NZLAV
- Start date
t68
Well-Known Member
If its coming in via commercial airways unless they intend for the aircraft to become the weapon, then I imagine they would be posing as tourist to disrupt NZ and the mission is either to kill capture or disable or gather intelligence within NZ borders (Rainbow Warrior incident)
On the other hand if its to use it as a means of securing a airport or port infrastructure would ultimately mean they would have either a very long air bridge to sustain or have sizeable assets parked off NZ waters, either way they have to pass the elephant in the room (ADF)
Whilst I believe NZ has a need for lightweight jet trainer in the short term, ultimately the primary role of NZ ACF was to contribute the capability of RAAF in the defence of Australia, continental Australia is the trip wire for NZ sovereignty, in that respect what is the most useful aspect from NZ to enhance RAAF ACF?
Yes the ACF was never just about defending NZ on their own - they were our contribution to a wider regional 'collective' (not just RAAF but SEATO too) whose role was protecting NZ interests in the region (primarily SouPac & S.E. Asia) & to a lesser extent, theoretically at least, further afield (think deployments like RAAF F18s in Middle East). This was a defensive & offensive role.
So we need to stop getting hung up abut the ability of the a NZ ACF to protect NZ on their own - our allies would be part of it. Yes the ACF would be the first cab of the rank in just about every such scenario, but if a task force arrived offshore we'd know they were in the area & the RAAF would be poking their noses in to make sure Oz south-east flank (NZ) isn't about to be compromised.
Remember tho that it's also more likely that if NZ faces a threat, Oz will too, and the RAAF will focus on immediate Oz interests over & above any immediate NZ interests, so yes the ADF will be an elephant in the room in most scenarios - comes back to that collective defence commitment.
Let's get a plan for a new ACF on the table now, but make a new & improved FASC & FAMC the priority, and don't compromise the 'quality' of the FASC & FAMC for the sake of a ACF.
In regard to how NZ can best enhance regional ACF forces, that's best defined by sitting down with core allies (Oz, USA, SEATO) and figuring out how we can best contribute. It could be as simple as an extra squadron of whatever they can offer, or there might be a small niche we might be able provide - and that may not be as obvious as a fast jet fleet - it could be chopper based combat search & rescue - something I long thought would be an excellent niche role for NZ.
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Honestly at this point, an ACF for the RNZAF/NZDF is more a Want by some, rather than a Need. I do feel obligated to point out that military & naval capabilities are very often like handguns, in that one does not need them, until they need them badly. And by then, it is almost always too late to get them...
For those that are tired of hearing my bang on about this, feel free to pull me up short. What I feel NZ needs to do is sit down and take an honest, rational and non-idealogically driven look at NZ's total defence situation in both the near term, as well as the likely situation into the 2040's. A plan to 2035 is nice, but that is only slightly longer than many initial procurement cycles, being only ~17 years away.
When I speak of the 'total defence situation' I mean more than what most people, even many here on DT, consider relevant to NZ's interests. One of course must consider the situation within NZ proper, and the home waters and airspace. NZ's EEZ and the EEZ's and SAR regions NZ has responsibility for is another obvious area to consider. What seems (still) to be an area people overlook is the SLOC over which kiwi goods transit to get to foreign markets and just as important, foreign goods transit to get to NZ. Expanding out even further is the security situations for both the various foreign markets for kiwi goods, and the sources for goods/materials NZ imports. Threats and hazards to the SLOC can impact NZ's trade by increasing the cost, the transit time, or the availability of goods. Unsafe conditions at foreign markets and sources can outright close export markets for Kiwi goods, as well as deny NZ access to materials and goods.
The current situation with N Korea is a very good example. If that erupts into a hot conflict, especially if there is significant damage and/or the use of WMD's, that will disrupt the SLOC to several trading partners, namely China, Japan, and S Korean. Depending on just how bad things get, it could also mean the actual destruction of various markets and sources which have active roles in the Kiwi economy and international trade.
NZ needs to have a defence force capable of independent operations to protect NZ and NZ interests, which is also able to make useful contributions multi-national coalitions and be able to operate with allied forces. From my perspective, that also means having more forces able to operate in Chapt. VII-level responses than the Chapt. VI-level deployments which past gov't seemed to believe (naively hoped?) was going to be the norm. NZ is too dependent on international trade to realistically be able to avoid being impacted by events elsewhere. An area where I fear the impact of those who wear rose-tinted lenses is in NZ's ability to have a say in outcomes without providing real, measurable and significant contributions to achieving said outcomes and/or suffering significant/unnecessary losses due to a lack of sufficient forces which are properly trained, kitted out and sustained.
The small size of the NZDF, and the tiny budget will of course make this difficult, but decision makers need to realize that security conditions are not all milk & honey now, while there is a chance to make changes which can have an impact.
For those that are tired of hearing my bang on about this, feel free to pull me up short. What I feel NZ needs to do is sit down and take an honest, rational and non-idealogically driven look at NZ's total defence situation in both the near term, as well as the likely situation into the 2040's. A plan to 2035 is nice, but that is only slightly longer than many initial procurement cycles, being only ~17 years away.
When I speak of the 'total defence situation' I mean more than what most people, even many here on DT, consider relevant to NZ's interests. One of course must consider the situation within NZ proper, and the home waters and airspace. NZ's EEZ and the EEZ's and SAR regions NZ has responsibility for is another obvious area to consider. What seems (still) to be an area people overlook is the SLOC over which kiwi goods transit to get to foreign markets and just as important, foreign goods transit to get to NZ. Expanding out even further is the security situations for both the various foreign markets for kiwi goods, and the sources for goods/materials NZ imports. Threats and hazards to the SLOC can impact NZ's trade by increasing the cost, the transit time, or the availability of goods. Unsafe conditions at foreign markets and sources can outright close export markets for Kiwi goods, as well as deny NZ access to materials and goods.
The current situation with N Korea is a very good example. If that erupts into a hot conflict, especially if there is significant damage and/or the use of WMD's, that will disrupt the SLOC to several trading partners, namely China, Japan, and S Korean. Depending on just how bad things get, it could also mean the actual destruction of various markets and sources which have active roles in the Kiwi economy and international trade.
NZ needs to have a defence force capable of independent operations to protect NZ and NZ interests, which is also able to make useful contributions multi-national coalitions and be able to operate with allied forces. From my perspective, that also means having more forces able to operate in Chapt. VII-level responses than the Chapt. VI-level deployments which past gov't seemed to believe (naively hoped?) was going to be the norm. NZ is too dependent on international trade to realistically be able to avoid being impacted by events elsewhere. An area where I fear the impact of those who wear rose-tinted lenses is in NZ's ability to have a say in outcomes without providing real, measurable and significant contributions to achieving said outcomes and/or suffering significant/unnecessary losses due to a lack of sufficient forces which are properly trained, kitted out and sustained.
The small size of the NZDF, and the tiny budget will of course make this difficult, but decision makers need to realize that security conditions are not all milk & honey now, while there is a chance to make changes which can have an impact.
The tiny budget needs to get bigger.
What also needs to be considered is that if we are under threat , then it is likely that Australia is also under threat and that they will be to busy dealing with their own problems to worry to much about us. the next cab off the rank would be USA and the time they take to react would be dependant on the political situation at the time and to the probability that that the help when it arrives will likely go to Australia first. We may simply wind up in the too hard basket
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
That tiny defence budget is one of the things which if changed, will have an impact over time at least. Unfortunately if things were to suddenly go pear-shaped and then the NZDF gets significant funding dumped on it after the fact, that extra funding would be too late unless the situation was a prolonged event (like a major war).
I agree that things which threaten Kiwi interests are likely threats to Oz interests as well. This is where NZ needs forces capable of independent operations, to handle threats that Australia, the US, UK and others cannot/will not address due to being otherwise occupied. At the same time NZ needs forces which can cooperate with other defence forces to either address a common threat, or provide coverage of a capability, permitting another nation to deploy more of their forces.
Providing the capability coverage for foreign forces is something which I suspect could most easily be accomplished by the RNZAF and RNZN, assuming enough examples of the right kinds of units are maintained. In threatened SLOC's this could be a RNZN frigate could escort RAN and/or civilian shipping, or a RNZN replenishment ship could provide bunkerage and victualing to a RAN or another nation's task force. Or with respect to the RNZAF, this could be airlift moving cargo around for another country, or maintaining aerial surveillance coverage.
The above of course all presupposes that the NZDF has not only the proper kit to provide the needed capability, but has sufficient available when & where needed to fill a capability gap another nation might have when addressing a threat.
There are number of capabilities which the NZDF currently lacks, which could be quite useful contributions to others. An ACF is one such, but I suspect an AAR capability would be both easier to 'sell' to decision makers in NZ, and easier to acquire and maintain in terms of resources. MCM would be another one but there are others as well.
These capabilities all require resources to either establish or expand, and of course maintain. They would also require the will and willingness to actually permit their deployment and usage.
t68
Well-Known Member
Whilst I believe their was a document expressing the desire for additional capability such as AAR these sort of things will come at additional expense, unless the NZDF can utilise the said equipment I cant see government giving the authority for the release of additional funds.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
And this gets back to decision makers needing both foresight and hindsight. Looking back at WWII, most nations that had made up the Allies had allowed their forces to decline pre-war at a time when members of what became the Axis were rebuilding their forces. In a number of cases, the situation was repeated following WWII and prior to the Korean War. All of which required a rapid building or rebuilding of capabilities. Given the complexities of current weapon systems they take time to design and construct, as well as learn how to operate effectively, which means the time to start acquiring and integrating such capabilities is before a conflict breaks out.
As for potential NZDF uses for something like AAR, there are recent, peacetime examples where the NZDF could have used an AAR capability. Any time an RNZAF aircraft has, or could have a long transit time, in-flight refueling could be of assistance. In an emergency, this could permit more/heavier flights between NZ and the Antarctic. Or the capability could permit longer loiter times on distant stations. I am certain there are additional examples where the NZDF would benefit making the cost worth spending a little extra coin, never mind having such a capability available to extend to allied forces. Aside from the US (with ~520+ such aircraft), most nations have little if any AAR capability with numbers in the low double digits or less, having the ability to 'borrow' one from NZ at times could enable some operations that would otherwise have to be scrubbed.
t68
Well-Known Member
I understand what you are saying and agree that additional capability would be good for NZ and as you highlight makes sense operationally, id say it makes sense in a tactical lifter that already has that capability from the factory like A400M. just not sure if going to the extra expense in a strategic lifter is value for money.
Actually the notion of coming to the collective defence of continental Australia was never a formal policy consideration until CDR 25 years ago and the DWP from that era other than the triggering of the ANZUS treaty. The ACF in the NZ context Pre-Kahu was about Battlefield Support of NZ deployed forces as demonstrated post war in Malaya (Venoms) and Borneo (Canberra's) and then extant through the SEATO period and up until 1 Batt left Singapore in 1989. Post Kahu upgrades (1991) allowed the greater emphasis on A/Shp and was effectively its new prime role gaining greater primacy over its traditional land forces support role Pre-Kahu. A/Shp had a direct bearing on protecting NZ interests - its SLOC. The RNZAF enhancing the RAAF is essentially only a positive bi-product of NZ possessing a capability set and is not and should be not the driver of that. Senator Dey (Aus) who advocated CDR back in the day and Gerald Hensley (NZ DefSec) who did the heavy lifting on our side back then were quite clear on that.
Germany's military build up began in 1934. The UK started increasing expenditure in 1934. The economy was growing well, & in 1934 military spending didn't quite keep up with the economy, but from 1935 onwards it increased quite fast - though not as fast as in Germany.
Italy's spending increased in the 1930s, but I think most of that was consumed by spending on the wars in Ethiopia & Spain, not increasing the strength of the armed forces. I'm not aware of any build-ups in Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria. The only Axis (as it became) country which undertook a significant build-up pre-war was Germany, which built up very fast, but from a very low base.
So, the UK, at least, didn't let its forces decline while Axis countries built up their forces. It just didn't increase them as fast as Germany did.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I would think Japan's pre-war naval expansion out paced most other nations.
Ah, bugger! Why didn't I include Japan? Brain fart!
Japan was constrained by the naval treaties (though like Germany, it cheated) until they fell apart, & I think was consistently outbuilt by the USN until a brief window about 1940-41, when it briefly clawed back some of the US lead.
The IJA underwent a great expansion in the 1930s, but most of it was fully occupied in China.
Japan was constrained by the naval treaties (though like Germany, it cheated) until they fell apart, & I think was consistently outbuilt by the USN until a brief window about 1940-41, when it briefly clawed back some of the US lead.
The IJA underwent a great expansion in the 1930s, but most of it was fully occupied in China.
Japan just shows how quickly things can change, 20 years before Pearl Harbour the Japanese were our allies, 10 years before still considered friendly, then as the war in china evolved, they where considered considered as belligerent but not dangerous to us. it was not until very late in the piece that any perceived danger was recognised. by that time it was to late. with all the best military of our countries tied up in Europe.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Very true, just look at how US-Russia relations have changed in the last 20 years. Of course the most important relationship will be the evolution of the China and the US during the next twenty years.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Not entirely true. War Plan Orange was adopted by the US Army & Navy in 1924 for a potential conflict between the US and Japan. IIRC plans had started getting drawn up a few years after President Theodore Roosevelt mediated the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth which formally ended the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese victories and Russian defeats during the conflict led to the balance of power in the Pacific region being reevaluated, TBH though I suspect a degree of institutionalized bigotry against the "Yellow Peril" also played a role.
It is also surprising (in hindsight) that more aggressive action was not taken in 1937 following the Japanese invasion of China and subsequent attacks upon US and British forces within China.
While people are historically poor predictors of the future, what NZ does need to make sure of is that the NZDF is properly trained and kitted out to cover a broad range of scenarios. Also of crucial importance IMO is for the NZDF to have the flexibility change it's response capabilities and/or re-role some assets if/when needed. Relating to that, NZ needs to not only get away from being so parsimonious with the NZDF budget as a whole, but also when selecting the types and numbers of specific pieces of kit. The entire Project Protector is an unfortunately great example of trying to do too much, with too little, and all on the cheap. The original SH-2G(NZ) Seasprite buy is another good example, as is the 8+1 NH90 TTH buy.
A little more thought, a little more planning, and a bit more coin up front can reduce the cost and/or pain & loss in the future.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I guess it was easier to focus on Germany, it was closer, more dangerous, and a threat to nations as opposed to colonial possessions.
Agreed and NZ isn't the only country that should do this (are you listening junior?)
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
From an outsider's perspective, albeit one with significant contacts in Canada, my impression of Canada's attitude towards defence is in some ways quite different from the Kiwi attitude.Agreed and NZ isn't the only country that should do this (are you listening junior?)
In NZ, it seemed that much of the attitude was a result of the relative remoteness alongside an ignorance about the limitations of such remoteness in a global economy. That, coupled with a (IMO unhealthy) degree of ideologically-driven naivety seemed to lead many Kiwis to feel that a peacekeeping/constabulary force and coast guard was viable for NZ, if they even thought about defence at all. One issue with such ideology is that it tended to ignore the problems with moving from being an Aligned to "non-Aligned" nation.
Canada OTOH seems to have been using the defence forces at a political punching bag, making decisions and cancelling contracts based upon what can either help their political power, or strike at the legacy of their predecessors the most. It seems to have even stopped being about what will 'save' the most money, or cost the least. As a result, capabilities are being reducing, while the costs either staying the same or increasing (in some cases likely dramatically).
I believe that NZ was always comfortable supporting the Five Power Defence arrangement and actively contributed to it in both Malaysia and Singapore while there was a substantial British contribution. When that waned it seemed to take the impetuous away from both the NZ military but more importantly the public, there seemed no point anymore.
Naturally the anti nuclear stance, prominent for many years and led by governments which held it as an article of faith simply weened NZs appetite away from a proactive attitude towards defence.
This has now changed with threats from North Korea and the growing Chinese presence in their SLOC as NZ's trading activity has grown with NE Asia.
Naturally the anti nuclear stance, prominent for many years and led by governments which held it as an article of faith simply weened NZs appetite away from a proactive attitude towards defence.
This has now changed with threats from North Korea and the growing Chinese presence in their SLOC as NZ's trading activity has grown with NE Asia.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
This is similar to the Canadian electorate's view on defence. The remoteness factor is substituted with the "we live next door to a superpower" so why worry about defence?
This is partially true but the greater problem is no political party really cares about national defence and all are willing to transfer money to their political priorities at the expense of DND. They could not do this if our electorate actually had even a partial understanding of our defence needs and were willing to express this to the pollies. Only some kind of crisis will change this IMHO and it will be too late then.