Mini Abrams...
- Thread starter lobbie111
- Start date
How about just buying more C-17?
Letting them close the line is IMHO one of the big mistakes of the US.
The US is pumping a lot of money into new programs and putting some of the funds into more C-17s would reduce the pressure onto the transport command and would give the US the ability to airlift more equipment be it current equipment or future systems.
Why invest much money into overhauling the C-5 fleet? Why invest such uge amounts of money into making the FCS extremely light?
I totally agree that current MBTs have reached the borderline of usefull weight.
So lets try to keep the weight low and make sure that your air transport command is able to lift a reasonable number of them.
As if even the US would airlift whole Corps and Divisions into a crisis region for nearly immediate combat...
Letting them close the line is IMHO one of the big mistakes of the US.
The US is pumping a lot of money into new programs and putting some of the funds into more C-17s would reduce the pressure onto the transport command and would give the US the ability to airlift more equipment be it current equipment or future systems.
Why invest much money into overhauling the C-5 fleet? Why invest such uge amounts of money into making the FCS extremely light?
I totally agree that current MBTs have reached the borderline of usefull weight.
So lets try to keep the weight low and make sure that your air transport command is able to lift a reasonable number of them.
As if even the US would airlift whole Corps and Divisions into a crisis region for nearly immediate combat...
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #124
Thats true get the C-130 into the Sherpa's role and the C-17 in the C-130's role. What about dropping a recon mechanised unit out the back of a C-17 to secure the place (you know very low level drops the plane doesnt land) to secure the landing strip and then you only need three or four C-5's to land the rest instead of a whole heap of C-17's.
The US has it's Rangers or 82nd for securing an airfield via jump. One doesn't need mechanized airborn units to secure an airfield. Only if you want to wreak havoc behind enemy lines with a mobile airborn unit you need them to be mechanized.
Just like the Sovjet/Russian approach.
In the end C-130 are just right for inserting Rangers. Leave all of your available heavy transporters for the transport of the heavy equipment and supply.
What really works against the idea of deploying whole mechanized divisions solely by air is not the equipment itself.
The US might get enough transports together to deploy the equipment but that are going to be alot of flights even with a lighter unit. Just think about the whole bunch of trucks, jeeps, specialized vehicles, etc. which belongs to a division.
But supplying these forces during high intensity warfare solely by air is a pipedream.
Just like the Sovjet/Russian approach.
In the end C-130 are just right for inserting Rangers. Leave all of your available heavy transporters for the transport of the heavy equipment and supply.
What really works against the idea of deploying whole mechanized divisions solely by air is not the equipment itself.
The US might get enough transports together to deploy the equipment but that are going to be alot of flights even with a lighter unit. Just think about the whole bunch of trucks, jeeps, specialized vehicles, etc. which belongs to a division.
But supplying these forces during high intensity warfare solely by air is a pipedream.
Good points, the C17 also has a more forgiving under carriage/wheel suspension also over a C-5, plus it can take off on shorter runways.
Many of the points you stated about the useful deployment of wheeled armoured force is very informative.
However - and with all due respects - I think the IDF found the AMX-13 to be quite useless in combat. As did the Indians. Both countries sold/gave away their AMX13 to us (Singapore).
The Israelis never adopted a light tank again. Nor did they show much interest in Stryker types. Instead, they continue to build and use very heavy MBTs like Merkavas, very heavy APCs using converted MBT hulls.
But the IDF example is not for everyone, and there is definitely a use for wheels as a complimentary force to tracks. One doesn't replace the other.
In many other situations, getting to the objective quickly is very important and roads are still the fastest. Supported by air power, there is no reason why a light wheeled force will be completely useless or helpless once there.
Remember that enemy forces will also be counting on the use of roads for their purpose. So what if all the MBTs can cross terrain but the fuel trucks cannot? So roads are very important and each side will want to gain control of it.
Take the Japanese Blitzkreig in Malaya for example. Nearly all the armour was used by the Japs to capture roads. Allied troops that fled into the jungle were virtually ignored. Capturing roads and bridges intact BEFORE they are destroyed was key to success. The Japs hit so fast often catching the Allies ill-prepared and causing panic. If the Japs had wheeled armour, the job would have been accomplished with perhaps even faster speed. Of course the tanks could go cross-country, but in that war, it wasn't necessary.
Furthermore, for some places like Australia, the chance of an enemy being able to land heavy MBT is very rare as few people have that capability. More likely, any enemy armour on Oz soil will be light airborne or amphibious variety. In which case, a well-supported wheeled Oz force will be more than a match. They will get there much faster than a track force and with less logistic prep. They should be able to hold or disrupt the enemy until the heavies arrive.
In many other situations, getting to the objective quickly is very important and roads are still the fastest. Supported by air power, there is no reason why a light wheeled force will be completely useless or helpless once there.
Remember that enemy forces will also be counting on the use of roads for their purpose. So what if all the MBTs can cross terrain but the fuel trucks cannot? So roads are very important and each side will want to gain control of it.
Take the Japanese Blitzkreig in Malaya for example. Nearly all the armour was used by the Japs to capture roads. Allied troops that fled into the jungle were virtually ignored. Capturing roads and bridges intact BEFORE they are destroyed was key to success. The Japs hit so fast often catching the Allies ill-prepared and causing panic. If the Japs had wheeled armour, the job would have been accomplished with perhaps even faster speed. Of course the tanks could go cross-country, but in that war, it wasn't necessary.
Furthermore, for some places like Australia, the chance of an enemy being able to land heavy MBT is very rare as few people have that capability. More likely, any enemy armour on Oz soil will be light airborne or amphibious variety. In which case, a well-supported wheeled Oz force will be more than a match. They will get there much faster than a track force and with less logistic prep. They should be able to hold or disrupt the enemy until the heavies arrive.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #129
What about a city? well the US FCS is meant to be self deployable right? ok heres my thinking in what we were discussing before your heavy units belt the crap out of the retreating forces and control ground, envelope the city and move on...The FCS then lands as a separate units to clear out the city for a quick operation (the best environment for FCS as they are designed IMO for urban combat). This also provides a way to resupply the heavier forces because the airfields are closer to the front
I get what your saying though in that it is unfeasable to launch a mechanized assault by air.
I don't really get what you want to say.
Do you want to encircle a city with airborn troops and then wait for heavier FCS units being brought in to clear the city?
And what do you mean with self deployable? FCS is relying on the same transport assets as every other vehicle in US inventory.
And that FCS is very good at urban fighting remains to be seen.
While the situational awareness is going to be bigger (Better optics, all around camera systems, etc.) than with some of the current vehicles (But vehicles like Merkava Mrk.IV and Puma also feature such things) and are going to be highly networked the idea of protection by better "hit avoidance" is IMHO just plain wrong.
Even with modern active and passive protection systems one just needs armor when using vehicles during MOUT engagements. here is a reason for the Abrams getting uparmored with the TUSK version. The same for every other MBT urban kit I have seen so far.
The same goes also for new vehicles like the Puma.
A city even further reduces the idea of being protected by superior hit avoidance.
Often enough MBTs are used as moving pillboxes during MOUT and to crush strongpoints.
Do you want to encircle a city with airborn troops and then wait for heavier FCS units being brought in to clear the city?
And what do you mean with self deployable? FCS is relying on the same transport assets as every other vehicle in US inventory.
And that FCS is very good at urban fighting remains to be seen.
While the situational awareness is going to be bigger (Better optics, all around camera systems, etc.) than with some of the current vehicles (But vehicles like Merkava Mrk.IV and Puma also feature such things) and are going to be highly networked the idea of protection by better "hit avoidance" is IMHO just plain wrong.
Even with modern active and passive protection systems one just needs armor when using vehicles during MOUT engagements. here is a reason for the Abrams getting uparmored with the TUSK version. The same for every other MBT urban kit I have seen so far.
The same goes also for new vehicles like the Puma.
A city even further reduces the idea of being protected by superior hit avoidance.
Often enough MBTs are used as moving pillboxes during MOUT and to crush strongpoints.
*cough* Wiesel? *cough*
And you want to compare this Smart with a gun which is supposed to be lifted in pars by CH-53s to give light airborn infantry some firepower to a FCS vehicle with dozens of tons which is going?
Ahem, why?
The Wiesel has no other option than to rely on it's small size to avoid anything bigger than small arms fire.
You are not going to use it in the same role as current equipment like MBTs and IFVs which the FCS is going to replace.
Ahem, why?
The Wiesel has no other option than to rely on it's small size to avoid anything bigger than small arms fire.
You are not going to use it in the same role as current equipment like MBTs and IFVs which the FCS is going to replace.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #133
No what I mean is the heavier forces sweep the terrain (Abrams and Bradley) and bypass all the cities...Rangers are then dropped to secure that cities airfield or an airfield a short distance away, on a few C-17's and C-5's (to free up the rest for logistics) a whole FCS brigade assults into the city supported by the rangers. The numbers of aircraft you saved by using C-5's can then transport more supplies to that airfeild which is closer to the front. In other words quicker supply and less of a logistics chain.
Now thats a shame that FCS replace heavier armoured units...the next war the US enters with FCS will be a wakeup call.
Now thats a shame that FCS replace heavier armoured units...the next war the US enters with FCS will be a wakeup call.
If you did this, it would significantly change the tank's characteristics and it would no longer be an MBT.
In the case of the US Army, they changed from the heavy tank, medium tank, light tank concept many years ago. The US Army will probably not have any tank requirement other than the present M-1 series MBT.
Years ago the US Army did operated the M551 Sheridan which was air-transportable and air-drop capable.
wagging the logistic tail
Lets look at the armor issue and what effect adopting things like kits and band track have:
A year or so ago, I wrote a small paper on a proposed AFV and had it circulated at the Command College for a bit of feedback. I was stunned by the poor reception to armor kits. Most of these guys were Majors (a few Colonels) and to a man they absolutely hated the "kit a, kit b, kit c "approach that you see the US Army and Marines adopting with their new vehicles.
The reason? Logistics. It is simply a pain in the a$$ to bring these kits online in the field and takes up a huge amount of time retorfitting it to vehicles that have been in-country for a few months. Things break on these vehicles ( normal wear and tear) and they get in field repairs which then makes the kit not fit. So the teams end up having to work backwards and repair the repair and then apply the kit, but oh then some of the kits are not packed properly and you are missing components. Result? It can quickly become a major pain to apply a kit to one vehicle and you can easily find yourself days behind schedule. Just one vehicle can have a disproportionate effect on your manpower.
So then how do you solve this problem? The army is going for longer lasting tracks, but those band tracks are segmented. That is a different sort of fish to the normal track and I guess you have to find someone who worked on an Ontoss or some crazy vehicle like that to learn the tricks of thre trade to replace those track sements quickly.
Another way to get around this problem is , well, to forget kits. I know, I know, I am going to be struck down for suggesting it, but isn't the Puma design kind of stepping along those lines already? Its very heavy to begin with. It still has kits but not to the extent of a USA FCS. Why not go one step further and actually think about customizing the vehicle to spec on the factory floor?
That means developing capacity to actually retool to a spec on the fly. Something US industry can't do at the moment, but what if you could? The biggest gripe about the Iraq-saga is the USA industrial complex's inabilty to respond to the changing tactical environment. MRAP is a symptom of this.
Takes months, years to build a bigger truck, but maybe a few days for the enemy to build a bigger bomb to suit said truck.
So, I feel the answer is actually here, on the shop floor, rather then out there , emptying sand out of your boots. Or bringing the shop floor closer to the people with the sandy boots.
So, in this regard, I have a very watchful eye on the FCS program. It doesn't address any of the issues that I have spoken about, other then RFPs for longer lasting bits and pieces. The end game is that the Army will think it can down size on its maintenance guys (one of the desired paradigms of transformation) but find itself short when all of a sudden they want to use kits to suit the tactical environment and over strain the maintenance guys they have left that survived that downsizing.
my 2c
cheers
w
I would have to agree. Assuming that "Mini-Abrams" = FCS and the Puma is a good template for the FCS, then the use of the rubber band track is probably the major difference. Adopting the rubber track and using a "kit" approach to uparmor to threats, has got lots of logistics issues that I don't think anyone has really addressed.
Lets look at the armor issue and what effect adopting things like kits and band track have:
A year or so ago, I wrote a small paper on a proposed AFV and had it circulated at the Command College for a bit of feedback. I was stunned by the poor reception to armor kits. Most of these guys were Majors (a few Colonels) and to a man they absolutely hated the "kit a, kit b, kit c "approach that you see the US Army and Marines adopting with their new vehicles.
The reason? Logistics. It is simply a pain in the a$$ to bring these kits online in the field and takes up a huge amount of time retorfitting it to vehicles that have been in-country for a few months. Things break on these vehicles ( normal wear and tear) and they get in field repairs which then makes the kit not fit. So the teams end up having to work backwards and repair the repair and then apply the kit, but oh then some of the kits are not packed properly and you are missing components. Result? It can quickly become a major pain to apply a kit to one vehicle and you can easily find yourself days behind schedule. Just one vehicle can have a disproportionate effect on your manpower.
So then how do you solve this problem? The army is going for longer lasting tracks, but those band tracks are segmented. That is a different sort of fish to the normal track and I guess you have to find someone who worked on an Ontoss or some crazy vehicle like that to learn the tricks of thre trade to replace those track sements quickly.
Another way to get around this problem is , well, to forget kits. I know, I know, I am going to be struck down for suggesting it, but isn't the Puma design kind of stepping along those lines already? Its very heavy to begin with. It still has kits but not to the extent of a USA FCS. Why not go one step further and actually think about customizing the vehicle to spec on the factory floor?
That means developing capacity to actually retool to a spec on the fly. Something US industry can't do at the moment, but what if you could? The biggest gripe about the Iraq-saga is the USA industrial complex's inabilty to respond to the changing tactical environment. MRAP is a symptom of this.
Takes months, years to build a bigger truck, but maybe a few days for the enemy to build a bigger bomb to suit said truck.
So, I feel the answer is actually here, on the shop floor, rather then out there , emptying sand out of your boots. Or bringing the shop floor closer to the people with the sandy boots.
So, in this regard, I have a very watchful eye on the FCS program. It doesn't address any of the issues that I have spoken about, other then RFPs for longer lasting bits and pieces. The end game is that the Army will think it can down size on its maintenance guys (one of the desired paradigms of transformation) but find itself short when all of a sudden they want to use kits to suit the tactical environment and over strain the maintenance guys they have left that survived that downsizing.
my 2c
cheers
w
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #136
That was a very good 2 c Wooki, that actually explains a hell of a lot. I think what we all have now established, or already knew...That for the FCS or any combat vehicle force needs to have a good logistics system. In other words, more oney should be spent into an efficient and easy logistics system on top of the money in the FCS coffer atm...
This is going back to the era of Napoleon when he said something along the lines of "a good army is a well fed army" (don't quote me on that).
The best thing I can see hapening is for MRAP's to replace logistics roles, with escorts included in logisitc units to safeguard their assets.Forward deploying logistics, making supply drops for equipment at forward points along the route off assault and making the supply drop zone the objective.
This is going back to the era of Napoleon when he said something along the lines of "a good army is a well fed army" (don't quote me on that).
The best thing I can see hapening is for MRAP's to replace logistics roles, with escorts included in logisitc units to safeguard their assets.Forward deploying logistics, making supply drops for equipment at forward points along the route off assault and making the supply drop zone the objective.
I think there is significant misunderstanding about things like armour kits and modular systems. No one is going to be changing a module – be it on a LCS type warship or a SEP type AFV – in the field. The same goes for changing the level of armour protection.
However having the capability to add on armour and change function is great for managing fleets in peacetime and in strategic deployment. During peacetime the AFVs will motor around for training with the lowest armour levels – this will mean less fuel consumption, lower wear and tear etc. When you deploy in theatre and get issued the warshot ammunition so will the extra armour kits be added to the AFV. The modular nature of the armour will also help in battle repair and through life upgrades.
The same with modular AFVs and ships. The only reason the modules will be changed is when they are offloaded for the vehicle system’s periodic upgrades. This enables one to manage a single vehicle type fleet independent of specialist roles.
Actually, that's the intention with the Puma IFV. The armour modules to bring it from Level A to C are supposed to be attached ... well, not really in the field, but you supposedly don't need a dedicated workshop or specialized personnel for it. Small crane or forklift due to the weight (iirc required lift capacity 2 tons, meaning about any small forklift can do it), but that's it. Alternatively, if possible, a GSI squad with a ARV.
I think the Puma is a special case. It was designed from the outset to accept add-on armour, & the armour was designed as part of the original vehicle. It's intended to be relatively quick & easy to fit and remove.
In general, add-on armour is an add-on in both the sense of being physically added to the vehicle, & an add-on to the design, thought of after the vehicle entered production, & long after it was designed. Making it easily fittable & removable like the Puma armour was not an option.
So of course you are right about Puma, but AGRA is right about the general case.
Simply well put AGR, some folks do not seem to realize the time consuming task of conducting this type of upgrade/installs while in a field environment, Battalion and Brigade size elements do not even have the resources nor expertise to conduct armor upgrades or repairs to battle damaged modular armor for that matter, this type of work would end up at a Division level maintenance/ordnance team. The U.S Army isn`t even allowed to change out a tank maingun tube without Divisional support, I know because I almost lost my stripes by conducting a field barrel changeout on a bell mouthed gun tube with a camo net and 7 ton wrecker
I would also like to state that the M1 series TUSK upgrades in Iraq has been a very slow process and has turned into a huge cluster with material arriving piecemeal for the tanks.
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