After Singapore get US government approval on F 35 B acquisition, I think we will scrap the idea to acquire 2 squadron of F 16 Block 70 and focus on KFX development and acquisition instead. Nevertheless, F16 Block 70 acquisition has not yet been approved by defense ministry office and is still regarded as Air Force wish list.
There is also news that Turkey offer Malaysia to join TFX and Hurjet program, this development IMO should further support Indonesia participation in KFX since as much bigger country, Indonesia doesnt want to be seen as falling behind Malaysia in aerospace sector.
1. The Indonesian government has approved an increase in the
proposed defence budget for 2020, taking the allocation to IDR131.2 trillion (USD9.6 billion). The new figure amounts to a year-on-year increase of 20% and a rise of IDR3.8 trillion over the originally proposed 2020 defence allocation of IDR127.4 trillion. The approved defence budget was confirmed in a document recently published by the Ministry of Finance, outlining state expenditure for 2020. According to the document, the defence budget amounts to nearly 8% of government spending for the year, which means the Indonesian defence planners are serious in implementing MEF; and are better resourced to execute these plans in 2020. The proposed 2 more F-16V (Block 70/72) squadrons is the costliest acquisition in the government’s defense priorities for 2020-2024. This is a good choice, as I note that:
(i) The combat ready F-16V has been selected by Bulgaria (8), Slovakia (14), Taiwan (66), and Morroco (25) in 2019 alone. It is a modern and capable fighter that is threat relevant in the next 15 to 20 years.
- If they are good enough for these 4 air forces, why is it not good enough for Indonesia? Please explain what is so different in Indonesia.
(ii) Unlike Singapore, the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) does not have tertiary capabilities nor is there any intent to develop a full spectrum of air warfare capabilities. But the Indonesians have a sensible plan to incrementally improve their air power generation capabilities.
- Why would Singapore’s F-35B down-select affect your country’s force structure planning for air power generation? Please explain your rationale to divert funds from the needed F-16V program.
2. Right now, TNI-AU would struggle to generate sorties from their tri-service integrated units in Natuna, Saumlaki, Morotai, Biak, and Merauke (as part of a larger eastern rebalance of the TNI’s force structure), after the 1st day of war, against any capable tertiary opponent. Regardless of which fighter type Indonesia chooses, be it American, European or Russian, the TNI-AU needs to be a certain minimum size to be credible and these fighter squadrons need to be networked together. The addition of 2 squadrons of 32 F-16Vs, costing an estimated US$2 billion will help your country, last two weeks, in the event of war — a badly needed follow on step from the American supply of 24 refurbished F-16C/Ds. Even if Indonesia buys into the untested KFX program, to eventually replace your 34 older F-16s, it should not be at the expense of this F-16V program. IMO, the additional new F-16Vs are badly needed to improve sortie generation capabilities by 2024. Capability management is not about the platform alone and much more than buying the 'best' or the 'right' platform. Taiwan’s tertiary force structure, including their 6 E-2T/K AWACS and planned upgrades to their 150 strong F-16 fighter fleet is instructive of what is needed to survive the 1st two weeks of war for their threat matrix (aka fight China), before external help can arrive.
- Under a Defence Cooperation Agreement, Singapore provides training assistance to the TNI, including professional courses like the Combined Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. To date, hundreds of TNI-AU pilots have undergone simulator training in Singapore, and 10 TNI-AU instructors have graduated from the Combined Fighter Weapons Instructor Course.
- The SAF gains tremendously by training with the TNI, as we have a conscript army, whereas, the TNI is a professional army. We also share a maritime border with Indonesia and we need your help to patrol these waters together.
- Having a stronger TNI-AU and naval presence for Indonesia (well within your country's capability with the current size of Indonesia's economy), is key to ensuring that your country is less affected by China’s 9-dash line claims in West Natuna. In mid-Dec 2019, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels were found escorting numerous Chinese fishing boats operating within the Indonesian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off Ranai. President Joko Widodo also unequivocally declared that no negotiation regarding matters pertaining to sovereignty would ever be held with Beijing over Natuna. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Navy beefed up its presence through eight warships to patrol and secure the Natuna waters. And TNI-AU announced plans to dispatch four F-16 fighter jets to Natuna for “routine patrol”. See CNA: Commentary: Indonesia’s high-stakes stand-off with China in the South China Sea
3. The South China Sea contains China’s major naval base at Sanya in Hainan and is vital for China’s access to the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. As well as installing missile systems in the Spratlys, China has previously installed anti-air and anti-surface missile systems in the Paracel Islands and in Hainan. Looking at all the China-controlled features in 2014, China has reclaimed land on seven reefs, and built three runways. The runway on Fiery Cross was completed in January 2016, and is the southernmost of the three at Mischief and Subi reefs. Many China-controlled features also contain large underground structures, possibly to store munitions and other supplies. Fiery Cross Reef is equipped with communications and sensors array which can function as a signals intelligence hub. And just recently, a maritime rescue centre was also added there. Administrative infrastructure has been built, in particular on Sansha, on Woody Island, the largest island of the Paracels which the Chinese upgraded from county to prefecture, just below that of a province.
- In sum, China has established a forward defence line some 800 km from its mainland coast. And this development from the Chinese perspective is in direct response to the encirclement policy articulated in the early 1950s through the three island chains. Despite the ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal in 2016 on the SCS dispute, no one that thinks that any country, at this point anyway, would attempt to forcibly push the PLA out of the SCS features. As such, the South China Sea situation appears to have settled into a “new normal” that neither China nor the United States are likely to disturb.
- In this new normal, both will continue their naval and air force displays of power in the South China Sea; defend their policies, positions, and actions; criticize each others and enhance relations with regional countries, including military relations. The Americans will continue sporadic freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) against China’s claims and China will continue to respond by sharply criticizing them and using them as an excuse to further militarize its features.
4. TNI-AU needs a capability roadmap to improve its (1) combat readiness, (2) sustainable capability and (3) force structure for a period of 10 years after the delivery of the F-16Vs. Due to China’s rise, to have more options in a time of tension, TNI-AU as a ground control intercept Air Force (aka no AWACS) should also consider spending another 2 to 3 billion US dollars, more to:
(i) acquire specialist recce pods for maritime use;
(ii) train and sustain this force by acquiring ground based equipment; spare engines and other parts and a flight simulator;
(iii) buy a tiny initial stockpile of 32 air launched anti-ship missiles to support the navy in a sea denial role (32 missiles enable the targeting of 8 enemy destroyers/frigates assuming a salvo of 4 were launched at each ship); and
(iv) buy another 150 to 250 air-to-air missiles of different types as war stock for OCA and DCA missions.
In my opinion Indonesia will be able to invade Singapore particularly after the year 2030... If we read Indonesian minimum essential force we know that Indonesia has the ability to make substantial damage to Singapore and have chance to invade it after the year 2030...
I dont think Indonesia will eventually do the invasion when the situation is in Indonesia advantage but rather saying its capability to do it. after 2030.
...Also I predict in 2030 Indonesia may already have mastered cruise missile technology and it can be used to attack any military target in Singapore from Batam. Mass production of Rhan rocket, SAM system, and land attack cruise missile will be a determining factor on the success of invasion.
5. I thought you said in
another thread all Indonesia needed was to invest in some cruise missiles and rockets? Please explain your changing position, where missiles and rockets no longer rule?
6. Or do you admit — that your prior posts in these 2 threads is incorrect.