Indonesia: 'green water navy'

[Ananda]

You are not going to learn anything new from either the Nahkoda Ragam or the Type 22. IT is a stop gap and that should be the main focus. For the proposed price, it would be pretty good value for money.

True but what I'm getting at, Type 22 (or any used Frigates on that size) is one of possible way out from political wrangling. The Navy wants Nahkoda Ragam since just like you say, it's a good value for money, it's available with minimum time for recondition, and it's relatively new. The potential political wrangling is due to the size of Nahkoda Ragam which is smaller than PKR (National Corvete/Light Frigate) project, thus it's been regard (politically anyway) as technology that should be build locally.
This's issue is politics. and common sense is not available in politics, especially present Indonesian politics.

Anyway, seems the chances for Nahkoda Ragam still there, the value still meet the budget, it's a stop gap until PKR Project underway. It will meet the 2014 minimum force requirement (MEF) agenda. The only thing left is how to lobby the 'idiots' that fill Indonesian Parliament this days.

The Navy now desperate to find any used Frigates, since the only Frigates left in their inventory (the Van Speijk) ares showing their age despite upgrading that's been done with them. In the end of 80's the Navy bought 6 Van Speijks and 3 Tribals with the window of replacement in the early 2000. The Tribals were decoom, the Van Speijk should also be decoom. However no replacement in hand due to budget in the last decade, and Political Wrangling presently. Meanwhile PKR projects has been on and off for more than a decade.

They also still got 3 Dutch build Corvettes/light Frigates, and also 1 Yugo's build Light/Training Frigate that aging fast. The only corvettes/light frigates that're already being replaced was the 4 US build Claud Jones with 4 Sigma Corvettes.

In short, if Nahkoda Ragam got an 'OK' to go ahead, it will only provide the Navy with Tribal replacement. They still have not find Van Speijk and the other 4 corvettes/light frigates replacement yet. That's why some local military analyst in here believe the goal for PKR project at least has to be 10 building only to covered replacement. Again with PKR still on and off, the Navy really in the corner now.

 

[STURM]

Ananda,

Do you know of any sites in Bahasa Indonesia that have a complete listing of the assets ALRI and AURI had when the Confrontation was declared? I'm also very interested in finding out what assets ALRI had in Pulau Sebatik and the Nanukan area in the 1963-1965 period, as there was a lot of activity in this area. I know what the RMN, RN and RAN deployed in this area to prevent Indonesian infiltration but I've always been curious as to what naval vessels the Indonesian deployed there. And where was the main ALRI base in East Kalimantan during the 1960's? All know is that Pulau Sebatik was home to a KKO unit, an artillery unit and a Mil-4 Hound squadron. As far as I know, there was only a few encounters between RMN and ALRI ships during the Confrontation as most contacts were with 'sampans' or other smaller craft used for infiltrating into Singapore and West Malaysia.

This site has 2 period newspaper articles describing 2 contacts between RMN and ALRI ships.

Confrontation – RMN (KD) vs TNI AL (KRI) | Utuh Paloi Banjar Blog

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

True but what I'm getting at, Type 22 (or any used Frigates on that size) is one of possible way out from political wrangling. The Navy wants Nahkoda Ragam since just like you say, it's a good value for money, it's available with minimum time for recondition, and it's relatively new. The potential political wrangling is due to the size of Nahkoda Ragam which is smaller than PKR (National Corvete/Light Frigate) project, thus it's been regard (politically anyway) as technology that should be build locally.
This's issue is politics. and common sense is not available in politics, especially present Indonesian politics.

Anyway, seems the chances for Nahkoda Ragam still there, the value still meet the budget, it's a stop gap until PKR Project underway. It will meet the 2014 minimum force requirement (MEF) agenda. The only thing left is how to lobby the 'idiots' that fill Indonesian Parliament this days.

The Navy now desperate to find any used Frigates, since the only Frigates left in their inventory (the Van Speijk) ares showing their age despite upgrading that's been done with them. In the end of 80's the Navy bought 6 Van Speijks and 3 Tribals with the window of replacement in the early 2000. The Tribals were decoom, the Van Speijk should also be decoom. However no replacement in hand due to budget in the last decade, and Political Wrangling presently. Meanwhile PKR projects has been on and off for more than a decade.

They also still got 3 Dutch build Corvettes/light Frigates, and also 1 Yugo's build Light/Training Frigate that aging fast. The only corvettes/light frigates that're already being replaced was the 4 US build Claud Jones with 4 Sigma Corvettes.

In short, if Nahkoda Ragam got an 'OK' to go ahead, it will only provide the Navy with Tribal replacement. They still have not find Van Speijk and the other 4 corvettes/light frigates replacement yet. That's why some local military analyst in here believe the goal for PKR project at least has to be 10 building only to covered replacement. Again with PKR still on and off, the Navy really in the corner now.

I wonder if we can replace the Ahmad Yani class with the Ulsan Class in the future.
We have a good relationship with South-Korea, they want to replace this class in the next 10 years with the new Incheon Class Frigates, and the Ulsan Class is not to large and quite modern (compared to the Van Speijks) but also with Hollandse Signaalapparaten stuff like the DA08 radar and PHS-32 Sonar....

The 361, 362, 363 and 364 should be upgraded, they are quite new (built in the '80s) and on the KRI Hajar Dewantara there is lots of space for additional sensor and weaponsystems....

 

[Saracens]

Yakhont test ??

Anyone have seen this pictures ?

I forget the link.
It said those pictures taken from Indonesian Yakhont test target.

May be some one can give note to these pictures

 

[SASWanabe]

i think you will find that is the HMAS Torrens (DE 53) being hit by a MK 48 torpedo fired by an australian submarine (HMAS Farncomb).

File:Mark 48 Torpedo testing.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Saracens]

Thank you for your information.
I've saved your link for future needs

This is a new picture for Indonesian Trimaran (right hand side).
Last week news told that 3 of these Trimaran now deployed near Ambalat.

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

This is a new picture for Indonesian Trimaran (right hand side).
Last week news told that 3 of these Trimaran now deployed near Ambalat.

This was bought up a few pages ago in Posts #339 and #340.

 

[jaychristian457]

Indonesia is a small nation and therefore its advancement in developing Green Navy
must be apprecited.Its progress wont be perceived negatively.Every country has
the right to develop its defence force.

 

[Ananda]

Ananda,

Do you know of any sites in Bahasa Indonesia that have a complete listing of the assets ALRI and AURI had when the Confrontation was declared? I'm also very interested in finding out what assets ALRI had in Pulau Sebatik and the Nanukan area in the 1963-1965 period, as there was a lot of activity in this area.

I haven't found a detail data on deployment assets during Konfrontasi. Officially it' always being stated by Soekarno Administrations that all assets dedicated to Konfrontasi. However I've seeing some 'unconfirmed' statement mostly from veterans, that show ALRI (TNI-AL that time) put their Whiskeys submarines in the border while the Cruisers (KRI Irian) and her Skory destroyers escort put mostly in the territorial sea with IL-28 air cover.

ALRI knows that RN and RAN carriers were lurking around. Thus they put their sole Cruiser and Destroyers within air coverage.

 

[Ananda]

Thank you for your information.
I've saved your link for future needs

This is a new picture for Indonesian Trimaran (right hand side).
Last week news told that 3 of these Trimaran now deployed near Ambalat.

Do you even have a picture or press release from Navy or Mindef for the launching of those Trimaran ? Heck even the Prototype is not ready yet, how come there even 3 already operational. Check your sources for confirm information first. That's my suggestion.

BTW, the picture is a Photoshop. It's already around local forum for god knows how many time. In the real picture, the Indonesia Navy Parchim was there, the RHIB was also there. but in the place of that Trimaran is actually an Armidale clas from RAN. The RHIB actually coming from RAN Armidale's. The actual picture was from an exercise between TNI-AL and RAN.

 

[Gadjah Mada]

Ananda,

Do you know of any sites in Bahasa Indonesia that have a complete listing of the assets ALRI and AURI had when the Confrontation was declared?

This site has 2 period newspaper articles describing 2 contacts between RMN and ALRI ships.

Confrontation – RMN (KD) vs TNI AL (KRI) | Utuh Paloi Banjar Blog

So far, it seems the confrontation has never been a popular subject in Indonesian history, especially during the Suharto era. Some ex-generals who was on the field that time complained about leaked information on every military operation, with some fingers pointing to Suharto. However, nobody knows the truth, except the fact that Suharto took the power and changed Indonesia foreign policy dramatically.

About Indonesian Navy asset you can open: Looking Back at Sukarno's Navy
It was written by a British I guess, so more representative as their point of view.

I am not sure if there is any detail information on the assets considering the secrecy of that time. Up to Suharto era, Indonesian military never informed their assets even to the parliament. I remember in 1992, when a reader asked about the exact number of Indonesian Air Force assets in a reader forum from the air force publication, the answer was simply "enough to defend our country".

 

[Tee_Centre_10]

BTW, the picture is a photoshop. It's already around local forum for god knows how many time. In the real picture, the Indonesia Navy Parchim was there, the RHIB was also there. but in the place of that Timaran is actually an Armidale clas from RAN. THe RHIB actually coming from RAN Armidale's. The actual picture is comming from an excercise between TNI-AL and RAN.

I tracked down the original image in case this issue comes up again. It is actually an ADF image.

 

[Ananda]

I tracked down the original image in case this issue comes up again. It is actually an ADF image.

Thanks for putting the real picture. The real picture/image also already being distributed for so many god knows time, but somehow the Photoshop image still come out and being stated as a fact .

 

[Ananda]

So far, it seems the confrontation has never been a popular subject in Indonesian history, especially during the Suharto era. Some ex-generals who was on the field that time complained about leaked information on every military operation, with some fingers pointing to Suharto.

Some of the Generals (especially in the Army) actually opposed Konfrontasi. Some sources told General Yani (Army Chief at that time, later killed on PKI's uprising in Sept 65) and General Nasution in fact quite vocal showing their opposition in the forum with Soekarno. General Soeharto meanwhile by some historians being describe as 'opportunist' in sense personally siding with Yani and Nasution, while keep agreeable faced in front of Soekarno.

The Army who were 100% backing Soekarno for taking over West Papua from the Dutch in the early 60's, has different opinion on the Konfrontasi. They believe it's a wasted endeavor, unnecessary, and they suspect the Communist Party (PKI) famed the idea toward Soekarno in order to get his blessing for their armed fifth column idea (the revolutionary armed civilians based on Labor and Farmer forces).

Thus the idea that some 'leaked' intelligence data being forwarded to commonwealth forces, perhaps has some based. Since there are some clues indicating elements within the Army that do not want Konfrontasi to succeed. Those elements work on the agenda solely to deterred any potential gain by PKI, and they believed a successful or prolong Konfrontasi will only benefit PKI's agenda.

 

[STURM]

So far, it seems the confrontation has never been a popular subject in Indonesian history, especially during the Suharto era.

The Indonesian military was put in a very tough position, on one hand it had to produce results but at the same time, it was aware that any serious escalation would bring consequences as Britain and the Commonwealth were determined to defend Malaysia. In the 1990's, it was revealed that had the situation worsoned on the ground in Borneo, Britain and Australia would have hit military targets in Java, with airpower, including Vulcans. Due to the ineffectiveness of the leftist irregulars in Kalimantan, whom Indonesia was providing support to [and whom the army was to conduct operations against in the 1970's], the army, especially the RPKAD had to take on a greater role, such as participating in cross border attacks. But there was an overall strategy of limiting the use of actual Indonesian assets for deniability and to avoid an escalation. That's why only civilian craft were used in the Singapore and Melaka Straits for infiltration and all military or most military personnel onboard were not in uniform. Of the 7-8 contacts the RMN had, that resulted in an exchange of fire and the sinking of enemy craft, none were with ALRI ships. The few contacts with ALRI ships in Malaysian waters resulted in the ALRI ships heading back to Indonesian waters - the same goes for contacts with ALRI and Commonwealth ships. The day to day problem for the RMN was actually customs boats from Sumatra and the Riau islands that regularly 'taxed' Malaysian fishing trawlers, rather than ALRI ships. The most provocative move made, I believe, was the drop of irregulars by AURI C-130s over Johore and the low level buzzing of AURI Marauders and Mustangs over Kuching in 1965.

It's speculation but had the situation on the ground gone well for Indonesia and had the Britain showed an unwillingness to escalate situation, perhaps the Indonesian military would have made a more visible appearance and perhaps the army generals would have showed more enthusiasm to the venture. Until recently, the Confrontation has also not received much coverage in Malaysia. For many years, the most popular book on the subject was the 'Undeclared War' by James and Small. Recent books like 'Kopassus' by Conboy [based on intensive interviews with former Indonesian personnel], which provide a detailed account on that units activities during the period, the 'Borneo Airflift' by Annet and 'Confrontation, The War With Indonesia' by Bijl, are an excellent source of information - being well researched and impartial. The Indonesian army, has also released an official historty of the Confrontation.

 

[Ananda]

In the 1990's, it was revealed that had the situation worsoned on the ground in Borneo, Britain and Australia would have hit military targets in Java, with airpower, including Vulcans.

It's speculation but had the situation on the ground gone well for Indonesia and had the Britain showed an unwillingness to escalate situation, perhaps the Indonesian military would have made a more visible appearance and perhaps the army generals would have showed more enthusiasm to the venture.

US did not want the Commonwealth forces to increase the stake toward Indonesian territory even the situations in the ground/Borneo turn unfavorable for Commonwealth forces. With Vietnam brewing, US did not want another front in Southeast Asia. Attacking Java will sure put Indonesia with Eastern Camp. Also they told the British that Indonesian Tu-16 and Mig-21 already fully operational, in such they can retaliate toward British bases.

Konfrontasi was a 'strange' conflict, because the conditions within Indonesia also was not uniform. Like I said, the Army Generals did not want to put more regular forces committed toward Konfrontasi, since they believe it will create vacuum that will be filled by PKI's Fifth Column supported by the Air Forces. In short the Army suspect they will be sacrifices by a military conflict with Commonwealth forces, while PKI's sympathizer will filled the loss with their own new forces.

Personally, I do believe some High Ranking Generals, did not want thing improving in the ground for Indonesian benefits, since it will just give Soekarno and PKI an ammo to enlarge the campaign, which the Army will take much of the burden anyway.

 

[STURM]

US did not want the Commonwealth forces to increase the stake toward Indonesian territory even the situations in the ground/Borneo turn unfavorable for Commonwealth forces. With Vietnam brewing, US did not want another front in Southeast Asia. Attacking Java will sure put Indonesia with Eastern Camp. Also they told the British that Indonesian Tu-16 and Mig-21 already fully operational, in such they can retaliate toward British bases.

I get what you're saying but despite differences in opinion with regards to handling Indonesia, Britain and the Commonwealth received full diplomatic and political support from the U.S. throughout the duration of the conflict as Indonesia was seen to be in bed with the Soviet Union and it was American policy to try and reduce the level of influence the Soviets had anywhere in the world. And had the situation escalated with the result that Britain was forced to hit targets in Java, it is very likely that Uncle Sam, would have supported Britain, due to a number of factors that were in line with its wider interests - though a junior partner in the alliance, Britain was still Uncle Sam's main partner. Also bear in mind that way before the Confrontation, the U.S. was already involved in covert attempts to destabilise Sukarno, it had dropped supplies to Permesta and other groups from the Philippines. Strikes on Java by Britain and Australia, might indeed have led to much increased cooperation between Soviet Union and Indonesia but bear in mind that the Soviet Union was also not keen on the conflict escalating.

Despite providing Malaysia with a security umbrella, Britain had no wish to be drawn in an all out war with Indonesia, as its main priority was shifting towards Europe and it was facing deep budget cuts but was willing to go all the way if needed. Even after its embassy in Jakarta was attacked and it was clear that the Indonesian military was running the cross border raids on West Malaysia and Borneo, the response of Britain IMO was quite restrained or muted. Dozens of cross border and sabotage raids on West and East Malaysia were launched, compare that with the reaction of the Commonwealth - the Claret raids across Kalimantan by the SAS [which were very hush hush at the time], leaflet raids by RMAF aircraft on Bintan island and a single instance when Malaysia army howitzers fired on KKO positions in Nanukan. It has been reported that Malaysia had suggested commando raids on islands off Sumatra but was veteod by Brtiain. For a number of reasons, no one was keen on seriously escalating the conflict, which was fortunate. And yes, the Indonesian army was mostly against the campaign as it viewed it as pointless and a diversion of resources, not to mention that it was very concerned with the PKI and the activities of the AURI, yet I'm of the firm opinion that had Malaysia not received the full backing of the Commonwealth and had the situation on the ground turned rapidly in Indonesia's favour, the generals would have shown more enthusiasm. An Indonesian victory would have led to increased public support resulting in incresed popularity for the army as well as Sukarno, which in turn might have ended Suharto's flirtation with the PKI.

 

[Gadjah Mada]

Strikes on Java by Britain and Australia, might indeed have led to much increased cooperation between Soviet Union and Indonesia but bear in mind that the Soviet Union was also not keen on the conflict escalating.

The confrontation occured at almost the same time with the beginning of US involvement Vietnam war and Sino-Soviet split. There were many contradictory information about Soviet and US involvement, while nobody disagree with the fact that PRC fully supported Indonesia due to their close relation with PKI, and also Malaysian communist were also PRC leaned.

Some Indonesian claimed that Soviet supported Indonesia, while other sources mentioned the difficult position of the Soviet: Sukarno Years and their half-hearted aid due to worry about increasing Chinese influence in Indonesia.

We should not forget also that at the time Indonesian military was not in one command, with army, navy and air force were actually separated. Even the army itself was not clean from PKI influence. This was more obvious with Suharto "cleansing" program after October 1965, especially against the Air Force and KKO leadership. Most anti-PKI faction in Indonesia either military or civilian were considered nationalist. And any open attack deep into Indonesian territory by foreign army would have put them in difficult position. I think this was the consideration why the US did not want increasing escalation while they help their "assets" in Indonesia. Even the limited cross border operation claret was very classified at that time.

 

[Ananda]

For a number of reasons, no one was keen on seriously escalating the conflict, which was fortunate. And yes, the Indonesian army was mostly against the campaign as it viewed it as pointless and a diversion of resources, not to mention that it was very concerned with the PKI and the activities of the AURI, yet I'm of the firm opinion that had Malaysia not received the full backing of the Commonwealth and had the situation on the ground turned rapidly in Indonesia's favour, the generals would have shown more enthusiasm. An Indonesian victory would have led to increased public support resulting in incresed popularity for the army as well as Sukarno, which in turn might have ended Suharto's flirtation with the PKI.

An Indonesian Victory during confrontation will not happen unless the Sabah/Sarawak Leftist Guerrilla can proved to be an effective Insurgences. Albeit from that the Victory can only happen if there's sudden withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Northern Borneo and coincide with an all out Invasions from Indonesian sides.

But again, A Konfrontasi Victory might not going to be in-line with both pro western and anti communist nationalists factions agenda. I do believe those factions still hold believe that any gain from Konfrontasi will only help PKI/Leftist agenda. If Soekarno able to push Commonwealth to left North Borneo, the result will created an independent but leftist leaning Sabah-Sarawak, which will provide Indonesian leftist/PKI with valuable regional allied.

Some Historians put PKI as the 3rd largest Communist entity in the world in the 60's. However the complete and rapid downfall of PKI in just a couple of years by Soeharto showed that PKI also not having as strong roots as many believe on a large communist entity of that period. In truth PKI also create many resentment and grudges from other Nationalists and Muslim factions during their rises to power. The grudges that Soeharto can harness effectively by providing them a complete 'revenge' venue to PKI during the cracked down.

Anyway, back to Indonesian Navy :
From Min-def official sites Wamenhan Meninjau Proses Pembuatan Kapal BCM di Dok dan Perkapalan Kodja Bahari
With Google translate:

Jakarta, DMC - A day after a working visit to PT Anugrah Buana Marine to know how far the process of shipbuilding Bantu Liquid Petroleum (BCM) was accompanied by Gen. Sjafrie Wamenhan Kemhan Laksdya Sumartono TNI, Kabaranahan Kemhan Ediwan Maj. Gen. Prabowo, TNI Headquarters and Army officials, Tuesday (8/5), Visiting PT. Dock and Shipping Kodja Bahari, who is also working on Liquid Petroleum Bantu shipbuilding both for the Navy.

Arriving at the PT. Marine and Boating Dock Kodja Wamenhan entourage were greeted by TNI Laksdya Wakasal Marsetio and president director of PT. Marine and Boating Dock Kodja Riri Syeried Jetta and his staff directly witnessed a process of cutting steel as a material vessel BCM.

After a visit to the shipyard II, Wamenhan into the Hall of PT. Marine and Boating Dock Kodja receive an explanation about the process of making a ship BCM solution that uses 100% local content material and planned to be built for 24 months.

In addition to shipbuilding briefed about BCM, Wamenhan also briefed on the plan of the two ships of Landing Ship Tank (LST) a signed contract, but still in the design stage, because the initial design Landing Ship Tank vessels with 354 crew transport vehicle can only combat (Ranpur) tank type BMP 3F, which is modified into a Landing ship tank vessels that can transport the Leopard tanks.

Meanwhile, for the type of BCM's own ship, length specifications of 122.40 m, 16.50 m wide, has a maximum speed of 18 knots and materials may contain as much as 5500 m3 of liquid oil.

Deputy Defense Minister (Wamenhan in Indonesian), visits two shipyard that building two Military Tankers (BCM in Indonesian or Liquid Petroleum Support). As far as I know, the two BCM will be the first locally build Military Specs Tankers.

The designed of locally build LST in my believe will be quite interesting. I already see the model in Indo-Defence expo last year, however seems it's potentially being enlarged or strengthen to made them able delivering MBT on Leoprad 2 class.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Anyone have seen this pictures ?

I forget the link.
It said those pictures taken from Indonesian Yakhont test target.

May be some one can give note to these pictures

As SASWannabee said, its a Leander Class Ship.
There are no pictures released of the Yakhont/P800 Oniks test target.