(i) ... really nothing is clear right now... speculation based on random news bites will never be correct.
(ii) Locals were not equipped or trained to carryout operations against such trained supplied and motivated terrorists, with such precise intelligence.
Agreed.
Time Magazine
The Mumbai operation that killed more than 150 people over two days in the heart of India's commercial capital marks the emergence of an unprecedented hybrid of terror tactics...
"This is essentially a small army sent into the heart of society with orders to kill and keep killing as long as possible. And they're technically capable of creating a lot of damage and death before they can be killed. So this is more like terrorism fused with insurgency and guerilla warfare."
I'll like to start this discussion with Time Magazine's summary, which is an accurate description of the nature of the Mumbai attack.
riksavage has suggested that a change in India's entire CT structure is necessary.
funtz and others elsewhere have suggested that the solution is increasing the numbers and equipment of the Indian security forces.
i suppose as you say now the strength of the NSG will have to be increased many folds...
"The Hindu" Newspaper has chosen to
blame the Indian hotel industry.
However, I don't think a knee jerk reaction of the above sort is useful (Change is necessary - but perhaps at a much deeper level than conventional solutions).
Here's why (I can list 5 reasons on the top of my head):
1. Even if the hotels had much, much better security - the attack would have taken place in Mumbai - it would just take place at a "shopping centre" or some other soft target.
2. To harden every Indian city against a small army sent into the heart of society with orders to kill and keep killing as long as possible - is impossible. However, India can:
(a) improve the response time of all CT Teams;
(b) change the ratio of assault gp and intelligence gp in CT Team composition:
For example, a more balanced CT Team may need to include:
(i) an assault gp (a force of more than 100),
(ii) a military intelligence battalion (a force of more than 800),
(iii) a bomb disposal team (a force of more than 25); and
(iv) a chemical warfare team (a force of more than 50)
(c) improve the technology deployed with the CT Teams; and
(d) improve the capabilities of the first responders in each city (part of which is to give police better weapons).
3. The most effective response - is not even more intelligence (whilst this attack can be recognized as an intelligence failure). Part of the solution must be
more intelligence coupled with better processing of the intelligence gathered. Some of these efforts - would require the fusion of HUMIT and technology.
4. Quite a few laws also need to be changed, so that police and military intelligence agencies can work together to foil such groups - at the planning and recce stage.
5. Port security monitoring needs to be improved. This cannot be achieved by increased manning levels alone. It needs to be a "system wide" type of response to improve the following:
(a) radar monitoring (and the management) of every port needs to be improved;
(b) databases for ship movement must be established and kept up to date;
(c) customs corruption must be addressed; and
(d) more effective coast guard/navy patrols with proper C4I technologies and surveillance equipment.