Swerve,
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Different price bases.
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Snicker. Yes indeed. 'The Armed Forces and The Rest Of The Worlds'.
Where everyone from the Beltway to CBO/GAO has been predicting a 70-77 million dollar airframe unit acquisition cost from the 1997 at least.
Roche` and his lackeys 'announced' a 45 million dollar _flyaway_ cost at the October 2001 SDD signing. And latest numbers (from the first flight articles) are 'in 2002 dollars' for 45 to SIXTY million dollars.
Yet the numbers now in the latest CRS booklet are for 112 million dollars. A year and a half later than the the F-35 was actually supposed to be /in production/ who was closer I daresay?
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The PUAC includes development & other fixed costs, some of which have already been spent for the F-35 (I know, most have been spent for the F-22).
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Except that when the USAF announced ground breaking for the JSF facilities at Nellis (back when total program costs were 'only' 244 billion) the jet was /already/ stated to be 100 million each in 'real money'.
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2004/Aug-21-Sat-2004/news/24587717.html
It's the idiots who 'toe the line' with the public front that you are going to get 2,437 jets who end up defrauding the country of the REAL money involved with PUAC which does indeed include military construction for a force which, even if only half that preposterous number, will still be FOUR TIMES the frontend investment of a 300 plane F-22 force (which is still all we are likely to 276 get).
For an inventory whose scalar economics will be shot to hell because THIS MAN-
>
Rear Admiral Craig Steidle is the director of the Joint Strike Fighter Program. He came to the program in January 1994 after spending four years managing the Navy's F-18 program, where he directed the development of the F-18E/F. A decorated Naval pilot, the admiral has flown over fifty different types of aircraft, among them the F-18, A-6, F-4, A-3, and H-2. He has accumulated over 3,600 flying hours in his flying career, including nighttime carrier-based missions over North Vietnam.
...
Cost and quantity curves flatten out at about 1,600 airplanes. You also have to consider a learning curve, which also becomes relatively flat after a period of time. Through affordability initiatives, though, we are lowering the learning curve to bring the initial cost down. Another aspect of overall cost is cost of ownership-what it costs to operate the airplane, the number of maintenance personnel required to support the airplane. These factors determine operation and support costs, and they are equally as important as production cost.
>
http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives/1997/articles/apr_97/apr97_01/apr2a_97.html
Says so.
I'm betting on less that 1,500 and possibly less than 1,200 _total_ U.S. inventory. At which point Lunchmeat will go bankrupt trying to sell on Tiered price spec to foreign buyers because this is the second iteration of 'buying in' technology base refinance (F-22->F-35).
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And that $117mn may be what Lockheed Martin got, but it isn't what the USAF paid. At a "flyaway" price of under $130 mn for an F-22, the unit acquisition cost for the USAF was about $175 mn, excluding fixed costs.
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Except 'flyaway' by the 339th example would have been between 74 and 83.5 million dollars depending on whose adjusted dollars you use.
http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2002/0902raptor.asp
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The lowest that's forecast to fall to is ca $160 mn.
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Sure, NOW. When you've gutted procurement and everyone is 'onboard with the JSF' as a conspiracy of manned aviation to save itself no matter what it costs this nation because /everyone with a vote/ is realizing that they will be flying 500 F-22s and 500 Teen jets as an alternative.
NEVER STOPPING TO THINK (egotistical little pricks that they are) that _maybe being in the cockpit is not the best answer at all_. That there shouldn't /be/ a mutant under glass effect destroying the REAL combat capabilities edges of the system. Specifically: no baby onboard = no goldplate.
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That's the real cost of adding one more F-22 to the inventory. Also, these are current prices.
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See above. I don't believe you. I would have to be a fool to do so. You would have the fox tell the farmer what a chicken is.
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The F-35 PUAC & APUC are "then-year" prices, and include forecast inflation between now & when the money is spent, i.e. over ten years in the future, on average. In 2006$ the PUAC & APUC are forecast at about $92 mn & $78 mn respectively.
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Except that this-
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publicat...ical_Aircra/B.19961003.US_Tactical_Aircra.htm
Showed the 'real' unit costs of the JSF as being some 63 to 81 million dollars _in 1996_.
Back before the program was effectively halved.
Back before the program was shoved right by 2+ years thanks to _predicted_ 'technology has not been sufficiently proven' weight problems.
Back before the SDD scheduling:cost problem was so extreme that they decided to run the IOT&E 'production decision' based on a NON PWSC REPRESENTATIVE AIRCRAFT because they knew they couldn't afford to make an apples to apples comparison with the specs since the STOVL and CVTOL models are STILL **vastly overweight**.
Even as all the things like Quick Mate and Structural redundancies for manufacturing efficiencies and 'thin skin' lifing are either gone or need to be completely revalidated. And they can't wait or risk being caught out in a fraud of achieved capabilities as the F/A-18E/F was.
Because after our 'vaunted military' runs yiping from the Gulf, oil will be sold by rabid Muslims in whatever currency it takes to ruin the USD. At which point all our foreign held commercial and private credit debt will blow up in our faces and _this country's economy will collapse_.
Do you get the idea that it is REALLY STUPID to trust to PUACs that /have always been pipedreams/?!?
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Sound point about the F-35 not having yet flown (or even been assembled!) in production configuration, though. F-22 costs are known, while F-35 costs are only forecast.
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I'm not your pet, don't pat me like a dog.
The USAF has known what the Just So F'd would cost from the very beginning. When it comes to spending money they hire the best accountants and lawyers as a function of figuring out the most sly way to commit grotesque acts of Deficiency Act fraud the likes of which billions ALL OF ORGANIZED CRIME TOGETHER can only gape in wonder at.
If the captains and the generals and the brats in the pentagon were to be treated like the mafia in 'The Firm' with RICO indictments all 'round for multiple corrupt organization acts of deliberate contract fraud, every man jack associated with the JSF effort would spend the rest of their worthless lives in prison.
THEN, maybe, we could start to look at how the ongoing WAR in Iraq is being _lost_ by inept use of military airpower as the principal NTISR surveillance modeal for places we won't strip Korea and NATO and CONUS units to _permanently_ station troops to cover by ground.
And the idiots who exclaim 'If the UCAV didn't have the endurance, we wouldn't even be considering it!' would be finally exposed as the street whore manned-airpower hustlers they are.
CONCLUSION:
PUAC is not a given. Most especially, it's not an excuse to be thrown about in _failing_ to compare what-is-sunk vs. what is STILL TO BE PAID for **like numbers** of line-vested airframes. 500:500 the F-22 will WIN because it is a UNIFIED NOT THREEWAY SPLIT FORCE. And one which will have LESS THAN HALF the 'one glowing hole, gone dark' _peacetime_ losses. Just like the F-15/16 have shown to do (as of 1994, _SIX_ of 380 jets had been lost in combat. Of the rest the predominant majority were stupid-pilot-showing-off faulted. But of the rest 30% were _engine related_).
The Air Force knows all of this. But being a boys club of Sky Knights fraternity, they all want to preserve cockpit airpower **at all costs**.
And we can simply no longer afford to indulge the image.
I suppose you've heard of the Pentagon Paradox. That performance is inversely proportional to expectation. There is a corollary to this. When nobody expects anything but lies and subpar excuses for contractual performance from those they vote into office with higher fiduciary trust, the very system of accountability breaks down under the premise that what is unfixable is also 'never to be acknowledged as broken'. Because that would mean admitting that there is no point in oversight and indeed the democratic system of allocated funds for responsible program management is itself a farce.
What we have failed to acknowledge here is that _there can be external modifiers_ which force the adjustment of such an entropic staticism of corruption and parochial service self interests. And the end of our commitment in the Gulf is about to be just that.
Congratulations on losing another war gentlemen. You couldn't have played into my argument any better if you had tried.
KPl.