Grand Danois,
It's not that we're so 'terribly proud' of the F-22. Though I am undoubtedly a fan. It's that it handles the American Problem of expeditionary airpower much better.
We face (and have always faced) a much different problem of getting to the target area from much greater distances than our European cousins plan for and so we have to do more with each sortie. That means that the mission effects of munitions on target, on time, with fewer airframe losses have to be explicit and guaranteed.
Or we don't win the airwar.
The F-22 helps with this because it has the physical performance to defeat most 'random encounters' with 20-something generation SAMs. And can further use this highly supersonic EM capability in combination with _reduced tanking requirements_ to get to the combat area more quickly from the same radius start point.
It being the latter effect which most people discount even before they start to make kill-mechanism:kill-mechanism comparisons.
Because if you only have 2-4 F-22 going into enemy airspace every hour or so, you can effectively 'rezero the radii datum' to reflect a from-base-to-fence. And from-fence-to-releasepoint. And from fence to homeplate again.
So that the Raptor can 'leg it' quickly to the 600nm point at which it needs a tanker '1 way'. Then advance throttles to /really step out/ as it enters enemy airspace. At which point, the GBU-39 become 'another 80-100nm' (given the F-15E barge attack reached 55nm from a subsonic launch) of effective radius while the _unengaged_ F-22 turns and goes back for a drink before heading home, some 3,500lbs worth of A2G munitions lighter. And only 2hrs into a 3.5hr sortie length.
All told, this 'fast is as leg segments does' is the only way to fight an 800-1,000nm radius war in places like SWA. Because it means you are able to leverage a smaller number of strikers with a smaller number of tankers to a LOWER overall launch platform risk.
Comparitively, the F-35, with a subsonic cruise to the target area almost a guarantee (at around .51-.55 T/Wr on a 460 square foot wing area) is going to operate on longrange missions almost as if it was doing a fighter-drag (tanker deployment to theater) with multiple hookups enroute and multiple support platforms further slowing up the pace of the mission to the 'slowest man' .85 marching level. So that '10-15 hours later' it will be finishing up the it's first sortie of the day.
THIS is what differentiates the JSF from the F-22 in the most negative fashion.
Because to match the F-22 for radius-at-speed generation of daily sorties, you have to double the number of F-35 in-theater. At least. And then double the tankers to service it. And add in another 20% for the EA-18s and F-16CJs to make it viable as an all-LO _target area penetrator_ without external DEAD/EA options to be sure it doesn't fatally step on any snakes.
And we can't afford that anymore than we can count on 'allied' export sales to make up the force numbers when those foreign orders are themselves (in total) insufficient to make up for the JSFs that have already been lost to OUR inventory through USAF/USMC/USN cost reductions.
I will agree that, for a lot of missions, the F-22 is a platinum plated diamond sledgehammer to strike a gnat with. But then, the last time we bought an F-22 'as a singleton bonus' to Lockheed for their efforts to improve the line efficiencies (FY 2003) it cost us 117 million dollars. Then Congress, in a fit of embarrassment, 'closed the loophole'.
While, according to this-
>
Funding and Projected Costs
The Defense Department’s quarterly Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) of
December 31, 2005, estimated the JSF programat$276,458.9 million in current-year
dollars for 2,458 aircraft, which equates to a program unit acquisition cost (PUAC)
of $112.4 million per aircraft in then-year dollars (accounting for inflation). The
average procurement cost (APUC) (which does not include R&D or other "sunk"
costs) is estimated at $94.8 million per aircraft in then-year dollars. The December
2005 SAR also notes that the JSF program has breached a "Nunn-McCurdy" cost
growth limit: unit cost growth over 30% of the original Acquisition Program
Baseline. The latest PUAC and APUC cost estimates are, respectively, 32.8% and
31.3% higher than cost estimates made in October 2001
>
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf
The JSF is already only 5 million dollars less than our 'best single airframe price' on a MUCH more capable platform. And has yet to even fly it's production configuration (something which won't happen until late 2008 or early 2009, after SDD->production decision).
Add to this, the simple fact that DOD is already in contempt of Congress-
>
Congress has in the past directed the formation of joint program offices to ensure
commonality between the services’ UAV programs. Congress has also expressed
concern that DOD’s "growing enthusiasm may well lead to a situation in which there
is no clear path toward the future of UAVs", and so has required DOD to submit a
UAV roadmap.5 In some instances, Congress has advocated a more aggressive
approach to fielding UAVs. For example, in 1996, the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) supported legislation directing DOD to weaponize both the
Predator and Hunter, but DOD opposed the initiative.6 The scope of Congress’s
support and confidence in UAV technology can be gleaned from the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which stated that, "Within ten years,
one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be unmanned."7
>
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31872.pdf
And we are in 'a pickle of an opportunity'. One whereby we can say to the the military: "YOU lost this war. YOU were asked on multiple occasions what was needed to make it work and YOU never said 'more troops, more planes, more everything'." As a not-our-Vietnam problem. And then back that with a policy shift that has some serious _teeth_ (no more BUR R&M back scratching) in setting aright our wardebt by killing programs that are maximum-visibility seen as 'needlessly cost intensive'. And that program, right now, is _not_ the F-22. It is the F-35.
CONCLUSION:
2003 was a banner year in a lot of ways. Because it was also the last time we had any real positive intel on the whereabouts of UBL. Indeed, early in January or February of that year we were told "He will be coming down one of three trails." And having _but one_ Predator, we took our best shot. And he rolled the dice and scored a lucky miss.
Such is the kind of warfighting capability that is absent in our military today. Such is the capability which is ESSENTIAL because it is CHEAP on both an acquisition and DCO basis of $:flying hour. It is NOT inherent to either the F-22. Or the F-35. Because as soon as you put a baby onboard an airframe, it instantly becomes limited by HIS 8-10hr limiter as much as their own SFC hangtime efficiencies.
Again, the USAF and indeed _all_ the Air Services KNOW THIS. And have refused (as they did in 1996, when 'asked nicely' to arm the Predator, causing us to miss UBL /again/ in 1998 and 2000) to undertake the necessary steps to keep up with the changing pace of warfare. i.e. To do their JOB.
The way to set them back on a 'you work for us' track is to TELL THEM: "Five hundred of any manned jet you wish, per service. The rest will be a shared pool of UAVs and Cruise."
I guarantee you the USAF will choose the Raptor in the hand over the JSF in the bush. Simply because they ARE a boys club of 'fighter pilots'.
Even as I _know for a fact_ that the USN would prefer a Lot III Hornet over the money pit that the F-35C has become.
Which leaves only Congress itself to be convinced. And they're easy: "If we build the F-35, the French will build a miltiarized Grand Duc and endrun us. At which point, our 'cheaper than gen-4' fighter will be competing with a gen-6 UCAV that costs one quarter as much on the export market. And we will never see 500 F-35 exports. Let alone 2,000+." Absent the smell of money, our great hall of kings will tuck their corkscrew tails between their legs and RUN for their red-ink pen to create program termination legislation 'for cause'.
Which will itself be simple to justify because the JSF is not within costs. And it doesn't meet LEGAL requirements for a 1/3rd unmanned force structure by 2011.
KPl.
