Defence of Taiwan

[koxinga]

They have been “failing to respond” since the CCP took control of mainland China. Putting it off for another decade might cost Xi his “legacy” - depending on how long he expects to live - but it won’t even go close to costing CCP power.

CCP has made the red lines/trigger to respond ("invade") pretty clear since they won the civil war.

It gave generations of CCP leaders (Mao, Hua, Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi) way out for NOT invading TW as long as those triggers are not met and it does not affect their legacy in anyway. Hence I view this Western talk about some kind of a fixed timetable with skeptism.

Of course, any Chinese leader would love to have the reunification of TW as their legacy and Xi is no exception. But will Xi want to walk back on the earlier rule and launch an attack preemptively?

 

[STURM]

Fallacy right there…. Arguing that if the defences were not reduced to the point of ineffective resistance, that they were not reduced at all.

Nitpicking are we? Let me say this again so it won't be understood or obfuscated [intentionally or otherwise]. Naval fire had an effect [not in dispute] on beach defences but not to the extent where beach defences as a whole were rendered ineffective. What was that you were saying about fallacy?

Look up the casualty figures for Normandy, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Peliliu, Galipolli and other places and tell me if beach defences were really rendered ineffective... You can also watch the Zaloga video I posted in a previous post and tell me if Omaha's defences were really degraded by naval fire...

Naval Gunfire Support In Operation Neptune: A Reexamination

Abstract. This chapter delivers a captivating narrative that takes readers from the choppy and cold waters of the French coast to the shores of North Afric

academic.oup.com

Irony is that you are arguing that fire support has hitherto been ineffective in reducing resistance to amphibious landings, but that the PLA will be able to do it just fine.

Firstly I'm not arguing but stating that in the vast majority of cases where opposed landings were made; naval fire did not render beach defences ineffective.

Secondly the irony only exists in your mind because it's not written in stone that Chinese fire will render Taiwanese defences ineffective. There is a possibility but no certainty. Also bear in mind that the Chinese will rely less on naval fire and more on ballistic/cruise missiles and airpower.

Oh and [again] the Allied air power you mentioned was effective in sealing off or isolating the invasion beaches; making it hard for the Germans to move stuff in but it had minimal impact on the actual defences.

Agreed, the Chinese experience is likely to be different from that of the Russians, because it is far more difficult to hide your air-defence and SEAD assets when the only “terrain” you have available is the curvature of the earth.

"The Chinese experience is likely to be different from that of the Russians" because they will be facing different opponents [whom we assume will not make the mistakes the Russians did] ; will be operating over a different type of terrain and probably because the Chinese operate airpower in a different manner compared to the Russians who operate air power more as a supporting arm to ground operations rather than as a strategic tool.

Note that per doctrine the Russians also don't see overall air superiority as a vital prerequisite; instead they first focus on achieving limited air superiority over the battle area. There is nothing to indicate that the PLAAF shares the same view. Also nothing to indicate that it's unable to mount a sustained and integrated SEAD/DEAD campaign; maybe it's capable, maybe it isn't. Alas I don't have an Oracle I can consult.

In short there are a host of reasons why an air war fought over Taiwan will be different to what we're seeing over the Ukraine.

 

[STURM]

A failed invasion means the loss of a very large chunk of their navy and airforce, plus a public demonstration of national impotence. It takes any potential reunification from “sometime”, to “never”.

On the other hand a successful invasion means that Taiwan has finally been "unified"; that the CCP has done what it has long said it would do and that by "unifying" Taiwan; China is in a much better position to project power in the South China Sea and to break out of the First Island Chain.

As has been mentioned before in this thread; an invasion will only happen if China has no other option. As for high casualties; it's seen as a penalty worth incurringj [ust like how in 1951 China accepted that it would incur huge casualties but still entered the war because of core national interests]. Failure to respond to certain political events related to Taiwan will be politically detrimental to China both internally and internationally. China has it's "red lines" and if those are crossed it will resort to military means.

 

[ngatimozart]

CCP has made the red lines/trigger to respond ("invade") pretty clear since they won the civil war.

It gave generations of CCP leaders (Mao, Hua, Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi) way out for NOT invading TW as long as those triggers are not met and it does not affect their legacy in anyway. Hence I view this Western talk about some kind of a fixed timetable with skeptism.

Of course, any Chinese leader would love to have the reunification of TW as their legacy and Xi is no exception. But will Xi want to walk back on the earlier rule and launch an attack preemptively?

Xi's moving the CCP & PRC back to its Marxist - Maoist doctrines and beliefs. He's also using the nationalist and racial cards probably more so that Mao ever did and he's smarter than Mao. Xi sees all Chinese regardless of location, as PRC subjects and he will push for the incorporation of Taiwan with the motherland. He's arguably already more powerful than all of his predecessors, including Deng Xaoiping, except for Mao. Xi Jinping has managed to outsmart a lot of people and He now has the capacity to do it again. There's a possibly that he will become more powerful (and greater in CCP & PRC eyes) than Mao and that will make him far more dangerous than Mao ever was because he doesn't appear to be flawed like Mao was.

If he succeeds with his third term, and that's looking more than probable now, then an attempted invasion of Taiwan is more probable than it was five years ago. If this is indeed the case, we will have to completely re-evaluate our assessments of him and how we assess him, his actions and potential actions, from now on.

 

[koxinga]

Fair enough.

I will add one point. Previous generations of leaders also recognised that PLA does not have the capacity or capabilities to make the invasion a success. So unless their hands were forced by those red lines, they all chose (wisely) to do nothing other than rhetoric.

Xi, on the other hand has modernised the military to the extent that gives him options where his predecessors did not have. The invasion remains risky but the odds of success are getting better every year.

This is where we are at the unknown. I still remain skeptical and certainly, recently comments by US leaders, military or political with precise dates like 2024 2025 sounds more like playing on to their internal audience and their MIC.

 

[OPSSG]

Buying services to gain a level of competence is not difficult, if determined

1. The PLA’s fleet of Type 96As, Type 99s & Type 99As can fire NORINCO's GP125 tank-gun launched missile. The GP125 missile is for 125mm guns and can kill Taiwanese MBTs & 105mm armed Clouded Leopards, from 5km away.

2. The greatest threat to the ROC Army’s MBTs & 105mm armed Clouded Leopards, is not even a PLA MBT, but it’s artillery heavy formations — the PLA is not 10 feet tall but their force design is not done by idiots either. Taiwan better take them seriously from 2022 onwards.

3. In the past, I was trained on 2 types of anti-tank weapons. The SAF DOES NOT employ anti-armour weapons alone to conduct an anti-vehicular ambush. The ATGM platoon will be augmented by a Carl Gustav section, along with a Pioneer section (to lay mines & obstacles) & an artillery FO. Not sure if a Taiwanese conscript will be acquire the types of skill sets a Singaporean conscript routinely demonstrate.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1583665790729216000

4. The PLA(N) is trying to buy competence by hiring British & French fighter pilots, at €20k a month — some of these NATO trained former pilots are already in China.

5. UK is going to have to change its laws to prevent & stop their pilots from continuing to train Chinese pilots.

6. In every major conflict since World War II, the US Army has committed 21 brigade-equivalents of ground force, the US Marine Corps roughly 15 battalions, and the USAF around 600 fighter/attack aircraft. Numerous studies have concurred with these historical realities and recommended a force twice this size to secure US interests. Today, the US Army has 31 brigades, the US Marine Corps 22 battalions, and the USAF approximately 626 combat-coded fighters available for use.

 

[STURM]

It's to be expected that China would hire ex military people for certain skills and experiences they have and which are lacking in the PLA but I'm just surprised this is something that hasn't been going on for years or if it has that it's something only making the news now.

 

[STURM]

A grim look at Taiwan's ability to repel a Chinese invasion; with critical commentary by 2 ex Taiwanese senior officials and a ex conscript who never touched a gun in 11 months of training.

 

[koxinga]

Another superb summary from PLAOpsOSINT. Again, nothing really new as most of these writings are available (in Mandarin).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1584319536245137408

While I am skeptical on PLA's ability and capacity to launch a successful waterborne invasion, this type of missile strikes are well within their capabilities and PLA Rocket Forces have been training for this mission for decades. What is unclear to me is the level of coordination with theater level commanders, since PLAA commanders also have assets like the PHL-16 under their direct control.


PLARF (f.k.a Second Artillery)

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-01-05%20PLARF%20Organization%20ExecSum.pdf

 

[StingrayOZ]

A grim look at Taiwan's ability to repel a Chinese invasion; with critical commentary by 2 ex Taiwanese senior officials and a ex conscript who never touched a gun in 11 months of training.

Certainly from what I've heard and seen it would be a big ask, Taiwan conscription is widely known to not be very effective, much of Taiwans equipment is older un-upgraded gear, and some of the locally designed and made stuff never got enough funding and support to really bring it up to code. Equipment and munitions are generally in short supply, particularly on delivered and ready to go on Taiwan itself.

Meanwhile China is clearly doubling down and going from strength to strength. Internally they see themselves as very strong, much stronger than Taiwan, but also now able to eclipse US and allied power particularly when so close to Chinese territory. Also their political power is seen as simply unmatched. China assimilated Hong Kong and implemented what they wanted, and realistically, no one said boo. Some people left, some people protested, but China was easily able to handle that. So they see that as a total win. They see it as proven capability, and an ongoing success.

Ukraine is much larger in population and area than Taiwan, and China is much, much, much stronger economically and military than Russia and orders of magnitude stronger than Taiwan. Unlike Ukraine which is right on the border of NATO and a clear sovereign country. Taiwan is very much alone, and everyone, some in Taiwan, while 100% of China, the US, the UN pretty much agree with one China policy and only recognize China, even if the US has made assurances it will defend Taiwan from attack.

If China launches a massive rocket attack, against all military targets in Taiwan, its not clear to me, how the US will stop that. If there is zero military capability in Taiwan, its 100km away, I'm not sure by the time anyone else gets there what there will be left to attack/defend and if any nearby US forces would be enough to do it. Particularly if the Chinese put forward the idea that they would launch attacks on US forces on Guam, Japan and SK if the US tried.

The US China balance isn't the same as in the 1950's or 1960's or the 1970s when Nixon visited.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

If China launches a massive rocket attack, against all military targets in Taiwan, its not clear to me, how the US will stop that. If there is zero military capability in Taiwan, its 100km away, I'm not sure by the time anyone else gets there what there will be left to attack/defend and if any nearby US forces would be enough to do it. Particularly if the Chinese put forward the idea that they would launch attacks on US forces on Guam, Japan and SK if the US tried.

Taiwan has anti-air defence batteries, not just American Patriots but also domestically designed and manufactured TK-II and TK-IIIs, etc. Taiwan is also increasing the number of missiles it can make every year.

If that's still not enough and China can destroy the Taiwanese military at the press of a button, then the reforms OPSSG are advocating would serve no purpose and there's nothing Taiwan can do because however much money it spends on defence, China can spend more on missiles.

If we're going to discuss the defence of Taiwan, we have to take the position that China is not realistically going to win via an air/missile campaign.

As for US bases, it's the same risk it faces if it became involved in a war with China over the Senkaku Islands. Backing down over Taiwan would mean backing down over almost anything else.

 

[STURM]

we have to take the position that China is not realistically going to win via an air/missile campaign.

I think that never was in doubt.

From a PLA perspective a missile/air campaign with perhaps a EW and cyber attack was either going to be launched simultaneously or just prior to an actual amphib assault. If it was going to launched on its own it was not intended to make Taiwan capitulate or destroy it but to maybe gain some political leverage/concessions.

 

[STURM]

The US China balance isn't the same as in the 1950's or 1960's or the 1970s when Nixon visited.

Or even the same as the late 1990's when the USN sailed a carrier through the Taiwan Straits during the Taiwan Straits Crisis with the PLA not having the means to do anything about it.

 

[koxinga]

If we're going to discuss the defence of Taiwan, we have to take the position that China is not realistically going to win via an air/missile campaign

You can replace "China" with the "US" and it is the same result.

You need boots on the ground to take Taiwan. The only purpose of the air/missile campaign is to set the stage for that invasion.

Certainly from what I've heard and seen it would be a big ask, Taiwan conscription is widely known to not be very effective, much of Taiwans equipment is older un-upgraded gear, and some of the locally designed and made stuff never got enough funding and support to really bring it up to code. Equipment and munitions are generally in short supply, particularly on delivered and ready to go on Taiwan itself.

I think the larger question and what Adm (retd) Li / OPSSG was going about the curious lack of urgency and desire to involve the wider population.

If we reference countries that faces a siege situation like Israel and Singapore, they invest heavily in both training up their population / military civilian integration but also to psychologically indoctrinate the population on the necessity of the fight (e.g survival).

It's almost as if they are afraid to get their 18 years olds to understand that war is going to be a bloody mess but it is better the other guy than you.

This something that:
1) You cannot outsource to the US or other countries to do the fighting
2) There is only so much the professional armed forces and expensive US weapons and missiles can do.

 

[Vivendi]

Taiwan has long-range land attack missiles that can reach the Three Gorges dam. Downstream is 400 million people and significant infrastructure, both military and civilian. If Taiwan were to successfully destroy the Three Gorges it seems to me the impact could be similar to a strategic (not tactical) nuclear attack.
Taiwan invasion: Chilling message for China as warning weapon could kill millions | news.com.au — Australia’s leading news site

In addition to the supersonic Yung Feng missile they also have the Hsuing Feng IIE Extended Range, which is believed to have a range of 1,200 km, just enough to reach the Three Gorges from Taiwan. Hsiung Feng IIE | Missile Threat (csis.org). Thus such an attack may have a real chance of succeeding. They most certainly have more than enough missiles to launch a saturation attack that no air defense system will manage to prevent 100%.

I am not sure if the Chinese leadership would consider the destruction caused by such an attack as sufficient deterrent to not invade? Probably not?

Anyhow, Taiwan now probably regrets to not having pushed forward with nuclear weapons development in the 80s. I guess now it's too late since indications of nuclear weapons development in Taiwan would probably be seen as a red line by China and trigger an immediate attack.

 

[John Fedup]

Taiwan has long-range land attack missiles that can reach the Three Gorges dam. Downstream is 400 million people and significant infrastructure, both military and civilian. If Taiwan were to successfully destroy the Three Gorges it seems to me the impact could be similar to a strategic (not tactical) nuclear attack.
Taiwan invasion: Chilling message for China as warning weapon could kill millions | news.com.au — Australia’s leading news site

In addition to the supersonic Yung Feng missile they also have the Hsuing Feng IIE Extended Range, which is believed to have a range of 1,200 km, just enough to reach the Three Gorges from Taiwan. Hsiung Feng IIE | Missile Threat (csis.org). Thus such an attack may have a real chance of succeeding. They most certainly have more than enough missiles to launch a saturation attack that no air defense system will manage to prevent 100%.

I am not sure if the Chinese leadership would consider the destruction caused by such an attack as sufficient deterrent to not invade? Probably not?

Anyhow, Taiwan now probably regrets to not having pushed forward with nuclear weapons development in the 80s. I guess now it's too late since indications of nuclear weapons development in Taiwan would probably be seen as a red line by China and trigger an immediate attack.

Indeed the nuke option for Taiwan has expired. Japan and SK, probably being planned for, sooner rather than later.

 

[STURM]

Probably not?

Probably not.

They most certainly have more than enough missiles to launch a saturation attack that no air defense system will manage to prevent 100%.

For me the problem is what comes after that? If the attack is successful but doesn't lead to the results intended.

 

[Vivendi]

For me the problem is what comes after that? If the attack is successful but doesn't lead to the results intended.

Such an attack would be a desperate, last-resort attack, in case Taiwan finds itself in a situation where the existence of Taiwan is threatened, forcing the Taiwanese leaders' hands. In other words, the scenario would be that they have no other options left. It will basically be their "nuclear option". Since they have no other options in such a scenario, they may well decide to try it, in the hope that it will change the course of the war. Which it might, given the massive impact it will have on China.

The US and other close allies decided to not become directly involved in the Ukraine war mainly because of Russian nukes. Will China take Taiwan's "nuclear option" into consideration? If they ignore it, (as we both believe they will), it will be at their own risk. At least Taiwan has warned the Chinese leaders about their "nuclear option" -- it is up to China to decide whether they want to heed the warning or not, just like Biden had to decide whether to heed Putin's warning about Russia's nuclear option.

I am guessing Taiwan will only take such a step if the US decides they cannot intervene, leaving Taiwan to defend themselves. Clearly Taiwan will not be able to stop China by themselves, and the "nuclear option" may rapidly become the only option. The obvious scenarios for avoiding this would be:

1. China decides to not invade. Nobody gets killed, and things continue like they have for the past several decades.
2. The US (and allies) become involved early in the war. Many gets killed on both sides, but there is a chance Chinese leaders will decide after a while that peaceful negotiations are preferrable to complete annihilation.

A pity Xi seems to be about to paint himself into a corner. Hopefully he will pull the world back from the abyss before it's too late.

 

[STURM]

I am guessing Taiwan will only take such a step if the US decides they cannot intervene

Probably but will it make a difference? Doubt it. Just like how a tactical nuke won't solve Putin's problems. If anything such an attack will further embolden the Chinese and a lot of Chinese who support the invasion will be clamouring for retribution.

What if such an attack causes so much casualties that the Chinese decide to retaliate with a tactical nuke or chemicals?

is a chance Chinese leaders will decide after a while that peaceful negotiations are preferrable to complete annihilation.

If hostilities start the Chinese will see it through even if it lasts for years. The political leadership is willing to pay the price. Zero chance of them negotiating in the event things go wrong; that would be the end of the CCP.

A pity Xi seems to be about to paint himself into a corner. Hopefully he will pull the world back from the abyss before it's too late.

He hasn't put himself in any corner; yet. He's merely maintaining what has been Chinese policy for decades. He will place himself in a corner if he finds himself in a similar position to Russia; really remains to be seen. Xi isn't Putin; China isn't Russia and Taiwan isn't the Ukraine.

 

[Vivendi]

Probably but will it make a difference? Doubt it. Just like how a tactical nuke won't solve Putin's problems. If anything such an attack will further embolden the Chinese and a lot of Chinese who support the invasion will be clamouring for retribution.

Such an attack on three Gorges would probably be more like detonating a strategic not tactical nuke. I think it would weaken China quite considerably. Anyway, the main aim with the "three Gorges scenario" is to act as deterrent, hopefully it will never come to that.

What if such an attack causes so much casualties that the Chinese decide to retaliate with a tactical nuke or chemicals?

What if the pretext is that China has launched a massive attack on Taiwan causing so much casualties that the Taiwanese decide to retaliate with an attack on Three Gorges?