I would argue that an attack on the Three Gorges won't change anything; it will probably embolden the Chinese and will help the CCP in shaping public opinion.
Defence of Taiwan
- Thread starter OPSSG
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I would argue that it's too early to tell how the war between China and Taiwan will play out.
Most experts believed that Russia would crush Ukraine relatively quickly. Yet here we are.
And very few predicted 20 years ago, after the US had rapidly removed the Taliban leadership, that 20 years later Taliban would again rule in Afghanistan.
I know China is not Russia and Taiwan is not Ukraine. And China is definitely not the US and Taiwan is not Afghanistan. My point is simply this: It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future. I believe China will experience some big surprises if they invade Taiwan. Three Gorges might be only one of several "surprises."
I think you are underestimating the military feasibility of such an attack and overestimating the strategic significance.
While the Hsiun Feng series cruise missiles have the necessary range, the reportedly +200kg warhead is puny. The dam itself is a concrete and steel monstrosity that is over 2.3KM long and over 40 meters in depth at some stages. I would be looking at GBU-28 type bunker bomb with 2 tons of high explosive to have even a remote chance of pentrating and needing multiple hits. (and that's saying something) That is not accounting for any losses due to missile defences, hardware failure etcs.
The time it takes to get to this level of catastrophic failure would probably take many strikes. Long enough, IMO, to discharge and relieve pressure the dam.
And finally, you failed to account for the weather. The dam is never at maximum capacity all year round as there are wet and dry spells. You will need to have the dam at maximum or near maximum capacity for this to work, have the war start on the right months.
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Indeed but it's not far fetched to think that an attack on the dam which causes huge casualties will further embolden China.
Which is why I maintain that although a anphib assault is risky and complex; it isn't domed to fail.
Great, precisely why we have to avoid making comparisons - as tempting as they are - along the lines of Xi backing himself in a corner and going into the abyss; hence my
"Xi isn't Putin; China isn't Russia and Taiwan isn't the Ukraine".
Posters need to remember that.
- Xi is far more dangerous than Putin.
- China is wealthier, more technologically advanced, more politically integrated, and the PLA is far more modern than the Russian military.
- Taiwan is an island and presents different strategic and tactical problems than Ukraine does.
And if I may also add; the Chinese also won't enter into a conflict under the same highly flawed political assumptions as the Russians. Another point is that unlike the Russian army which has spent the past decade planning for sharp but short wars like Chechnya,, Syria, Georgia and the Donbas campaign; the PLA has been planning for high intensity protracted multi domain ops.
It is 40m "thin" at the top, the bottom it is over 115m "thick".
I'm not sure this is the silver bullet that this is made out to be, while possibly vulnerable, it is most likely attract some defenses. But the structure is so massive, it would be a difficult one to significantly damage, particularly with weapons and platforms that Taiwan has. Dams successfully struck during WWII were of the 6m thickness at the top, and were struck on the water side with specific sinking bombs over 4t in mass. Striking the open air dam face, even with large bombs or missiles, is unlikely to do significant damage, as there is all that concrete, supported by all that water.
The level of explosive required to even damage such a dam would be at least grandslam sized munitions, of the order of 10t. Even then, unless terminally damaging the object, WW2 history shows, often repairs were able to be carried out within a few days, sometimes within 24 hrs. Often making repeat raids fairly useless.
China will not be using half measures. I would expect an attack to involve everything, from mass sleeper agents, media influence, cyber, EM, decoys, drones, kinetic etc.
Any single attack on China is not likely to cripple them, they are a big nation. It would certainly however, give CCP leadership all the local support they could ask for, and probably international support as well.
Ultimately hitting the gorge doesn't disable China's military. Its air force, army and navy would still be fully functional.
Not sure I see a few F-16's and F-5's and a small dated navy being able to hold off China long enough for help to arrive. Taiwan should be aiming to keep itself in the fight for weeks or months. China has really stepped up in the last few years improving the quality and capability of its airforce and navy. Where before it was somewhat laughable, people aren't laughing anymore.
While ultimately ground forces will be needed, I'm curious to see how people see them rallying to that cause with no or limited air force or navy and in a space dominated by China.
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Both a retired Taiwanese Army Colonel and a retired Taiwanese Navy Admiral have said that Taiwan can't withstand a full blown PRC assault. They simply don't have the resources or the people under arms.
Adding on to @StingrayOZ excellent summary, the Three Gorges is of a gravity dam design which means it is self reinforcing and not susceptible to a cascade, failure. A successful hit and penetration is likely to do no more than cause the dam to leak slowly..
The larger question is why did the Taiwanese even suggest this as an option? Certain Taiwanese people were saying two missiles can do the job They could have consulted their own civil engineers and came to the same conclusions.
The larger question is why did the Taiwanese even suggest this as an option? Certain Taiwanese people were saying two missiles can do the job They could have consulted their own civil engineers and came to the same conclusions.
A belief that they hold an advantage over China makes it easier to spend less, have slipping defence programs and not push harder on conscription. To the casual lay person, it seems plausible. It wasn't Taiwans only card, their is also this belief that their strategic industries will mean China won't attack them, and the US will absolutely come to save them.
The US has the capabilities to damage this dam, but would have to assert massive air superiority over mainland China, not exactly an easy or cheap thing to obtain. Even then, it would be seen mostly as a civilian target, with a massive civilian casualty.
Taiwan doesn't have to defeat China is a straight up one on one fight. It just has to have significant capability to deter. Russia invaded Ukraine, because Ukraine politically & military was judged to be a soft target that Russia could win. Embolden by their previous efforts, the expected the whole country to fail to defend itself and it would be easy to make crushing victories like taking the capital, at which point there probably would be no organized military resistance.
China does not feel its current military capability is enough to comfortably take Taiwan. But in less than 5 years that is likely to change, as China seeks very near parity with the US, and Taiwan's capability continue to be fairly weak or age and erode.
We can see the US and Japan have concerns, because the US is significantly upgrading Guam, and Japan is significantly upgrading its lower island defences. Neither of these locations will be able to entirely defend Taiwan and stop an invasion, but they would be key locations in an prolonged fight to resist invasion. It is unlikely China would want to expand the fight to the US or Japan, and it would seek to deter both of them from getting involved in "an internal Chinese issue". It intends to take Taiwan, and keep others away,
The Americans aren't going to fight and high intensity war with China directly, just to keep Taiwan free and back up its minimal defence spending. That didn't happen in South Vietnam, it didn't happen in Ukraine. Sure they will supply weapons and intel, they might even distract and keep some Chinese forces busy. But ultimately the fight for Taiwan need to come from the Taiwanese themselves.
If China attacks any us bases or tried to limit their capability, well Pearl Harbor all over again and that will definitely be a US v China. So China is likely to be very careful to keep the Americans at bay. They may be a bit more direct with the Japanese.
But as we have seen in many recent conflicts, its an assistance, not completely handling the problem themselves. If you look at South Korea which faces a huge land based threat and even less strategic depth, they are in a much better position to defend themselves, and seem to indicate they would be able to sustain a resistance until a bigger US and global allies effort came to settle that game. South Korea does have similar issues with weapons and conscriptions, but they seem to be at a far higher order of capability. Taiwan has a fairly high GDP particularly PPP, and a reasonable population size. It isn't as tiny in size and population as Singapore, and it isn't exactly poor either.
Taiwan needs to address their weaknesses with great energy. At this stage, there isn't much time to bring in new platforms, but munitions and turn key weapon systems are still possible. An intensive call up of recent past conscript and addressing the current conscription system could easily turn around the training issues they have. Politically not popular, but it is time to start being realistic.
It is a bit like the "wunderwaffe" mentality of Nazi Germany towards the end of the war.
In the 2021 QDR, they did emphasis the need to reform the reservist program, which is a tacit acknowledgement that they are not doing enough. However, pg 32 of the QDR merely expressed high level principles. I am also surprised that they defined the role of the reservist force as:
i) garrisoned in beachhead,
ii) operational depth and urban terrain, and
iii) HVT protection
Other than ii) which is ambigious, the rest seems to be less direct combat roles. It is different from say Israeli or Singaporean thinking where reservists formations are often fully equipped as their regular counterparts and participate in warfighting exercises and evaluations (Singapore calls it ATEC)
In the 2021 QDR, they did emphasis the need to reform the reservist program, which is a tacit acknowledgement that they are not doing enough. However, pg 32 of the QDR merely expressed high level principles. I am also surprised that they defined the role of the reservist force as:
i) garrisoned in beachhead,
ii) operational depth and urban terrain, and
iii) HVT protection
Other than ii) which is ambigious, the rest seems to be less direct combat roles. It is different from say Israeli or Singaporean thinking where reservists formations are often fully equipped as their regular counterparts and participate in warfighting exercises and evaluations (Singapore calls it ATEC)
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- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #452
DPP supporters engaging in cognitive warfare against the Taiwanese
1. Every astute watcher of Taiwan knows that the ROC Army can’t fight. Taiwan’s MND illogically claims that the hollow 188k ROC Army, can fight for 14 days — across the board, a shortfall of 25% of troops in every regular battalion. Taiwan’s buy a few of each platform like the M1A2T, strategy is wrong. Choices have consequences — it’s great that fanboys celebrate the ROC Army decision to buy 108.
2. Taiwan’s weapons acquisition cycle lacks coherence.
5. Please feel free to checkout what the Taiwanese, DPP supporters, are saying in Chinese and this includes:
6. I am sad for Taiwan because there is no coherence to training their armoured battle group (ABG). The PLA is capable of infantry-tank cooperation & when the fight is from ridge-line to ridge-line (as with some of the terrain in Taiwan) — PLA tanks and tracked IFVs can provide a far-fire base support to kill ROC Army prepared positions. Taiwan needs to replace their M113s. The Cloud Leopard as an 8x8, is not an appropriate substitute for the M113 in an ABG — it just doesn’t have the mobility needed, for some mission sets.
7. There are plenty of passive aggressive Taiwanese catboys that can read Taiwanese brochures on their CM-32/33/34s but can’t understand armoured warfare. An 8x8 vehicle is not a substitute for existing ROC Army M113s (which are to be paired with M1A2Ts). Piss poor planning.
8. More than buying any CM-32, M1A2T, F-16V or missile defence system, Taiwan needs to pour concrete & buy blast doors. To be prepared for war, Taiwan needs to:
1. Every astute watcher of Taiwan knows that the ROC Army can’t fight. Taiwan’s MND illogically claims that the hollow 188k ROC Army, can fight for 14 days — across the board, a shortfall of 25% of troops in every regular battalion. Taiwan’s buy a few of each platform like the M1A2T, strategy is wrong. Choices have consequences — it’s great that fanboys celebrate the ROC Army decision to buy 108.
2. Taiwan’s weapons acquisition cycle lacks coherence.
3. Both the DPP & CCP on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are engaged in cognitive warfare; which is a form of information warfare against one's own people — this makes one's own people stupid.4. Many Taiwanese on Twitter don’t even understand war. Translating the DPP echo chamber, the above post says:
“In combat power, Taiwan is stronger than Ukraine, & China is weaker than Russia. Taiwan is not like Ukraine — there is a natural barrier, the Taiwan Strait, the terrain is rugged, & the density of mountains is the highest in the world. Only the army is better in China. Just how to land is difficult. As a defender, our conditions can be said to be very good.”
5. Please feel free to checkout what the Taiwanese, DPP supporters, are saying in Chinese and this includes:
(i) Taiwan is more important to the US than Ukraine.
(ii) They think it is almost impossible for Taiwan to lose in a real fight, and the only factor that they will lose is the possibility that a bunch of pro-Chinese traitors on the island knelt down and surrendered directly!
6. I am sad for Taiwan because there is no coherence to training their armoured battle group (ABG). The PLA is capable of infantry-tank cooperation & when the fight is from ridge-line to ridge-line (as with some of the terrain in Taiwan) — PLA tanks and tracked IFVs can provide a far-fire base support to kill ROC Army prepared positions. Taiwan needs to replace their M113s. The Cloud Leopard as an 8x8, is not an appropriate substitute for the M113 in an ABG — it just doesn’t have the mobility needed, for some mission sets.
Q: When is the ROC Army going to replace it’s M113s with another tracked armoured vehicle?
7. There are plenty of passive aggressive Taiwanese catboys that can read Taiwanese brochures on their CM-32/33/34s but can’t understand armoured warfare. An 8x8 vehicle is not a substitute for existing ROC Army M113s (which are to be paired with M1A2Ts). Piss poor planning.
8. More than buying any CM-32, M1A2T, F-16V or missile defence system, Taiwan needs to pour concrete & buy blast doors. To be prepared for war, Taiwan needs to:
(i) equip bomb shelters w blast doors & generators (like Finland);
(ii) properly train & equip its reservists; &
(iii) make up its shortfall in its 188k troop numbers.
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They can make up the shortfall by giving the same level of training to the reservists forces as the regular army, organise them properly into BCTs, and start to fill up their paper TO&Es with real equipment.
I am not sure which is more scary;
1) a Chinese leadership thinking (recklessly) they have a good chance of invading Taiwan succesfully, or
2) Taiwanese politicians who think they can buy their way out of the problem and/or depend on the US to come to their aid and magically reverse the situation, deus ex machina style.
The two complement each other and talk about them sleep walking into a conflict is a real possibility.
I could well be wrong but I doubt the Chinese is under any illusions that hostilities against Taiwan will be a piece of cake. They also have to factor in not only Taiwan but also hostilities against the U.S. and others.
I think Taiwan's leadership is highly aware of the fact that there might be a period where Taiwan is on its own until help arrives and that there might be a limit as to how far the U.S. is willing to given that China is a nuclear power or that at some point in the future the U.S's resolve might lessen due to various factors.
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- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #455
1. Those Taiwanese driving pro-DPP viewpoints usually are dedicated readers of Taiwan-can hype that ignore information from reliable sources (on actual and known problems in Taiwan’s military). I suspect that the ROC Army can’t use their reservists as interchangeable forces with the active battalions for 3 reasons — which are due to:
(a) equipping shortfalls — Taiwan has very old weapons, vehicles & equipment allocated for their reserve units — new stuff goes to active units;
(b) lack of leadership confidence in reserve units to perform — which is why the reserves get crap equipment & weapons; and
(c) poorly trained conscripts who cannot fight and move under fire (with only 4 months of unserious military training). They lack the budget to be trained properly — they don’t even have to pass a marksmanship test.
2. Without leadership and C4ISR, these numerous conscript battalions are not able to fight and move as a battalion for movement to contact, to engage in fighting on the move. These idiots are a greater risk to their own Taiwanese sector reinforcements — because their weapons are not zeroed and their platoons are not trained in passage-of-line procedures. They are often deployed in a static manner — I refer you to point 1(a) and (c), above for the reasons why they can’t fight or move.
3. Ukrainian forces steadily advanced in Kherson Oblast in Nov 2022 as Russian forces conduct a withdrawal from the Right bank of the Dnipro River. Like the mobilised Russian conscripts, the Taiwanese want to use their conscripts like literal cannon fodder, in static defensive positions — the average Taiwanese conscript will be like the Russian troops left behind in some of their chaotic withdrawals — elite units are withdrawn but they keep the poorly trained conscripts there to buy time.
4. Instead of Ukraine striking the left bank, the PLA wants to use PHL-16s to trap these conscripts Taiwanese battalions in Falaise Pockets (WWII); and also create a "Highway of Death" (from 1991 in Iraq & Kuwait), for the reinforcements. PLA land-based artillery are already capable of striking a significant portion of Taiwan; especially the PHL-16’s 250km to 290km range.
- PHL-03: 120km (allegedly at 130km)
- PHL-16: 250km (allegedly at 290km)
(a) Anti-ship weapons will be critical in a Taiwan scenario, but past and planned Air Force buys of the LRASM total only 179 by 2027, just enough for 9 B-52s or 7 B-1s to fly 1 sortie in a war over Taiwan.
(b) A huge influx of newcomers have joined these debates by writing nonsense. Many of these newcomers do not speak Chinese, nor do they understand the standard ploy of Taiwanese politics — telling lies or being an echo chamber for unsound ideas.
(c) As former INDOPACOM Commander, Adm(rtd) Phil Davidson noted:
“Our conventional deterrent is eroding. The main reason is the staggering growth in China’s air and maritime forces, its rocket forces, its nuclear program, and weapons like hypersonic missiles.”
6. Conversely, just because the PLA can invade does not mean it will do so. Beijing will not just throw a cosmic roll of the dice and start a Taiwan Straits war in the 2027 to 2030 Davidson window. But the notion that China is now a cautious, play it safe actor, does not stand scrutiny.
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The issue is not can't but won't. 1 (a), (b), (c) exist because they won't do it (e.g they are not interested to fix this). They gave the "military" reasons why clearly in the QDR but I suspect it is driven by a desire not to directly involve the civilian population for fear of unpopularity.
TW strategy now depends on the professional military to hold the line long enough to (1) exhaust the Chinese/causing them to fail and (2) for the Americans to get involved and of course, to convince the TW population that this will work.
The problem with this strategy is (1) seems to be less likely as the years go by. Yes, the Chinese would take massive losses but the capabilities that they are building today, both hardware and training are addressing it.
As for (2), some form of US involvement in a TW conflict is inevitable, but in what shape or form? Ukraine war strongly suggest the hypothesis that the US will restrict its support to aid, intelligence and indirect support as long as China does not directly attack US assets first (e.g Kadena, Anderson) like a Pearl Harbour.
Political post. Awarded 12 demerit points for 6 months.
DPP has lost the local elections of mayors and councillors to KMT, with Tsai resigning as the leader of DPP and it seems to hark back to the adage, "all politics is local".
Her strategy of trying to link the elections to the existential threat of China and this being of global significance backfired; voters were generally unhappy with the post-pandemic performance, economic issues and how the drought in 2022 was being dealt with (e.g water rationing for the people just to keep TSMC running)
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/CJT2SCO2BVMAJEVO4VCYX2VZXE.jpg)
www.reuters.com
www.scmp.com
Her strategy of trying to link the elections to the existential threat of China and this being of global significance backfired; voters were generally unhappy with the post-pandemic performance, economic issues and how the drought in 2022 was being dealt with (e.g water rationing for the people just to keep TSMC running)
Taiwan president quits as party head after China threat bet fails to win votes
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen resigned as head of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on Saturday after her strategy to frame local elections as showing defiance to China's rising bellicosity failed to pay off and win public support.
www.reuters.com
Taiwan elections: DPP’s Tsai resigns as party chief after KMT wins big
Results indicate the main opposition party has control of four of six key municipalities.
www.scmp.com
Political post. Awarded 12 demerit points for 6 months.
Analysis of the mid-term results. The issues are largely local considerations.
What do these two posts have to do with defence? They are of a purely political nature and that is against the rules. You have been given two warnings and awarded 12 demerit points for a period of 6 months for each warning. If you post about politics again the Moderators will act more severely.
Musashi_kenshin
Well-Known Member
Military unveils longer training - Taipei Times
Bringing Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan
www.taipeitimes.com
The military has announced longer training for its volunteer personnel. From next year, they will be in boot camp for eight weeks with training of 380 hours, up from five weeks and 230 hours respectively. The skills they are training on will increase to include (amongst other things), health management, survival skills and casualty care. They will also spend more time on marksmanship.
After boot camp, volunteer recruits will be assigned to military units for further training (I'm not clear if this is new or already part of their training system).
Taiwan has not yet formally announced conscripts receiving a full year's training, but an announcement this year is regarded as very possible.