a few pertinent points:
if CATOBAR then the following has to be addressed:
new engines for the ship as she was not designed for CATOBAR
- thus dramatic changes to bunkerage arise
- single engined aircraft become more viable - but still doesn't change the inherent limitations - but it will give an indication of the vessels likely operational purpose and factors like tempo capability.
- it means a redesign of the Su-2/3nn for snout pulling - a major exercise
STOBAR means some savage looking at aircraft types - eg none of the Russian STOBARs were able to be deployed fully fueled or weaps loaded. CATOBAR would change that.
STOBAR means that single jet engined aircraft for the intercept or strike role are less likely. It also means that smaller aircraft are severely challenged on range and load out issues if they are launching under their own engine thrust. Bear in mind that the PLAAF are still wandering around with no firm decision on replacement aircraft engines, be they russian or rebadges or indigenous
Aircraft choice will give huge indications of the vessels role as well as what changes are needed to be made to make it ready. It will also cement the window of availability of the vessel
At the moment STOBAR launches restrict this class to single shot launches and no concurrent traps. whereas a US carrier can undertake concurrent (2-3) simultaneous launches as well as traps if the angled CAT is not being used. (not entirely true - but I'm being generous
) That drags up the very real issue of persistence and saturation. A CATOBAR US equiv can get 3 times as many aircraft in the air and heading to target than a Varyag solution.
A STOBAR means that launches result in the aircraft to hold pattern so that they can form up and create a "flight" before heading to the target. If they don't then it means that aircraft are being sent in isolation and are thus left less effective in delivering not only persistence, but weapons saturation. They are already compromised by having shorter range due to self launch, a reduced weapons load and now thats even further compromised by having to run laps before forming up. meanwhile (depending on location of conflict etc...) a US style task force would see those aircraft forming up en route - not flying out immediately would have an absolute response advantage impact accordingly.
CATOBAR also means dramatic changes to crewing and skillsets. an ATC for a CATOBAR is a far more competent and skilled operator than that required for a STOBAR. It also effects handling techniques, crew resources, overall vessel complement, maintenance issues, and an increase in base level crewing. Tempo and skilled crew issues escalate dramatically for CATOBAR.
A STOBAR solution thus compared to a CATOBAR means that a vessel that is 60-70% of the displacement size of a typical US CVN will only have some 20-30% of absolute force generation in a given window of delivery - and with none of the force multipliers that a typical USN CSF/CTF can also bring to bear
organically
Thats an appalling example of efficiencies.
The impact on bunkerage alone is a full thread discussion item.