I have often seen parallels in the management of Tiger to the management of Collins, too few acquired, with insufficient investment in logistics and support in general, to have any hope of meeting the desired capability or availability. The other similarity is the public perception that a capable, world leading, high end platform is a failure and waste of money because of the underestimation by government of the investment actually required to meet the capability their policies have demanded.
It is a real shame Australia didn't acquire a squadron of surplus AH-1s in the 90s to learn everything about operating (and sustaining) attack helos before kicking off the ARH program. This would have averted a big issue with Tiger, jumping straight from a 60s vintage observation helo design (yes I know the Kiowa was introduced in the 70s but it was pure 60s, if not 50s in capability and technology) to the most advanced (and complex) example of attack recon helo available in the 2010s. There is precedence for this, the acquisition of King airs to bridge between the Caribou and Spartan, as well as the Rhinos bridging from the F-111/ HUG Bugs to the F-35. It was not just about capability (definitely not with the King Airs) but also about growing the required support capability and knowledge before the arrival of the bleeding edge new capability.