Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Takao]

I found Paul Dibbs' article an interesting read.

Revisiting the north in the defence of Australia | The Strategist

Certainly the author has being in the defence conversation for some decades now.

What ever we think we need on the defence chess board, Dibb's message is time is not on our side.

What should we do?

Regards S

I dislike it, but also confess to having issues with Dibb still being around and the fact that most of these "great" strategic thinkers recently have just written - meh. We are still picking up the pieces across the force 30 years on....

I love northern Australia. I've been posted up there before and would go again in a heartbeat. This includes the family - they love Darwin. But having said that, it has one big problem, 3422 of them actually. It's a long way away. That's before we hit Exmouth, Broome or Kununurra. This distance becomes key for blue and red.

Red: There are two ways of hitting northern Australia, via strike or as an invasion. Both have advantages in that there is little ADF assets there to stop us. There may be a submarine, there is a fighter squadron at Tindal (still 2 800 km away) and there are some Patrol Boats / OPVs. There is also a P-8 operating out of Darwin (that may be near the NW coast), Jindalee and anything on Christmas Island. Using fixed wing is slow - but the first strike may avoid the RAAF deployment of E-7 / KC-30 and go in unscathed. It can't really do anything east of Kununurra, although Darwin is a slim chance. Using missiles is obviously better, but is a political risk.

And...?

You hit some industry around the NW shelf (which is a strike that will hurt the economy a little, but not much compared to the war that red has just started and Australia cannot defend that no matter the investment put in there). But fundamental Australian industry, war making capability or...anything? Nope. In fact, to do this you have had to do something to Indonesia, meaning there is a really good chance your strike has just forced Indonesia into a formal alliance with Australia - which is kinda not good for you. You may have hit Darwin, which would kill a small naval base, some logistics, part of a Brigade (including most of our attack helicopters) and some C2 nodes. That will hurt a little, but honestly, not really (it'll become clear why in Blue)

So. Invade. Let's go bonkers and assume you can put a reinforced Division ashore without the ADF noticing (and can anyone actually do that?). And...? You have to advance 1 500 km to hit Perth, which still hasn't dramatically effected Australia's warfighting potential (although the loss of Stirling will have some operational level impacts), but the Australian centre of gravity is in the south east - the Brisbane-Adelaide-Melbourne triangle. That's more than 4 000 km away - what military can do that on the end of a supply chain open to interdiction through littorals and open ocean? Against an ADF that you cannot hit their bases of operations or supply chains, as they are 1000's of kilometres in front of you. Not even the US! Moving the invasion point from the NW to Darwin still has an impossibly large force advancing more than 3 500 km....

So there is no feasible red option that means anything because it's so far away.

Blue: We have to defence against a red strike. Missile defence is a joke (and I firmly believe it's a bottomless money pit that the ADF should be avoiding) and for us to put any reasonable assets in the north will demand similar assets already be placed in Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne as a minimum. That's a huge, huge chunk of money.

To defend against a fixed wing strike or invasion, you need forces up there. So lets place the E-7s, more F-35, some KC-30 add 9 FSB, get 1 Bde complete back up there and you get what? Well, first is a massive retention problem, second is a vulnerable target to that missile strike and thirdly, you get a bunch of resources on the end of a long, thin supply chain. And that right there is the killer - supporting a warfighting force in north Australia when all the industry, ports, people and infrastructure is in the south east is idiocy. Perhaps for a few weeks, but for months? Permanently? Catastrophically stupid. It takes, at best, four days for big materiel (AFV parts, helicopter parts, ammunition, fuel) to get from Brisbane to Darwin. Maintaining sufficient supplies up there for peacetime op's can be...sporting; in a war is going to be Herculean.

Overall, there is a whole big lot of nothing in Australia. Dibb ignores this. It's funny, because lesson #1 for RMC cadets in DefOps is don't chase ground. That applies strategically and tactically. Why dangle our forces out there, when we can let red do that and destroy their supply chains, and let the emus and kangaroos feast?

Putting some elements in the north is essential for acclimatisation and political reasons. An ADF element in Darwin is vital for military and civil reasons (the latter being more important - there is a need to publicly show Darwin locals are as important to Canberra as Brisbane or Sydney locals) and honestly, is a ball of fun. But just like in 1942 - 1945, the main centres of military power will lie in Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. There will be secondary nodes in Perth/Fremantle and Townsville. This works offensively and defensively with modern forces as well as 1940s forces. There are few in this country who have actually conceptualised what a modern military chews through in terms of logistics and how that needs to be sustained. It'll be hard doing that when fighting in Dalby, let alone 4 500 km away.

 

[Takao]

The only thing we can do is increase our defence budget, and use the money wisely.

Let me tweak that a little for you @hairyman: "The only thing we can do is increase our defence budget, and use the money wisely"

We need to prove we can use the money wisely first. And a tightening of our belts will also drive some innovation and make us question urgent v important. We are still too intellectually poor to justify a budget increase yet.

 

[Volkodav]

The justification for moving a big chunk of 1 BDE South was to have year round access to training grounds. Why not, if the wet is such an issue, send the rest of the brigade south and pivot Darwin to be the centre of amphibious capability?

I'm not suggesting we base the LHDs in Darwin, but rather 2 RAR and other units tailored for amphibious an tropical/monsoonal conditions. This should include, but not be limited to army water craft, amphibious vehicles, vehicles suitable for use in marshy terrain etc. Specifically trained and equipped engineering and logistics elements etc. Basically the sort of stuff we would need to make one of the three regular brigades amphibious or to conduct a short notice HADR op.

 

[Stampede]

The justification for moving a big chunk of 1 BDE South was to have year round access to training grounds. Why not, if the wet is such an issue, send the rest of the brigade south and pivot Darwin to be the centre of amphibious capability?

I'm not suggesting we base the LHDs in Darwin, but rather 2 RAR and other units tailored for amphibious an tropical/monsoonal conditions. This should include, but not be limited to army water craft, amphibious vehicles, vehicles suitable for use in marshy terrain etc. Specifically trained and equipped engineering and logistics elements etc. Basically the sort of stuff we would need to make one of the three regular brigades amphibious or to conduct a short notice HADR op.

There has been much discussion regarding force composition over the years.
Many including myself have put in our two cents worth.
What you suggest has merit and I can certainly see some logic in the geography regarding 2 RAR's move to Darwin.
My feeling is that I'm not really sure what Army wants to do with 2RAR.
It seems to be perpetually evolving.
Is it still a trials unit for amphibious concepts? Or has it finally found it's niche. Will it remain it's current small size, or will it grow and therefore to how big?
What of its internal composition, and what of its mix of regulars and reservists.
Change ,change,change!
I think it's days of de facto INF Battalion status has certainly well and truly gone.
So yes, maybe a move of 2 RAR to Darwin, but first I'd suggest we need to figure out just what we are moving?

My two cents on 2RAR is that I feel it is a most important unit within the ADF. Particularly as we want to expand our proficiency in amphibious operations.
As such It needs to sized accordingly to meet this expectation. Id suggest it needs three company sized groups to meet this requirement to mirror the Three Combat Brigade Group's ready, reset, reading phase's.
This means an expansion in it's numbers and those numbers should be Regulars not Reservist.
In particular the battalion should have the specialist water craft to perform this role acquired as a matter of urgency. That means now and not as some future project!
2 RAR has an important place in the ADF. It needs to be consolidated first and understood.
Then we can think about the geography it's location.


Regards S

 

[buffy9]

There has been much discussion regarding force composition over the years.
Many including myself have put in our two cents worth.
What you suggest has merit and I can certainly see some logic in the geography regarding 2 RAR's move to Darwin.
My feeling is that I'm not really sure what Army wants to do with 2RAR.
It seems to be perpetually evolving.
Is it still a trials unit for amphibious concepts? Or has it finally found it's niche. Will it remain it's current small size, or will it grow and therefore to how big?
What of its internal composition, and what of its mix of regulars and reservists.
Change ,change,change!
I think it's days of de facto INF Battalion status has certainly well and truly gone.
So yes, maybe a move of 2 RAR to Darwin, but first I'd suggest we need to figure out just what we are moving?

My two cents on 2RAR is that I feel it is a most important unit within the ADF. Particularly as we want to expand our proficiency in amphibious operations.
As such It needs to sized accordingly to meet this expectation. Id suggest it needs three company sized groups to meet this requirement to mirror the Three Combat Brigade Group's ready, reset, reading phase's.
This means an expansion in it's numbers and those numbers should be Regulars not Reservist.
In particular the battalion should have the specialist water craft to perform this role acquired as a matter of urgency. That means now and not as some future project!
2 RAR has an important place in the ADF. It needs to be consolidated first and understood.
Then we can think about the geography it's location.


Regards S

VIDEO: RIMPAC Showcases the Evolution, Expansion of Australia's Amphibious Force - USNI News

“I’m really keen to push the unit to become a world-class pre-landing force unit. The aiming mark I have set for the guys and girls in 2RAR is 1st Recon Battalion, U.S. Marine Corps. They’re an incredibly capable unit with a rich history of performance, and I think that’s what our aiming mark should be,” Pashley said, noting the unit’s attitude of setting high standards for themselves. “I’d like to really leverage off their specialist insertion capabilities, optimized for the littoral maritime environment. I’d also like to achieve the same level of innovation and adaption that exists there; they’re constantly innovating.” - LT COL. Douglas Pashley, CO of 2RAR (amphib).

IIRC there are several aquisition programs being undertaken by 2RAR, the first and most important being the procurement of equipment (namely comms gear) suited to the amohibious environment with sand, salt, etc. Riverine craft and/or unmanned systems are also being considered. Kind of fills that innovation mindset.

I'd like to understand how the four security PL work within 2RAR, whether they are specialised to beach security or whether they may operate in a maneuvre/assault role.

 

[Volkodav]

There has been much discussion regarding force composition over the years.
Many including myself have put in our two cents worth.
What you suggest has merit and I can certainly see some logic in the geography regarding 2 RAR's move to Darwin.
My feeling is that I'm not really sure what Army wants to do with 2RAR.
It seems to be perpetually evolving.
Is it still a trials unit for amphibious concepts? Or has it finally found it's niche. Will it remain it's current small size, or will it grow and therefore to how big?
What of its internal composition, and what of its mix of regulars and reservists.
Change ,change,change!
I think it's days of de facto INF Battalion status has certainly well and truly gone.
So yes, maybe a move of 2 RAR to Darwin, but first I'd suggest we need to figure out just what we are moving?

My two cents on 2RAR is that I feel it is a most important unit within the ADF. Particularly as we want to expand our proficiency in amphibious operations.
As such It needs to sized accordingly to meet this expectation. Id suggest it needs three company sized groups to meet this requirement to mirror the Three Combat Brigade Group's ready, reset, reading phase's.
This means an expansion in it's numbers and those numbers should be Regulars not Reservist.
In particular the battalion should have the specialist water craft to perform this role acquired as a matter of urgency. That means now and not as some future project!
2 RAR has an important place in the ADF. It needs to be consolidated first and understood.
Then we can think about the geography it's location.


Regards S

My thinking is the annual USMC rotation through Darwin also makes it the logical location for our main amphibious capability. There is talk of combat boats and probably space for something like the Bronco / Warthog or even an AAV of some of sort. There is probably a case for more army aviation based in Darwin rather than less (as army seems to desire, ie with their distain for Darwin and Sydney they could be called the " I want to be the Royal Queensland Air Force".

 

[Todjaeger]

So. Invade. Let's go bonkers and assume you can put a reinforced Division ashore without the ADF noticing (and can anyone actually do that?). And...? You have to advance 1 500 km to hit Perth, which still hasn't dramatically effected Australia's warfighting potential (although the loss of Stirling will have some operational level impacts), but the Australian centre of gravity is in the south east - the Brisbane-Adelaide-Melbourne triangle. That's more than 4 000 km away - what military can do that on the end of a supply chain open to interdiction through littorals and open ocean? Against an ADF that you cannot hit their bases of operations or supply chains, as they are 1000's of kilometres in front of you. Not even the US! Moving the invasion point from the NW to Darwin still has an impossibly large force advancing more than 3 500 km....

I have a minor quibble, in that I believe the US could launch successful strikes against ADF bases, depots, and supply lines if a conflict upon Australian soil were to break out between the US and Australia. The US simply has such an over match of potential strike assets along with the ability to in the C5ISR space that something could be tasked. As for carrying out a successful invasion and occupation, that becomes much less clear. I believe that the US has the potential assets and could arrange the needed level of logistical support, but it would be a major effort and would require the US drawing upon forces currently tasked with other responsibilities elsewhere in the world. Realistically, the only type of US invasion of Australia I see happening would come during tourist season(s) upon various airline carriers. The US and Australia just have too much at stake and too much in common for a direct conflict to occur.

Blue: We have to defence against a red strike. Missile defence is a joke (and I firmly believe it's a bottomless money pit that the ADF should be avoiding) and for us to put any reasonable assets in the north will demand similar assets already be placed in Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne as a minimum. That's a huge, huge chunk of money.

I am curious what you mean about missile defence being "a joke," are you referring to Australia being able to defend against inbound missile (cruise, ballistic, etc.) attacks? Or are you referring to Australia fielding GBAD SAM units? My personal feeling is that Australia having a limited GBAD capability over an area would be a good idea. A mobile or semi-mobile unit which can be used to create or be a part of an ad hoc IADS over a local area that ADF personnel might be deployed to or operating in, in the event that RAAF or allied fast air is not available to provide a CAP.

 

[Takao]

I have a minor quibble, in that I believe the US could launch successful strikes against ADF bases, depots, and supply lines if a conflict upon Australian soil were to break out between the US and Australia. The US simply has such an over match of potential strike assets along with the ability to in the C5ISR space that something could be tasked. As for carrying out a successful invasion and occupation, that becomes much less clear. I believe that the US has the potential assets and could arrange the needed level of logistical support, but it would be a major effort and would require the US drawing upon forces currently tasked with other responsibilities elsewhere in the world. Realistically, the only type of US invasion of Australia I see happening would come during tourist season(s) upon various airline carriers. The US and Australia just have too much at stake and too much in common for a direct conflict to occur.

Agreed. The US has sufficient conventional forces to hurt us very badly. But at a cost that would be staggering.

I am curious what you mean about missile defence being "a joke," are you referring to Australia being able to defend against inbound missile (cruise, ballistic, etc.) attacks? Or are you referring to Australia fielding GBAD SAM units? My personal feeling is that Australia having a limited GBAD capability over an area would be a good idea. A mobile or semi-mobile unit which can be used to create or be a part of an ad hoc IADS over a local area that ADF personnel might be deployed to or operating in, in the event that RAAF or allied fast air is not available to provide a CAP.

Air defence is essential. We are critically underdone in that respect, as are almost all Western forces, although we are getting better in the short range area (on land) through our Enhanced NASAMS and in the medium/long range area at sea though CFAR / DDG / SM-6. Add in the very capably E-7 set-up and we can mount highly successful DCA missions - to a point. But there are only 2 Bty of SAM and 3 DDG - they can't be everywhere. I'd love more; while I have enormous faith in the RAAF, historically defence of the ground / sea forces has always taken second place to "strategic" bombing and fighter combat. While they are doing that, I need some protection.

Missile defence is much, much harder. I am not convinced that kinetic interceptors will ever be suitable, the attacker has too many options to spoof the guidance. Between decoys, EW and simple salvo density, they can very quickly swap any defence. Western cruise missiles are easy, they are effectively just sub-sonic aircraft. But hypersonic or ballistic missiles are just too hard. Until non-kinetic means become viable, I don't see anyone licking the problem. Iron Dome and its associated systems (especially Arrow 3) are interesting, but even the targets are (generally) much easier than those that would be slung at Australia.

Then there is the tactical issues. The sensor network has to be capable of operating constantly and through the dry and wet seasons. Not too challenging I'd imagine for the surveillance aspects, but the cuing and targeting sensors will struggle in the wet most likely. Furthermore, those sensors are going to have impressive electronic signatures, and are mostly going to be large and static. Perfect targets for an anti-radiation missile or similar. Shutting down these ISR networks isn't hard.

Beyond the technical issues is the cost. Generally speaking, any of the systems capable of intercepting these threats are at least one, if not two, orders of magnitude in cost more that the threats they are engaging. So unless you battery can kill (not just engage) at least 10 missiles, it's a struggle to justify it. Now, how many launchers are we talking about? If it is to protect the Melbourne-Brisbane-Adelaide triangle, that's at least 8 - 10 online at any one time. How many to defend Northern Australia? Darwin + Tindal + Townsville + 2 - 3 for NW shelf + 2 - 3 other locations? That's another 7 - 9 launchers....That isn't sustainable from a money aspect, let alone the cost to maintain 100% alert status (and the additional launchers for training, redundancy and the like).

All up, I agree 100% with you about SAMs / GBAD to protect fleet or land units out to 100 odd km against anything under, say, Mach 3.5. Boost that stuff. But Mach 6 - 8? Or Mach 20? That stuff is not viable, cost effective or likely. How many trillions of dollars has the US spent? We cannot match that. It sucks, but at this point we should spend that money on passive defence measures, including redundant elements for when strikes are successful.

 

[vonnoobie]

Pretty much my take on it too. The old "elite" light infantry and special forces argument, even though every war we have fought has proven the need for mounted forces, be it the light horse in the Boer War and WW1, or armour since. Then there's every other "expensive" capability that saves lives and makes a big difference in battle, seen as unnecessary in peace and rapidly recapitalised when the shooting starts.

Actually armour was arguably vital to our needs in WWI as well as history shows it was an all but useless back and forth struggle until elements of Australian, British and Canadian forces together and independently developed and refined combined arms warfare of which armour was a vital piece of the force.

Simple matter is we have needed armoured forces to one degree or another for over the last 100 years in almost every conflict we have fought in in that time and can very well be argued that not having them at the start of WWII was detrimental to our forces.

 

[ngatimozart]

Actually armour was arguably vital to our needs in WWI as well as history shows it was an all but useless back and forth struggle until elements of Australian, British and Canadian forces together and independently developed and refined combined arms warfare of which armour was a vital piece of the force.

Simple matter is we have needed armoured forces to one degree or another for over the last 100 years in almost every conflict we have fought in in that time and can very well be argued that not having them at the start of WWII was detrimental to our forces.

Well when you think about it, modern armour is just the latest iteration of armoured knights on horseback riding into battle - heavy cavalry. It's just the mounts and weapons have changed.

 

[vonnoobie]

Well when you think about it, modern armour is just the latest iteration of armoured knights on horseback riding into battle - heavy cavalry. It's just the mounts and weapons have changed.

Was speaking more in the Australian historical context but yes you are right. Quick research on it and what is believed to be the origination of heavy cavalry was the Cataphract between 1000 and 700BC or if you want to go back further War Elephants which can be dated anywhere 1500 and 1200 BC. All just goes to show heavy forces have been a major requirement of many military's going back up to 3,500 years. But yeah the ADF doesnt need to pay attention to 3,500 years of world wide warfare experience, We can just stick with light infantry. She'll be right mate.....

 

[Stampede]

Well when you think about it, modern armour is just the latest iteration of armoured knights on horseback riding into battle - heavy cavalry. It's just the mounts and weapons have changed.

Was speaking more in the Australian historical context but yes you are right. Quick research on it and what is believed to be the origination of heavy cavalry was the Cataphract between 1000 and 700BC or if you want to go back further War Elephants which can be dated anywhere 1500 and 1200 BC. All just goes to show heavy forces have been a major requirement of many military's going back up to 3,500 years. But yeah the ADF doesnt need to pay attention to 3,500 years of world wide warfare experience, We can just stick with light infantry. She'll be right mate.....

Shall we buy some elephants for our light Infantry?

Regards S

 

[ngatimozart]

Shall we buy some elephants for our light Infantry?

Regards S

If they'll powered by diesel engines, move wheels or tracks, armed with 30 mm chain gun and are armoured. Not something that Hannibal took over the Alps to give the Romans nightmares and cause them to crap their togas.

 

[vonnoobie]

Shall we buy some elephants for our light Infantry?

Regards S

Nah we need to create Australian jobs, Recruit the Wombats. Dont even have to arm them, They will break anything any enemy sends against them

Jokes aside, I recall a while back about discussions going on about increasing the number of M1's in service, Is that still planned or is that on the back burner until a decision is made on the upgrade/replacement of our current lot?

 

[Volkodav]

Nah we need to create Australian jobs, Recruit the Wombats. Dont even have to arm them, They will break anything any enemy sends against them

Jokes aside, I recall a while back about discussions going on about increasing the number of M1's in service, Is that still planned or is that on the back burner until a decision is made on the upgrade/replacement of our current lot?

On the topic of tank numbers I read an article comparing the current US and Russian Combined Arms battle group doctrine. The US battle group is tank heavy (three companies and possibly a tank equipped Cav Troop) with limited infantry (one company) and engineer support, with only mortars for indirect fire support, while the Russian equivalent is mechanised / armoured infantry heavy, with a company of tanks in support with massive artillery support (one or more SPG Btns). The US doctrine is direct fire support from the tanks, then over whelming the enemy with the following armoured brigade / division, the Russian doctrine is find and fix the enemy with the infantry and armour then destroy them with artillery.

In the Australian context, we have fewer tanks than the Russians without their overwhelming artillery overmatch, and nowhere near as many tanks as the US, and even less in terms of organic indirect fire support. So looking at what you would assume is worlds best practice, our battle groups are lighter and less well supported, with neither the direct, or indirect fire support the big boys see as indispensable.

 

[Ocean1Curse]

No jokes from me though. At the last Cold War when we had a war economy vs an economic one, the economic one is still around. I just think that an Army designed and built from the bottom up to serve Australia will produce something that could be more capable and perhaps cheaper than one designed to be an adjunct of US Foreign Policy. Now we have to look on China as if it is a beast. So will the Army be designed to stabilise other nations through military means or should stabilisation occur through loans and development and so on forcing them to be friendly to Australia otherwise Chinese interests will take them over in the long run.

China hasn't wasted a penny on getting into wars so if the Army gets into being more and more an adjunct of US foreign policy then Australia simply won't be able to afford it because the economic component demands more growth to project itself into the rest of the world.

So now we have a different set of decisions because the global market is supposed to rejuvenate western economies and now the ADF must have the tools to do that and at some point the ADF and the economy has to be conjoined because history is with the material, and among that material there is no credible threat that would justify increasing expeditionary forces. So now we have to invent boggy monsters to justify increasing expeditionary forces.

There's the African notion that if you want to go quickly then go alone. But if you want to go far then go together. So I do think it is about how do we include everyone in the development and growth agenda which should be at the core of the ADF. Y'know and that will pay the bills.

 

[old faithful]

On the topic of tank numbers I read an article comparing the current US and Russian Combined Arms battle group doctrine. The US battle group is tank heavy (three companies and possibly a tank equipped Cav Troop) with limited infantry (one company) and engineer support, with only mortars for indirect fire support, while the Russian equivalent is mechanised / armoured infantry heavy, with a company of tanks in support with massive artillery support (one or more SPG Btns). The US doctrine is direct fire support from the tanks, then over whelming the enemy with the following armoured brigade / division, the Russian doctrine is find and fix the enemy with the infantry and armour then destroy them with artillery.

In the Australian context, we have fewer tanks than the Russians without their overwhelming artillery overmatch, and nowhere near as many tanks as the US, and even less in terms of organic indirect fire support. So looking at what you would assume is worlds best practice, our battle groups are lighter and less well supported, with neither the direct, or indirect fire support the big boys see as indispensable.

we had some of the finest light infantry in the world.
Now we have average mechanized infantry, with below average vehicles, below average fire support for them, below average armour assets to support them , and well below average resup means, eg off road refuelers and other logistics.
If we are going to have mechanized infantry Battalions x 3, then we need mechanized support properly done.

 

[south]

Agreed. The US has sufficient conventional forces to hurt us very badly. But at a cost that would be staggering.

Although this is an exceedingly unlikely, hence irrelevant scenario, I disagree. Utilising purely conventional effects a combination of SSN/SSGN/B-52/B-1 could take out a enough high value targets in a single night, even if the ADF was in a defensive posture, to cripple our JOC / C2 / RAAF / RAN in a very short period of time. Army is far more resilient, but to what end if they can't get anywhere. And in the grand scheme of things it wouldn't be super expensive.

Air defence is essential. We are critically underdone in that respect, as are almost all Western forces, although we are getting better in the short range area (on land) through our Enhanced NASAMS and in the medium/long range area at sea though CFAR / DDG / SM-6. Add in the very capably E-7 set-up and we can mount highly successful DCA missions - to a point. But there are only 2 Bty of SAM and 3 DDG - they can't be everywhere.

NASAMs whilst definitely a step forward for Army will be most effective against choppers, most UAV's and slower aircraft; it presently will struggle to engage fast air (look at the wiki numbers for a surface launched AIM120 vs a high altitude JDAM, let alone JDAM-ER or SDB equivalents), and will be outranged by anyone with any sort of standoff weapons. Hopefully some sort of AIM120-ER and future Land based strategic SAM will help redress these points.

I'd love more; while I have enormous faith in the RAAF, historically defence of the ground / sea forces has always taken second place to "strategic" bombing and fighter combat. While they are doing that, I need some protection.

For mine this is slightly unfair to air - priorities will be set by the Joint Force Commander, the Air Component will work within this. Force protection will be assigned a very high level of priority (example despite getting limited press, DCA was conducted 1991, 2003, and is ongoing in other theatres). The bigger limitation for the RAAF in isolation is pure numbers to maintain a ongoing DCA presence with a robust air threat.

Western cruise missiles are easy, they are effectively just sub-sonic aircraft. But hypersonic or ballistic missiles are just too hard. Until non-kinetic means become viable, I don't see anyone licking the problem. Iron Dome and its associated systems (especially Arrow 3) are interesting, but even the targets are (generally) much easier than those that would be slung at Australia.

Western cruise missiles are not a trivial target set, hence they are continuing to be built. Ask the Syrians.

Then there is the tactical issues. The sensor network has to be capable of operating constantly and through the dry and wet seasons. Not too challenging I'd imagine for the surveillance aspects, but the cuing and targeting sensors will struggle in the wet most likely. Furthermore, those sensors are going to have impressive electronic signatures, and are mostly going to be large and static. Perfect targets for an anti-radiation missile or similar. Shutting down these ISR networks isn't hard.

Shutting down a resilient, redundant, well engineered IADS is actually quite difficult, particularly in the presence of passive and active defence (i.e mobile systems, passive systems, electronic decoys and hard/soft kill). All stuff the west doesn't do much of.

 

[seaspear]

If wew were to revisit the sixties are we to revisit the atomic weapons where there was research and planning of which didnt fade away in the sixties ,Im not advocating this just pointing out Australia was in the past in a reasonable position to develop its own and the launch vehicle was the F111

 

[ngatimozart]

If wew were to revisit the sixties are we to revisit the atomic weapons where there was research and planning of which didnt fade away in the sixties ,Im not advocating this just pointing out Australia was in the past in a reasonable position to develop its own and the launch vehicle was the F111

I can't quite remember what the story was but GF0012 did know the story and I think the US was not very happy with the idea of Australia having nuclear weapons, so they more or less gave Australia the hard word. Unfortunately GF is taking an extended break from the forum. During WW2 the UK gave the US money and a substantial head start in the creation of the atomic bomb and after the war ended, the UK rightfully expected to have some nuclear weapons of its own from the ones developed in the US. However the US under Truman point blank refused such a request and forced the UK to develop its own right from the start and forbade any US material, scientific or otherwise to be passed on to the UK. My own opinion is that they had the same attitude towards Australia developing its own nuclear weapons program in the 1960s yet turned a blind eye to the Israeli program.