Afghanistan War

[STURM]

Unreliable Indian sources estimate that more than 10,000 Pakistanis have entered the war zone in Afghanistan to openly support the Taliban's offensive against the Ashraf Ghani-led Afghanistan government. Pakistan's envisioned pivot to geo-economics continues to be a pipe dream due to their army’s addiction to sponsoring terror groups in Afghanistan and India.

The last time (I could be wrong) Pakistani volunteers (mostly Pashtun) in large numbers entered Afghanistan to assist the Taliban was in the 1996 period when the Talibs were much weaker and faced not only the Northern Alliance but several
anti-Taliban Pashtun groups in the Pashtun heartland but as you said the 10,000 figure didn’t come from a credible source. If anything I would guess that a lack of volunteers or manpower is not an issue for the Talibans at present but logistical and other issues.

As is well known Pakistan’s aims in Afghanistan are driven by the Indian threat (strategic depth) and also to ensure it has friendly relations with Afghanistan’s Pashtun majority; given that Pakistan has a large Pashtun population and unresolved border demarcation issues with Afghanistan along the Durand Line. India’s previous attempts to seek greater influence in Afghanistan and the reported support given to Baluch separatist groups have played to Pakistani paranoia.

 

[OPSSG]

Providing Context to News Reports on Taliban Success — Part 7

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1413509591116107783

29. Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the rapid territorial gains made by the Taliban in recent months are partly due to the fact that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have been consolidating their forces. “Part of this is they're giving up district centres in order to consolidate their forces because they're taking an approach to protect the population, and most of the population lives in the provincial capitals and the capital city of Kabul.”

30. Balanced news reporting occurred in the 2006 to 2010 period that accompanied the surge in NATO forces in Afghanistan at the tail end of the period and the dramatic escalation of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan—one of which killed Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud — as the level of security went down, the quality of reporting declined.

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(a) The 2014 Afghan presidential election provides a sobering reminder of how difficult it is for meaningful democracy to emerge and develop in a situation such as that faced by Afghanistan, and resulted in a fragmented government leadership structure that fails to lead and seeks to blame their failure on the Taliban. Instead of being honest about reform and change, the corrupt President Hamid Karzai and later President Ashraf Ghani used Pakistan as an outside threat to unite Afghans behind them. They refused to characterize the Taliban as anything but a creation of Islamabad. It is not surprising for an Afghan leader to claim to be fighting a foreign Pakistani invasion — but Pakistan could never fully out-inspire the American occupation narrative of the Taliban.​

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(b) “I like to use a cancer analogy. Petty corruption is like skin cancer; there are ways to deal with it and you’ll probably be just fine. Corruption within the ministries, higher level, is like colon cancer; it’s worse, but if you catch it in time, you’re probably ok. Kleptocracy, however, is like brain cancer; it’s fatal,” Christopher Kolenda, an army colonel who had been deployed to Afghanistan several times, told SIGAR researchers. US officials told interviewers that by allowing corruption to fester, the US and allies helped destroy the popular legitimacy of the wobbly Afghan government.​

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(c) In an interview with National Public Radio, CIA Director Bill Burns admitted that while “the trend lines are certainly troubling,” the Afghan government is far from helpless. “The Afghan government retains significant military capabilities,” Burns said. “The big question, it seems to me and to all of my colleagues at CIA and across the intelligence community, is whether or not those capabilities can be exercised with the kind of political willpower and unity of leadership that's absolutely essential to resist the Taliban,” Burns added.​

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(d) Gen. Mark Milley said in May that the Afghan Air Force (AAF) conducts “80 to 90 percent of all air strikes in support of the Afghan ground forces.” So, after the American withdrawal, “[t]he key will be the Afghan air force and their ability to continue providing close air support,” Milley predicted. Unfortunately, despite significant progress, the AAF is not yet ready to provide the full range of air support. While it may conduct most air support now, Afghans still depend on the US for some of the more difficult missions. An Afghan general in Kandahar warned in Jan 2021 that “without U.S. air support, the Taliban would gain power here.”​

31. Unless the ANDSF believe in their own government and is willing to fight for it, and the AAF grows more capable, no amount of American support is enough. Kandahar’s notorious police chief, the late Abdul Razziq, was renowned for caring for his officers and something of an authority on fighting the Taliban. He once said, “Taliban morale is better than government morale. Taliban morale is very high. Look at their suicide bombers. The Taliban motivate people to do incredible things.”

32. In contrast to the 2006 to 2010 period, news reports today on Afghanistan tend to be unbalanced (with any gains made by the Taliban reported in a breathless manner). When the ANDSF take back the same territory, it is deemed not news worthy — for example, Afghan security forces retook the control of Dara-e-Sof-e-Bala district in Samangan province. Each time the ANDSF take back a district, the Taliban lose fighting men. This is part of the reason why the Taliban concentrate on fighting to gain ground in rural areas and have to keep moving their forces — as they cannot hold ground in the face of a determined counter attack by the ANDSF.

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(a) Residents of Balkh were taken aback when they received leaflets from the Taliban ordering them to follow severe regulations identical to those enforced on Afghans when the Taliban ruled the nation from 1996 to 2001. Many Afghanistan citizens, especially those in the urban areas have been disappointed by the new stringent restrictions imposed on the local population in several of the districts that the Taliban have lately conquered — which means greater resistance to Taliban mis-rule. Massoma Jafari (23), who sells jewellery and make up in Kabul, said she knew the price women would have to pay if the militants seized national power. "I come from Ghor where many women have been stoned to death by the Taliban in the past. But look at me, I symbolise resistance," said Jafari.​

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(b) Women own almost 60,000 businesses, predominantly in Kabul, including restaurants, salons and handicrafts shops, according to the Afghanistan Women Chamber of Commerce and Industry. "All of my friends and family are advising me to quit and leave the country (but) my resolve to promote women's businesses, create jobs for them and see a self-reliant Afghanistan is keeping me here and fighting for survival," said designer Marzia Hafizi (29) is worried about the survival of her fashion business and of the gains women have made in the last 20 years.​

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(c) Thanks to news reporting that conforms to Taliban propaganda, the country has seen an exodus of its political elite and civil society activists, journalists and intellectuals over the last year due to a targeted killing campaign that swept the country, largely unclaimed but widely attributed to the Taliban. This campaign, along with the potential for the country to slide back under Taliban rule, has struck fear in the hearts of many Afghans.​

 

[STURM]

When the Afghan security forces take back the same territory, it is deemed not news worthy — for example, Afghan security forces retook the control of Dara-e-Sof-e-Bala district in Samangan province.

Indeed. By the same token we keep hearing time and time again about how ill trained and ineffective Afghan army units have enabled the Taliban to gain ground. Little or no mention of the few well trained and effective Afghan units which have offered fierce resistance in stemming tide.

 

[OPSSG]

Providing Context to News Reports on Taliban Success — Part 8

33. In 2020, reportedly in accordance with secret annexes to the U.S.-Taliban deal, the insurgents significantly scaled back their traditional annual campaign to attack the capitals of a number of besieged provinces. About 20,000 Afghans who worked as interpreters for the United States during its war in Afghanistan and now fear retribution from Taliban insurgents have applied for evacuation, the White House said 15 Jul 2021.

(a) The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, which created the Afghan Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) program. The interpreters being readied for evacuation are those who have already filed applications under the State Department program of SIV for Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters.​

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(b) For an Afghan applicant to apply for and receive a SIV is 14 steps, within the interagency progress. Last year the State Department reported to Congress that the DoD “Find My Supervisor” link on the SIV application webpage had been broken for a year; preventing many Afghan translators and interpreters from even beginning to apply for SIVs. The failure to roll-out SIV in a timely manner is causing damage to the Biden administration’s reputation.​

34. After Sept 2021, physically getting U.S. forces back into Afghanistan and sustaining them logistically will pose serious challenges. In the past, when the U.S. military could rely on overland routes through Pakistan and a collection of other military corridors known as the "Northern Distribution Network." At the height of the Afghan war from 2009 to 2012, that network flowed through former Soviet states that border Afghanistan, into Russia and ultimately to the Caspian or Baltic seas, and played a critical role the last time the U.S. tried to withdraw fully from Afghanistan in 2014. Neither of those logistics routes are practically reliable now following two decades of fraying relationships between Washington and Islamabad – chiefly over support for the Taliban from elements of its army and intelligence services – and Moscow since its annexation of Crimea in 2014.

35. The Americans made a choice (not to have a small counter-terrorism force of 1,500 to 2,500 troops). But that choice to pull-out all troops by 11 Sept 2021 has consequences.

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(a) IMO, what is happening to people in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, is terrible — even more districts are going to be subject to Taliban rule as the ANDSF, realigns it’s forces to defend the cities — which to some extent is inevitable. The UN blames most of the 1,600 civilian deaths on the Taliban and other anti-government elements. The fighting has also forced many people to flee their homes - around 300,000 have been displaced since the start of the year. The UNHCR says a new wave of internal displacement across the provinces of Badakhshan, Kunduz, Balkh, Baghlan and Takhar comes as the Taliban has captured large swathes of rural territory.​

(b) George Bush (43rd president) was in office when al-Qaeda operatives hijacked commercial airliners and flew the planes into the World Trade Center towers in New York and the Pentagon military headquarters outside Washington, DC on 11 Sept 2001. The US invaded Afghanistan the following month in pursuit of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who was being hosted by the Taliban. In the media interview recorded at Bush’s summer home, the former president was asked whether the withdrawal is a mistake. "I think the consequences are going to be unbelievably bad," he told German broadcaster Deutsche Welle.​

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(c) Therefore, I am not sure that we should buy the BS from the US President Biden, when he says that the US can't be in Afghanistan "indefinitely." There are some 28,000 US troops in South Korea three-quarters of a century after the end of the Korean War, because the US has a strategic interest in defending the country against the nuclear armed North Korea.​

 

[ngatimozart]

A Foreign Affairs article on the impact that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan will have on Pakistan. They label it a pyrrhic victory because whilst the ISI will be congratulating themselves, in the long term the victory will diminish Pakistan in the game of nations. The US will no longer need to support it and any US weapons systems that it has. The Pakistani Taliban may decide to increase their domain physically, religiously, and politically. Pakistan is building up an increasingly large debt to the PRC and it has the possibility of being a Chinese puppet state, because it has no obvious ways of repaying the large debt. The Pakistan military's blind fixation upon India and its control of Pakistani politics and government is holding back the country.

Pakistan’s Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan

Islamabad will come to regret aiding the Taliban’s resurgence.

www.foreignaffairs.com

 

[STURM]

A very interesting/informative podcast which although is focused on a specific area in Afghanistan; has a direct bearing a various things discussed in this thread.

In 31.00 the guest speaks about an incident an which the Americans got themselves into something they didn’t understand at the urging of an Afghan government official; making enemies of a local community who called the Taliban in because they saw the Americans as being used aa muscle for the Afghan government official.

 

[STURM]

They label it a Pyrrhic victory because whilst the ISI will be congratulating themselves, in the long term the victory will diminish Pakistan in the game of nations.

The Pakistanis are fully aware of this. They have had their share of disagreements with the Afghan Taliban which contrary to popular belief don’t dance to every Pakistani tune. A nightmare scenario for Pakistan is its large Pashtun population seeking some kind of merger with Afghan Pashtuns and the Afghans reviving their claim on the disputed parts of the Durand Line (which as is well known is an artificial border like many created by outsiders).

The Pakistan military's blind fixation upon India and its control of Pakistani politics and government is holding back the country.

“Pakistan A Hard Country” (Anatol Lieven) has an interesting chapter on the Pakistani military. He points out that despite its flaws and political meddling; the military is seen as the one stable, efficient and incorruptible institution in the country- the contrast between the chaotic streets of major cities and the orderliness of army camps is striking. The army holds a very important place in the national psyche; not very apparent or understood by most outsiders.

Another author who has written extensively on Pakistan (often very critically) and its role in Afghanistan is Ahmad Rashid. His books, articles and videos are highly recommended. In one of his videos he recalls briefing Blair who apparently wasn’t really interested.

 

[STURM]

Therefore, I am not sure that we should buy the BS from the US President Biden, when he says that the US can't be in Afghanistan "indefinitely." There are some 28,000 US troops in South Korea three-quarters of a century after the end of the Korean War, because the US has a strategic interest in defending the country against the nuclear armed North Korea.

Plus the fact that U.S. troops have been in the Middle East for decades.

The difference between South Korea is that U.S. troops are not being killed with no end in sight; they face North Korea which unlike the Taliban can actually threaten the U.S. (and it’s allies), there is a fully democratic government in South Korea and East Asia is an area of far greater strategic importance for the Americans compared to Central Asia.

A cynic might also point out that the continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan also serves as a sharp constant reminder of a policy which went terribly wrong. Getting the troops out plays to domestic politics as well.

 

[John Fedup]

The possibility of territory being lost by Pakistan to the Afghanistan Taliban would be an interesting outcome from a blame game perspective. How would the military, ISI, and the government (not sure if they hold any cards) assign blame? Putting it all on India, can’t see that working. Perhaps godless Xi will sort it.

 

[OPSSG]

Providing Context to News Reports on Taliban Success — Part 9

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1418146829854728192

36. Along with American air strikes all across Afghanistan, there is courage to be found by the public uprising forces in 2 of the 3 hotly contested districts mentioned. It was reported that US air strikes were carried out in the last 52 hours across many provinces in Afghanistan. What we see in information releases by the Afghan Government or the Taliban is so selective and limited that it is propaganda by either side. The situation is more complex than it appears. Let me share some background info on 3 districts where American air strikes occurred:

(i) Garmsir district is located in the southern part of Helmand Province. It is the site of the Apr 2008 Battle of Garmsir, where US Marines and British troops of the 16 Air Assault Brigade, fought hard battles to pry it out of the dead hands of the Taliban who fought there — given that Helmand is stronghold for the insurgents. After seizing Garmsir back in 2008, the US Marines took a month to push further south into an area where the insurgents had built bunkers and tunnels capable of withstanding coalition airstrikes. It is the site of many subsequent battles in an area that will always be held by the Taliban.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1408386658278547457

(ii) Sayed Abad district is a hotly contested district in Maidan Wardak Province, and its district headquarters was over run by the Taliban before and taken back by ANDSF. In 2018, the district police chief along with 9 other policemen was killed. The Taliban also set fire to some official buildings in that 2018 attack before withdrawing from the district center, a usual rebel tactic — as usual, when there is a Taliban attack, the news is well covered. But when the district is taken back, the new agencies don’t care to report this as news.​

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(iii) In Jul 2021, 2 US air strikes in the Shah Wali Koat district destroyed 10 Humvees used by the Taliban. Earlier, in Feb 2021, the Afghan Air Force destroyed 7 Taliban vehicles in the Shah Wali Koat district. American UAVs had helped locate these Taliban vehicles, and Afghan flown A-29s destroyed them. The “Taliban wanted to use the vehicles in suicide car bombs,” said a counter-terrorism officer in Kandahar. As you may know, Shah Wali Koat district is a hotly contested district that is situated in the northern part of Kandahar Province (and it borders Naish District and Oruzgan Province to the north)— significant fighting occurred in 2010 — it took a five-day joint operation conducted by Australian special forces and the Afghan National Army with US air support to pry it out of the dead hands of the Taliban who fought there.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1414836355234996226

37. Women have taken up guns in northern and central Afghanistan, marching in the streets in their hundreds and sharing pictures of themselves with assault rifles on social media, in a show of defiance (as the Taliban make sweeping gains nationwide). They are not likely to head to the frontlines as part of the public uprising forces, any time soon, because of both social conservatism and lack of experience.

38. According to a UN report, anti-government forces were responsible for 64% of civilian casualties. Pro-government forces accounted for 25%, and 11% are blamed on crossfire. Of all casualties, 32% were children. Peace talks between the two sides are moving slowly. Deborah Lyons, the UN special envoy for Afghanistan, urged both sides to "take heed of the conflict's grim and chilling trajectory". In the meantime, Taliban commanders have a list of names that the insurgents wanted to take revenge on. In some cases, the fear was from family members who were fighting on opposing sides. As such, it is not surprising that a deadly string of assassinations have occurred across Afghanistan. What we see in Afghanistan in districts taken over by the Taliban, is a bloodbath. Media reported that on July 19, Taliban forces shot and killed two sons of a provincial council member, Fida Mohammad, who had reportedly had a close relationship with the late Kandahar police chief, Gen. Abdul Raziq, whom the Taliban killed in 2018.

39. The immediate future for Afghanistan in 2021 to 2022 is going to look like a slug fest near Afghan cities between the ANDSF and the Taliban, with a bunch of militias in the mix. Seizing a city in Afghanistan requires the massing forces, which makes the Taliban vulnerable to airstrikes. The Taliban have learned this lesson before (the hard way), as did the mujahedin in the battle for Jalalabad.

40. The Taliban strategy is to take districts that circle Kabul. and recently took districts in Parwan, Logar, and Maidan Wardak provinces and only just captured Alah Say district in Kapisa, an hour’s-drive to the north of Kabul. I am unconvinced the Taliban can conquer Afghanistan militarily in 2021 or 2022. Rather, if the Afghan Government is going to fall in 2023, it will fall politically via abandonment by Afghan elites. This is because the US is providing 37 additional UH-60s, 3 A-29s & US$3.3B in military aid for FY22. There have also been reports that:

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(a) B-52s are seen providing a show of force over Kandahar city and air support in other areas of Afghanistan; and​

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(b) the US will also provide training for Afghan Commandos in Qatar, and big-ticket maintenance for Afghan Air Force aircraft in UAE, plus some remote contract maintenance support as well.​

 

[Feanor]

Providing Context to News Reports on Taliban Success — Part 9

36. Along with American air strikes all across Afghanistan, there is courage to be found by the public uprising forces in 2 of the 3 hotly contested districts mentioned. It was reported that US air strikes were carried out in the last 52 hours across many provinces in Afghanistan. What we see in information releases by the Afghan Government or the Taliban is so selective and limited that it is propaganda by either side. The situation is more complex than it appears…

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1414836355234996226

37. Women have taken up guns in northern and central Afghanistan, marching in the streets in their hundreds and sharing pictures of themselves with assault rifles on social media, in a show of defiance (as the Taliban make sweeping gains nationwide). They are not likely to head to the frontlines as part of the public uprising forces, any time soon, because of both social conservatism and lack of experience.

There are a number of local militias in Afghan that are not fond of the Taliban. It's not dissimilar to the pattern of local militias that appeared in Syria, whose loyalties primarily lie to their community. They often don't have any general political ambitions and are very open to negotiating with just about anyone, as long as it protects their purely local interests. Some of the recent information out of Afghanistan suggests that a number of these have emerged all over Afghan. I can't help but wonder if these armed women are part of this trend.

 

[STURM]

If I’m not mistaken there were reports of armed Hazara women in the mid 1990’s period when the Taliban went on the offensive.

 

[OPSSG]

If I’m not mistaken there were reports of armed Hazara women in the mid 1990’s period when the Taliban went on the offensive.

As an ethnic group, the Hazaras are again at risk of genocide. The Hazaras have been discriminated long before the Taliban. Their Shia religion and Asian-looking phenotype make them stand out in Afghanistan as easy targets.

When the Taliban took the Saighan and Kahmard districts many Hazara people left their houses and fled to the mountains. At least 7 children died in the mountains because of cold and lack of food.

In early July 2021, the Taliban also shot and killed 43 civilians and security forces members in the city of Ghazni (with a population of 190,000 people), Malistan district — the city and the district is strategically located along Highway 1, which has served as the main road between Kabul and Kandahar. On 18 July 2021, ANDSF forces have liberated the Hazara district of Malistan from the Taliban.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1403076617694494729

This is happening again, as the CEO of The HALO Trust, James Cowan, in his statement, confirmed that Hazara deminers have been separated from the others and killed by the assailants.

 

[STURM]

As one of the smallest ethnic groups in the country the Hazaras have long had to thread very carefully; unlike the Turkmans, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Pashtuns they don’t have a friendly neighbouring country they can seek refuge in; nor do they have a vast hinterland they can go to. Events have always caught up with them; in 1996 they came under unprovoked attack from the Talibs and later found themselves in vicious fighting against Ahmad Shah Massoud’s men in the streets of Kabul. Hazara gunmen gained a reputation for their doggedness and like their opponents carried out their share of atrocities.

On the overall situation as a whole; in my opinion something which truly symbolises how the initial American aim has gone very much off script is the Americans providing close air support to Taliban ops conducted against IS; as mentioned in a pod cast; the link was provided in an earlier post. Under the Doha Agreement the Taliban is required to ensure that no extremist or terrorist group gains a foothold in areas its controls; the Taliban of course being “moderate” compared to IS and unlike IS and AQ before it; having no desire to spread its ideology or teachings abroad.

 

[STURM]

Taliban claims to favour ‘settlement’. Can it be trusted?

The armed group says it wants ‘political settlement’, but its fighters continue to press ahead with military campaigns.

www.aljazeera.com

The Taliban leadership has said it does not want civil war (it would say that) but if the Taliban maintains its advance civil war is unavoidable; especially as it edges closer to areas which have traditionally been unreceptive to them such as Mazar and Herat. Their is also the question of how much control the leadership actually has over its many field commanders. Given the lack of trust which exists I suppose the Taliban has also factored in the possibility of U.S. troops delaying the withdrawal or even returning (slim chance however due to political reasons) briefly should the Kabul government come close to collapsing.

 

[STURM]

P..S.

As one of the guests in the last video makes clear; it’s important to make a distinction between ANA units in large urban areas and those in small numbers based in very remote areas which in some cases face a numerical inferiority and have to rely totally on suppliers delivered by air. Quite often these units lose support from the local population which has “persuaded” by the Taliban.

It remains to be seen how things ultimately pan out but labelling the whole ANA as combat ineffective gives the wrong picture due to specific circumstances and also because like many Third World armies (and even arguably some First World ones); there are good units and there are those which are not as good.

 

[STURM]

Can Beijing avoid being drawn into the Afghan quagmire? | The Strategist

Since Washington’s February 2020 agreement with the Taliban to withdraw from Afghanistan, some commentators have suggested that China may step into the vacuum. Beijing may be watching recent events with some apprehension, but it will ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

China is unlikely to get involved in a “boost on the ground” (a cliche u yet to avoid using) situation but its likely to increase its influence in the country; this will in turn lead to the Indians doing the same and the Pakistanis responding. It’s not addressed in the article but it also remains to be seen what Russia will do with the Taliban does take total control.

 

[ngatimozart]

The PRC would be dead keen on the mineral resources and if they could do a deal with the Taliban they will. The other thing no addressed in the article would be an oil pipeline from Iran, across Afghanistan and Pakistan into the PRC in Xinjiang province. From the PRC POV that would reduce their reliance upon sea transport of energy. Secondly I wouldn't be surprised if at some stage there are both oil and gas pipelines from Russia into the PRC across Mongolia. It could be a good money spinner for Mongolia with rent payments for the pipelines land.

However any investments that the PRC have and will have in Afghanistan will carry extra risk attached because of the nature of the Taliban and the Afghan political and social landscape. If the PRC wishes to have a permanent military presence within Afghanistan will the Taliban allow it? Remember they have fought against foreign infidels for 30 odd years with a 14 year break between the Russian infidels and the American infidels and their lackies. So I would suggest that there would be a reasonable amount of resistance to the idea.

WRT Russia they may already be involved with Tajikistan requesting assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organization because of the influx of Afghan refugees and armed security forces at its border with Afghanistan. It appears to have lost control of its border. Of note, the PRC also has a military base in Tajikistan. Whether Russia really wants to become embroiled in Afghanistan again is another story. From memory they have had two bad experiences of Afghanistan; once in the 1980s and I think another during imperial times.

 

[STURM]

As long as the Chinese don’t deploy troops (doubt they will) and agree to other terms; the Taliban will be happy on a deal which benefits them. It helps that the Chinese won’t pressure anyone about democracy and human rights.

Back in the 1990’s they were quite receptive to the idea of working with an American company which wanted to lay a pipeline. A small group of Talibs even visited the U.S. at the invitation of the company and if I recall correctly even met a Congressman (details in Ahmad Rashid’s book).

Russia certainly won’t want to get embroiled in the country again but might take certain steps to safeguard its interests if things get worse; like it has over the years when reportedly supplied the Taliban due to fears over IS and when it supported the Northern Alliance prior to 1st September 2001.

 

[John Fedup]

With all the various factions in Afghanistan and the ongoing violence for decades, the ideal of an expensive pipeline traversing this country doesn’t seem like a secure investment. Rare earth minerals is a different matter and is something the PRC will go after.