This post is a very good example of the presumptive reasoning, abductive and non sequitur arguments and the use of red herrings and 'benefit trawling' that have been the hallmarks of one side of this debate.
The table presented at:
(i cant link yet
)
is a comparative tool known in the trade as a 'comparator'. Working back through the points raised in the above post:
5.
Exchange Rate - The same risk hedged exchange rate has been used across the table, where applicable. Therefore, any variation in exchange rate will effect both sides of the ledger, so to speak. Obviously, exchange rate does not apply to work done and paid for in Australia. Raising 'exchange rate' as a source of variance to the accuracy of the data, particularly when it is only applied to one side of the argument, is a red herring and somewhat flawed reasoning.
4.
2006 CRS Report - The figure of US$173 million in this report was representative of the average unit procurment cost (AUPC) of the current production numbers of F-22 aircraft for the US Air Force. In simple terms, that would have been about the cost of aircraft # AF-4090. See Note (v) beneath the table. All 185 aircraft in this production have been committed to the US Air Force. Any Australian or other foreign buy would be over and above this number and, therefore, further into the production. Just as senior officials in Defence are saying in relation to the JSF, the further into the full rate production, the lower the unit cost. Using this figure from the 2006 CRS Report is a non sequitur, a good example of a red herring and flawed reasoning.
3.
Extensive Weapons and Sensor Package - Citing the imprimatur of the Minister for Defence, his "public acknowledgment today (20/3/07)" and such terms as 'extensive' is all very grand(iose) but no substitute for hard data. How much is this package worth?
Is it $237m, $500m or even $1Bn. If the latter (which it certainly is not), then, does this effect the overall conclusions that can be drawn from this comparative table? As for being 'fair', the cost used for the F-22 includes a cost estimate for armament which, when amortised across the proposed buy numbers, works out to around about 5 per cent of the average unit procurement cost. Again, this point is predicated on presumptive reasoning, is non sequitur in nature, and a red herring - as well as shows how this post misses the point of the cost comparison entirely. It is also a good example of an attempt at 'benefit trawling'.
2.
Australian Access to the F-22 - As has been said repeatedly on this forum and in other forums, including before Parliamentary oversight committees, because of the Obey Amendment and, moreover, the politics that now surround this issue, the US DoD cannot offer Australia the aircraft - we have to ask for it, and formally. Given, as is well known in Defence and Parliamentary circles, the Minister 'hates' the F-22, is he the right person to ask? Given, back in 2001, the new CAF at the time (now CDF) was the person who shut down the 'F-22 for Australia' responses coming out of the US Air Force, is he the right person to ask? As for the arguments presented, this post appears to assert some first hand knowledge of what Japan and Israel think about, and their intentions in relation to, the F-22. Based on the arguments presented in similar previous posts, it would be fair to assume this statement is based upon a not unbiased interpretation of reports in the media. Another fine example of presumptive reasoning leading to abductive and non sequitur argument.
1.
HUG Project Budget - Firstly, the comparison is based upon the NACC and related activities. The original acquisition of the F/A-18 classics is not part of these activities and, therefore, any suggestion it be included is, in itself, a 'furphy' - a classic 'red herring'. The post is quite correct when it says that HUG Project funds have been expended. It is also quite correct in saying "that CBR remains a considerable part of that budget". However, what it doesn't say is that the figure used in the comparison ($2.92 Bn) is conservative, pre-dates the budgetary changes due to such things as the ALR2002/ALR-67V3 changeover but offsets the monies already expended with those that will need to be spent as the risks identified in the HUG and related deeper level maintenance activities (eg. Kapton insulated wiring replacement, fuel bladders, ASI 1 & 2 structural arisings, vapour seals, full strip/repaint, wing internals, etc) materialise. To leave the HUG Project costs out of the comparator, either in part or fully, would invalidate the comparison as it is, after all, a comparison between two options for the 'NACC Project and related activities' and the HUG Project is one of the activities in one of the options. Again, this post seems not to understand the purpose of such a comparison.
A Relevant Question or Three:
By its very nature, tone and obvious intent, this post raises some interesting questions:
The F-22 is the 'meanest dog on the block' when it comes to air power. It would not only ensure Australia regains its fading regional air superiority status but would provide the air dominance capability to enable our country to continue to make valuable contributions to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. That said, what is so wrong with advocating the best for our fighting men and women, for our Nation and for future generations of Australians - particularly when the best is far more capable than, far more cost effective than, and far less risky than the current plans of the Department and its Minister?
Is it not the Australian way, part of the Great Australian Heritage, to seek out innovative, cost effective solutions to our Defence capability needs and isn't this what the people in Government and the Department keep asking of people in Defence and the Australian Defence Industry?
If so, what is the basis behind the nature, tone and intent of this post, with its red herrings, presumptive reasonings, abductive and non sequitur arguments, and benefit trawling?
:shudder
