Actually, it didn't. the Acronym MBT didn't appear until the second-half of the 1950s. During WWII, Medium Tanks were just that, Medium Tanks which was abbreviated as Med.Tk.
Yes, correct What I meant was that before and during WW2 tanks were differentiated, and if anyone said MBT, they would be referring to a medium rather then the ‘main’ tank.
You're contradicting yourself. Indeed, this appears to be babbling, perhaps you shouldn't be posting so late at night? I'm sorry. You cannot admit that the acronym didn't exist and wasn't used and then claim they used it in the next breath.
Again, I believe you are wrong. The M26 was redesignated from a Heavy Tank to a Medium Tank after WWII..
Yes, this is what I said. AFTER WW2 the US redesignated the already existing M26 into a medium tank, however this was for a very brief period. Soon after the light tanks were also redesignated as airborne, and light tanks disappeared as a class of vehicle along with the medium tanks. As part of the redesignation the freshly mediumed M26 became ‘main’.
No, it did not. The first US MBT was the M48. Until then, they were still simply designated "medium". Light tanks were not redesignated "airborne" until the advent of the Sheridan, some 15 years later. While the designation may have changed, what the vehicle was, didn't.
The A41 Centurion was, I think you'll find, redesignated a Medium Tank, post-war. It was not designated a Main Battle Tank until the appearance of the Mark 5/2 in IIRC 1959, equipped with the L7 105mm gun.
Yes, the UK went along with the US on this because Churchill had already foreseen the need for an anti-Soviet alliance with Americans. The 50s were a weird time for dank development.
Well, actually, as far as I can determine, it was the British who were the first to term the designation "Main Battle Tank" after the Russians used the term, to describe the Centurion. So if anybody was leading and if anybody was following, I think you have the order reversed.
You're right that Pz.IV production was never halted, however you're wrong, I believe that resources were diverted to Panther and Tiger production.
I must apologise. I appear to have missed the word "not", before the word "siphoned" when I typed that yesterday. Would you care to readdress that point? I am well aware that Guderian fought tooth and nail to prevent the diversion of material away from the Panzer IV production, which was attempted several times.
They were, and in many ways. Experienced engineers, design team members working on different parts of the alternative subsystems, the ironing out of all the problems in testing, the creation of new production lines, the retraining of all the experienced production personnel (not to mention finding them in wartime), the actual steel (and it was a different steel manufacturing process to Pz-IV), the new engine, the training of new, and retraining of old crews. All this is hard enough in peacetime, but is a real headache in wartime even for the uber-organised Germans. It is one of the reasons neither the Soviets nor the Allies changed their primary tank designs despite Stalin being offered an alternative to T-34. Americans went so far as to even keep the same hull from a pre-war design!
Errr, the Sherman was a completely new design, retaining only the suspension from the pre-war M2 Medium. The hull was completely new, as was the turret. It is one of the reasons why the M3 Medium was introduced as a stop-gap - because while its hull was only modified from the M2, it was easier to produce a casemented mounting for the 75mm gun than a turret mounting, in the time available. Indeed, the M4 underwent such transformation during its production run that it could be claimed that the M4a3e8 which came out at the end of WWII was a completely different vehicle compared to the M4 which started it. So to claim that the Americans stuck with the same vehicle is a bit silly, really. The designation was the same and it was an evolutionary process but it was so advanced that it might as well have been revolutionary. Further, you appear to be ignoring the fact that the Soviets were in the throws of introducing the T44 at war's end, which was a completely revolutionary vehicle compared to the T34.
Bit simplistic but essentially correct. However, this is essentially AMERICA's design philosphy, not the UK's. Within the American doctrine, there was a division between specialised Tank-Destroyers and Tanks. Tanks were intended to be universal in their application, they were intended to be able to destroy both tanks and support infantry (through the use of HE), whereas Tank-Destroyers were intended to be specialist units who's primary function was to seek out and destroy the enemy's armour, hence an emphasis upon AP ammunition in their guns and HE was provided much as an afterthought.
In the UK, the division was, as you've already hinted at, between Infantry and Cruiser tanks. Infantry or "I" tanks were intended to follow infantry closely and support them in their advance over the battlefield to achieve a breakthrough of the enemy's defensive line. Cruiser tanks were, as you've suggested, akin to the Cavalry and were intended to exploit that breakthrough and harry and pursue the retreating enemy. However, in both, because of a belief in the use of Artillery as the primary means of support (and hence the provision of neutralising and destructive firepower) upon the battlefield as a result of experiences in WWI, British tanks were initially not provided with HE ammunition. The 2 Pdr gun was capable of firing HE and had a HE round (two were in fact developed, one in Australia which was base fused and one in the UK which was nose fused) but it was not widely issued until early 1944, when the use of the 2 Pdr was then limited to the SW Pacific (in Australian Mathildas and AT guns) and NW Europe (in Armoured Car Regiments). It had been superseded by 6 Pdr and 75mm guns, both which fired HE. In the UK's philosophy (doctrine is in many ways, too rigid a word), Tank-Destroyers were an aberration and while they were used, the units largely came under the control of the Royal Artillery, which saw them more as mobile, protected AT guns, rather than armoured units.
Rickshaw, please accept my apologies for the simplistic description but although I like to write things up, I also understand the forum is not for short essays.
Short essays are sometimes necessary to make things clear. Two paragraphs is not excessive and it made it very clear that your points were too simplistic and contrasted the differences between US and UK design/doctrinal philosphies.
Yes, the British philosophy/doctrine was different, but they were stuck with the Sherman from 1941. Doctrine is faster to type, and better defines the application of thinking about use of troops. The interesting thing is that US and UK both shared the belief in the infantry, hence the infantry support tanks that dominated the armoured fleet. What the UK doctrine never tried to address is how they would react to an enemy that failed to stand still for the infantry to engage.
Of course it did. It assumed that the infantry would advance until they engaged the enemy. That advance would be mechanised, indeed the UK's army was the only one which entered the war entirely mechanised.
Rubbish. Balderdash. Armies still use the designation Light, Medium, Heavy and Main to describe their tanks. It has absolutely nothing to do with their weight, it has in fact everything to do with both their armour and their intended function within a military's doctrine.
Main Battle Tank is how all armies refer to their tanks.
That may be the case for the US but even they refer to other force's tanks according to the classications Light, Medium, Heavy and Main.
For transportation they are load classed. The light tanks are sometimes known as reconnaissance vehicles. The load classes used in most armies do not refer to weight of tanks. Originally the reference was to the weight of the tank…which is of course the armour plating. I think the British had some thing like 5 armour classes that referred to the plating, but they were not termed as light or medium but had coding I think.
Care to provide a reference for that?
In the West all tanks are deceptively known as the Main Battle Tank because this is the only type of tank produced.
As I said, that maybe how the US refers to its own vehicles but it is not even how they refer to others' vehicles, FutureTank.
Again, rubbish. Light tanks were still produced until recently, with the Scorpion, Stingray and the Sheridan coming immediately to mind. Much of their role has however been overtaken by converted APCs, mounting light-tank like turrets.
Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) or, CVR (T) family. The full design name is Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) Fire Support (Scorpion).
"A rose by another name would smell as sweet". The Scorpion is a light tank, FutureTank. The MoD might have fallen victim to foot in mouth disease but the rest of the knows when its being offered a silk purse or a sow's ear.
Stingray lacks a designation by the US Army. The M8 is known as a ‘gun system’ though.
M551 Sheridan was known as armored reconnaissance/airborne assault vehicle at various times, but only as a light tank by the manufacturer I think in the XM phase.
Even the Soviets dislike having light tanks, the PT-76 is an Amphibious tank.
Invariably its referred to as a "light tank" by all and sundry. Describing it as an "ampbibious tank" merely describes its abilities.
An artificial division, I'd suggest based more upon your obviously mistaken and preconceived ideas on this matter. As I've said, the designation owes more to the amount of armour carried but ultimately, it depends upon where the vehicle sits in relation to doctrine and how it is employed by the military that owns it. Essentially, it’s all relative anyway and such designations tend to be far more fluid and non-rigid than your definition would have it.
It may be that I am "mistaken and preconceived in ideas", but they are not mine.
They may not be but as I've never read them before today, I must assume they are your's unless you provide a reference to them.
Pre-WW2 the European armies viewed tank designs in very much the same way cavalry selected horses a century earlier. Nowhere is it easier to see then the Soviet Army which started WW2 with everything from multi-turreted monsters to light tankettes in its AFV fleet. In every doctrine in Europe there was a need for multiple types of AFVs to fill their niche in their complex still-in-development employment in battle. By the end of the war it was clear that one type of tank could do most of the work with the exception of reconnaissance. This design issue was never really solved.
Wasn't it? We have, as you've noted, a steady movement away from specialisation towards generalisation. I'd suggest that the prime motivator of this has been economics, rather than necessarily because there is no longer a need for specialisation in AFV design. When the money is short, even militaries must trim their sails to fit the cloth they have. The result has been that the MBT has become the maid of all work and like Jack, the master of none as well.
Doctrine has followed to suit this circumstance, rather than being driven by strategy.
No, designations are not fluid, the direction of design philosophy is. The designs try to satisfy the tactical demands and these are rigid. The multitude of different tanks in use during the pre-WW2 period supports this rigidity (this AFV does job X, and that AFV does Y), and for the UK even the separation of responsibility for different types of AFVs among the Corps. The selection of a single type after WW2 supports the fluidity in use of a single tank design. The words just reflect the change.
I think the semantics are on your behalf in regards to “amount of armour carried” since this is the major material of manufacture in the tank. However the designation of light, medium, heavy, cruiser, cavalry, etc., all relate to the speed rather then armour of the tanks.
According to whom? Again you have produced what I can only describe as being a bizarre definition which has no relation to any theoretical or technical work that I have ever read. Whereas mine has a founding in the works of Fuller, Liddel-Hart, Guderian, etc., et al.
This, and not armour, was seen as the important factor since it was considered impossible to operate very large cannon in a moving tank (after stopping) with any accuracy before WW2. The designations in English were applied by former cavalry officers who had to give away their mounts. Trivial, but true.
Really? According to whom? Guderian was a ex-Transport and Signals. Liddel-Hart was ex-Infantry. Fuller was ex-Infantry. Von Manstein, ex-Infantry. Zhukov, ex-Cavalry. Triandafillov & Pavlov ex-Cavalry. Patton was ex-Cavalry, Bradley, ex-Infantry. I'd suggest that you're over-emphasising the effect of the cavalry mentality on armoured vehicle classifications.
Oh, look, if the balloon had really gone up in Europe, how many tanks a side had would have been immaterial 'cause they'd all be running around on a giant glass ashtray until their fuel ran out, anyway.
Are you suggesting NATO would have used nuclear weapons on their own troops?
No. Not intentionally, perhaps however they would have been "collaterial damage" without a doubt and I don't doubt that the WarPac was seriously about using them on NATO troops. However, personally I don't think too many people would be overly able to identify which direction the warheads came from, the end result would be the same - a glass ashtray parking lot.
Of course not. Are you suggesting that the Soviets would have used nuclear weapons on the NATO forces? Of course not, because you know that the Soviet strategy was an overthrow of the capitalist regimes in Europe, and this meant the proletariat was not to be incinerated.
Ah, now you're talking about whether or not a war was likely. I agree that it was extremely unlikely, except by mistake or miscalculation that war would break out on either side. Neither side was as deadly serious about war as they made out to be, both had far too much to lose if it was to occur. However as the events of 1983 proved, war was a possibility and if it was to occur, it was extremely likely that the plans which did exist as we now know from the Cold War History Project, that it would go nuclear and it would go early, rather than later.
For this purpose they had created an army of special forces with the express purpose of disabling NATO WMD stocks before they could be used. Would NATO use nuclear weapons on its own territory if it was being overrun? Would the UK and USA use nuclear weapons on Germany, or even Poland or Hungary? I doubt it, but I’m glad we will never find out.
No we won't. However, as I said, the Cold War History Project has revealed a great deal about WarPac plans. From what we know from other sources, its highly likely that NATO had similar plans. The result would have been like Taylor's hypothesis about WWI - a railway timetable to annilation which once started, could not be interrupted IMO.
This would explain why they continued to pursue heavy tank design until well into the 1960s, now would it? Furthermore, they put one or two more vehicles which they, themselves designed as "heavy tanks" into operational service in the early-mid-1950s (T-10). It would also explain why they kept the IS-2 and IS-3 in service into the 1960s as well. The role of the Heavy Tank has always been both inside and outside Russian doctrine as that of a "breakthrough tank" - one which could support the infantry in close assault of the heaviest enemy defences and help achieve a breakthrough. It is why the Soviet's chose the large, heavy calibre guns that they did, despite the limitations that using both split ammunition and such a large calibre, imposed on their vehicles. While Soviet doctrine emphasised manoeuvre operations, it also realised that on the relatively narrow frontages available in Northern Europe that before manouevre could be achieved, a breakthrough was necessary, hence the need for Heavy Tanks.
However, when NATO adopted the equivalent of a heavy tank gun, the L7 105mm on a medium tank chassis the "Main Battle Tank" became a popular way of describing it. At a stroke the Heavy Tank was basically rendered obsolete and started to fade from sight.
Not quite. You are correct in describing the Soviet post-WW2 doctrine, but in 1955 all heavy tank regiments were removed from tank divisions and reformed into eight heavy tank divisions. These existed until 1958 (the year T-55s received NBC system when Soviets realised the true effects of radiation). In early 1960s the recently mothballed heavy tanks were reassigned to the fortified regions, mostly along the Chinese border with four battalions of four companies each. Because there were insufficient heavy tanks, T-34-85s were also used. T-10 was the last of the ‘heavies’. However a very small number of independent heavy tank battalions were retained at Front level for dealing with ‘hard’ targets until the early 80s.
True but then the role of the heavy tank had been overtaken by the MBT. The need for such a vehicle was no longer there as each heavy tank cost approximately twice the cost of an MBT, the Soviets went for quantity over quality. Further, the addition of the ATGW to the inventory meant that no heavy tank was likely to be able to survive for long.