Hi, new here, just like to say with regards to the development of the aircraft carrier, it's highly likely that the carrier will serve first and foremost, as a political tool of intimidation against other forces in the region that they may potentially clash with, discouraging direct military action. If u've studied Chinese military doctrine in-depth, it is obvious that for the past 5000 years, China (at least the majority population of the Han ethnicity), China has always encouraged defensive military strategies and assymetric warfare (ie: bribe, political pressure, etc). One of the best examples is the Great Wall. Bearing in mind that the entire infrastructure was built, rebuilt and refurbished over several dynasties, the notion of protecting Chinese interests by locking out foreign forces is proven to be an intrinsic element in Chinese military thinking. Of course in this day and age, such a strategy of absolute denial is impossible, but the classic Chinese mentality of assymetric warfare is not lost, and the ability to construct and operate such a weapon certainly does add considerable weight if political pressures were to b applied. This kind of mentality is put into practice with very real results. For example, although CHina's military is overall, still behind Western standards by at least one or two decades, it's rapid modernisation is increasingly posed as a huge threat that is givin China greater clout in regional disputes, so much so that the US Department of Defence openly states in their congressional report that China is a growing concern not to b taken lightly of.
Though key technical skills and capabilities will b gained, and certainly the possession the only aircraft carrier operated by an East Asian nation will b an excellent asset for propaganda, from the research i did it seems as if tho these are not as important as the first goal. In the foreseeable future, the key technical skills China is afta r things like building a capable network of cruise missiles, a modern submarine fleet, survivable anti-air assets and improved C4ISR capabilities, particularly in the fields of Satellite Jamming Technology and Intelligence. Aircraft carriers are primarily used for assaults and although havin it would b a good addition for any contingency plan in an invasion of Taiwan, the restricted geography of the Taiwan Strait would pretty much eliminate any real advantage of havin a mobile attackin force (which could escape preliminary counter-attacks staged by Taiwan/possibly USN and USAF against airports). And as the propaganda role, although it would certainly fan nationalistic sentiments to new heights (unforunately), those who r educated (and based on my experience in Chinese military forums, i would say many of who does openly express a balanced perspective on the state of Chinese military power, as opposed to recitin wateva the military news on CCTV8 says) r quick to point out that the scale of the Chinese development comes no where close to US capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, its propaganda value would not b as great, as say, the current Chinese progress in the construction of modern submarine fleet, which is of much greater importance in not only a campaign against Taiwan, but to the overall security of Chinese energy interests overseas, much of which is transported through the US-patrolled Malacca Strait.
(My general analogy on Chinese military thinking is based upon readings from
China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March by
Andrew Scobell (US Army War College) pages 15-40 Layers of Culture -The Chinese Cult of Defence, as well as from sources such as
www.strategypage.com, a website ran by James Dunnigan, a professional military analyst who codesigned a war games simulation featured in November 1990 on ABC's
Nightline, which correctly projected every major aspect of the Gulf War (specifically read articles in the links below:
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2006127223510.aspw,
http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/478-3056.aspx,
http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/478-3080.aspx, and the book
How to Make War (Fourth Edition) written by him as well (in his book refer to various bits regarding China in sections such as Part Three: Naval Operations - THe Navy: Run Silent, Run Deep and Part Five: Special Weapons - The Electronic Battlefield and Information Warfare), as well as the book
China's Path to Power by
Scott Cooper, who served 10 years in the Australian Defence Force, in his book refer to Chapter 4 - Intent and finally, through conversations with my uncle, who is a Shao Xiao (equivalent to a major) in the PLANAF, Guiping Naval Airstation of the South Sea Fleet)
...if anyone cbb to chek the details themselves