Good post on the Gyro stabilzation system on the Sherman, alot of the target reticle jump that the Sherman tank gunners experienced was due to the Sherman suspension, on the Pershing`s torsion bar suspension it was a perfect match making for a smoother shoot on the move capability.
Cause of German Tank Success
- Thread starter redsoulja
- Start date
The Sherman was a terrible tank in reallity. The British much improved theirs with the 17 pounder which was at least up to the task of defeating the heavier German tanks. Good point eckherl, the Sherman suspension was crap for sure!
The Panther was not a copy of the T-34, but it was in fact a response to the excellent T-34 and the features that made the T-34 a successful tank were the features the Germans went after designing the Panther. The early design sketches of the Panther looked VERY MUCH like a T-34. The first version of the Panther (ausf D) had problems which were corrected on the ausf A (it's odd that the D came before the A but it did). Despite the fact that Germans had no chance of winning a war with the Russians their tank versus tank kill ratio is pretty impressive and speaks for the quality of the tanks, the training and tactical employment.
Regarding the IR Panthers, there were very few fielded and they were barely used. I don't believe any of the IR Panthers scored a night kill. Another wonder weapon that was too little too late to make any difference on the battlefield.
The Panther was not a copy of the T-34, but it was in fact a response to the excellent T-34 and the features that made the T-34 a successful tank were the features the Germans went after designing the Panther. The early design sketches of the Panther looked VERY MUCH like a T-34. The first version of the Panther (ausf D) had problems which were corrected on the ausf A (it's odd that the D came before the A but it did). Despite the fact that Germans had no chance of winning a war with the Russians their tank versus tank kill ratio is pretty impressive and speaks for the quality of the tanks, the training and tactical employment.
Regarding the IR Panthers, there were very few fielded and they were barely used. I don't believe any of the IR Panthers scored a night kill. Another wonder weapon that was too little too late to make any difference on the battlefield.
FutureTank
Banned Member
Since when does ease of manufacture and production numbers making anything better?
However it is not out of place in peacetime marketing.
The object of the tank production is to achieve victory through combat dominance and eventually providing effective and flexible options to the commanders at different levels of responsibility.
Vehicle casualties were higher during WW2 then crew casualties, so it was desirable for the crews having a replacement vehicle to get back into combat. This allows retention of experience and prevents combat shock setting in, both very important factors in tank combat.
Much effort was made to return even the recovered vehicle casualties, and the Chrysler Detroit plant (for example) which manufactured a quarter of all US tanks also rebuilt 3,000 during the war.
Ease of manufacturing and production ensures this availability of replacement vehicles. It was dominant in Soviet manufacturing in general, and was embraced in United States also earlier in the war because it was expected that invasion of Europe may take place in 1942. However as the invasion was delayed, and experience with tanks was gained (US didn't have a Tank Corps until 1941), designs became more complex in part due to the British limited experience in North Africa.
There was still a desire in US to simplify the manufacturing, and the change over from riveting tanks together to welding of both armor plate and castings was complete in the US by 1943, and many of welding process refinements were learned and applied in Sherman tank assembly factories. Sherman was still a fairly simple and robust design, and those who designed it should be better known and heralded for what was essentially a T-34 equivalent in the West as far as the mainstay of the Western Allies are concerned. Having said that, the T6 was a direct derivative of the M3 in terms of design, but replaced the superstructure with a single larger turret. This was in part based on the consideration that there was already an existing production of the hulls in a very limited (at the time) tank production in the USA, so the changes in production that need to be made were made as painless as possible considering Presidential demands of 45,000 tanks by 1943 (never attained)!
Lastly, availability of numbers of tanks allows for greater tactical, operational and strategic flexibility to commanders. This is something that was increasingly denied to the Wehrmacht as the war went on due to their inability to field required numbers of tanks along the fronts.
The design criteria have been different in Soviet Union and the rest of Europe due to nature of defence industries. In the West tanks had to be paid for by governments at a cost that would allow a profit margin to the manufacturers. Because the budgets were limited, the designs were sought to have, what Americans call, "more bang for the buck". This philosophy however came from Germany where post-Depression recovery denied Hitler the funds to build a large enough tank park, so he was persuaded to instead opt for quality over quantity. This proved to be fairly easy for a personality ‘inspired’ by ‘super’ and ‘miracle’ weapons. This is known as the "engineer's" or ‘producer’ approach to AFV design.
The early Soviet approach had been impacted by the lack of qualified labour, and even greater need for recovery from the combined effects of WW1 and Civil War, coupled with the effects of Depression on Soviet exports. However doctrinal development in cooperation with Germans in late 20s and early 30s led Soviet designers to initiate production of designers based on specifications derived from doctrinal considerations, or the “client” approach to AFV design.
The doctrinal considerations however played a role in tank designs outside of USSR. German doctrine has always been defensive, even if aggressively so, while that of Soviet Union has always been offensive even if ostensively ‘defensive’ for political reasons. The ‘celebration’ of blitzkrieg tends to ignore this, but the reality is that analysis of tank fleets, as the most offensive part of the army, shows that Soviet Tank fleet was by far the larger (in recognition of larger casualties incurred by attacker), and included types which were explicitly made for offensive operations, i.e. the BT series. Impact of doctrine on design elsewhere produced tanks in France and the UK which emphasized infantry support, or were underpowered for true offensives.
Design in Germany was also influenced by the wartime lack of raw materials used in tank manufacture, and most importantly those for hardened steel. Inability to increase steel hardening without increasing volume of metal (face hardened steel initially used) forced German designers to use heavier plates, and consequently increased overall tank size due to need for a larger power-pack. Russians were able to retain their steel manufacturing technology, thus maintaining lower overall weight. Wartime Allied measurement in Brinnel Hardness shows that early war armour was around 200-300 BHN. However Soviet manufacturers were able to raise this to 400-450 BHN after 1943. Germany was never able to raise the hardness to above 375 BHN. This caused the Panther, intended to be a counterpart to the T-34 to effectively assume a heavy tank role with 45ton of combat weight compared to the 32ton T-34-85. It needs to be remembered that the T-34 was not developed to counter German tank types, but to replace T-26 and BT series tanks to fulfil specific doctrinal role.
In US after the war this ‘T-34’ role was recognized in the US Army.
“During 1946 the Tank Destroyer Command, the Armored Command and the Cavalry were merged as the Armored Cavalry because it was felt that tactical methods and objectives during World War II had been common to all three. The objectives insofar as vehicle design was concerned were to develop components which would make possible the replacement of the World War II M-24 Light Tank, the MA-A3-E8 Medium Tank and the M-26 Heavy Tank. In each class, emphasis was to be placed on lightness of weight consistent with the most powerful armament possible; parts standardization; reliability in extremes of temperature; simplicity of field maintenance in those extremes; and conservation of materials.” http://www.pattonhq.com/m47files.html
To summarise, the offensive doctrine, need for retaining large fleet reserves and ability to implement manufacturing and production change, all contributed to greater flexibility in use of tank forces as part of general Soviet strategy in WW2, and defined the T-34 as a superior design.
While Western Allied M4 design was also developed with same philosophy, the far more limited deployment of troops, and far less serious opposition they faced, as well as heavier reliance on air support, prevented development of a robust doctrine for what later became NATO tank forces, and led to later acceptance of German experience as doctrine model, and tank design guide within the context of market economies of the West.
After WW2 the Western Allies adopted a philosophy that relied on nuclear retaliation coupled with (mistaken) reliance on strategic bombing in an era which until late 50s can generally be called the ‘Air Force era’.
However own experience with German heavy tanks, and German experiences on the Eastern Front with Soviet heavy tanks (from 1941), convinced US and Britain to design heavy ‘main’ tanks because effects of radiation on troops were not yet understood, and because German impressions of Soviet use of tanks was downplayed, and vehicle survival emphasized. This was because of low availability of replacements to Wehrmacht, and because of significant reduction of tank building budgets in the peacetime West.
In US the M26 Pershing was redesignated as Medium tank (originally Heavy), and there begun a program to enhance the wartime design with medium designs abandoned (though light tanks continued). Eventually this culminated in the M46 which was essentially an M26 in basic design. In total 1160 M26s were rebuilt: 800 to the M46, 360 to the M46A1 standard (from a total of 2212 built). From there the M47/M48/60 designs represent redesign of the basic M26 rather then significant new design development due to change in doctrine or manufacturing change.
The M46/47 design suffered from the ‘German engineering affliction’ in that
The M-46 hull was better ballistically, at least in front. The T-42 turret was put into production. The M-46 hull and chassis was modified and the two were married. Thus this tank was considered an emergency vehicle created out of existing components, but even with the short cuts taken, the vehicle never became available for use in Korea.
It was a design which was put together without test and as could be expected, many "bugs" developed. Ordnance refused to accept them until the tanks could be classed as serviceable and considerable time elapsed until the necessary testing which should have been done first was done after production and the necessary corrections were made by the two producers, the Detroit Tank Arsenal and the American Locomotive Company. http://www.pattonhq.com/m47files.html
For the US tank production declined steadily through the Cold War
A total of 8,576 [8,676?] M47 were produced (including exports)
Some 11,703 M48s were built between 1952 and 1959 (including about 2,300 exports)
Over 15,000 M60s were built by Chrysler between 1961 and 1980 (including about 3,200? exports)
Initial Defense Department budget was for 7,058 M1s at a cost of roughly $19 billion (before exports)
This design thinking was still based on the nuclear strategy, but recognized that US and NATO troops may be used in ‘limited war’ scenarios where nuclear weapons would not be used. The philosophy was to increase crew survivability by enhancing tank systems. This philosophy was seen as substantiated by the Israeli experience.
The thinking was largely a continuation of the German philosophy of the heavy sophisticated tank due to absence of NATO operational doctrine outside of ‘flexible defence’ unlike that of Soviet breakthrough/exploitation developed during WW2.
In fact the M1 design owes its beginnings to the US/German co-design project begun in the late 70s for a heavy tank to (in German view) coexist with the Leopard 1 just entering service at the time (probably seen as the modern Panther role). The project ended with US and Germany abandoning cooperation due to differences of opinion reputedly on gun and engine to be used, as well as US looking for a Main Battle Tank (i.e. a tank purchasable in significant quantities like the M48/60) rather then a heavy tank following the M103 experience.
In Soviet Union there was a realization that the heavy Western tanks required a larger weapon to defeat their armour (just like the Tiger experience of WW2), but offensive doctrine still demanded medium tanks able to maintain rates of advance. This, coupled with the realization of the true effects of radiation on troops in early 50s led Soviet designers to produce the T-54/55 series with the 100mm weapon. This design was not judged able to defeat the next generation of heavy tanks being designed in the West, and the T-62 with 115mm gun was later put into production for limited deployment in selected areas of probable use.
However it was realized that guided weapon development increased range of engagement, and required heavier volume of tank fire, so designs to replace the T-55 were begun, and culminated with the T-64 and the T-72 from two separate design bureaus. These designs conformed to the development of offensive doctrine in USSR since 1936, but also included the ability to use guided weapons against targets at extreme ranges. These types, and their derivatives and modifications became the Soviet Main Battle Tanks while retaining the medium tank’s offensive doctrinal fit.
Germany meanwhile used car market marketing to capture the European market in tank fleets by offering the ‘locals’ Leopard II as a replacement for their Leopard Is (with exception of France and UK) which emphasized reliability and service
It seems to me the 'philosophy' applied to tank manufacture during major international conflicts is somewhat different to marketing cars
However it is not out of place in peacetime marketing.The object of the tank production is to achieve victory through combat dominance and eventually providing effective and flexible options to the commanders at different levels of responsibility.
Vehicle casualties were higher during WW2 then crew casualties, so it was desirable for the crews having a replacement vehicle to get back into combat. This allows retention of experience and prevents combat shock setting in, both very important factors in tank combat.
Much effort was made to return even the recovered vehicle casualties, and the Chrysler Detroit plant (for example) which manufactured a quarter of all US tanks also rebuilt 3,000 during the war.
Ease of manufacturing and production ensures this availability of replacement vehicles. It was dominant in Soviet manufacturing in general, and was embraced in United States also earlier in the war because it was expected that invasion of Europe may take place in 1942. However as the invasion was delayed, and experience with tanks was gained (US didn't have a Tank Corps until 1941), designs became more complex in part due to the British limited experience in North Africa.
There was still a desire in US to simplify the manufacturing, and the change over from riveting tanks together to welding of both armor plate and castings was complete in the US by 1943, and many of welding process refinements were learned and applied in Sherman tank assembly factories. Sherman was still a fairly simple and robust design, and those who designed it should be better known and heralded for what was essentially a T-34 equivalent in the West as far as the mainstay of the Western Allies are concerned. Having said that, the T6 was a direct derivative of the M3 in terms of design, but replaced the superstructure with a single larger turret. This was in part based on the consideration that there was already an existing production of the hulls in a very limited (at the time) tank production in the USA, so the changes in production that need to be made were made as painless as possible considering Presidential demands of 45,000 tanks by 1943 (never attained)!
Lastly, availability of numbers of tanks allows for greater tactical, operational and strategic flexibility to commanders. This is something that was increasingly denied to the Wehrmacht as the war went on due to their inability to field required numbers of tanks along the fronts.
The design criteria have been different in Soviet Union and the rest of Europe due to nature of defence industries. In the West tanks had to be paid for by governments at a cost that would allow a profit margin to the manufacturers. Because the budgets were limited, the designs were sought to have, what Americans call, "more bang for the buck". This philosophy however came from Germany where post-Depression recovery denied Hitler the funds to build a large enough tank park, so he was persuaded to instead opt for quality over quantity. This proved to be fairly easy for a personality ‘inspired’ by ‘super’ and ‘miracle’ weapons. This is known as the "engineer's" or ‘producer’ approach to AFV design.
The early Soviet approach had been impacted by the lack of qualified labour, and even greater need for recovery from the combined effects of WW1 and Civil War, coupled with the effects of Depression on Soviet exports. However doctrinal development in cooperation with Germans in late 20s and early 30s led Soviet designers to initiate production of designers based on specifications derived from doctrinal considerations, or the “client” approach to AFV design.
The doctrinal considerations however played a role in tank designs outside of USSR. German doctrine has always been defensive, even if aggressively so, while that of Soviet Union has always been offensive even if ostensively ‘defensive’ for political reasons. The ‘celebration’ of blitzkrieg tends to ignore this, but the reality is that analysis of tank fleets, as the most offensive part of the army, shows that Soviet Tank fleet was by far the larger (in recognition of larger casualties incurred by attacker), and included types which were explicitly made for offensive operations, i.e. the BT series. Impact of doctrine on design elsewhere produced tanks in France and the UK which emphasized infantry support, or were underpowered for true offensives.
Design in Germany was also influenced by the wartime lack of raw materials used in tank manufacture, and most importantly those for hardened steel. Inability to increase steel hardening without increasing volume of metal (face hardened steel initially used) forced German designers to use heavier plates, and consequently increased overall tank size due to need for a larger power-pack. Russians were able to retain their steel manufacturing technology, thus maintaining lower overall weight. Wartime Allied measurement in Brinnel Hardness shows that early war armour was around 200-300 BHN. However Soviet manufacturers were able to raise this to 400-450 BHN after 1943. Germany was never able to raise the hardness to above 375 BHN. This caused the Panther, intended to be a counterpart to the T-34 to effectively assume a heavy tank role with 45ton of combat weight compared to the 32ton T-34-85. It needs to be remembered that the T-34 was not developed to counter German tank types, but to replace T-26 and BT series tanks to fulfil specific doctrinal role.
In US after the war this ‘T-34’ role was recognized in the US Army.
“During 1946 the Tank Destroyer Command, the Armored Command and the Cavalry were merged as the Armored Cavalry because it was felt that tactical methods and objectives during World War II had been common to all three. The objectives insofar as vehicle design was concerned were to develop components which would make possible the replacement of the World War II M-24 Light Tank, the MA-A3-E8 Medium Tank and the M-26 Heavy Tank. In each class, emphasis was to be placed on lightness of weight consistent with the most powerful armament possible; parts standardization; reliability in extremes of temperature; simplicity of field maintenance in those extremes; and conservation of materials.” http://www.pattonhq.com/m47files.html
To summarise, the offensive doctrine, need for retaining large fleet reserves and ability to implement manufacturing and production change, all contributed to greater flexibility in use of tank forces as part of general Soviet strategy in WW2, and defined the T-34 as a superior design.
While Western Allied M4 design was also developed with same philosophy, the far more limited deployment of troops, and far less serious opposition they faced, as well as heavier reliance on air support, prevented development of a robust doctrine for what later became NATO tank forces, and led to later acceptance of German experience as doctrine model, and tank design guide within the context of market economies of the West.
After WW2 the Western Allies adopted a philosophy that relied on nuclear retaliation coupled with (mistaken) reliance on strategic bombing in an era which until late 50s can generally be called the ‘Air Force era’.
However own experience with German heavy tanks, and German experiences on the Eastern Front with Soviet heavy tanks (from 1941), convinced US and Britain to design heavy ‘main’ tanks because effects of radiation on troops were not yet understood, and because German impressions of Soviet use of tanks was downplayed, and vehicle survival emphasized. This was because of low availability of replacements to Wehrmacht, and because of significant reduction of tank building budgets in the peacetime West.
In US the M26 Pershing was redesignated as Medium tank (originally Heavy), and there begun a program to enhance the wartime design with medium designs abandoned (though light tanks continued). Eventually this culminated in the M46 which was essentially an M26 in basic design. In total 1160 M26s were rebuilt: 800 to the M46, 360 to the M46A1 standard (from a total of 2212 built). From there the M47/M48/60 designs represent redesign of the basic M26 rather then significant new design development due to change in doctrine or manufacturing change.
The M46/47 design suffered from the ‘German engineering affliction’ in that
The M-46 hull was better ballistically, at least in front. The T-42 turret was put into production. The M-46 hull and chassis was modified and the two were married. Thus this tank was considered an emergency vehicle created out of existing components, but even with the short cuts taken, the vehicle never became available for use in Korea.
It was a design which was put together without test and as could be expected, many "bugs" developed. Ordnance refused to accept them until the tanks could be classed as serviceable and considerable time elapsed until the necessary testing which should have been done first was done after production and the necessary corrections were made by the two producers, the Detroit Tank Arsenal and the American Locomotive Company. http://www.pattonhq.com/m47files.html
For the US tank production declined steadily through the Cold War
A total of 8,576 [8,676?] M47 were produced (including exports)
Some 11,703 M48s were built between 1952 and 1959 (including about 2,300 exports)
Over 15,000 M60s were built by Chrysler between 1961 and 1980 (including about 3,200? exports)
Initial Defense Department budget was for 7,058 M1s at a cost of roughly $19 billion (before exports)
This design thinking was still based on the nuclear strategy, but recognized that US and NATO troops may be used in ‘limited war’ scenarios where nuclear weapons would not be used. The philosophy was to increase crew survivability by enhancing tank systems. This philosophy was seen as substantiated by the Israeli experience.
The thinking was largely a continuation of the German philosophy of the heavy sophisticated tank due to absence of NATO operational doctrine outside of ‘flexible defence’ unlike that of Soviet breakthrough/exploitation developed during WW2.
In fact the M1 design owes its beginnings to the US/German co-design project begun in the late 70s for a heavy tank to (in German view) coexist with the Leopard 1 just entering service at the time (probably seen as the modern Panther role). The project ended with US and Germany abandoning cooperation due to differences of opinion reputedly on gun and engine to be used, as well as US looking for a Main Battle Tank (i.e. a tank purchasable in significant quantities like the M48/60) rather then a heavy tank following the M103 experience.
In Soviet Union there was a realization that the heavy Western tanks required a larger weapon to defeat their armour (just like the Tiger experience of WW2), but offensive doctrine still demanded medium tanks able to maintain rates of advance. This, coupled with the realization of the true effects of radiation on troops in early 50s led Soviet designers to produce the T-54/55 series with the 100mm weapon. This design was not judged able to defeat the next generation of heavy tanks being designed in the West, and the T-62 with 115mm gun was later put into production for limited deployment in selected areas of probable use.
However it was realized that guided weapon development increased range of engagement, and required heavier volume of tank fire, so designs to replace the T-55 were begun, and culminated with the T-64 and the T-72 from two separate design bureaus. These designs conformed to the development of offensive doctrine in USSR since 1936, but also included the ability to use guided weapons against targets at extreme ranges. These types, and their derivatives and modifications became the Soviet Main Battle Tanks while retaining the medium tank’s offensive doctrinal fit.
Germany meanwhile used car market marketing to capture the European market in tank fleets by offering the ‘locals’ Leopard II as a replacement for their Leopard Is (with exception of France and UK) which emphasized reliability and service
The main "success" of the Leo II occured after the fall of the sovjets with the market being full of surplus Leo IIA4s from Germany, the Netherlands and Swiitzerland and with the Leopard IIA6EX being the main marketing argument.
Ok, maybe the reputation of our car manufacturers helped.
Ok, maybe the reputation of our car manufacturers helped.
FutureTank, your absolutely right about the amount of M4's that were repaired and then sent back into combat. Chrysler repaired quite a few of those Sherman's in my home town. Though I don't know exactly how many were repaired in Evansville. I have seen many pictures of the Ammunition factory/Repair facility where the Shermans were repaired and sometimes even pics of M4's damaged again during repair trials because some ambitious driving.
The combat losses that my armor brothers sustained on the Sherman was appaling, we gave the Russians a few big batches of them armed with a 76mm gun and they nicknamed it a coffin for 5 brothers, they called the Grants that we sent them a coffin for seven brothers.
Another point I would like to make is that it did not handle worth a darn over soft muddy soil and getting stuck was a big issue with them. (thin tracks).
German tigers 1 and 2 along with Panthers had better cross country travel on this type of soil conditions.
Hey Waylander - why did the Spanish Army go with a more heavier armored version of the LEO2.The main "success" of the Leo II occured after the fall of the sovjets with the market being full of surplus Leo IIA4s from Germany, the Netherlands and Swiitzerland and with the Leopard IIA6EX being the main marketing argument.
Ok, maybe the reputation of our car manufacturers helped.
The tanks tread were a problem, and the Evansville Chrysler plant made "thresher" tracks. They replaced the old tracks and added an additional foot of ground placement for the M4. They still weren't good as Soviets or German wide angle tracks, but did help the Shermans in those muddy situations.
FutureTank
Banned Member
They were a problem for Soviets also.
Its not widely known, but the many tanks Germans destroyed in first months of the was were destined for scrap because trials in 1939 showed they were useless in some of the worst climate conditions. War in Finland confirmed this when the ground went soft during a temporary warm weather.
BT series was great as long as the ground was firm or they were running on roads. The intention was (since 1934) to fight the Japanese and install the Communist party in China, but after Manchuria it was realised there were no roads in China!
Hence the T-34. Many people talk about armour, guns, ammo and engines because they are 'sexy', but tracks are like feet for a tank. Take care of yout feet
is rule number 1...even grunts know that When the Spring set in in 1942, Soviet troops captured hundreds of German vehicles of all types including tanks which had been stuck in mud. Ground pressure is an engineering miscalculation, but can't be blamed in German designers since they were never asked to design tanks that could swim in mud
nfloorl: nfloorl: nfloorl:And this is where the christie suspension system will rule with the likes of the T-34, even newer model German tanks that came out after 1942 went to the same system but with inter weaved roadwheels that was a major weakness on the Panther series.They were a problem for Soviets also.
Its not widely known, but the many tanks Germans destroyed in first months of the was were destined for scrap because trials in 1939 showed they were useless in some of the worst climate conditions. War in Finland confirmed this when the ground went soft during a temporary warm weather.
BT series was great as long as the ground was firm or they were running on roads. The intention was (since 1934) to fight the Japanese and install the Communist party in China, but after Manchuria it was realised there were no roads in China!
Hence the T-34. Many people talk about armour, guns, ammo and engines because they are 'sexy', but tracks are like feet for a tank. Take care of yout feet
When the Spring set in in 1942, Soviet troops captured hundreds of German vehicles of all types including tanks which had been stuck in mud. Ground pressure is an engineering miscalculation, but can't be blamed in German designers since they were never asked to design tanks that could swim in mud
FutureTank
Banned Member
Yep! And I never trully understood why that was done
One of the big reasons was the weight of the tanks, panther weight was 45 tons versus a T34/85 at 32 tons, also they felt that it gave them superior cross country capabilities.Yep! And I never trully understood why that was done
One Russian tactic that was used on the Eastern front during fall and winter months was to attack panthers and tigers in the early morning hours due to the fact that there would be a good chance that they had frozen mud in between the roadwheels and tracks making the vehicle stuck or frozen in place.
FutureTank
Banned Member
Surely the posibility of encountering mud arise in the development process! Wider rubber coated whees would have prevented this problem (though rubber may have become brittle from cold). Carrying some wooden boards, or just putting some sapplings down would have prevented freezing.
I think somone just liked lots of wheels!
IIRC it was with respect to actual lens grinding capability.
The thought (As well as the swedes and greeks) that the uparmored hull is worth the money. And I totally agree with them. With the unprotected ammo right behind the frontal hull armor this is a weakpoint if you don't upgrade it. Money is the only reason why the other users of A5/A6s just uparmored the turret and not the hull.Hey Waylander - why did the Spanish Army go with a more heavier armored version of the LEO2.
If you would put everything into the Leo what KMW and Rheinmetall are offering with their Leopard IIA6EX package you can get a real beast and the Greece, Sweden and Spain nearly did that.
Especially when you look at the shrinking numbers of MBTs in the european countries this is a clever decision.
powerslavenegi
New Member
I concur and I guess likes of Carl Zeiss,Leica and Schneider hold a testimony to the same.
Thats not the only issue that was at hand, please don`t try and tell me that Russia did not have the capablitie to do this, it was matter of how many tanks that were being pumped out of the factories. (Massive production versus quality).
Huh - I was told that the Spanish version actually is more heavily armored than all the other versions.
Let`s not forget Steiner optics either, yes Germany did make some darn good optics, still do, but a big portion of that played in to the quality control of making the sights and how they were installed in relation to the main gun, T - 34`s at target long ranges were not very accurate until they closed the target area to with in 800 meters, this changed when the JS2 rolled onto the scene due to the fact that Russia had better quality control standards, a JS2 could engage enemy vehicles at ranges over 1500 meters and have first round hit capability. Sight grinding is not the only issue that played into this.