(A little rephrasing of the thread subject for clarity)
Did Germany achieve tank dominance because their tanks which were really good?
Was it more of the doctrine that they used with the tanks they used?
A better method than other powers?
The whole blitzkrieg doctrine?
I think the French had better tanks but the Germans use the tanks in the best possible way
Just found this thread, and wanted to put my 2 cents worth.
The question is phrased in a way that suggests German tanks were dominant, that their doctrine was unique, or that they used them better then anyone else.
In fact none are true statements.
Clearly because the 3rd Reich lost the war, its tanks ultimately did not achieve dominance, and the doctrine did not allow victory.
To understand why, one needs to go beyond the gun/armour issues. Any AFV has several design parameters which, when combined, should create an employment balance. These are in the order of priority:
Ease and economy of production
Ease of crew training
Field maintainability (service freedom)
Fuel efficiency for a given range of unrefuelled movement (logistic feedom)
Mobility appropriate for terrain/environment (tactical flexibility)
Protection from expected enemy weapon systems
Firepower appropriate to expected enemy targets
Upgradeability of above
Now considering all these factors, it is VERY clear that the T-34 is a clear winner. By far the primary reason is the ease and economy of production. What many consider in German tanks to be appreciated, the engineering sophistication and quality of manufacture, were purposefully eradicated during production by Soviet designers and production engineers. Through ruthless elimination of superfluous features in the design, they were able to grossly outproduce the Germans. This also allowed easier crew training and field maintenance. Ultimately every kilogram of superfluous feature saved, enhanced fuel economy and range of the tank also. The wider tracks allowed greater mobility in a variety of environments and terrain of the theatre, and innovative use of armour geometry allowed greater protection using less armour. Lastly it had a good weapon which was upgraded mid-war without requiring introduction of a new vehicle design.
Consider German designs. Only the Pz IV was extensively modified during its production history, however it never achieved the production numbers of T-34, nor was it as serviceable as T-34 in the field or have the tactical manoeuvrability. It required 5 crew to T-34s 4, and it certainly did not achieve armour parity.
Now to doctrine.
Doctrine refers to many things, including methods of using forces at tactical, operational and strategic levels.
Blitzkrieg is simply the post-war name given to the German strategic use of mobile troops.
The strategic methodology was not developed by Germans, but is rather a culmination of theory based on WW1 operations and trials in part carried out in the Soviet Union during the late 20s and early 30s, and in part by the general European attempt to integrate mobility in general and tanks in particular (and aircraft, and use of radio) into its combat theory.
In strategic terms the Soviet methods were essentially same before, during and after the war.
Operationally speaking there was a need for formation of large mobile groupings. How different nations solved this is inconsequential because at the time (1930s) this was largely a logistic issue resolved at Army level.
Tactically speaking the development of tank tactics was rather basic because the only significant experiences for Germans to learn from had been in Spain and Finland. The Spanish experience was limited and largely consisted of infantry support. The Finish experience had been in unusual and non-tank friendly terrain.
On the other hand Soviets had invaluable experience against Japanese in ideal tank country, including allowing for cooperation with the air forces. In fact it was the Soviets that begun to substantially rethink application of their theories on use of armour in 1939 leading to redesign of combat structures, and design of the T-34 among others.
Method has a lot to do with structure of the forces.
Looking at the formation and unit structures of German tank forces before 1941 we see a very balanced approach that seeks to integrate different classes of tanks in same formation to allow tailored approach to different types of TACTICAL objectives and situations. However later in the war the structure changes to single tank class/type, and emphasis on simplified logistics and shock.
One may think this was to enhance tactical capability for penetrating enemy defences, but in fact by the time this change took place, the intent was in halting enemy penetrations because there were insufficient tank forces to achieve operational, never mind strategic breakthroughs. The Ardennes Offensive in the West was the last such attempt.
This suggests that method was short lived, and was closely related to inadequate production numbers.
The whole blitzkrieg doctrine.
The whole ‘blitzkrieg’ doctrine depended on short duration campaigns and interdependence of primary arm, the infantry, with mobile and air forces. However once the air superiority was lost, and armoured production was incapable of maintain parity with that of the enemy, the whole doctrine collapsed into tactical, operational and strategic retreats using very much WW1 infantry tactics, and only limited mobile defence.
Overall then, the Germany did not achieve dominance either because of their tanks being ‘very good’, or because of the doctrine they were used with. Other nations, USSR in the first instance, proved to have a superior doctrine and tools to dominate combat.
Much of the myth of German tank dominance was created after the war based on selective description of tactical engagements, often based on views of single crew or even an individual’s perspective.
Its hard to comment of French tanks and their potential within the scope of same analysis because of the very limited use they were put to during the war.