shrinking USN carrier air wings

[sidishus]

You first comment doesn't make sense at all. In 1989, an A-6 couldn't even fly a strike sortie without help from a F-14 or F-18 flying escort, so multiple threats further reduced the operational tempo in 1989 compared to today. Of coarse loss rates matter, they would apply to both, and in 1989 it was extreamly difficult to sustain even 2 sorties per day for just 3 days for the vast majority of carrier based planes.

An F-18 loaded with JDAMs won't be without F-18 escorts loaded for AAM either...All the talk about being dual mission aside. And this talk about buddy tanking F-18s in the fight is tripe. Pickle your buddy tanks and then what?

So, your point?

I am missing your point completely with the A-1, and I am certain you missed mine regarding the F/A-18. My point isn't a debate about what the best strike platform is, what the carrier air wing should be, or what the USN is doing right or wrong. I am simply making a comparison between the available strike platforms today and the available strike platforms of 1989, and making the point that despite all the noise over specific platforms and numbers, a carrier air wing today is still a substancial upgrade over what was being fielded at the end of the cold war.

In terms of munitions, there are no doubts that substantial strides have been made. Its just a damned shame that similarly substantial strides have NOT been made in terms of range, persistence, or payload of the aircraft in the CVW.
Indeed, along with greatly reduced numbers (mitigated somewhat by the more reliable Rhinos...however the Bugs are getting old and suffering reliability problems in their own right...), the three key metrics of Range, Persistence, and Payload, have FALLEN since 1989.

Also, may I remind you that it was you who brought this thread into a platform specific context:

As you can see, smart weapons and improved sortie rates have made war more efficient by sea. I am only using average sortie rates for these calculations, you can certainly use higher expectations for both to skew the numbers, but in that case, you'll find the numbers skew even further in favor of the F/A-18 platform.

All this hoopla about aimpoints does nothing at all to skew the numbers "further in favor of the F/A-18 platform" All it does is suggest the modern CVW is ekeing every ounce of effectiveness it can with the aircraft it has.

And thats it. Whether F/A18s or A-1 Spads were embarked, either could hit the same number of waypoints given the same precision munitions.

 

[contedicavour]

It increases range by 50%. It has a new navigation system and it corrects the vibration levels from the C model that are harmful to it's electronics.

Wow, IIRC we're talking then of 70km * 1,5 = 105km or almost 60 nautical miles ... sooner or later the Amraam's evolved versions will match the AIM54
That would also be better than the R77/AA12 in Russian service, wouldn't it ?

cheers

 

[sidishus]

There are other components of the fleet that will be taking on some of these roles. ASW will be taken up by the Virginias and MH-60s dropping soda can sized sono/hydro bouyes that will form a net that covers an insane area.

I would say the MH60 series is not going to be as good an area surveillance asset the S-3 (or actually, a new fixed wing aircraft) would be.
What is the comparative response time to the edges of that "insane area"?

There is also the problem of numbers covering area...The oceans are the same size, and the hard laws of physics still apply to how well and how far sensors can see.
Also, now the fight is expected to be in areas that are more crowded, which suggests MORE assets, that can get to places quite quickly, will be needed to keep tabs on things.

The AEGIS system can handle a high threat environment in close quarters where BARCAP aircraft can't engage in time. The addition of AIM-120D will replace the role of F-14s and Pheonix missles. The Growlers will replace buddy tanking S-4s and ELINT/SEAD A-6 Intruders. Honestly I think they need to up Growlers to a full squadron.

In terms of onstation time before having to go somewhere and tank-certainly a vital characteristic of an EW bird-how will the EF-18 compare to the EA-6?
Sure, its a newer aircraft with better equipment -an NO I am not advocating a time warp back to the "good old days"-but I will opine the EF-18 will put even more of a burden of stressed tanking assets.
This new rose has some mighty sharp thorns to contend with...

The AIM-120D is certainly a qualitiative improvement as well, especially with the gains that will come from AESA and NCTR.

The supossed abilities of the JSF should limit the size of strike packages needed for ECM. This new airwing revolves around the JSF and her stealth more than you think at first glance. They are counting on it dominating the airspace.

It still remains to be seen how well that stealth can be maintained aboard. Also, in a time that augurs for MORE payload and range, the USN settled for diminutive numbers in both cases with the F-35.
And as afar as dominance goes...It still takes numbers....

Surging replacements forward isn't a problem with ariel tanking. But you are right, they're not many replacements to go around. I hope we keep a fleet of mothballed C/Ds

Subject to the whims of host governments who own the fields and the airspace. Can't count on it as a given.

That's why the gods made AEGIS... SPY-3 will be a major improvement especially being on CV(X). Give it some ESSM and she has a SERIOUS self defense capability.

The fight gets that close and I will bet a paycheck the carrier wont tarry in the vicinity.

Gone are the days a commander can afford a view like this out of the bridge window...

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g340000/g342020.jpg

They are counting on the dominance of stealth to clear the way then they can operate in a safe evironement.

The recent "surprise" for the Kitty suggests that you had best be mighty careful on what you aSSume you can count on in this business...

 

[Galrahn]

And thats it. Whether F/A18s or A-1 Spads were embarked, either could hit the same number of waypoints given the same precision munitions.

You are being intellectually dishonest in your topic tangent. The A-1 cannot achieve or sustain the same sortie rate as the F/A-18 under any circumstance, and thus cannot hit the same number of aimpoints per day with the same munitions. Comments like your make me wonder if you are thinking this out.

I did not make this specific about any platform, I compared 1989 platforms to modern day platforms. The Navy made it about a specific platform when they decided the F/A-18 was the only platform for every job. In this thread, I have not given my opinion once regarding thier decision, or my opinion of the F/A-18 as the USN platform of choice.

You are trying to turn my point into a discussion of whether the USN has done everything it can to achieve its greatest potential, making the case that with the F/A-18 the USN has not. That may or may not be the case, but that has nothing to do with what I am talking about. My point is about consistant improvement despite deminishing numbers, and I pointed out there is substancial improvement despite potentially not achieving the maximum possible capability or having the best platform possible for each individual task that may be required.

You want to jump on your soapbox about how good or bad a platform is, you'd sound smarter if you did it with someone engaged in that discussion.

 

[sidishus]

You are being intellectually dishonest in your topic tangent.

No, I'm not. What is intellectually dishonest is the view pushed by those in the USN that the increase in aimpoints completely solves the problem of diminished range, persistence, and payload on dramatically fewer aircraft in the CVW.
Fewer hardpoints over the target means fewer aimpoints hit ...and there is no getting around that reality.

The A-1 cannot achieve or sustain the same sortie rate as the F/A-18 under any circumstance, and thus cannot hit the same number of aimpoints per day with the same munitions. Comments like your make me wonder if you are thinking this out.

I did not make this specific about any platform, I compared 1989 platforms to modern day platforms.

(Hmmm, been here before) I am not one of those retros suggesting we go back in time to the Pretailhook days of 1989. My view is that the USN Naval Air leadership STOPPED looking forward in the '90s....

you'll find the numbers skew even further in favor of the F/A-18 platform

These were YOUR words...The numbers of aimpoints have diddly to do with the F/A-18.

If anything, the calculus favors an aircraft that can carry MORE precision munitions FARTHER, and can stay on station LONGER than the F/A-18.

You are trying to turn my point into a discussion of whether the USN has done everything it can to achieve its greatest potential, making the case that with the F/A-18 the USN has not. That may or may not be the case, but that has nothing to do with what I am talking about. My point is about consistant improvement despite deminishing numbers, and I pointed out there is substancial improvement despite potentially not achieving the maximum possible capability or having the best platform possible for each individual task that may be required.

You are the one who trotted out the party line that emanates from that powerpoint that stated two F/A-18s equal 2 Essex class carriers or some such.
Wonderful play on numbers, but highly disingenuous.

I am sure you read that article "Bridging the Gap" in a recent Proceedings?

When a CAG and a DesRon Commander say there are too few airplanes aboard....then there most likely are.
I will agree that the USN is doing the best it can with what it has. However, for the historical record, it was the headlong rush into achieving an "All Hornet Deck" that created this numbers gap that now exists in the first place.

How much MORE of an improvement could have occurred over the last 15 years if the Naval Air leadership had not been so shortsighted?

You want to jump on your soapbox about how good or bad a platform is, you'd sound smarter if you did it with someone engaged in that discussion.

Again, you brought up "how the numbers skew even further in favor of the F/A-18 platform", not me.

As currently configured, the contemporary CVW has some very serious deficiencies, the largest of which is lack of numbers of aircraft aboard.

 

[Galrahn]

Fewer hardpoints over the target means fewer aimpoints hit ...and there is no getting around that reality.

Here is why I disagree with your A-1 analogy. It is easy to say a platform with more hardpoints is better than a platform with fewer hardpoints if the discussion is tactical regarding a single strike, but that is the wrong way to evaluate. The method I am using to evaluate is how many times can you get a number of hardpoints over a target over an extended period of sustainability. A squadron of A-1s would average at most 1.3 sorties per plane per day against targets at a range of 250 miles, while under the same conditions a F/A-18 squadron would average at least 2.5 sorties per plane per day.

By the end of the first day, the difference in the amount of ordinance delivered would be noticeable, and in favor of the F/A-18. This doesn't even factor the variables, including mission type, also which favor the multi-mission platform over the strike platform. The A-1 isn't a good analogy, and by the same token the A-6 wouldn't be either, because there is no CVW in existence today in another country, or by any country in the past, that measures up to the sustained strike capability of a CVW today, which is centered around the F/A-18. While not a popular point against those (whom I'd agree with btw) have plenty of ammunition to highlight the deficiencies of the F/A-18, it is what it is. Despite reduced numbers and despite not having all the right platforms, there is no question the capability of a CVW is greater today than it was in the past. It may not be the best it could be, but nothing ever is.

You are the one who trotted out the party line that emanates from that powerpoint that stated two F/A-18s equal 2 Essex class carriers or some such. Wonderful play on numbers, but highly disingenuous.

It is not my intention to be a powerpoint warrior for the US Navy, nor would I choose to be. Measuring historical capability and modern capability isn’t always disingenuous, and I think historical context is relevant. Everything must be done in context, and I believe I established the context. In 1989, despite all those aircraft in a CVW, the number of targets that could be hit per day was fewer by more than a factor of five than what can be done today with fewer platforms. That is an important metric, because in a time when the Navy is starving for money for aircraft programs, the overall capability continues to grow despite hardships.

I am sure you read that article "Bridging the Gap" in a recent Proceedings?

When a CAG and a DesRon Commander say there are too few airplanes aboard....then there most likely are.
I will agree that the USN is doing the best it can with what it has. However, for the historical record, it was the headlong rush into achieving an "All Hornet Deck" that created this numbers gap that now exists in the first place.

How much MORE of an improvement could have occurred over the last 15 years if the Naval Air leadership had not been so shortsighted?

I read the article, and I thought it ignored a major issue as to not offend the Proceedings audience. The current US Navy leadership continues to make the surface warfare fleet the most important budget item, and has raided the aircraft budget for money needed to bring up ship totals. The problem is, they are making these decisions to push projects like the DD(X), which looks like it may cost 17 billion for 7 ships (not including costs that can be rolled into the CG(X)). How many aircraft are being discarded for another major surface warship project, at a time when the average age of the surface fleet is less than the average age of the aircraft fleet. That last point is critical, this is the first time in history the average age of warships is less than aircraft, and the trend will continue for at least the next decade unless significant budget changes occur.

With the incredible budget bias towards surface warships over logistics ships, amphibious ships, submarines, and aircraft, all of which are in a state approaching critical shortage, at a time when the surface fleet has no such shortages, the shortsighted approach of the US Navy isn't a problem that is going to go away anytime soon.

As currently configured, the contemporary CVW has some very serious deficiencies, the largest of which is lack of numbers of aircraft aboard.

Agreed, which is why it is very impressive the contemporary CVW has more capability than the contemporary CVWs in the past did during their era's. There is also no evidence this will change without a significant geo-political event highlighting the deficiency.

 

[Aussie Digger]

While not wishing to make light of the situation, it must be "terrible" to be in the position the USN is in today...

Each single carrier possesses more combat capability than most entire airforces around the world. This situation is also increasing at a rapid rate. Newer weapons such as AIM-120D, SLAM-ER, SDB and advanced HARM variants are rapidly increasing this capability.

Add stealth capacity into the mix with the F-35C (which WILL feature greater range/payload parameters than current F/A-18C/D/E/F series fighters, even if not as long as could be desired) and the USN will be further ahead yet again.

Supported by subs firing Block IV Tactoms and USAF strategic bombers with their worldwide range and the almost ludicrous numbers of precision strike weapons the USAF will arms it's heavy bombers with (doesn't the B-2 carry 84 GBU-38's for instance?) the US is hardly doing "badly" in it's power projection capabilities...

 

[sidishus]

The A-1 isn't a good analogy, and by the same token the A-6 wouldn't be either, because there is no CVW in existence today in another country, or by any country in the past, that measures up to the sustained strike capability of a CVW today, which is centered around the F/A-18. While not a popular point against those (whom I'd agree with btw) have plenty of ammunition to highlight the deficiencies of the F/A-18, it is what it is. Despite reduced numbers and despite not having all the right platforms, there is no question the capability of a CVW is greater today than it was in the past. It may not be the best it could be, but nothing ever is.

However, that capability is ONLY a function of increased ordnance effectiveness, and ALL it measures is the effectiveness of the CVW in the strike arena.

Sure, the F/A-18 is all that is left, but about the best you can say is that increased ordnance effectiveness has covered the increased shortfalls in range, payload, and perisistence-and other mission shortfalls such as ASW-brought about by all Hornet deck.


Is the CVW more effective in fighting a combined suface, subsurface, air threat into the littorals (where its obligated to be because of its lack of legs)...?
Numbers of aimpoints that can be struck doesn't answer that question.

In 1989, despite all those aircraft in a CVW, the number of targets that could be hit per day was fewer by more than a factor of five than what can be done today with fewer platforms. That is an important metric, because in a time when the Navy is starving for money for aircraft programs, the overall capability continues to grow despite hardships.

Precision weapons ONLY made that difference. Shortsighted decisons caused that 1989 airgroup to be incapable of not putting substantially more aimponts under threat than the one circa 2006....

it is very impressive the contemporary CVW has more capability than the contemporary CVWs in the past did during their era's. There is also no evidence this will change without a significant geo-political event highlighting the deficiency.

In the limited context of strike warfare you are right....But is the CVW OVERALL more effective?

One of the historic selling points is that a carrier can visit an enemey "without a calling card". Can't do that today. Without significant land based support, the carrier is not in the fight. This is chalked off to the USN doing the right thing and being "Joint".

Bunkums....


It is also potentially MORE at risk to potential adversaries' sea denial capabilities because, instead of increasing the ability to stand off, the CVWs effective range has actually decreased over the years. Used to be a sacrosanct rule that no carrier would venture north of the Hormuz.
Ain't so today...
http://www.iranian.ws/iran_news/publish/article_18867.shtml

Focusing on just the number of aimpoints that can be hit today, versus how many could have been hit a generation ago, is the troublesome tangent.

 

[Aussie Digger]

One other thought just occured to me too. How'd those A-1's and A-6's go at air combat?

 

[Big-E]

One other thought just occured to me too. How'd those A-1's and A-6's go at air combat?

Not very... The A-6 was able to carry old versions of AMRAAM but seldom did. The A-1 was no dog-fighter and operating in the jet age had to be protected.

 

[sidishus]

One other thought just occured to me too. How'd those A-1's and A-6's go at air combat?

Note the MiG-17 stenciled on the side of this Spad...

http://www.midwaysailor.com/midway1960/va25ne577-001b.jpg

Pilot describing encounter here:
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/u110000/u113736c.htm

Scroll down to find the story here:
http://www.midwaysailor.com/midway/shootdowns.html


It wasn't the only case either...

http://skyraider.org/skyassn/sartapes/migkill/migkill.htm


Two questions for a two part question:

What is the loss of effectiveness to the CVW if a "self escorting" buddy tanker F/A-18E has to pickle his stores in the face of an AAW or SAM threat?
How many of those buddy tanks are aobard anyway?

What is the loss to operational effectiveness if "self escorting" F/A-18s have to pickle their stores in the face of an AAW or SAM threat?

Are there substantial redundancies for unforseen combat contingencies in today's CVWs?

Ok. A third.
If a contemporary CVW suffers the loss rates suffered by those circa 1967, how long will it be before the contemporary CVW is rendered combat ineffective as compared to the one 40 years past?

 

[Big-E]

Note the MiG-17 stenciled on the side of this Spad...

For the few cases of victories must we remind you of the losses? There were a total of 274 Skyraiders lost in Nam under US control, once we left we gave them to the South Vietnamese. 43 Navy and 18 USAF Skyraiders were shot down by MIGs. Countless more were shot down after we left them in the hands of less capable pilots. The combat record is far from being in the A-1s favor.

Two questions for a two part question:

What is the loss of effectiveness to the CVW if a "self escorting" buddy tanker F/A-18E has to pickle his stores in the face of an AAW or SAM threat?
How many of those buddy tanks are aobard anyway?

What is the loss to operational effectiveness if "self escorting" F/A-18s have to pickle their stores in the face of an AAW or SAM threat?

The 31-301 Sargent Fletcher pod is configurable on three hardpoints for the Growler for a total of 903 gallons and they dispense at 220 GPM. We normally tanker over water in a safe zone before we enter the combat zone. If for some reason they break convention and have to dump them we have several dozen on board. The loss of a few isn't criticle.

Are there substantial redundancies for unforseen combat contingencies in today's CVWs?

AAW we fly BARCAP with AIM-120Ds, have AEGIS and CIWS
ASW we have MH-60s, SSNs, sonobouyes, bow mounted surface sonars and ASROC
Surface Strike- 50 Hornets filling all kinds of missions, TLAMs and MOD 4 ERGM 5 inch guns
Naval Strike- ca 50 Hornets carrying Harpoon IIs, TLAMs in naval role, SSNs, MOD 4 ERGM 5 inch guns

Looks pretty redundant to me...

Ok. A third.
If a contemporary CVW suffers the loss rates suffered by those circa 1967, how long will it be before the contemporary CVW is rendered combat ineffective as compared to the one 40 years past?

We are currently operating two versions of Hornets with a production line still open. At the moment we are in pretty good shape for spares. When this one closes the JSF line will be open and they will be doing the high risk missions.

 

[Galrahn]

However, that capability is ONLY a function of increased ordnance effectiveness, and ALL it measures is the effectiveness of the CVW in the strike arena.

That is not a factually true statement though. The F/A-18 as a platform, even if all ordinance was the same, can still sustain a greater sortie rate over a longer period of time than any previous carrier strike or intercept platform. There are certainly other factors where other platforms are specifically more superior on a tactical level, but none of those other platforms can match the F/A-18 maintenance record which accounts for the higher sortie rate, and none come close to matching its sustainment rates recorded in wartime operations.

I'm not advocating the F/A-18 is the best platform for all roles (or any specific role actually), but because of the F/A-18 the a CVW today can sustain operations for intercept or strike longer than any CVW in history. Ordinance isn't the only factor, rather it is a major factor in accounting for the substancial increase over previous generations. To say it is the only factor would be to ignore the most time critical element of any CVW during military operations, maintenance.

Sure, the F/A-18 is all that is left, but about the best you can say is that increased ordnance effectiveness has covered the increased shortfalls in range, payload, and perisistence-and other mission shortfalls such as ASW-brought about by all Hornet deck.

Is the CVW more effective in fighting a combined surface, subsurface, air threat into the littorals (where its obligated to be because of its lack of legs)...?
Numbers of aimpoints that can be struck doesn't answer that question.

What shortfall in persistence? Range and payload shortfalls over previous CVW I agree with, but not persistence. After 48 hours of operations a CVW squadron couldn't average more than 1 sortie per day in the past, but today’s CVWs have been able to do this many times in operations. Remember, while combat capability matters at the moment of attack, the moment of attack is less than 1% of the time in any given sortie. The CVW of today is more efficient than any CVW in history, particularly over periods of time measured in days. Efficiency is critical to sustained operations.

Yes, today's CVW would be more effective in the littorals than previous generation CVWs, but this has nothing to do with platform or ordinance, rather because of technological improvements in electronics.

Precision weapons ONLY made that difference. Shortsighted decisons caused that 1989 airgroup to be incapable of not putting substantially more aimponts under threat than the one circa 2006....

I agree with your second sentence, but precision weapons aren’t the 'only' difference, rather it is the biggest difference. Aircraft maintenance is also an important factor, and the superior electronics of today’s CVW accounts for major increases in capability as well.

In the limited context of strike warfare you are right....But is the CVW OVERALL more effective?

One of the historic selling points is that a carrier can visit an enemey "without a calling card". Can't do that today. Without significant land based support, the carrier is not in the fight. This is chalked off to the USN doing the right thing and being "Joint".

True, but the Navy isn't the only service guilty of this. The EA-6B covering the gaps in the USAF inventory in Iraq is another example. There are more advantages than disadvantages to the "Joint Warfighter" concepts, so in general you are correct the specifics make it more complicated.

Is the CVW overall more effective than in the past? Depends, but mostly yes. While I agree not as effective as it could be if given more tools for specific missions to work with, the efficiency of today's CVW does make it easier for war planners to get the job done faster than in the past, which is one way to evaluate effectiveness. A point here is in the past the CVW was asked to take on a much larger role in the past than it is today, or will be in the future. Ship/Sub based strike weapons and joint capabilities have changed the calculus of some of these metrics, after all, deep strike on hardened targets is a tomahawk issue where it was an A-6 issue in 1989, and the move to a CSG integrated helicopter based ASW and MIW forces, backed by unmanned vehicle sensor support, and in combination with submarine perimeter sentry's has changed the ASW and MIW metrics.

One example is the ASW point you made. I consider the retirement of the S-3 from ASW, and tanking for that matter, a major issue that without question reduces the potential capability of the CVW, and I think the recent tour by the Big E to the Mid-East highlighted this yet again. However, the 1989 CVBG with 5 ships would have a maximum of 14 helicopters, with no more than 6 able to support ASW, ASuW, or a logistics mission at any one time, much less a sustainable rate, and nothing for MIW.

In 2010 a CSG with 5 ships would have a minimum of 10 helicopters for any ASW, ASuW, MIW, or logistics mission at any one time. That is a major increase in persistence even when accounting for the loss of the S-3s, but at the cost of range and speed.

So to answer your question, yes today's CVW is more effective than in the past. There are obvious ways a CVW could be even more effective today, but that doesn't mean today's CVW is in any way less effective than in the past.

 

[sidishus]

For the few cases of victories must we remind you of the losses? The combat record is far from being in the A-1s favor.

I was NOT by a longshot suggesting the A-1 is anything but a relic. By 1966 they had to be kept out of North Vietnam.
According to the Air Ops officer on the Coral Sea's first Vietnam cruise, "those Fn-kers were crazy!", and had to be kept on a short leash.
I brought it up in this thread because of the whole aimless aimpoint stand.
On the last about the MiG victories, I suspect many reading this thread didn't know they happened.

The 31-301 Sargent Fletcher pod is configurable on three hardpoints for the Growler for a total of 903 gallons and they dispense at 220 GPM. We normally tanker over water in a safe zone before we enter the combat zone. If for some reason they break convention and have to dump them we have several dozen on board. The loss of a few isn't criticle.

The Growlers will be the buddy tankers?

How much of that fuel will the Growler need in egress, since it carries out what it carries in?

AAW we fly BARCAP with AIM-120Ds, have AEGIS and CIWS
ASW we have MH-60s, SSNs, sonobouyes, bow mounted surface sonars and ASROC
Surface Strike- 50 Hornets filling all kinds of missions, TLAMs and MOD 4 ERGM 5 inch guns
Naval Strike- ca 50 Hornets carrying Harpoon IIs, TLAMs in naval role, SSNs, MOD 4 ERGM 5 inch guns

Looks pretty redundant to me...

All well and good in a neatly pahsed engagement...much like the way the USN goes about practicing for war.
But add in sustained ops in any phase leading to down aircraft, significant combat losses, simultaneous multiple engagements across several regimes from air to subsurface, and your described redundancies will evaporate quickly.

We are currently operating two versions of Hornets with a production line still open. At the moment we are in pretty good shape for spares. When this one closes the JSF line will be open and they will be doing the high risk missions.

The JSF is an egg that hasn't hatched yet. No one really knows what the final numbers will be, or how effective its stealth will prove to be in the real world.


The point I am trying to make is there is no substitue for numbers, no matter how efficient you make what little you have.

 

[Big-E]

The point I am trying to make is there is no substitue for numbers, no matter how efficient you make what little you have.

Why do you think we don't have enough to handle a war?

If a CVW takes losses spares will be surged forward. If they take enough casualties then VFAs from non-deployed squadrons will be put on sea deployment. All CVWs are not deployed in any conflict. At least half of them are state side. We can take hundreds of losses before it will hamper our combat effectiveness.

 

[sidishus]

The F/A-18 as a platform, even if all ordinance was the same, can still sustain a greater sortie rate over a longer period of time than any previous carrier strike or intercept platform....
To say it is the only factor would be to ignore the most time critical element of any CVW during military operations, maintenance.

There is no doubt that maintnence is a critical factor in sortie generation, but so are total numbers. And I might add even the new Rhino is having it share of maintenace foibles...
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/NAV12016.xml

What shortfall in persistence? Range and payload shortfalls over previous CVW I agree with, but not persistence.

Which could stay on station longer with more ordnance before going off to tank, or for that matter which would require the most time in the basket overall for a given mission?

A 4 plane section of A-6s carrying 4000 lbs? A 4 plane section of A-3s carrying 6000 lbs? Or a 4 plane section of F/A-18Es carrying 4000 lbs? Given the same ordnance which would win the aimpoint metric?

NO, I AM NOT SUGGESTING BRINGING MUSEUM PIECES OUT OF THE DESERT!!:lul

Just illustrating that the all Hornet deck can't go as far, carry as much, for as long, as previous generation CVWs... And that this has had a downward effect on presistence. Sortie rates of individual aircraft notwithstanding.

The CVW of today is more efficient than any CVW in history, particularly over periods of time measured in days. Efficiency is critical to sustained operations.

The Germans were way more efficient than the Soviets in 1940...but they lost. Why? They were overwhelmed by numbers.

Yes, today's CVW would be more effective in the littorals than previous generation CVWs, but this has nothing to do with platform or ordinance, rather because of technological improvements in electronics.

Yeah, the recent little dance between the Sh1tty Kitty and the Chinese sub proves that!!

When F/A-18s are pressed into ASW, then you don't have enough of the right kinds of assets where they are needed.

One example is the ASW point you made. I consider the retirement of the S-3 from ASW, and tanking for that matter, a major issue that without question reduces the potential capability of the CVW, and I think the recent tour by the Big E to the Mid-East highlighted this yet again. However, the 1989 CVBG with 5 ships would have a maximum of 14 helicopters, with no more than 6 able to support ASW, ASuW, or a logistics mission at any one time, much less a sustainable rate, and nothing for MIW.

Why do you keep bringing up 1989? It was a good year.

That was then. The question is, are the numbers -and types- of assets right for the wars of today and tomorrow.

And my take on the first is a definite NO!...And on the second, the USN way too lopsided in the direction of shortranged strike warfare.

I say, this guy was (sadly) right on the money (register for free to read):
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles00/prorowe.htm

What he prognosticated is where we are today...

And this gent's message is even more to the point:
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/articles05/Pro02Stone-2.htm

The Navy's senior leaders proudly assert that "naval aviation allows us to take credible combat power across the globe without a permission slip."23 This may once have been true, but the all-Hornet air wing is sorely taxed to take its combat power further than 150 miles from the nearest blue water. Except for small strikes, this capability, once available to a carrier air wing with organic, dedicated tankers, now exists only when the Navy has Air Force tanker support, which requires permission from a host country. Even if organic tankers return to service, "credible combat power" comes only from a properly equipped, properly trained air wing—one equipped with warplanes, not simulators; one manned by pilots experienced in actual, not simulated, flight. Efforts to "balance current and future readiness" have been a bridge too far. Unless the balance is tilted back toward current readiness, the tactical expertise required to exploit future combatant aircraft will wither away before those aircraft enter fleet service. Most important, the United States will be caught in a very tenuous position if its Navy is unprepared and ill equipped for action against enemies stronger than those it has faced in the past three years.

 

[Galrahn]

A 4 plane section of A-6s carrying 4000 lbs? A 4 plane section of A-3s carrying 6000 lbs? Or a 4 plane section of F/A-18Es carrying 4000 lbs? Given the same ordnance which would win the aimpoint metric?

Just illustrating that the all Hornet deck can't go as far, carry as much, for as long, as previous generation CVWs... And that this has had a downward effect on presistence. Sortie rates of individual aircraft notwithstanding.

There are factors here, range to target and defenses would dramatically effect the metrics, wouldn't you agree? If there is an enemy CAP, additional sorties from other platforms would be required just to enable the A-6 or A-3 strike. Sortie rates of the individual aircraft very much matter, because the average sortie rate for the SH is more than twice that of both planes.

Plus, when you factor in the context of the era in which these platforms operate, you can't dismiss that deep strike in the SH era doesn't even require a SH, it can be done via cruise missile. It is noteworthy that the carrier based deep strike mission was a more critical mission during the cold war than it is today.

Yeah, the recent little dance between the Sh1tty Kitty and the Chinese sub proves that!!

Neither you or I have enough information on that incident to say it proves anything relevant to this discussion other than carrier based ASW is important, something we don't disagree on.

Why do you keep bringing up 1989? It was a good year.

That was then. The question is, are the numbers -and types- of assets right for the wars of today and tomorrow.

And my take on the first is a definite NO!...And on the second, the USN way too lopsided in the direction of shortranged strike warfare.

I use 1989 as a point of reference, as it was at the point of highest CVW capability during the cold war, and at a point in time where the USN was at the height of having a legitimate competitor.

I think you ask the right question btw, and all I have is my opinion. I am somewhat in favor of the F/A-18 as the platform of choice for the CVW for this era, because I do not see this era (1989 through about 2025) as being a time of competition for the US Navy. I do not see any advantage gained in increasing the overall numbers or capability of the current aircraft fleet, but I do see merit in raising a high level of efficiency in platforms for this era and maintaining at least 10 deployable large CVNs.

I have read both proceedings articles, but I think the segments of the articles that worry me are different than the segments of the articles that worry you. I am not too concerned with current operational levels, as long as a suitable force to deal with today's potential advesaries is maintained, and capability isn't a reduction of previous generations total battle force capabilities I am not too concerned. What worries me is the lack of R&D in maintaining technologies like tanking at sea, or fixed wing ASW on carrier capable aircraft. Both are critical technologies that must be maintained, as they are sure to be used in the future. The USN doesn't need production runs for platforms, but shouldn't stop developing for the possibility of production platforms.

Because I operate under the belief that the USN must be very smart to maintain its lead over future potential adversaries, and the smart move is to keep a robust design base, produce smaller yet innovative R&D platforms, and be as efficient as possible while maintaining mission critical technologies like submarines and aircraft carriers. I think the current CVW reflects the efficiency model, and its current configuration is an acceptable stopgap platform for an era void of war on a global industrial-military scale.

I'm not worried about the now, I'm more concerned with what the Navy has planned for 2025, because by then the world will have changed substantially and the USN better have the right mix ready for that world, or we will be in some trouble.

 

[Ths]

Good post Galrahn.

I tend to agree with You, that at the moment the US Navy is reasonably well covered - if somethings turn up medium term a production of F-18's could be done without to much fuss. The long term is reasonably covered with the F-35. That is the fighter department.
It doesn't matter if the F-18 is a jack of all trades but master of none in so far as the relevant comparison is what opposition it will be up against.
I agree that 1989 is a good base for comparison; but the aimpoint statistic is perhaps not that relevant for the 1989 case. I'm tending to believe that the reduction in complement foremost is a reflection that the task of taking care of the carriers has become easier.

As to research in to fixed wing ASW I'm not so certain of the need if Your horizon is 2025. The development of specialised non-fighter airframes is not liable in themselves to be very protracted. For such specialised aircraft the "black boxes" are more likely to be the pace-setter.

What I get from this reduced complement is that the entire fleet of aircraft carriers have spare capacity to:
Either increase the punch of the attacking force
Or provide space and other facilities to an increase in defensive aircraft.

What will be needed does not seem clear at the moment.

 

[sidishus]

There are factors here, range to target and defenses would dramatically effect the metrics, wouldn't you agree?

The single metric I am breaking out is how long aimpoints can be under threat by a given class of aircraft. The biggest payload capacity, and the biggest fuel fraction actually skews the numbers AWAY from the F/A-18....

It is noteworthy that the carrier based deep strike mission was a more critical mission during the cold war than it is today.

This isn't about deep strike...its about Persistence. This key metric in the CVW has marched steadily downward with the predilection for strike fighters over all other aircraft types.
This in turn has made the carrier beholden to big wing tanking (and big wing C4I assets as well) -which can be denied at the whim of a foreign governement or threatened indpendently. Also, the loss of legs means the carrier is more constrained in its ability to operate outside sea denial threats.

Can't get your airplanes within range of the aimpoints in the first place, then the point is moot...

(Yeah, the recent little dance between the Sh1tty Kitty and the Chinese sub proves that!!)

Neither you or I have enough information on that incident to say it proves anything relevant to this discussion other than carrier based ASW is important, something we don't disagree on.

What is DOES prove is that carriers are STILL not immune to the quiet diesel threat while conducting presence missions or established in a MODLOC close to the beach.
This is how carrers spend the majority of their time.

Your assertion that we are better able to handle the threat today than in previous years is simply incorrect.

In ASW, more than any other fight, numbers matter...

A narrow focus on aimpoints misses this critical vulnerability.

I do not see any advantage gained in increasing the overall numbers or capability of the current aircraft fleet, but I do see merit in raising a high level of efficiency in platforms for this era and maintaining at least 10 deployable large CVNs.
I think the current CVW reflects the efficiency model, and its current configuration is an acceptable stopgap platform for an era void of war on a global industrial-military scale.

And I say your view is only through the lens of Desert Storm and later and is a view that is dangerously myopic.
Razor thin effieciencies work in the business world against competitors
...Its not only takes effieiciencis , but also adequate numbers, to prevail against an enemy.
This era has been marked by a period of unprecedented assured acces to the peripheries of the battlespace, and astonishingly low combat losses because the foes have either been grossly incompetent, or irregulars who could not mount a symmetric threat.
These good ole days won't last until 2025...

Numbers matter in war, and recent experience aside, they will continue to do so.
That said, my take is draw down the number of hulls to six and put some real teeth and claws back on the decks that are left.

What worries me is the lack of R&D in maintaining technologies like tanking at sea, or fixed wing ASW on carrier capable aircraft. Both are critical technologies that must be maintained, as they are sure to be used in the future.

Couldn't agree with you more!!!

 

[heyjoe]

Not very... The A-6 was able to carry old versions of AMRAAM but seldom did. The A-1 was no dog-fighter and operating in the jet age had to be protected.

I think you mean Sidewinder. The A-6 had ability to carry Sidewinder on extra pylons but seldom did. AMRAAM is only carried by Hornet variants although it was tested on the Tomcat and planned for the A-6F variant.