shrinking USN carrier air wings

[rjmaz1]

Navy policy is to standardise 1 aircraft for multiple roles. Saves cost on maintenance. Hence EA18 to replace EA6 and buddy tanking to replace the TA6. 1 plane type is easier to maintain than multiples.

Understand concept of carrier based AWACs is also being reviewed.

A wedgetail radar on the back of a hornet?

It would probably fit too...

A hornet as an AWAC would requre less escorts than a hawkeye and could fly further and higher into enemy territory for a much better view of the enemy.

Could all the avionics be integrated small enough to be operated by the rear seat? I think at the rate computers are advancing it could be done very soon. Or if it was intergrated enough it an UAV could do the job.

 

[Big-E]

A wedgetail radar on the back of a hornet?

It would probably fit too...

A hornet as an AWAC would requre less escorts than a hawkeye and could fly further and higher into enemy territory for a much better view of the enemy.

Could all the avionics be integrated small enough to be operated by the rear seat? I think at the rate computers are advancing it could be done very soon. Or if it was intergrated enough it an UAV could do the job.

A hornet AWAC... mmmm no. Biggest reasons being loiter time, no room for sensor equipment and no one at the controls. Sensor fussion only accomplishes so much. You still need operator(s) onboard to filter and direct for contacts. Basing it in the CIC is too problematic.

 

[rjmaz1]

A hornet AWAC... mmmm no. Biggest reasons being loiter time, no room for sensor equipment and no one at the controls. Sensor fussion only accomplishes so much. You still need operator(s) onboard to filter and direct for contacts. Basing it in the CIC is too problematic.

So easily dismissed?

Everyone suggests that UAV's will eventually be doing AWAC roles.

A hornet with the same radar offers:
Quicker time on station.
Longer detection range due to higher ceiling.
Fewer escorts needed.
Can go further away from carrier as it can sprint away.
Less maintenance with fewer aircraft types.

Only downside is half of the endurance. Which means quicker rotation and more deck activity. However the reduction in escorts will make for a overall reduction.

But then again its not going to happen as the navy just finnished upgrading a few E-2's to hawkeye 2000 status and will be upgrading them with AESA and new computers in a few years.

 

[Big-E]

So easily dismissed?

Everyone suggests that UAV's will eventually be doing AWAC roles.

A hornet with the same radar offers:
Quicker time on station.
Longer detection range due to higher ceiling.
Fewer escorts needed.
Can go further away from carrier as it can sprint away.
Less maintenance with fewer aircraft types.

Only downside is half of the endurance. Which means quicker rotation and more deck activity. However the reduction in escorts will make for a overall reduction.

But then again its not going to happen as the navy just finnished upgrading a few E-2's to hawkeye 2000 status and will be upgrading them with AESA and new computers in a few years.

Shorter detection range due to smaller power output.
A Hornet carring a wedgetail won't be carrying AA gear.
If Hornet sprints away she won't have much loiter time and distance is reduced due to wasted fuel. She can't maintian combat speed for long durations.
Maintenance of turbo props isn't as intensive as jet fighter aircraft

Downsides are everything I listed and unless a radical AWACs structure is developed a Hornet won't carry it. Stick any wedgetail on any fighter and watch it pitch out of control.

 

[Ths]

There is something that makes me wonder.

If you take the CV66 air group from 1981 of 91 aircraft and the planned air group of 69, then there should be the option of operating 1 or 2 squadrons more from a carrier - an increase in punch of between 25-50 %.

On the other hand the Pacifik Fleet is starting to operate with carrier groups.

Can anybody tell me, if there are any plans to upgrade the size of carrier complement?
Especially seen in the context of carrier shortage, it should be an advantage if one carrier could provide the same punch that takes 2 carriers with present level complement?
Are there any increase in the number of carrier reserve squadrons?
When the F-35 gets into service, will all the F-18's stay in service?

 

[Big-E]

There is something that makes me wonder.

If you take the CV66 air group from 1981 of 91 aircraft and the planned air group of 69, then there should be the option of operating 1 or 2 squadrons more from a carrier - an increase in punch of between 25-50 %.

On the other hand the Pacifik Fleet is starting to operate with carrier groups.

Can anybody tell me, if there are any plans to upgrade the size of carrier complement?
Especially seen in the context of carrier shortage, it should be an advantage if one carrier could provide the same punch that takes 2 carriers with present level complement?
Are there any increase in the number of carrier reserve squadrons?
When the F-35 gets into service, will all the F-18's stay in service?

Please refer to post #12

 

[Ths]

Big E: I read no.12 - that was what started me.

I understand the increase in effectiveness due to new types.
I understand the lower numbers of planes.
I understand the improved logistics.

But if my arithmatic isn't wrong, there could be more plane on each carrier - as they have had that before - I just seem to my uninformed and naive eye, that with more planes on the ship you could have a more powerfull strike force.
The reduced number of planes should say it is not the deckspotting factor.
The newer types should (I might be wrong) mean lower man-hours maintainence pr. plane. Thus it is not servicing the planes that is a factor.

Is the problem that the F-18's are running low on service life at the introduction of the F-35. If you can keep pilots in reserve, it would seem to me to be an option to have 1 or 2 reserve squadrons for each active carrier that could augment the complement.

 

[Big-E]

Big E: I read no.12 - that was what started me.

I understand the increase in effectiveness due to new types.
I understand the lower numbers of planes.
I understand the improved logistics.

But if my arithmatic isn't wrong, there could be more plane on each carrier - as they have had that before - I just seem to my uninformed and naive eye, that with more planes on the ship you could have a more powerfull strike force.
The reduced number of planes should say it is not the deckspotting factor.
The newer types should (I might be wrong) mean lower man-hours maintainence pr. plane. Thus it is not servicing the planes that is a factor.

Is the problem that the F-18's are running low on service life at the introduction of the F-35. If you can keep pilots in reserve, it would seem to me to be an option to have 1 or 2 reserve squadrons for each active carrier that could augment the complement.

I just want to mention that more frames doesn't equal more capability. You have to carry the logistics to run a cetain level of tempo and have the pilots and crews to keep it up. Is there room in the hanger deck for more, yes. Is it going to equal more sorties and effective rotation, probably not. Cramming the deck isn't conducive of a fast sortie rate, it clogs the monkey works.

 

[Ths]

That was sort of the explanaition I was looking for.
It will be interesting though to see how the organisation adapts to the new situation. These immensely practical problems take time to find their optimum.

These contingency procedures are very interesting, but rarely in the public eye - we are talking about 25% increase; but (as You point out) just in certain conditions.

 

[Big-E]

That was sort of the explanaition I was looking for.
It will be interesting though to see how the organisation adapts to the new situation. These immensely practical problems take time to find their optimum.

These contingency procedures are very interesting, but rarely in the public eye - we are talking about 25% increase; but (as You point out) just in certain conditions.

Once CV(X) comes out it will leave current sortie generation rates in the dust.

 

[Ths]

That might very well be true; but untill then the Navy will have to live with the Nimitz-class. The other problem will be to find money to build enough new generation carriers.

The problem with these big carriers is that the USA will have to fight with what they've got in that department. New planes can be developed - but the carrier soldiers on.
When the F-35 comes into service there will have been 3 generations of fighters on board the basically same ship.

WW2 was fought with makeshift carriers from the between war period. The real carriers only came into service when the war was won - more or less.

 

[sidishus]

I just want to mention that more frames doesn't equal more capability. You have to carry the logistics to run a cetain level of tempo and have the pilots and crews to keep it up. Is there room in the hanger deck for more, yes. Is it going to equal more sorties and effective rotation, probably not. Cramming the deck isn't conducive of a fast sortie rate, it clogs the monkey works.

Remembering the days when decks looked like this...

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h97000/h97716.jpg

I will opine there is plenty of room aboard today's carriers before they would be "too" crowded...Note the 10 A-3s (out of the 18 embarked) on board the Indy.
It would take something on the order of 100 Bugs and Rhinos to match the deck factor the Indy sported in late 1960 (the pic was actually taken in Nov 1960).

...That said, you have a bit of a valid point. It was crowded in those days, and because of the plethora of manufacturers -not just airframe makers but the whole host of OEM parts makers that each aircraft company preferred-logistics was a nightmare. It didn't help that MTBF of most of the bleeding edge electronics systems could be measured in minutes in many cases as well.

However, having just 44 (relatively diminutive in size compared to the aircraft in the pic above...and CERTAINLY diminutive in terms of "legs") strike aircraft aboard -and a dearth of other special mission aircraft such as ELINT tanking and ASW- isn't necessarily the better place to be in terms of combat effectiveness.

First, there is an unstated assumption that combat losses will remain at the next to nil numbers they are today. It is an assumption just waitng to bite the USN (and USAF) in the A-- too.
Unlike late WWII where aircraft were expended at a prodigious rate, but were replenished just as quickly by CVEs shuttling aircraft forward...
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CVE/cve99.html

...or as in Vietnam when attack aircraft losses in the hundreds could be absorbed...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_losses_of_the_Vietnam_War

...the 21st century USN will have to pretty much finish the fight with the resources they start with, given the dramatically reduced unit levels and greatly diminished manufacturing capability.

Another issue is the assumption of "assured access" near the beach. If the carrier has to fight a littoral battle, and is forced to operate in contested areas while conducting power projection missions, numbers-not to mention people proficient in all the varied mission areas- of aircraft become very important very quickly indeed.
Related to this is, if an opponent can mount a robust enough sea denial strategy, the carrier may be forced to stand off at such ranges that the "modest" combat radius of the current flock aboard will very quickly stretch organic tanking beyond what it can handle, and may even stretch what big wing tanking can provide. Add in sortie lengths and effectiveness would plummet.

Which brings up the last point....The assumption that land based assets will always be able to "be there" when needed. Will they? If a country decides to shut down their fields or airspace, then the carrier will be hard pressed to even start a fight, much less stay in it...

 

[Big-E]

Barrier Combat Air Patrol

However, having just 44 (relatively diminutive in size compared to the aircraft in the pic above...and CERTAINLY diminutive in terms of "legs") strike aircraft aboard -and a dearth of other special mission aircraft such as ELINT tanking and ASW- isn't necessarily the better place to be in terms of combat effectiveness.

There are other components of the fleet that will be taking on some of these roles. ASW will be taken up by the Virginias and MH-60s dropping soda can sized sono/hydro bouyes that will form a net that covers an insane area. The AEGIS system can handle a high threat environment in close quarters where BARCAP aircraft can't engage in time. The addition of AIM-120D will replace the role of F-14s and Pheonix missles. The Growlers will replace buddy tanking S-4s and ELINT/SEAD A-6 Intruders. Honestly I think they need to up Growlers to a full squadron. The supossed abilities of the JSF should limit the size of strike packages needed for ECM. This new airwing revolves around the JSF and her stealth more than you think at first glance. They are counting on it dominating the airspace. They are also counting on cutting CAG budgets as well. That is the main reason.

First, there is an unstated assumption that combat losses will remain at the next to nil numbers they are today. It is an assumption just waitng to bite the USN (and USAF) in the A-- too.
Unlike late WWII where aircraft were expended at a prodigious rate, but were replenished just as quickly by CVEs shuttling aircraft forward...

...the 21st century USN will have to pretty much finish the fight with the resources they start with, given the dramatically reduced unit levels and greatly diminished manufacturing capability.

Surging replacements forward isn't a problem with ariel tanking. But you are right, they're not many replacements to go around. I hope we keep a fleet of mothballed C/Ds

Another issue is the assumption of "assured access" near the beach. If the carrier has to fight a littoral battle, and is forced to operate in contested areas while conducting power projection missions, numbers-not to mention people proficient in all the varied mission areas- of aircraft become very important very quickly indeed.
Related to this is, if an opponent can mount a robust enough sea denial strategy, the carrier may be forced to stand off at such ranges that the "modest" combat radius of the current flock aboard will very quickly stretch organic tanking beyond what it can handle, and may even stretch what big wing tanking can provide. Add in sortie lengths and effectiveness would plummet.

That's why the gods made AEGIS... SPY-3 will be a major improvement especially being on CV(X). Give it some ESSM and she has a SERIOUS self defense capability.

Which brings up the last point....The assumption that land based assets will always be able to "be there" when needed. Will they? If a country decides to shut down their fields or airspace, then the carrier will be hard pressed to even start a fight, much less stay in it...

They are counting on the dominance of stealth to clear the way then they can operate in a safe evironement.

 

[contedicavour]

What improvements does Amraam AIM120D bring vs previous versions such as the "B" in service on the Italian Navy's Harriers Plus ?

cheers

 

[Big-E]

What improvements does Amraam AIM120D bring vs previous versions such as the "B" in service on the Italian Navy's Harriers Plus ?

cheers

It increases range by 50%. It has a new navigation system and it corrects the vibration levels from the C model that are harmful to it's electronics.

 

[Galrahn]

Carrier air wing comparison discussions should also include sortie rates and aimpoints as a method of comparison and evaluation. Improved weapons and more reliable aircraft today have changed dramatically since the cold war, and a reasonable comparison of the numbers shows just how much more effective a compliment of 48 carrier strike aircraft today is compared to 60 carrier strike aircraft was in 1989.

For Comparison.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) deployed in 1989 with two 12 plane F-14A squadrons (VF-41 and VF-84), two 12 plane F/A-18C squadrons (VFA-15 and VFA-87), two 8 plane A-6E sqaudrons (VA-35 and VA-36), and one 4 plane EA-6B squadron (VAQ-141). During wartime it was believed this air wing would give the CVN 162 total aimpoints per day based on average sortie rates of the respective aircraft.

In 2010 any Nimitz class aircraft carrier that deploys with two 10 plane F/A-18E/F squadrons, two 12 plane F/A-18C/D squadrons, and one 4 plane EF-18G squadron is expected to have 1080 aimpoints per day based on average sortie rates of the repsective aircraft.

As you can see, smart weapons and improved sortie rates have made war more efficient by sea. I am only using average sortie rates for these calculations, you can certainly use higher expectations for both to skew the numbers, but in that case, you'll find the numbers skew even further in favor of the F/A-18 platform.

****
This is not a claim the F/A-18 is a superior aircraft, only it has superior reliablity to pervious carrier aircraft and operates in an age of much improved weapons.
****

Also by comparison, the 13 deployable carriers in 1989 (yes there were 16 carriers, but 3 were always unavailable) could combine for 2106 aimpoints per day. Today the US Navy could deploy 10 carriers for 10800 aimpoints per day, more than FIVE times as many aimpoints per day as the larger carrier force of 1989.

The CVN-21 is expected to improve on these figures, and undoubtably new technologies like the F-35, JUCAS, and new light weight precision weapons will increase this margin even further.

 

[sidishus]

Carrier air wing comparison discussions should also include sortie rates and aimpoints as a method of comparison and evaluation. Improved weapons and more reliable aircraft today have changed dramatically since the cold war, and a reasonable comparison of the numbers shows just how much more effective a compliment of 48 carrier strike aircraft today is compared to 60 carrier strike aircraft was in 1989.

The math works only so long as the loss rate remains low and the carrier is not faced with multiple threats

In 2010 any Nimitz class aircraft carrier that deploys with two 10 plane F/A-18E/F squadrons, two 12 plane F/A-18C/D squadrons, and one 4 plane EF-18G squadron is expected to have 1080 aimpoints per day based on average sortie rates of the repsective aircraft.

Also by comparison, the 13 deployable carriers in 1989 (yes there were 16 carriers, but 3 were always unavailable) could combine for 2106 aimpoints per day. Today the US Navy could deploy 10 carriers for 10800 aimpoints per day, more than FIVE times as many aimpoints per day as the larger carrier force of 1989.

As you can see, smart weapons and improved sortie rates have made war more efficient by sea. I am only using average sortie rates for these calculations, you can certainly use higher expectations for both to skew the numbers, but in that case, you'll find the numbers skew even further in favor of the F/A-18 platform.

This is a highly disingenuous argument. Hang the same ordnance on an A-1 Spad and you would have better persistence over the same aimpoints at the same unrefueled range as compared to a Bug...It would just take 3 times as long to get there -but without the need for a big wing tanker-is all.

These numbers are singing accolades to the accuracy of modern ordnance *ONLY*, and they are being twisted into a case for way too few aircraft aboard.

****

This is not a claim the F/A-18 is a superior aircraft, only it has superior reliablity...

This argument is holding less and less water as well. Way back in the early '70s when VAdm Kent Lee rammed the Hornet down the throat of NavAir, this argument did have some merit. There were too many different types of aircraft from too many makers sporting too many unreliable systems.
In exchange for inferior payload, inferior range, and inferior performance, the Navy *did* get a more reliable aircraft in the F-18 Hornet.

However, aircraft manufacturing philosophies have moved ahead a generation while the navy's mindset has not. Reliability in modern aircraft construction is NOT about the same airframe. Its about employing common parts using a common design philosophy in airframes optimized for their intended purpose.
You can see this in airliners. While the ATR and the A340 are definitely different aircraft, their avionics systems boast a high degree of commonality. Airbus cockpits on all their aircraft are all exactly alike.
"Pop the hood" on modern Boeings and you will find similar commonalities in systems from hydraulic to electrical to plumbing.
That is this modern path to "reliability".

Stuffing all missions-like tanking and ASW support-into a common aircraft ill suited for even its purported main mission areas is a mighty high price to pay to the Altar of Reliability...

...Especially when you don't have enough of them.

 

[Ths]

This at least explains to me why the F-18 is the bird of choise.

Does the increase in "aimpoints" (I assume an aimpoint is an aircraft launched from a carrier) mean that the critical factor is the catapults?

 

[Waylander]

Another question is how have the "aimpoints" of the potential enemies have risen throughout the years.

 

[Galrahn]

Another question is how have the "aimpoints" of the potential enemies have risen throughout the years.

Aimpoints is meant as number of targets that can be hit. In 1989, 1 plane for 1 target was a common montra, although not always true in the case of some platforms like the A-6. Today, 1 SH can hit more than one target, mostly because of precision weapons.

Waylander I guess it depends. Stealth technology is leading to fewer aimpoints, because the extra ordinance negates the stealth capability. The F-22 hits fewer aimpoints per day than the F-15, but using the same comparison I did above, the F-15 today hits tons more targets than it did in 1989, so you are correct, it has less to do with platform than ordinance.

Sid,

You first comment doesn't make sense at all. In 1989, an A-6 couldn't even fly a strike sortie without help from a F-14 or F-18 flying escort, so multiple threats further reduced the operational tempo in 1989 compared to today. Of coarse loss rates matter, they would apply to both, and in 1989 it was extreamly difficult to sustain even 2 sorties per day for just 3 days for the vast majority of carrier based planes.

I am missing your point completely with the A-1, and I am certain you missed mine regarding the F/A-18. My point isn't a debate about what the best strike platform is, what the carrier air wing should be, or what the USN is doing right or wrong. I am simply making a comparison between the available strike platforms today and the available strike platforms of 1989, and making the point that despite all the noise over specific platforms and numbers, a carrier air wing today is still a substancial upgrade over what was being fielded at the end of the cold war.