Worst Commanders in History

[FutureTank]

Actually you didn't. When you tried to correct me on Zhukov you only illustrated the point I made that successful officers were a threat and were on his choping block. It is not like Stalin just stopped getting rid of these generals in 37'. He did it before, throughout, and after the war. He just didn't put them to death on a large scale. .

What I tried to point out is that the scale was much wider then just the military, and that military distinction had nothing to do with being purged.
Zhukov was again 'purged' by Khrushev after Stalin's death.

 

[Big-E]

Stalin could not belive that Hitler attacked regardless of being prepared for it. Most German officers (despite wartime and post war propaganda) did not consider Wermacht prepared for war with USSR.

I think the build up was obvious enough, talk about military blunders. Stalin was in lala land and couldn't read the writing on the wall. He couldn't read Hitler to save his life, much less most of his country. If he had taken proper steps the war would not nearly have been the blood bath it was.

 

[Big-E]

What I tried to point out is that the scale was much wider then just the military, and that military distinction had nothing to do with being purged.
Zhukov was again 'purged' by Khrushev after Stalin's death.

Which again only emphasizes the environment prone to getting rid of THE BEST commanders they have for political protection. Zhukov was popular because of his military success. There was a reason I used Zhukov as an example to emphasize my point. His career is laced with being purged over and over again.

 

[FutureTank]

If that's what the manuals say that doesn't mean command followed. All one has to do is read the reports of human waves reminiscent of the WWI veterans that implemented them. I'm not making this stuff up. But you do illustrate something VERY important to this and is a prime example of wasted lives. As Confucius once said: "To lead untrained men to war is to throw them away." The forced conscription of millions of "untrained" and "unarmed" men did take place during the initial losses which lead to even more unessecary losses down the road..

I did say that the problem was in the large scale integration of reservists and civilians into an army in transition.
I think you are 'painting with broad brush strokes' here because we are talking about 4 years of war. Even if some civilians did go to war untrained, this does not mean they were led to their death in waves every time for 4 years! Nor does it mean they were inept and incapable of learning as individuals.

Below is a detailed study of single area rectuit casualties of one Soviet rifle regiment.

How 771 Rifle Regiment of the 137 Rifle Division perished.
November 16 2006
Published on a Russian site kisvalera.narod.ru the analytical work of a Nizhniy-Novgorod journalist Valerie Pavlovich Kiselev, who traced fates of the natives of Pavlovsky region of the former Gor'kiy region, called up June 23, 1941 for 771 RR of 137 RD.
ANALYSIS
information about the persons, called up in Pavlovsky of Gor'kiy region for service with the 771 RR of 137 RD on June 23 1941 g.
1. In all it is mobilized in Gor'kiy region - 884505 men., in that number:
A) permanent losses - 340275 men., including:
- perished in combat - 139240 men.;
- perished in the captivity - 3998 men.;
- died of the wounds - 39397 men.;
- missing - 157640 men.;
b) were in the captivity - 4000 men., of them returned home - 800, including the natives of Pavlovsky of region - 3.
2. mobilized in Pavlovsky 21651 men 21651 region., including:
A) permanent losses - 9702 men., including:
- perished in battle - 3948 men.;
- perished in captivity - 122 men.;
- died of wounds - 1094 men.;
- missing - 4538 men.;
b) expected returned - 11949 men., actual returned 11703 men.
3. all natives of Pavlovsky region called up for 771 RR of 137 RD - 958 man., of them:
- perished - 264 men., including in the captivity - 31;
- died of wounds - 13 men.;
- missing - 585 men.;
- fate unknown - 61 men.
4. The time of loss:
A) 1941:
- first combat - 21 men.;
- with the breakthrough from the area on the river Sozh - 46 men.;
- in combat for Miloslavichi - 36 men.;
- in autumn and in winter 1941 - 34 men.
- altogether - 137 men.
b) 1942 - 32 men.;
c) 1943 - 32 men.;
g) 1944 - 19 men.;
d) 1945 - 13 men.;
e) date unknown - 5 men.
zh) for the war - 238 men.
5. On the time of loss without detail (missing):
A) 1941:
- first combat (with 13 until July 19) - 9 men.;
- with the breakthrough from the environment on the river Sozh (18-24 July) - 72 men.;
- in combat for Miloslavichi and in August - 83 men.;
- in September - December - 228;
- altogether - 392 men.
b) 1942 - 112 men.;
c) 1943 - 20 men.;
g) 1944 - 9 men.;
d) 1945 - 2 men.;
e) date is unknown - 2 men.;
zh) for the war - 537 men.
6. In all perished and missing in 771 RR of 137 RD:
A) 1941 - 529 men.;
b) 1942 - 144 men.;
c) 1943 - 52 men.;
g) 1944 - 28 men.;
d) 1945 - 15 men.;
e) date unknown - 7 men.
zh) for the war - 775 men of 958 men soldiers, called up 23.06.41 for 771 RR of 137 RD in the Pavlovsky region.
Yes this does show majority of losses in 1941. However notice the rate of decline in casualties during subsequent three full years. Consider also the type of operations and conditions under which they were performed in 1941 compared to subsequent years. In theory as I said the offensive operations of later two years.
A short guide to the history of the conscripts in the study of 137th Rifle Division.
The division was formed in Gorky with 14,000 establishment. The contingent in the study joined the division on its way to Mogilev. They came from vicinity of the Krasnoye Sormovo factory which would be soon evacuated and build T-34s in the Urals.
At Mogilev it is credited with 1000 enemy casualties and 30 tanks, but was surrounded and had to break out and retreat. At the Sozh river it joined the 20th Rifle Corps facing the 4th Panzer and 10th Panzergrenadier divisions. The breakout begun on the 19th of July, 1941. Left in the breach not far from the village Miloslavichi was the 2nd battalion, 771st Rifle Regiment which was to await relief from other units of 13th Army (of which 20th Corps was a part). As it awaited relieving troops it came under attack by the 10th Panzergrenadier division.
In 1944 it was still wit the 137th Division, part of the 42nd Rifle Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Bobruysk offensive (second echelon - breakthrough sector). For liberation of Bobruisk the division was awarded this name added to Gorkovsky. Before the operation the division had 5911 personnel.

 

[FutureTank]

Which again only emphasizes the environment prone to getting rid of THE BEST commanders they have for political protection. Zhukov was popular because of his military success. There was a reason I used Zhukov as an example to emphasize my point. His career is laced with being purged over and over again.

It seems to me that you can hardly prove a point using a single, even if well known individual!!
How about all the commanders from Army level and higher?

 

[FutureTank]

I think the build up was obvious enough.....He couldn't read Hitler to save his life, much less most of his country. If he had taken proper steps the war would not nearly have been the blood bath it was.

It was obvios but Stalin lso had plans. The Red Army was in themidt of reorganization, and this clouded his judgement. His assessment was that Germans were not ready for an offensive, particularly after Poland and France, and with Rommel in Africa. However throughout the rest of the war Stalin and his staff were able to predict Hitler's reactions fairly accurately and consistently.

 

[FutureTank]

Every other method is so subjective it really isn't worth examining in any certainty. The TRUE casualty figures tell a story amongst themselves.

I always though that its a complex assessment. Surely you are not into the 'body count' ?

It seems to me that degree of mission achievement, attaining of objectives and approaching the overal goal are a better way to assess quality of command.

This kind of suggests that missions, objectives and goals can not be achieved if insufficient troops are available due to casualties, requiring commanders to preserve combat strength of their commands.

 

[FutureTank]

Yeah, #1 is rather offensive to my sensibilities. I am not a neo-nazi. I go by strict military casualties, not civilians and especially not by Jewish concentration deaths in my analysis. There where 10,700,000 military casualties of the CCCP during WWII..

What is your source for this figure?

 

[Big-E]

What is your source for this figure?

Russian historian Vadim Erlikman... Official Soviet records hold it at almost 9,000,000 but the 1.7 million lost in the initial stages of the war had not been recorded.

 

[FutureTank]

Well that's interesting, mind telling me why casualty rates actually went down towards the end of the war? This posturing is absurd looking at casualty per year. They took much more casualties on the defensive then they did offensively.

It seems to me the answer is that one needs monthly casualty figures per Front. Totals do not adequately tell the story.

The RKKA was on the offensive even before Moscow. However these were local operations. Considerable casualties were inflictred as a result of mismanagement of battles and operations due to lack of clarity in the general situation during 1941.
What explains reduction of casualties from 1942 onwards is improvements made throughout the forces in training and equipment, as well as command personnel.
This is not unique to RKKA of WW2, and in fact affected the German Army in 1941 also. The Polish and French campaigns were not bloodless for Wermacht, and for attack on USSR it was substantially expanded. This diluted expereince of the individual units accordingly. What happens at lower level though is that more expereinced soldiers try to pass on their expereince to new recruits as a matter of self preservation.

The means and methods of combat used by RKKA, particularly from Autumn 1942 changed also. Massive barrages, increased use of armour, better reconnaissance, more air support all contributed to less casualties overall although per-operation the casualties still required achieving numerical superiority (usually 3-5:1) on narrow sectors.

And this is what I'm saying...with time the commanders and the troops became better as individuals and overall through training and by osmosis.

 

[FutureTank]

If Rommel was there with his Corps, Moscow would have fallen. Not so much from his troops but from the man himself. He was a GENIUS. If Hitler's assasination plot had been succesful it would have been interesting to see what Fuhrer Rommel would have done.

Ah, now I see where you are coming from
Bad Hitler was the only one issuing oredrs and so Germany lost. IF only a GENIUS was issuing orders...

Have you ever considered WHY this 'genius' was sent to Africa with two divisions instead of commanding troops in Russia?

There are many different opinions on the nature of Rommel's 'genius', and one suggests that he was a career builder, showoff, and risk-prone. Another suggested that in a regime which gave centre stage to to Hitler, Hitler didn't want his own 'Zhukov' hanging around

 

[Big-E]

I always though that its a complex assessment. Surely you are not into the 'body count' ?

It seems to me that degree of mission achievement, attaining of objectives and approaching the overal goal are a better way to assess quality of command.

This kind of suggests that missions, objectives and goals can not be achieved if insufficient troops are available due to casualties, requiring commanders to preserve combat strength of their commands.

I am into body count, it does mean something. It is by far the most valuable asset in war. Achieving goals is certainly one element but it is subjective, who decides what was what... no one. Casualties are a clear cut affect of those commanders and their decisions.

 

[Big-E]

Ah, now I see where you are coming from
Bad Hitler was the only one issuing oredrs and so Germany lost. IF only a GENIUS was issuing orders...

Have you ever considered WHY this 'genius' was sent to Africa with two divisions instead of commanding troops in Russia?

There are many different opinions on the nature of Rommel's 'genius', and one suggests that he was a career builder, showoff, and risk-prone. Another suggested that in a regime which gave centre stage to to Hitler, Hitler didn't want his own 'Zhukov' hanging around

No doubt, and it was a mistake by the Fuhrer. Not using Rommel to his full potential was always one of my arguments of why they lost.

It was Hitler's incompetence that lost the war... not superior Soviet commanders.

 

[FutureTank]

....they're first hand acounts that have the good as well as the bad..... If you disregard my war time experiences simply because of my politics you are being rather myopic.

Sure I can be myopic because of politics. This has something to do with the myopic nature of politics at the time
Interpreting sources always needs to be kept in the perspective of the writer's worldview at the time.

Consider this statement "can see from the wording that respect is paid to loyalty and honor the Soviets displayed on the way to certain death."
You have actually 'hit it on the nail' here because the SS creed was all about "loyalty and honour". Now it wouldn't look good if they were fighting enemy which were not equal to them. So not only were the 'Russians' dying with loyalty and honour, but attacking in vast numbers!
Shall I tell you my 'fishing story'?
This is basic psychology.
Imagine how the USMC troops would fight if they were told they are going into Falijah to kill people who were caring for wounded Americans, were elected representatives of the town, and loved rock and roll?
Australians in WW1 were told that the 'hun' fight for conquest and to strip Europe of wealth for own gain. North Korean troops were told Americans were raping Korean women behind lines. Arabs (and Mel Gibson) believe they must destroy Israel before it takes over the World.
Need I go on?
Its called projection. The way it works is, that to justify hating someone (a distinct advantage if you want to kill them), you project on them your own worst (usually suppressed) qualities. In this case the 'loyalty and honour' of the SS was pleded to a NAZI regime based in part on myth and in part on pseudo-science.
Did RKKA troops fight with loyalty and honour? I think mostly they fought with outrage and hate, and out of simple self preservation and defending their families.
By the way the Arabs like to use this 'loyalty and honour' a lot.

 

[FutureTank]

I am into body count, it does mean something. It is by far the most valuable asset in war. Achieving goals is certainly one element but it is subjective, who decides what was what... no one. Casualties are a clear cut affect of those commanders and their decisions.

Please re-read history of US participation in Vietnam.

 

[Big-E]

Please re-read history of US participation in Vietnam.

And casualties were far heavier on the VC than it ever was on American forces. If the US was given the order to win they would have. They weren't allowed to win, that's the difference. Same can be said for Iraq. They are both political failures, not military failures.

 

[FutureTank]

No doubt, and it was a mistake by the Fuhrer. Not using Rommel to his full potential was always one of my arguments of why they lost.

It was Hitler's incompetence that lost the war... not superior Soviet commanders.

Wait...are my still in the same thread...is this one about Superman?

Ok, sorry for sarcasm
NO ARMY HAS EVER WON A BATTLE ON ACCOUNT OF ONE INDIVIDUAL.
This is all the truer for a whole war, the greatest conflict in human history.
Have you considered that given intensity of Eastern front compared to Lybia Rommel may have been killed in the first week of combat? Geniuses get killed in combat also you know, particulaly if they ride in a halfrack with a radio aerial!
In any case, there is just no way to predict how Rommel's participation would have changed the outcome of the war in the East. The best he would have got is a Korps. I would say this one (a direct promotion from his 7th Panzer div.)
LVI Motorized Corps under General of Panzer Troops Ferdinand Schaal
6.Panzer-Division under Major General Franz Landgraf
7.Panzer-Division under Major General Freiherr von Funck
14.Infanterie-Division (Mot.) under Major General Friedrich Fürst

Schaal commanded the 10th Panzer, and took Calais of which Churchill said "The eyes of the Empire are on the defence of Calais", but he could get some other Korps. He was obviously less of a genius because from September 1943 on he is “Wehrmacht representative in the office of the German minister of state and commander in the military district of Bohemia and Moravia”.

What did he get that promotion for? Well, it seems for this in part:
"One of Germany's greatest feats of arms, the encirclement of 55 Soviet divisions that led to the capture of about 463,000 prisoners, was accomplished during Operation Typhoon, the offensive toward Moscow that began on October 2, 1941. The 7th Panzer Division had quickly arrived on the outskirts of Vyasma, 145 kilometers east of Smolensk, setting one encircling arm around a northern pocket of Soviet forces. The 10th Panzer Division arrived on the southern outskirts of Vyasma virtually simultaneously, having covered more than twice the distance that the 7th had traveled in the same period of time.

The 10th Panzer Division and other German formations that were concentrated for the attack faced the challenge of attacking Soviet forces that had been preparing defenses for more than two months.

The Germans were also forced to attack a Soviet front that ran almost in a straight line north and south of the heights of Jarcevo, located 50 kilometers northeast of Smolensk. The Germans would have to penetrate the Soviets' prepared defenses, then advance quickly enough behind the defending Soviets to cut them off from the rest of the Soviet Union and destroy them.

The 10th Panzer's commander, Maj. Gen. Ferdinand Schaal, had led his division through campaigns in Poland and France and the opening operations in the Soviet Union. For his success, the Wehrmacht promoted him to lieutenant general, and Maj. Gen. Wolfgang Fischer was given command of the 10th Panzer on the eve of Operation Typhoon.

On the evening of July 20, 1944, the news of the attempt to assassinate Hitler reaches Prague via the radio. Shortly after, the first teleprint message from the conspirators arrives at the military district command in Prague. After reading it, Schaal tries to obtain a clear picture of the situation in Berlin from Colonel General Fromm, his immediate superior in the Berlin center of the conspiracy, but is only able to contact Erich Hoepner. Schaal intends to observe the “Valkyrie” orders, although not unconditionally. He is arrested the next morning on Heinrich Himmler’s orders and imprisoned until April 1945. Ferdinand Schaal survives the war.

What made Rommel more famous then Schaal? He was fighting the British!
The British Empire was down, but not out. To illustrate this, they needed a worthy foe, and Rommel was it. Again psychology helps here. What happens when the resources of a global Empire have only the half-willing Italians to chase around? Its bad publicity. As soon as Rommel arrived, he got more publicity in UK then in Germany! The British Empire, having been defeated every where else needed a worthy foe. Ask anyone in the English speaking world who the most famous German commander was in WW2 and they will tell you Rommel. But ask them how many dozens of Armie Group, Armie, and Korps commanders served in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and you will get silence.
Not only that, but he was also in Normandy! How lucky could he get!
Not so lucky apparently, because neither his service record nor genius meant much to Hitler in the end.

Well, here are the names of some of non-geniuses that made it to Moscow...and then some (for AG Mitte only) [sorry about the French...its not meant to make a point]
Army Group Centre 1941
Général Feldmarschall Fedor von Bock
LIII. Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Weisenberger
9. Armée Général Colonel Adolf Strauss
VIII. Corps d'armée Général d'Artillerie Heitz
XX. Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Friedrich Materna
XXXXII. Corps d'armée Général du Génie Kuntze
3. Panzergruppe Général Colonel Hermann Hoth
V. Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Ruoff
VI. Corps d'armée Général du Génie Otto-Wilhelm Foerster
XXXIX. Corps d'armée (mot) Général des Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt
LVII. Corps d'armée (mot) Général des Panzertruppen Adolf Kuntzen
4. Armée Général Feldmarschall Günther von Kluge
VII. Corps d'armée Général d'Artillerie Fahrmbacher
IX. Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Hermann Geyer
XIII Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Hans Felber
XXXXIII. Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Gotthard Heinrici
2. Panzergruppe Général Colonel Heinz Guderian
XII. Corps d'armée Général d'Infanterie Walter Schroth
XXIV Corps d'armée (mot) Général de Cavalerie F. Geyr von Schweppenburg
XXXXVI. Corps d'armée (mot) Général des Panzertruppen Heinrich von Vietinghoff gen. Scheel
XXXXVII Corps d'armée (mot) Général d'Artillerie Joachim Lemelsen

 

[FutureTank]

And casualties were far heavier on the VC than it ever was on American forces. If the US was given the order to win they would have. They weren't allowed to win, that's the difference. Same can be said for Iraq. They are both political failures, not military failures.

If you believe this, you will believe anything. NO Vietnam veteran I have ever spoken with has ever said that they fought without expecting to win.
Casualties were heavier on VC and NVA regulars, but only because of the vast disparity in firepower! The NVA didn't drag 8" guns through the jungle, nor did they have access to thousands of helicopters and aircraft.

 

[FutureTank]

I illustrate the bold... The fact he was promoted simply illustrates the mentallity of the RKKA and their tolerance of human wave tactics.

Rotmistrov was an exclusively tank commander. I am not going to go to sources, but I am absolutely sure that he would not have had the quantity of of infantry attached to his tank formations to stage wave attacks, particularly since he was usually fed into operations that required mobility at rates farster then infantry slog.

You can of course argue that he just did it with tanks, but that is what tanks are for! One can not expect to fight without sustaining casualties.

Maybe Germany sustained less casualties by practicing better tactics that saved more lives, and built tanks that saved more crews, but Germany sustained the greatest casualty of them all by loosing the war! Germany PAID for less casualties in war by being divided and occupied for 50 years! Do you suppose any memeber of the RKKA wanted to see Russia divided between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan?

 

[FutureTank]

There are several published works available that illustrate the Eastern Fronts hardships and loss on the German side....there are examples of the Wehrmacht taking a pounding in these books, especially towards the end of the war. It is one thing to make hard decisions, it is another to waste lives.

Did I say there are no examples of German expereinces. I just prefer to draw my understanding from memories of less 'loyal and honourable' of the Wehrmacht then Waffen SS. Call it personal choice if you like.

Again I repeat. No RKKA commander intentionally sent his troops to the slaughter. There is even a psychological principle involved - group survival. When people are scared, and in combat normal people are, they seek safety in numbers. Rank stops being a shield the first time you see a casualty, friendly or enemy.

Just so we have it clear, people get promoted in war very quickly. Some get promoted without desiring it, but because they are just good at it. Some of the best commanders in history were promoted from the ranks, and that is why I sighted Barklay de Tolly elsewhere. In his days troops were sent forward not in waves, but in neat rank and file.