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I don't know how you expect us to take you seriously with comments like these.
Worst Commanders in History
- Thread starter Big-E
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FutureTank
Banned Member
Ok, what are we talking about here in this thread? Worst commanders.
Does that include Presidents as Commanders in Chief?
I think not.
I for one am talking about military professionals.
By and large American professionals serving in Vietnam were certainly no worse, and generally better then could have been expected.
At tactical, operational and strategic levels within the theatre they generally completed missions, achieved objectives and reached goals set to them with resources available. Body count had nothing to do with all this. Body count was a measure of effect on the enemy of US firepower regardless how it was delivered, or why. Controlling a province for a month while killing 10 enemy has same value as controlling a province for a moth while killing 100 enemy. Not controlling a province for a month while killing 1000 enemy is NOT better then controlling a province without firing a shot.
However if a democratic government chooses to limit resources or change its attitude towards desired outcome in a conflict, then you can hardly blame the military professionals for it.
The army is always a political tool of last resort. At least in a democracy. If the democracy chooses to withdraw from the conflict, that usually reflects the political will of the population.
You can take me any way you want Big-E. Someone already told me I'm not serious for suggesting that NATO should send 32 division into Afghanistan. I hope to see myself proven wrong...which may take 50 years or so. I just think that people shouldn't start anything if they are not sure how and when they will finish it, and if started, they should finish it as soon as possible.
Vietnam dragged on for 10 years in its American phase, but the will was gone in 4 years. Maybe if US had sent in 32 divisions into Vietnam in 1965, the war would have been over by 66', and wouldn't have cost so many lives of US soldiers. (in fact I'm sure it wouldn't have)
But hey, the Korean War is still not over mate, and its been 50 years since then, so I might be right after all
Although the Russians had the info that an attack was immenant, they had the exact date, along with every other day of the week. You cannot keep standing too all your troops for an attack that may or may not happenin, in the next hour, day or week. Poor rotation of Border Guards and Scouts led to complete shock and awe. It cannot be said they didn't know it was coming, but it can be said they were completely outmastered in Counter-intelligence and false leads to nowhere, the Germans managed to throw that much disinformation into the mix that the USSR commanders could not be certain of dates.
But an army has lost a war on the account of an Individual, Hitler
Take Battle of Britain, the RAF was on its knees when they launched a daring raid on Berlin, this infuriated Hitler so much( he could'nt keep an election promise, go fig) that he ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb London to the ground, and most military Historians agree that this saved Britain, his blunder in not destroying all the Airfields led to the Luftwaffe getting destroyed by RAF pilots who had rested and been able to regroup, then there was the push to Moscow, the German Army had Moscow in their Sights but were ordered to head south to the Ukraine for Oil fields, this set their plan back weeks, and allowed the Red Army to resupply from the East with fresh troops, much to the annoyance of Eastern Commanders. This is the ultimate case of Armchair Generals affecting a Battle.
Commanders did infact make a Bad plan worse by lack of preperation and planning. The Weathers effect would have been halved if they had Anti-freeze for Trucks Fuel and warm coats for their troops. A cold army that has to carry its own gear is not going to fight effectively in battle, and some moron in charge of Supply did not see to far ahead, perhaps believing the Fuerer in that the Red army would collapse quickly and would not be needed to survive outside by the time winter arrives.
Lets leave Mel out of this one, surely hes had enough of Israel...
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- #64
This is the argument I have been making for years and the same one my father made in Vietnam. Yes... he was a vet. An F-4 driver aboard Enterprise among other things and he and most vets that served (in combat) agree with. To win a war like Korea, Nam or Iraq the nation has to have the will to do it. There is no doubt in my or anyone's reasonable mind that the US has the capability to conventionally defeat ANY country given the political will to do so. The biggest weakness of this nation is we have a coincience and the ends don't justify the means. It has made this nation and it's threat of force impotent. The members of the "Greatest Generation" had the will to overcome the threats of their time which were far greater than the ones we face today. That stern will has been lost with time. Until some event angers the population to action this will be the case throughout our history. That's the price we pay for being a democracy.Vietnam dragged on for 10 years in its American phase, but the will was gone in 4 years. Maybe if US had sent in 32 divisions into Vietnam in 1965, the war would have been over by 66', and wouldn't have cost so many lives of US soldiers. (in fact I'm sure it wouldn't have)
But hey, the Korean War is still not over mate, and its been 50 years since then, so I might be right after all
The bottom line is that alot of Russia`s Generals were incompetant at the beginning of the German invasion, there are people out there including Russians who feel that if Stalin did not kill off a majority of his officers, the ones who helped master mind Russian armored tactics, that things may of been different at the start of the invasion, I have my doubts on this, I feel that a lot of the new equipment that was designated to be in the hands of the military wasn`t there due to the fact that Stalin had personnel who were involved in the economy taken out also. The two names that I mentioned on the prior post that I sent out were responsible for this, isn`t it ironic that they were knocked off also at a later date. Zhukov was really the true hero for Russia, he alone can be credited for the first real check of the Germans in 1941, the counter attack around Smolensk comes to mind, he is also responsible for the defense of Moscow, the German defeat at Stalingrad, the battle of Kursk that broke the German armies back for good. Were there other good Russian officers at the later stage of the war yes, Koniev, Katukov, Rybalko are some that shined thru at the mid point of the war. Big E`s figures are in the ball park for Russian losses, Yes - Hitler was incompetent and he broke the golden rule on not letting his Generals fight the war, but it was a war that Germany would of lost anyways due to the fact that they under estimated the Russian peoples resolve, did not have proper logistics, and they didn`t have the proper equipment for the job, History has shown that no one ever truly has been able to take Russia and hold it, alot of Armies have tried and failed. Germany did have better Generals than Russia, Generals that could meet the Russians head on and out wit them and destroy them, German Generals like Model, Rommel, and let`s not forget the Waffen SS, General Paul Hausser, these are only a few that were great. It is my personal opinion that Russia was the primary one for the destruction of the German Army, All the other Allied players just helped them shorten the war by a year or two. The Chechny war was a black eye for the Russians, bad tactics played a major part in this, does this mean that Russian officers at this present time are incompetant no, sometimes a black eye is good for shaking up your way of thinking so that you do not recieve anymore sucker punches.
FutureTank
Banned Member
Its hard to disagree with you, but it seems to me the many good commanders in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe should have been able to prevail on Hitler to maintain campaign goal, and battle objectives. The STAVKA staff was able to do so with Stalin (though he had less choice).
I think your commnet says much about officer corps failing as a group.
It seems that Maybe Churchill also understood Hitler, and expected the response, so maybe traded London in the short term for long term preservation of the RAF?
I think your commnet says much about officer corps failing as a group.
It seems that Maybe Churchill also understood Hitler, and expected the response, so maybe traded London in the short term for long term preservation of the RAF?
FutureTank
Banned Member
Just a note that I find posts easier to read if the paragraphs dealing with discrete ideas are separated by a blank line.
You also forget death of natural causes that can affect design process. In fact an important engineer on the A-20 tank design did die of natural causes during the design final phase and it may have affected its rejection by Stalin later.
Forces sent in to defeat the separatists were TROOPS. They were trained and equipped, but not trained for specific combat environment, which is MOUT.
MOUT is a complex and difficult combat environment. However what you are missing is the political and economic dimension. The initial rules of engagement did not allow for conduct of intensive operations, but were meant as a show of force. Aside from that the oil pipelines were threatened and had to be secured, so in a sense the assault on Grozny was not the primary campaign goal, but an operational objective.
Almost no campaign or commanders waging it have had undefeated record. I think the ability of Russia to continue the campaign against the Chechen terrorists and their supporters over so many years, and win, says much for the ability of the Russian Army and the political will of the Russian population.
This is a very ambiguous and general statement. I have not seen any studies dealing with assessment of RKKA officer corps in general during the initial period of the war as defined by the Soviet historians. I have seen studies about senior officer decision making. Based on these I would disagree with you. In any case the combat environment was a very complex one, and I doubt competency can be objectively applied based on any standards (which do you use?)
You are wrong in this. Yes, the purges affected the technical branches and various design selection committees, and yes, some design bureaus had lost staff. However this did not significantly affect design progress. For example (from memory) I think Ilushyn and his immediate design assistants were at one time held under ‘house arrest’ but were instructed to continue work ‘while investigation of their guild continued’.
You also forget death of natural causes that can affect design process. In fact an important engineer on the A-20 tank design did die of natural causes during the design final phase and it may have affected its rejection by Stalin later.
However they were relatively remote from RKKA operational planning for war with Germany in 1939-40.
I don’t like when people use the word ‘true’ without substantiation. Yes Zhukov played an important command part, but while he was commanding in one AO, others were commanding elsewhere! Not only that, but he was for the most part a strategic planner. Much of the operational planning was done at the many Army HQs. Zhukov himself never commanded more then one of the three strategic directions, and never more then 4 of the 12 Fronts that operated at various times under various names along the Axis frontline. It seems to me the title you bestow on Zhukov is overstated.
I don’t disagree, just wanted to know the source.
COMMAND AT ANY LEVEL IS A FINE BALANCE OF DIRECTION FROM ABOVE AND INITIATIVE FROM BELOW. In this sense Hitler did not break any rules. Stalin, while often accepting advice from his own marshals and generals, and even lower ranking officers, on occasions insisted on decisions contrary to advice. This is prerogative of command.
Funny, is this not what I said in reply to why Stalin could not believe Hitler’s attack? Soviet intelligence was well aware of Wehrmacht’s shortcomings, and so was Stalin, so considered the moves as ‘provocations’ because he considered Germany unprepared.
Not true, the Mongols did conquer and occupy Russia.
Please pardon me for saying so, but ‘meet the Russians head on’ does not exactly illustrate military skill. Nor did the initial operational methods illustrate particular creativity on the part of German upper echelons. There is much literature on analysis of this, but the essential quandary faced by the Wehrmacht was that the infantry were dependent on horses. What this meant was that they had two choices 1) rapid mobile advance leaving infantry behind, or 2) slower advance in greater coordination with infantry. They chose the former, but this caused stress on the German logistics which was later to damage their operations when they needed them most. In fact it was a one shot gamble of a short distance sprinter. He has energy reserve X, and distance Y to cover. Once the run is made, the energy is spent, and the muscles are at their extreme of endurance.
Again, I prefer to credit many officers of the Wehrmacht with command skills, though I ma happy they were not skilled enough to gain victory. Waffen SS was a very small and generally damaging organization within the Wehrmacht. So far as I’m concerned every member of Waffen SS was a criminal to be shot on site, and I’m happy to know that RKKA did carry this out as a matter of routine.
You again paint in large brush strokes.
Forces sent in to defeat the separatists were TROOPS. They were trained and equipped, but not trained for specific combat environment, which is MOUT.
MOUT is a complex and difficult combat environment. However what you are missing is the political and economic dimension. The initial rules of engagement did not allow for conduct of intensive operations, but were meant as a show of force. Aside from that the oil pipelines were threatened and had to be secured, so in a sense the assault on Grozny was not the primary campaign goal, but an operational objective.
Almost no campaign or commanders waging it have had undefeated record. I think the ability of Russia to continue the campaign against the Chechen terrorists and their supporters over so many years, and win, says much for the ability of the Russian Army and the political will of the Russian population.
Yes - they were equiped but didn`t use the equipment properly, they lost in the range of 200 tanks due to the fact that they did not place the explosive charges in the reactive armor on their tanks, how many casualties did they suffer?
I never said that they did not reach their objective, just that they made tactical errors.
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FutureTank
Banned Member
This is a very ambiguous and general statement. I have not seen any studies dealing with assessment of RKKA officer corps in general during the initial period of the war as defined by the Soviet historians. I have seen studies about senior officer decision making. Based on these I would disagree with you. In any case the combat environment was a very complex one, and I doubt competency can be objectively applied based on any standards (which do you use?)
This is the well known issue of attrition warfare inefficiency.
You are wrong in this. Yes, the purges affected the technical branches and various design selection committees, and yes, some design bureaus had lost staff. However this did not significantly affect design progress. For example (from memory) I think Ilushyn and his immediate design assistants were at one time held under ‘house arrest’ but were instructed to continue work ‘while investigation of their guild continued’.
You also forget death of natural causes that can affect design process. In fact an important engineer on the A-20 tank design did die of natural causes during the design final phase and it may have affected its rejection by Stalin later.
I don’t like when people use the word ‘true’ without substantiation. Yes Zhukov played an important command part, but while he was commanding in one AO, others were commanding elsewhere! Not only that, but he was for the most part a strategic planner. Much of the operational planning was done at the many Army HQs. Zhukov himself never commanded more then one of the three strategic directions, and never more then 4 of the 12 Fronts that operated at various times under various names along the Axis frontline. It seems to me the title you bestow on Zhukov is overstated.
COMMAND AT ANY LEVEL IS A FINE BALANCE OF DIRECTION FROM ABOVE AND INITIATIVE FROM BELOW. In this sense Hitler did not break any rules. Stalin, while often accepting advice from his own marshals and generals, and even lower ranking officers, on occasions insisted on decisions contrary to advice. This is prerogative of command.
Funny, is this not what I said in reply to why Stalin could not believe Hitler’s attack? Soviet intelligence was well aware of Wehrmacht’s shortcomings, and so was Stalin, so considered the moves as ‘provocations’ because he considered Germany unprepared.
Not true, the Mongols did conquer and occupy Russia.
Please pardon me for saying so, but ‘meet the Russians head on’ does not exactly illustrate military skill. Nor did the initial operational methods illustrate particular creativity on the part of German upper echelons. There is much literature on analysis of this, but the essential quandary faced by the Wehrmacht was that the infantry were dependent on horses. What this meant was that they had two choices 1) rapid mobile advance leaving infantry behind, or 2) slower advance in greater coordination with infantry. They chose the former, but this caused stress on the German logistics which was later to damage their operations when they needed them most. In fact it was a one shot gamble of a short distance sprinter. He has energy reserve X, and distance Y to cover. Once the run is made, the energy is spent, and the muscles are at their extreme of endurance.
What you need to be able to show is that the WAY Germans carried these operations out was distinctively different and superior to the way the RKKA did. It seems to me that having conducted an attack on largely unprepared RKKA, Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe had a relatively easy run of the ‘kitchen’. However it was not all their way, and despite inflicting heavy losses and taking a large number of prisoners they failed in the operational objectives and strategic goals of the campaign.
In the conduct of the rest of the war they were repeatedly defeated, though they may have displayed tactical prowess on some occasions.
Again, I prefer to credit many officers of the Wehrmacht with command skills, though I ma happy they were not skilled enough to gain victory. Waffen SS was a very small and generally damaging organization within the Wehrmacht. So far as I’m concerned every member of Waffen SS was a criminal to be shot on site, and I’m happy to know that RKKA did carry this out as a matter of routine.
It reminds me about that fight between a boxer and a karate master.
Now I note you don’t say “every time they came into contact”, because that would mean that Waffen SS won every battle but lost the war The truth is that they did not win every battle, and often retreated like Wehrmacht troops. The one advantage they had was in being more mobile so they never held the line for long, and were able to run faster.
You again paint in large brush strokes.
Forces sent in to defeat the separatists were TROOPS. They were trained and equipped, but not trained for specific combat environment, which is MOUT.
MOUT is a complex and difficult combat environment. However what you are missing is the political and economic dimension. The initial rules of engagement did not allow for conduct of intensive operations, but were meant as a show of force. Aside from that the oil pipelines were threatened and had to be secured, so in a sense the assault on Grozny was not the primary campaign goal, but an operational objective.
Almost no campaign or commanders waging it have had undefeated record. I think the ability of Russia to continue the campaign against the Chechen terrorists and their supporters over so many years, and win, says much for the ability of the Russian Army and the political will of the Russian population.
The tanks (one regiment had T-80M and the other T-72M both with ERA) in 98% of the losses sustained hits on the engine compartment. Tank design makes attaching ERA to this part of the tank difficult if not impossible. All AFVs received 3-6 hits, primarily with RPG or AT grenades. This was the first month of operations. This was the last success of the Chechens against Russian Army.
Again, I don’t accept raw casualty count as a definition of command competency. If anything, by this definition Soviet Union should have lost.
This is the well known issue of attrition warfare inefficiency.
You are wrong in this. Yes, the purges affected the technical branches and various design selection committees, and yes, some design bureaus had lost staff. However this did not significantly affect design progress. For example (from memory) I think Ilushyn and his immediate design assistants were at one time held under ‘house arrest’ but were instructed to continue work ‘while investigation of their guild continued’.
You also forget death of natural causes that can affect design process. In fact an important engineer on the A-20 tank design did die of natural causes during the design final phase and it may have affected its rejection by Stalin later.
What are you talking about? Who is ‘them’?
I don’t like when people use the word ‘true’ without substantiation. Yes Zhukov played an important command part, but while he was commanding in one AO, others were commanding elsewhere! Not only that, but he was for the most part a strategic planner. Much of the operational planning was done at the many Army HQs. Zhukov himself never commanded more then one of the three strategic directions, and never more then 4 of the 12 Fronts that operated at various times under various names along the Axis frontline. It seems to me the title you bestow on Zhukov is overstated.
However, Zhukov’s ‘record’ is one of many.
COMMAND AT ANY LEVEL IS A FINE BALANCE OF DIRECTION FROM ABOVE AND INITIATIVE FROM BELOW. In this sense Hitler did not break any rules. Stalin, while often accepting advice from his own marshals and generals, and even lower ranking officers, on occasions insisted on decisions contrary to advice. This is prerogative of command.
It may hold true, but when you make ‘rules’, they need to hold true for every case of application.
Funny, is this not what I said in reply to why Stalin could not believe Hitler’s attack? Soviet intelligence was well aware of Wehrmacht’s shortcomings, and so was Stalin, so considered the moves as ‘provocations’ because he considered Germany unprepared.
Building up is not same as using.
Not true, the Mongols did conquer and occupy Russia.
Russia was a lot smaller then. They took all of Russia and harassed The Polish-Lithuanian border. Ukraine was then under partial Ottoman control.
Please pardon me for saying so, but ‘meet the Russians head on’ does not exactly illustrate military skill. Nor did the initial operational methods illustrate particular creativity on the part of German upper echelons. There is much literature on analysis of this, but the essential quandary faced by the Wehrmacht was that the infantry were dependent on horses. What this meant was that they had two choices 1) rapid mobile advance leaving infantry behind, or 2) slower advance in greater coordination with infantry. They chose the former, but this caused stress on the German logistics which was later to damage their operations when they needed them most. In fact it was a one shot gamble of a short distance sprinter. He has energy reserve X, and distance Y to cover. Once the run is made, the energy is spent, and the muscles are at their extreme of endurance.
Were they? These are a type of operations. It’s kind of like saying the French are good at preparing breakfast, lunch and dinner.
What you need to be able to show is that the WAY Germans carried these operations out was distinctively different and superior to the way the RKKA did. It seems to me that having conducted an attack on largely unprepared RKKA, Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe had a relatively easy run of the ‘kitchen’. However it was not all their way, and despite inflicting heavy losses and taking a large number of prisoners they failed in the operational objectives and strategic goals of the campaign.
In the conduct of the rest of the war they were repeatedly defeated, though they may have displayed tactical prowess on some occasions.
Again, I prefer to credit many officers of the Wehrmacht with command skills, though I ma happy they were not skilled enough to gain victory. Waffen SS was a very small and generally damaging organization within the Wehrmacht. So far as I’m concerned every member of Waffen SS was a criminal to be shot on site, and I’m happy to know that RKKA did carry this out as a matter of routine.
Well, you know what they say about picking on someone your own size
It reminds me about that fight between a boxer and a karate master.
Now I note you don’t say “every time they came into contact”, because that would mean that Waffen SS won every battle but lost the war
The truth is that they did not win every battle, and often retreated like Wehrmacht troops. The one advantage they had was in being more mobile so they never held the line for long, and were able to run faster.You again paint in large brush strokes.
Forces sent in to defeat the separatists were TROOPS. They were trained and equipped, but not trained for specific combat environment, which is MOUT.
MOUT is a complex and difficult combat environment. However what you are missing is the political and economic dimension. The initial rules of engagement did not allow for conduct of intensive operations, but were meant as a show of force. Aside from that the oil pipelines were threatened and had to be secured, so in a sense the assault on Grozny was not the primary campaign goal, but an operational objective.
Almost no campaign or commanders waging it have had undefeated record. I think the ability of Russia to continue the campaign against the Chechen terrorists and their supporters over so many years, and win, says much for the ability of the Russian Army and the political will of the Russian population.
Are you referring to the whole of the ‘First’ Chechnya war? The only significant armour loss I’m aware of amounted to about 62 tanks from two separate Russian regiments. 225 IFVs were also lost.
The tanks (one regiment had T-80M and the other T-72M both with ERA) in 98% of the losses sustained hits on the engine compartment. Tank design makes attaching ERA to this part of the tank difficult if not impossible. All AFVs received 3-6 hits, primarily with RPG or AT grenades. This was the first month of operations. This was the last success of the Chechens against Russian Army.
Just one small comment of me before you two go on.
Saying that all Waffen SS members were criminals and should be shot is totally wrong. The more the war went on more and more normal conscripts entered the Waffen SS. A young guy send to the SS and not much later dying in France or in the Balticum is for sure not a war criminal.
It is also not true that the Waffen SS were the bad guys and the Wehrmacht the normal soldiers. Both committed warcrimes with the SS comitting more but the Wehrmacht being not free of it.
The SS is also not the Elite as many here seem to think.
Especially at the beginning they lacked experience and equipment and later they were normally integrated into the Wehrmacht structures to fill the wholes.
Saying that all Waffen SS members were criminals and should be shot is totally wrong. The more the war went on more and more normal conscripts entered the Waffen SS. A young guy send to the SS and not much later dying in France or in the Balticum is for sure not a war criminal.
It is also not true that the Waffen SS were the bad guys and the Wehrmacht the normal soldiers. Both committed warcrimes with the SS comitting more but the Wehrmacht being not free of it.
The SS is also not the Elite as many here seem to think.
Especially at the beginning they lacked experience and equipment and later they were normally integrated into the Wehrmacht structures to fill the wholes.
FutureTank
Banned Member
I don't call SS criminals because they commited attrocities. War is one big crime and everyone commited attrocities but Germans lost.
SS are criminals because they loyally supported a system which started the war, and supported this system's ideology, which most Wehrmacht troops didn't. However most Wehrmacht troops were brainwashed, and SS were part of the brainwashing system.
Oh yes, I know. There are lots of people who think they were the elite, but compared to what regular Wehrmacht units did with less equipment and support, they were just a burden on the general organization of German structure. Himmler's toy-boys
The SS itself was for sure the ideological private army of the leading party but that doesn't make the young boy pressed for service in it more ore less a supporter of it than his counterpart in the Wehrmacht.
Just new material for the frontlines...
Just new material for the frontlines...
FutureTank
Banned Member
that was maybe in 45...what about the other years?
Yes - SS WIKING Div was mostly foriegn soldiers, they destroyed alot of Russian units.The german war machine did not started in 45 to get short on soldiers.
There were also many non german soldiers in the SS making some of their units more a foreign legion.
I agree with you - they took alot of casualties at the beginning of the war, they still had some ass kicking units but so did the Wehrmacht, 12th panzer div comes to mind. Alot of the allure to get German men into the SS units were the equipment and living standards, they had the best equipment.Just one small comment of me before you two go on.
Saying that all Waffen SS members were criminals and should be shot is totally wrong. The more the war went on more and more normal conscripts entered the Waffen SS. A young guy send to the SS and not much later dying in France or in the Balticum is for sure not a war criminal.
It is also not true that the Waffen SS were the bad guys and the Wehrmacht the normal soldiers. Both committed warcrimes with the SS comitting more but the Wehrmacht being not free of it.
The SS is also not the Elite as many here seem to think.
Especially at the beginning they lacked experience and equipment and later they were normally integrated into the Wehrmacht structures to fill the wholes.
FutureTank
Banned Member
I'm talking about German SS formations only. Maybe I'm wrong, but by boys I mean under 18 year olds. It seems to me the induction of under-18 year olds didn't begin until very late in 44'The german war machine did not started in 45 to get short on soldiers.
There were also many non german soldiers in the SS making some of their units more a foreign legion.
Also the 18-20 years old where often enough just pushed into the unit were combat losses had to be filled.
Normally only the higher ranks were really indoctrinated and supporters of the regime.
They were just not able to proceed with the luxury to draft all their personall from really regime friendly people with the war going on.
Normally only the higher ranks were really indoctrinated and supporters of the regime.
They were just not able to proceed with the luxury to draft all their personall from really regime friendly people with the war going on.