Putting the costs aside as that was just a comment based on the Asiapacificdefence reporter article …acknowledge the fit out will double + the overall costs…I was impressed by April 2023 contract signing, and 12 months from being laid down to launch…30 months from contract signing to first launch…..noting it’s another three years till delivery On the first ship. How do we stack up on the Hobarts, Hunters, and GPFs?
Sorry, still not going to put the claimed costs aside. Between the price tag the writer listed, as well as comments about the design going to be the most advanced vessel class in the RSN, the information just does not add up. That in turn makes me question everything else in the article. Looking at other sources, it appears that there was less than a year between the contract being awarded for detailed design and first steel being cut. That in turn suggests to me that comparatively little had to be rearranged between the base design, or what will be the ST Marine's derivative.
From that, it could be the basic Danish design was something where things either did not require rearrangement, or the design had sufficient built-in flexibility to speed things along. Or alternately, the planned capabilities for the MRCV are such that not as much time is required to design the capabilities required. A per vessel price tag some USD$50 mil. less than the per vessel cost of the new frigates the Philippines Navy purchased from S. Korea's HHI makes me think that the new RSN vessel is going to be capable for their needs, but not necessarily something particularly advanced or capable compared to major warships in other navies. Such complexity, or the lack thereof, can also have a major impact on the time and effort it takes to actually build the vessel.
Looking at the
Hunter-class frigates as an example, the design is to include the Aegis CMS, which on it's own is quite expensive with a price tag in the hundred of millions of US dollars. In addition to that, there is also the costs and complexities involved in hull quieting with machinery isolation and rafting, all to improve the ASW capabilities of the new frigates. Such work is expensive and time consuming to design, and adds complexity and cost to the build as well. If the upcoming RSN MRCV is not really designed or intended for ASW ops, then it would most likely not have the work to quiet the hull done. This would drop the cost per hull as well as likely leave a design that is faster and easier to build.
Then there is are also somethings to consider about the yards where the production is taking place. The GPF is a great example, since AFAIK the 'yard' where these will be built in Australia does not exist yet. Hard to compare production from an established yard which has had an active order book to maintain activity, with a yet to be built yard which also does not have an established, never mind skilled, work force. As for the
Hunter-class build and before that, the
Hobart-class I <cough, lack of continuous build, cough> recall there being something referred to as a 'valley of death' in terms of ship construction. Hard to maintain rapid and efficient production if there is a lack of ongoing activity.
Now if Australia and Singapore were both the seek comparable vessels for essentially the same roles and service areas/conditions and there was still a major difference in the costs or time involved, then looking at such comparisons might be more relevant. Right now though, the vessels are different designs, for different navies, with different intended roles and likely operating in different areas under different conditions.