ADF General discussion thread

SammyC

Well-Known Member
Increasing the defence budget definitely doesn’t have to mean purchasing more from the US.

It could mean the Army getting more Redbacks, Boxers and K9 SPG’s.

It could mean additional KC-30 tankers or E7 Wedgetail.

It could even mean throwing money at Rolls Royce and BAe to attempt to accelerate SSN-AUKUS to mitigate the risk of the US not providing Virginia class submarines. Or accelerating Hunter class construction.
I would agree, the recent Australian based factories have all been configured for much higher production than initially authorised. One must assume this was part of the thought process. Perhaps not with Trump in mind, but definitely with a concern for a deteriorating environment.

Easy options to increase defence spending (that also have value) include the armoured vehicles listed, or alternatively more missiles and shells. That NSM factory should be put to maximum the minute it is built, so should the new 155mm shell factory.

I personally have money (monopoly money at least) on Mitsubishi proposing an offer that is significantly accelerated, both the overseas build (from rumours the No2 build for the upgraded batch) and locally (potential direct investment and staff).

I would align with your thoughts on options to accelerate the SSN AUKUS outcome. It would be interesting to spit ball what this would entail. What would it take to implement simultaneous production with the UK for instance. It would be difficult, but perhaps it might become imperative.

My comment regarding the US, is, I would view, that the US will be expecting that expenditure to go to them, call it fealty (or in more crude terms pizzo). Want American protection, buy American gear.

Easy ones here are additional American aircraft (of all types) and American missiles, hence the coalition starting point of F35s.
 

MARKMILES77

Well-Known Member
IPA has released a book on what Australia needs to do in the short term to respond to the changing geopolitical circumstances.

A video overview of recommendations is here:

A few highlights:
3% Defence Spending.
F-35B not a Squadron of F-35As.
B-21s
Invite a much larger force of U.S. Marines to rotate into the Northern Territory.
 

StevoJH

The Bunker Group
My comment regarding the US, is, I would view, that the US will be expecting that expenditure to go to them, call it fealty (or in more crude terms pizzo). Want American protection, buy American gear.

Easy ones here are additional American aircraft (of all types) and American missiles, hence the coalition starting point of F35s.
Honestly, with the unpredictable behaviour of the current US political leadership the people making the procurement decisions need to be very careful about anything purchased from the US that they could withdraw parts/maintenance support from.

There may be a need to minimise the amount of leverage that can be exerted upon the employment of Australian sovereign capabilities.
 

Flexson

Active Member
My comment regarding the US, is, I would view, that the US will be expecting that expenditure to go to them, call it fealty (or in more crude terms pizzo). Want American protection, buy American gear.

Easy ones here are additional American aircraft (of all types) and American missiles, hence the coalition starting point of F35s.
Cut our loses with Supply and Stalwart before it gets worse and buy two, preferably three, John Lewis Class.... Would also help with retention of Auxiliary sailors (it's demoralising working on a materiel issues and ILS deficiencies Lernaean Hydra)
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
Cut our loses with Supply and Stalwart before it gets worse and buy two, preferably three, John Lewis Class.... Would also help with retention of Auxiliary sailors (it's demoralising working on a materiel issues and ILS deficiencies Lernaean Hydra)
No chance of 2 or 3 John Lewis class off the shelf.

The most likely options would be
-Something like the kiwis HMNZS Aotearoa(built by Hyundai) or Hanwha. (Sucks that the Cantabria class was selected and not an Aegir variant)
-Japans Towada class replacement

Less likely
-Purchase of 1-2 of the UKs Tide class
-Italians + French Vulcano class
-Netherlands HNMLS Den Helder
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
IPA has released a book on what Australia needs to do in the short term to respond to the changing geopolitical circumstances.

A video overview of recommendations is here:

A few highlights:
3% Defence Spending.
F-35B not a Squadron of F-35As.
B-21s
Invite a much larger force of U.S. Marines to rotate into the Northern Territory.
IPA is the Liberal party so not really a balanced source.
The otherside has not said no to 3% overtime but the F35Bs and B21s look like a long shot after the DSR.
 

Julian 82

Active Member
IPA is the Liberal party so not really a balanced source.
The otherside has not said no to 3% overtime but the F35Bs and B21s look like a long shot after the DSR.
It’s a conservative think tank (not a part of the liberal party). Just like the Australia Institute is a left leaning think tank but not a part of the ALP. Unfortunately left leaning think tanks don’t generally talk about national defence issues as their focus tends to be on climate change and welfare. I think it would be worth a read as opposed to simply dismissing out of hand.
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
It’s a conservative think tank (not a part of the liberal party). Just like the Australia Institute is a left leaning think tank but not a part of the ALP. Unfortunately left leaning think tanks don’t generally talk about national defence issues as their focus tends to be on climate change and welfare. I think it would be worth a read as opposed to simply dismissing out of hand.
Members and Donors from the Liberal party.
No different to the Australian Institute with its bias.
I guess I prefer sources that are independent of government.
 
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MickB

Well-Known Member
IPA has released a book on what Australia needs to do in the short term to respond to the changing geopolitical circumstances.

A video overview of recommendations is here:

A few highlights:
3% Defence Spending.
F-35B not a Squadron of F-35As.
B-21s
Invite a much larger force of U.S. Marines to rotate into the Northern Territory.
Unsure how the proposed purchase of F 35Bs and B21s would constitute immediate action.
Even if requested today what would the delivery date be?
How long for IOC and then FOC?

Not saying I don't see some merit in the F35B but the B21 not so much.
 

Flexson

Active Member
No chance of 2 or 3 John Lewis class off the shelf.

The most likely options would be
-Something like the kiwis HMNZS Aotearoa(built by Hyundai) or Hanwha. (Sucks that the Cantabria class was selected and not an Aegir variant)
-Japans Towada class replacement

Less likely
-Purchase of 1-2 of the UKs Tide class
-Italians + French Vulcano class
-Netherlands HNMLS Den Helder
Having worked on FFG's and Anzac's, served on Both LHD's, Both AOR's, Success and Tobruk and worked at the training centre for OPV's my opinion is buy american designs or nothing else.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Unsure how the proposed purchase of F 35Bs and B21s would constitute immediate action.
Even if requested today what would the delivery date be?
How long for IOC and then FOC?

Not saying I don't see some merit in the F35B but the B21 not so much.
This argument was put forward recently (amongst other flawed analysis) on the RAAF thread. Let’s be serious that if the ADF was only concerned with that timeframe then we should bin Hunter (~2031 projected for 1st of class?) or Virginia SSN (2032?).

End of the day the ADF needs to plan for short, medium and long term capability (reflected in NDS epochs).
 
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MARKMILES77

Well-Known Member
Michael Pezzullo's plan for a rapid increase in ADF capability.
He feels there is only a window of 2 years to get ready. Not because war is very likely in 2027 (he puts the risk at 10-20%) but because the cosequences of being unprepared are too great. He also hints at what would be required if the U.S. is no longer a reliable ally.Screenshot 2025-03-09 at 15.52.53.png
 

downunderblue

Active Member
I feel the the alarm bells are increasingly ringing louder day by day, and in response we need to be very careful here.

Much commentary centres around insecurity centred around an unpredictable Trump, and how that effects our relationship with the US.

In listening to Elbridge Colby's recent testimony (on the assumption - big if) that it speaks for Trumps current and future agenda, their focus seems glued on contintinental defense (border control and Arctic) as well as the Pacific. Many in the Congress want the administration draged into confronting Iran, so I'm sure it and Gaza will continue to be a distraction but one of peripheral risk (more of a risk to Israel, SA etc).

I also see US foreign policy more centred around self interest and moving away from the global rules based order morality cop. I don't see the issue here. 99% of nations act on self interest so I don't see the issue here, and in being the global cop you disable others from actually protecting themselves, or making choices affecting their own soverignty. I also see an awareness that the US cannot fight on two fronts anymore (1 major, 1 minor), so they are fairly looking for help/ others taking greater responsibility for their own theatre security.

I also see Trump as a massive disruptor, deliberately in fact. In his outlandish positions he actually forces compromise (tariffs, Gaza riviera, Illegal migration) and change. It works for him and he's almost predictable in how he seeks to negotiate. Follow the hands, I'd say, not the bark.

My point is, we need to understand the why, and for me, I get why he is effecting so much change and have no issue with it (that's once I take a deep breathe after I hear the latest scandel etc).

As for the US/ AU, the runs are on the board on both sides. We both need each other equally therefore I don't see any real change to our relationship (bar more noise/ alarmist commentary when Trump barks his latest outlandish negotiation). We don't need to move away from the US as from their perspective IMO (how I read it) nothing has changed between us.

We need more cooler heads. Yes increased commitment is (should be) coming and I do agree at advancing the timetable (sorry Jim Charmers but you're already in deficit so whats another 2+ billion released now) to increase lethality, capability and sustainability now, but let's all take a step back from the noise and logically calculate what we need to do now, not react emotionally whilst we lose our minds in fear of abandonment.

Now to goto the timely Pezullo article, he recommends 10 board categories to be delivered in the next 2 years:

1. Enhance surveillance
2. Lift operational readiness
3. Acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities
4. Acquire longer-range air superiority capability
5. Remediate naval warfare capability
6. Ensure RAAF is battle ready
7. Push forward army’s maritime capability
8. Address capability gaps ... sum-purchase IAD ie THAAD
9. Negotiate PNG alliance
10. Develop a war book

For me, increasing tempo and readiness is a given, but there are some glaring issues here around manpower and sustainability.

Much of his 2 year plan has the word 'acquire' attached to it. Just because we snap our fingers, a magical squadron of B-1B's will not appear. How can 6 Collins be ready to deploy at once when 2 at best seems reasonable (esp considering future LOTE), GWEO needs a massive speed up- yes, but a text search tells me the word 'recruitment' is not mentioned once. Stategic fuel reserves also are ignored nor is supply/ logistics/ air lift, supply ships mentioned etc.

Overall, I like the sentiment and it serves it's purpose to make people think, but I would like to see to actual deliverables within his recommendations, focused on increased lethality, capability and sustainability that can be locked in, rather that pie in the sky stuff that just clouds the debate now (I deliberately won't go into the hint of acquiring nuclear weapons in the last paragraph).

Lastly, in a contingency I think we need to identify what force/ capability we will seek to forward deploy and what will stay continental based. The US will seek to use AU as a safe FOB, just like they did in WW2. I assume we will be responsible for the protection of that FOB from interference. When push comes to shove, what are we willing to forward deploy? Pezzulo's talk of forward deploying to PNG is interesting, until I read further:

" ... establishment of ADF bases in locations such as Manus, Rabaul and Lae to support the conduct of maritime surveillance, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and air superiority missions. For instance, a forward-deployed composite RAAF wing, consisting of F-35A Lightning fighters, B-1B Lancers armed with LRASM, F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with SM-6 missiles, and P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft could operate from the Bismarck to the Celebes seas and beyond with the aim of denying access into our northern sea-air approaches. A similar alliance should be negotiated with The Philippines".

I'm going to ignore why you would forward deploy a strategic bomber as again there is not one available nor would you deploy it there, but I can't see how we would forward deploy without significant Indopacom support (particularly logistically) or more likely only in conjunction with their forces and commitment.

TBH, I'd like a resubmit Mike. I understand and value the sentiment, but let's be real here.
 

StevoJH

The Bunker Group
I feel the the alarm bells are increasingly ringing louder day by day, and in response we need to be very careful here.

Much commentary centres around insecurity centred around an unpredictable Trump, and how that effects our relationship with the US.

In listening to Elbridge Colby's recent testimony (on the assumption - big if) that it speaks for Trumps current and future agenda, their focus seems glued on contintinental defense (border control and Arctic) as well as the Pacific. Many in the Congress want the administration draged into confronting Iran, so I'm sure it and Gaza will continue to be a distraction but one of peripheral risk (more of a risk to Israel, SA etc).

I also see US foreign policy more centred around self interest and moving away from the global rules based order morality cop. I don't see the issue here. 99% of nations act on self interest so I don't see the issue here, and in being the global cop you disable others from actually protecting themselves, or making choices affecting their own soverignty. I also see an awareness that the US cannot fight on two fronts anymore (1 major, 1 minor), so they are fairly looking for help/ others taking greater responsibility for their own theatre security.

I also see Trump as a massive disruptor, deliberately in fact. In his outlandish positions he actually forces compromise (tariffs, Gaza riviera, Illegal migration) and change. It works for him and he's almost predictable in how he seeks to negotiate. Follow the hands, I'd say, not the bark.

My point is, we need to understand the why, and for me, I get why he is effecting so much change and have no issue with it (that's once I take a deep breathe after I hear the latest scandel etc).

As for the US/ AU, the runs are on the board on both sides. We both need each other equally therefore I don't see any real change to our relationship (bar more noise/ alarmist commentary when Trump barks his latest outlandish negotiation). We don't need to move away from the US as from their perspective IMO (how I read it) nothing has changed between us.

We need more cooler heads. Yes increased commitment is (should be) coming and I do agree at advancing the timetable (sorry Jim Charmers but you're already in deficit so whats another 2+ billion released now) to increase lethality, capability and sustainability now, but let's all take a step back from the noise and logically calculate what we need to do now, not react emotionally whilst we lose our minds in fear of abandonment.

Now to goto the timely Pezullo article, he recommends 10 board categories to be delivered in the next 2 years:

1. Enhance surveillance
2. Lift operational readiness
3. Acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities
4. Acquire longer-range air superiority capability
5. Remediate naval warfare capability
6. Ensure RAAF is battle ready
7. Push forward army’s maritime capability
8. Address capability gaps ... sum-purchase IAD ie THAAD
9. Negotiate PNG alliance
10. Develop a war book

For me, increasing tempo and readiness is a given, but there are some glaring issues here around manpower and sustainability.

Much of his 2 year plan has the word 'acquire' attached to it. Just because we snap our fingers, a magical squadron of B-1B's will not appear. How can 6 Collins be ready to deploy at once when 2 at best seems reasonable (esp considering future LOTE), GWEO needs a massive speed up- yes, but a text search tells me the word 'recruitment' is not mentioned once. Stategic fuel reserves also are ignored nor is supply/ logistics/ air lift, supply ships mentioned etc.

Overall, I like the sentiment and it serves it's purpose to make people think, but I would like to see to actual deliverables within his recommendations, focused on increased lethality, capability and sustainability that can be locked in, rather that pie in the sky stuff that just clouds the debate now (I deliberately won't go into the hint of acquiring nuclear weapons in the last paragraph).

Lastly, in a contingency I think we need to identify what force/ capability we will seek to forward deploy and what will stay continental based. The US will seek to use AU as a safe FOB, just like they did in WW2. I assume we will be responsible for the protection of that FOB from interference. When push comes to shove, what are we willing to forward deploy? Pezzulo's talk of forward deploying to PNG is interesting, until I read further:

" ... establishment of ADF bases in locations such as Manus, Rabaul and Lae to support the conduct of maritime surveillance, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and air superiority missions. For instance, a forward-deployed composite RAAF wing, consisting of F-35A Lightning fighters, B-1B Lancers armed with LRASM, F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with SM-6 missiles, and P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft could operate from the Bismarck to the Celebes seas and beyond with the aim of denying access into our northern sea-air approaches. A similar alliance should be negotiated with The Philippines".

I'm going to ignore why you would forward deploy a strategic bomber as again there is not one available nor would you deploy it there, but I can't see how we would forward deploy without significant Indopacom support (particularly logistically) or more likely only in conjunction with their forces and commitment.

TBH, I'd like a resubmit Mike. I understand and value the sentiment, but let's be real here.
The mention of aged assets that are not available, and will not be available for purchase, if for no other reason than that they are at EoL discredits the whole document.

There also seems to be an assumption that just because we would like to do something other parties will agree to it. What benefit does PNG get from allowing the RAAF to forward base combat assets on their soil? As far as I can see, it just means that PNG gets dragged into a conflict that they may want no part of.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
This argument was put forward recently (amongst other flawed analysis) on the RAAF thread. Let’s be serious that if the ADF was only concerned with that timeframe then we should bin Hunter (~2031 projected for 1st of class?) or Virginia SSN (2032?).

End of the day the ADF needs to plan for short, medium and long term capability (reflected in NDS epochs).
Never said there was no value in long term planning.
We all know with such long lead times for defence equipment planing ahead is vital.

I was commenting on calling for the discussion of the purchase of a system that might not make it into RAAF service for two decades (if at all) and then refering to it as an "immediate action".
 
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south

Well-Known Member
Never said there was no value in long term planning.
We all know with such long lead times for defence equipment planing ahead is vital.

I was commenting on calling for the discussion of the purchase of a system that might not make it into RAAF service for two decades (if at all) and then refering to it as an "immediate action".
The “immediate action” is the wholistic take, consisting of 36 recommendations.

Best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now. The authors understand that acquiring such capability would take time - but if you don’t start… you have zero percent chance.

No one on this board was predicting SSNs for RAN 3.5 years ago either.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
The mention of aged assets that are not available, and will not be available for purchase, if for no other reason than that they are at EoL discredits the whole document.
Pezzullo’s arguments mix elements of lucidity with several outlandish suggestions (inferior to many given short shrift on DT really). Having said that, the gentleman might again be Secretary of a relevant department in a month or so.

His point that a low probability event (a major war) requires significant and expensive preparations is sound.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
It should be a no brainer to spend more money on research and development ,some of the developments can be then exported ,I don't know what the present capability is how long the ammunition and missiles would last but building a larger capacity in this area would not be amiss
 

SammyC

Well-Known Member
The mention of aged assets that are not available, and will not be available for purchase, if for no other reason than that they are at EoL discredits the whole document.

There also seems to be an assumption that just because we would like to do something other parties will agree to it. What benefit does PNG get from allowing the RAAF to forward base combat assets on their soil? As far as I can see, it just means that PNG gets dragged into a conflict that they may want no part of.
I actually like the idea of forward basing in PNG. in my view has a lot of merit. I'll note that PNG recently signed security deals with the Australian Government, and I would suggest they still remember what it feals like to be invaded by a hostile force and have a massive land battle in your home.

We often talk about the Australians that died in PNG, however we forget the horrific depopulation that occured for the locals over about three years of vicious occupation and frontline combat.

PNG forward basing provides us an extra 1,300km range from Darwin, an enormus buffer and a second safety net over the maritime archipelago choke points. Yes it comes with a lot of logistical requirements, but that is what the defence force is being set up to do. I would see it not too much different to RAAF Curtin or Learmonth. Perhaps we should consider a similar bare base preparation in PNG.

We could forward deploy an F35 and P8 squadron, protected by an army littoral deployment (with said NASAMS, HIMARS and SkyCeptor missile defences) if the geopolicial climate deteriorates. PNG has over 20 airports dotted around its countryside, so it offers a lot of flexibility to move around and disperse.

I would actually expand the the concept to some of the Pacific islands, such as Fiji or New Caledonia.

My personal view is that F35s, and even P8s have limited use operating exclusively out of the Australian continent. They are much more use way out front stopping things getting to Australian waters in the first place.
 
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