How so? What specific steps has he taken towards Russia that are hawkish? You keep looking at effect and assuming intent, but that's not a credible way to analyze this situation. Actions have multiple consequences. Trump wants to reduce US support to Europe and is using the demand for greater defense spending on Europe's part as a lever to push in that direction. But is his intent to have Europe better defended? Or is his intent to minimize US commitments there? His policy could very well be a net better for Ukraine, but is that his intention or is that a by-product?
I care little for intent, and much more about effect. Or in other words, I never believe politicians' words. I always assume they lie. I judge their actions.
Lowering US commitments in Europe, and strengthening Europe, IMO are one and the same.
Ukraine isn't truly strong without a strong backbone - Europe.
What's good for the frontier nations and bad for the axis, is ultimately good for Ukraine.
Since reduction of US commitments in Europe, and prospects of European assistance and burden sharing in the AOR of CENTCOM and INDOPACOM, are overall bad for the axis, then they're overall good for the frontier nations.
And by the way, I'm not sold that this will be a better policy for Ukraine in the end. It might be, but it also might not be. European re-armament is a medium-term goal, but the war in Ukraine is going on now and the lack of US aid will be felt now, not in the medium term (well also in the medium term assuming it continues). And there's the question of what his actual intentions are. If he intents to have Europe defend itself but also intends to sell Ukraine to Russia, then that's hardly a net better for Ukraine.
I can only talk about longer term effects. Current dynamics are... dynamic.
To a person taking politicians' words at face value, Trump definitely sounds incoherent.
But the US and his administration are operating like a 2nd or 3rd order system, pushing and pulling in various directions until they get to where they want.
What further complicates this is the often, in some aspects, mutual exclusivity between strengthening Europe and negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine. These factors can be parallel but also conflicting. This might make things seem even more incoherent. But I see the coherence in this.
Assuming that it stops there. But if Europe deploys troops to Ukraine, attempts to close its skies, and gets nuked in the process, I don't think Ukraine will be better off, since it's Ukrainian territory that's likely to get nuked.
Nukes flying around is a big assumption. If the wars of 2022-2025 have taught us anything, it's that the threshold for nuclear strikes is much higher than past public perception.
It's not love or lack of care in and of itself. It's just a desire to reduce US commitment there. But consider the rest of his behavior. Look at the entire picture. Does it look like he has "harsh love" for Europe?
To me it does. I see actions consistent with that, hidden by a layer of politics which I insist on unmasking.
What is too small and isn't too small is a question of what they believe the threats are. And the whole point of NATO as far as I can see is that you don't have to defend yourself independently. You have allies.
That is both correct and incorrect.
Like a 2nd order system, an alliance would correct the required investment levels, but this comfortable arrangement promotes over-corrections. Observe this poll. Europeans generally believe Ukraine should receive a lot more support. But they want other countries to do it for them. Understandable when European mentality on defense has always been submission and reliance on others, at least since the end of the cold war.
Consider you have a company of 10 men. You decide that to save money on fuel, you'll carpool and drive in pairs. Meaning 5 cars.
Without explicitly telling anyone to bring their cars, how many cars do you think will be brought? 5? I think fewer than that, if at all. Everyone will think the others have them covered. At least in a culture where you're used to everyone doing your work for you.
Now imagine you tell 5 guys to bring their cars. The other 5 sell theirs because they don't need them anymore. Why keep an expensive car with insurance and all if you don't even drive it?
Due to neglect, age, and damage, 3 of the cars are broken down after a while. Now you got 2 cars to transport 10 people. That's pretty much maxing it out.
Except on that day, one guy needs to hit the pharmacy to get medicine for his sick wife. An unacceptable detour for the rest. How does he manage? There's no 3rd car that can be spared.
We've hit a point where every individual nation doesn't even have enough for their own defense, maintaining rudimentary capabilities at best. Let alone defending another. In a time of crisis of course they'll rally everything they have for homeland defense and claim they don't have anything to send to allies. That's how we ended up with the frankly shamefully obsolete equipment sent to Ukraine, mostly on Europe's part.
Your view of this "axis" doesn't seem to be shared by much (most?) of the world, and it seems to be a clever way to try and lump Israel, a country with questionable foreign policy, in with the US and Europe.
Israel is often villified for various reasons like simple antisemitism or affiliation with axis members or jihadist organizations.
But what does this have bearing on? Media? I don't care about media.
The undeniable fact is that Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan are frontier nations fighting for the same cause the west used to fight and to an extent still fights for. All these nations value life while their enemies value death. They value liberties while their enemies are content with oppression.
Or in other words - Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, are liberal democracies. Even if Ukraine is just starting on that path. And Russia, Iran, China, are oppressive dictatorships.
Does Europe see Israel as an ally? Do they see the war in Ukraine as part of a larger conflict? Or do they have a different assessment? Was Europe ready to secure Ukrainian skies within 1-2 days? What was the posture of European forces? Politically how does such a decision get made?
1. Europe doesn't see Israel as an ally yet. For the same reason just a little pushback from the US leads to them claiming the US is no longer an ally. But that's likely to change. There is direct correlation between how well a European country assesses its security, and how it perceives Israel. As an example, Ireland, Spain, and Norway, some of the lowest spenders in the continent, have also revealed certain levels of partnership with axis members and therefore are strongly anti-Israeli.
The UK which is currently anti-Israeli, has also cooperated with China to give it control over Chagos.
On the other hand, countries leading Europe's rearmament or just without ties to the axis, like Germany, Poland, have good relations with Israel. Recently elected Merz has simultaneously pushed to increase German military capabilities, and announced he won't honor the axis-led case at the ICC to arrest Netanyahu.
2. Europe certainly does not see the war in Ukraine as part of a larger conflict. They have friendly relations with Iran despite Iran supplying weapons that bomb European cities. I'm hopeful it'll change.
3. Europe wasn't ready militarily, industrially, or politically. Lack of ability to fulfill what I said earlier, should have been treated as a grave national security threat.
The EU and NATO are organizations made up of sovereign states. You might consider Hungary's position reprehensible, but it doesn't change the fact that you can't force them to join in, or provide their airspace, for this sort of fight. And while Hungary is easy to smear as pro-Russian, what about Poland? They're not eager to deploy to Ukraine as peacekeepers. Would they have been ready and willing to go into a shooting war with Russia in '22? You've talked about Polish re-armament before, I'm assuming you follow it. What was the state of their re-armament in '22? What was the state of their airforce, especially vis-a-vis readines rates?
European capability as a whole is inadequate. Poland started very late, so yes they were inadequate as well. But they're doing the work now, and I can't fault them for that.
Hungary is also a good example of the dangers the EU have unknowingly accepted, giving up their sovereignty in a way that prevents them from action, blocked by a single other nation.
Let me make my position clear, in case it doesn't come across. I don't think the EU nations see the conflict in the same global terms you do
That is precisely my point. They failed before and are failing now to perceive security threats as what they are.
They welcome destructive elements with open arms.
www.theguardian.com
Some in Taiwan though believe that building the chips in the U.S makes it less strategic by the U.S to defend
commission.europa.eu
