The process is to ensure that we spend money neither unwisely, nor in a manner unfair to those offering us goods and services. And the definition of “unwisely” has expanded every time there is any sort of problem, while “unfairly” expands each time an unsuccessful bidder complains. Both are often as the result of an ANAO audit, typically conducted for the most part by young, and admittedly smart, recent graduates with little real world experience. In turn the press picks up the story and paints those doing the procurement as a bunch of idiots. That is far from the truth, but it sticks and yet another regulation and review process is put in place to prevent it happening again. Result? Those doing procurements become increasingly risk averse, and that means they seek to eliminate every risk. And, apart from actually being impossible, that just adds unnecessary layers, and therefore time, to the process.
In times of emergency a rapid acquisition process gets around a lot of that. Down the track problems sometimes emerge, commonly with support packages, but the procurements are done fast. One I am aware of, for a reasonably complex weapons systems was done, and the weapon fielded, in about 10 weeks from the time the operational commander identified the need. And we did have problems later, but the warfighters got what they needed.
So the solution to the problem is to accept that perfect processes are impossible, and that issues will arise. Attempt to mitigate, but not eliminate, the risk; and don’t react with changed regulation and more levels of review to every report in the media that a risk has been realised.
But that doesn’t mean complex acquisitions can be done over night. The technical and commercial assessments of such things take time, and some governance of that process is essential. So deciding on a ship to buy is never going to happen over night; it normally going to take months just to read and assess all the submitted documentation.
