Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

protoplasm

Active Member
Risk is an interesting beast, I assume they are talking technical risk and not project risk.

The technical complexity of incorporating CEAFAR and SAAB CMS is greater than staying with a combination already integrated a selected design. This is a technical risk, that if not mitigated appropriately, i.e. by the application of suitable resources, could easily manifest as an impact on schedule.

However, not switching to the proven in service systems the RAN and sustainment are already supporting, introduces new technical and schedule risk.

There is an attitude that ILS "just happens". It doesn't, it is in many ways more complex and resource intensive than design and build. Introducing new systems dramatically increases the load in this area.

It's not just parts, spares, manuals etc. it's workforce planning, training and the ongoing, through life impacts of supporting systems through life.

The only people whose lives get easier are the project managers and project directors, because it moves the complexity and technical risk from the front end, to through life.

It basically means, instead of doing it properly upfront, we will have an even more risky, complex and expensive upgrade program later.
This is an incredibly important point and turns up in a range of different industries. As a leader in education we constantly see this where a new system is introduced with no thought as to the risk of implementation and sustainment, followed by years of lowered achievement as the whole educational enterprise adjusts to the new system and finds the efficiencies needed to actually make it work without burning people out.

My earlier comment regarding this was trying to address this issue. We already have an integrated set of systems that perform very well on an in-service platform. Personal opinion, do the hard work now to integrate that suite of systems onto a new platform, rather than a lot more hard work stretching out into the future to standup, troubleshoot and then learn how to be efficient with a whole new suite of systems that we currently do not have any training pipeline for or an ecosystem to provide through life support.
 

OldTex

Well-Known Member
Risk is an interesting beast, I assume they are talking technical risk and not project risk.

The technical complexity of incorporating CEAFAR and SAAB CMS is greater than staying with a combination already integrated a selected design. This is a technical risk, that if not mitigated appropriately, i.e. by the application of suitable resources, could easily manifest as an impact on schedule.

However, not switching to the proven in service systems the RAN and sustainment are already supporting, introduces new technical and schedule risk.

There is an attitude that ILS "just happens". It doesn't, it is in many ways more complex and resource intensive than design and build. Introducing new systems dramatically increases the load in this area.

It's not just parts, spares, manuals etc. it's workforce planning, training and the ongoing, through life impacts of supporting systems through life.

The only people whose lives get easier are the project managers and project directors, because it moves the complexity and technical risk from the front end, to through life.

It basically means, instead of doing it properly upfront, we will have an even more risky, complex and expensive upgrade program later.
The suggestion that the first 3 GPFs be acquired "as-is" off the foreign production line and "Australianise" them when they go into a major refit or MLU is great for the politicians as it makes them seem like they are being active in increasing the number of warship hulls in the RAN.
This suggestion is probably the worst combination of options, compared with doing nothing (i.e. introducing new technology streams into service) or doing the integration before the vessels are built. Doing the "Australianisation" at the major refit or MLU means that the issues associated with the ILS are compressed into a 10-15 years period rather than the 25 years through life. The change at MLU then throws additional load onto the existing support systems for the "Australian" systems, with commensurately less time to resolve before EoL.
But politicians are not renowned for their willingness to listen to advice which threatens their very short term political view or challenges their idealogical stand, however misguided it is in reality.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The suggestion that the first 3 GPFs be acquired "as-is" off the foreign production line and "Australianise" them when they go into a major refit or MLU is great for the politicians as it makes them seem like they are being active in increasing the number of warship hulls in the RAN.
This suggestion is probably the worst combination of options, compared with doing nothing (i.e. introducing new technology streams into service) or doing the integration before the vessels are built. Doing the "Australianisation" at the major refit or MLU means that the issues associated with the ILS are compressed into a 10-15 years period rather than the 25 years through life. The change at MLU then throws additional load onto the existing support systems for the "Australian" systems, with commensurately less time to resolve before EoL.
But politicians are not renowned for their willingness to listen to advice which threatens their very short term political view or challenges their idealogical stand, however misguided it is in reality.
We probably won't know until the ships hit the water what is exactly changed and modified and what isn't.

Personally I don't think putting Saab 9LV consoles are deal breakers, depending on how much and how ambitious, they could be fitted to the first ships built in Japan. They could be filed under English language signage. The bigger issue is probably 9LV itself not built for the crewing and automation of the ship itself. I guess it depends how much of the combat system has been integrated with the rest of the ships systems on the baseline Mogami. So you could have 9LV and consoles fitted, but it doesn't mean anything to the crew, or makes their lives harder.

CEAFAR2 probably is at least in the initial builds, a bridge too far. But we probably need to ask ourselves, what do we need from our radars, do we need to turf the entire existing setup or just see if we can fit a few bits here and their.

On the CMS itself, the space itself is evolving, maybe both Japan and Australia end up fitting Aegis and their local consoles, Japan and Korea were the initial inspiration for that kind of fit out on the Hobart to handle local integration issues.

Given that we are building them here, we will probably have decent support for them, eventually. Not going through normal process to do that will be interesting. Like does Mitsubishi work with existing SME to do that, or does Mitsubishi just setup its own entity and do everything, basically as a dropship warehouse locally, shipping everything from Japan. Is that what we mean as sovereignty.

Which again gets back to building frigates in WA. Never been done. Plenty of risk there. Perth being the most remote city on the planet, trying to support a build program bigger than anything in say Germany or the UK. How many SME are in Perth to support that. How many are prepared to jump onto that bandwagon when we have seen the attack disaster which burned a huge number, and the Hunter numbers now apparently kind of cut. The bigger risk is government actually committing to the project and ensuring numbers actually come through.

So really the biggest risk is the politicans. Both for as you mentioned their inability to listen, or see the world how it actually is rather than their ideological belief, and also because they are flightily and fickle things, and unreliable even if they are capable and listening.
 

BSKS

New Member
Here are some recent pics of Naval Group's Corvettes being built for the Bulgarian Navy once in the frame for our Tier II. Far cry from Mogami and A200 offerings...


 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Here are some recent pics of Naval Group's Corvettes being built for the Bulgarian Navy once in the frame for our Tier II. Far cry from Mogami and A200 offerings...


Similar lines to our OPV80, yet bigger and much more capable.

One of those what if and if only conversations.

Thanks for the pics

Cheers S
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
To summarise/and what I see:

(1) To keep the majority of the equipment / sub-systems from their country of origin (small exceptions on comsec or specific security gear)
  • Pros: Probability of lower integration, retesting, recertification risks and causing impact to schedule, higher cost from integration testing
  • Cons: Entirely new training and logistic (ILS) footprint for RAN, which itself is a form of risk to ILS due to lack of commonality. Unknown impact to lifecycle cost
(2) AU specific kit on major critical systems (e.g Combat Systems (9LV), Radar (CEAFAR), torpedoes, missiles, sonar), while integrating the sub-systems from country of origin (e.g ESM, IPMS)
  • Pros: Reuse existing AU investments, reduce compatibility issues, reuse existing logistics/training footprint, presumbly (unproven) lower ILS cost for RAN overall.
  • Cons: High probability of integration risk arising from compatibility, testing and recertification, impact to schedule/cost. Unproven that it will lower ILS cost. Potentially miss out on new capabilities that country of origin might have.
While it seems like there are no good choices, from my experience, I would usually go with the risks that (1) have a known and measurable impact, (2) has the least dependency. Because those are the risks that are easier to mitigate.

But then again as @OldTex points out, there's something called politicians who will make choices out of political expediency more than rationality.
 

Severely

Member
I am old enough to rmember the River Class DE and CFA Destroyers but to young to know their cpabilities in detail. I would have to rely on others on the forum to enlighten us. Were there significant issues operating US and UK systems side by side in the 60s 70s and 80s or were these managed relatively well. I believe the Rivers had Dutch fire control and radar systems and also had US sourced torpedos installed along with the Limbo mortars from the UK, Seacat and the 4.5 inch guns. The CFAs had obviously major capabilities with their electronic fitout but different 5 inch guns, Tartar then Standard as well as Ikara. Ikara was also integrated later in the Rivers. What I am trying to get at is that the Mogami off the shelf looks a great vessel and it would be a shame to dismiss it due to a lack of commonality in systems. A revolutionary change with the first 3 frigates as is, then an evolutionary change down the line. Similar to our past efforts but would it be feasible. My worry is the MEKO A200 is an easier fit due to modularity. Not that it would be terrible but if we are investing good money, get the best there is.
 

iambuzzard

Well-Known Member
I am old enough to rmember the River Class DE and CFA Destroyers but to young to know their cpabilities in detail. I would have to rely on others on the forum to enlighten us. Were there significant issues operating US and UK systems side by side in the 60s 70s and 80s or were these managed relatively well. I believe the Rivers had Dutch fire control and radar systems and also had US sourced torpedos installed along with the Limbo mortars from the UK, Seacat and the 4.5 inch guns. The CFAs had obviously major capabilities with their electronic fitout but different 5 inch guns, Tartar then Standard as well as Ikara. Ikara was also integrated later in the Rivers. What I am trying to get at is that the Mogami off the shelf looks a great vessel and it would be a shame to dismiss it due to a lack of commonality in systems. A revolutionary change with the first 3 frigates as is, then an evolutionary change down the line. Similar to our past efforts but would it be feasible. My worry is the MEKO A200 is an easier fit due to modularity. Not that it would be terrible but if we are investing good money, get the best there is.
In my opinion with no military experience or background, the Evolved Mogami appears more capable with room for upgrading, plus lower crew numbers.
The A200, whilst a capable ship just looks crammed as is with no extra space. As the experienced members on here know, steel is cheap and extra space invaluable.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
I am old enough to rmember the River Class DE and CFA Destroyers but to young to know their cpabilities in detail. I would have to rely on others on the forum to enlighten us. Were there significant issues operating US and UK systems side by side in the 60s 70s and 80s or were these managed relatively well. I believe the Rivers had Dutch fire control and radar systems and also had US sourced torpedos installed along with the Limbo mortars from the UK, Seacat and the 4.5 inch guns. The CFAs had obviously major capabilities with their electronic fitout but different 5 inch guns, Tartar then Standard as well as Ikara. Ikara was also integrated later in the Rivers. What I am trying to get at is that the Mogami off the shelf looks a great vessel and it would be a shame to dismiss it due to a lack of commonality in systems. A revolutionary change with the first 3 frigates as is, then an evolutionary change down the line. Similar to our past efforts but would it be feasible. My worry is the MEKO A200 is an easier fit due to modularity. Not that it would be terrible but if we are investing good money, get the best there is.
The long term cost saving from sharing integration costs for future and updated systems with the JMSDF might also be a benefit. Given the effort to integrate a 40mm gun into 9LV failed on Arafura that is unlikely to go away as a comcern. Harder to see the same benefits from A200.

I suspect it would be best to have the first six frigates as being close to the same baseline. If the Australian yard has to build the first of a new subclass (as opposed to reproducing existing exemplars) then that would be likely to create more risk.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
With the DEs (and Darings) and the CFAs we had the advantage of them using the same language as we did. When we first received them they had very little in the way of complex electronic systems, and those they did have were essentially analog not digital. People did a lot of the work now done by electronics. Nevertheless we had considerable adjustment issues, and for about 10 years there were effectively two navies with little pollination between the UK and US streams.

The Dutch systems (LWO2 and M22/44) in the DEs came with English face plates and documentation.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
In my opinion with no military experience or background, the Evolved Mogami appears more capable with room for upgrading, plus lower crew numbers.
The A200, whilst a capable ship just looks crammed as is with no extra space. As the experienced members on here know, steel is cheap and extra space invaluable.
The history of the ANZACs illustrates the possible difficulties of lacking space.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Among the root causes of the personnel issues on HMAS Success was the uniqueness of the systems led to a culture where specialist maintainers thought the rules didn't apply to them.

As the River class was drawn down there was a situation I heard of where a senior technical sailor with HIV was given a waiver to go to sea even though at the time I believe an HIV diagnosis resulted in automatic discharge. It was a case of they give him the waiver or the ship didn't deploy.

Having niche systems, niche capabilities often means you need to support and sustain them separately. The sustainment and support system footprint for a niche capability, with a small number of platforms, is often as large and expensive as that of a larger, more conventional capability.

Some capabilities and the elements of them, need to e niche, need to be specialised, but others don't.

Why add complexity and risk when it's not necessary and adds little to the outcome?
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Is there any information on crew quarters on the Mogami class ,I have heard in the past this was a concern for the submarine tendering as bunk size was smaller than RAN equivalent , it could be a lot of work just extending bunks etc.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
The Collins subs have been listed as a Product of Concern. To clarify it isn't the first time the Collins has been a Product of Concern. Probably the revelation that at least two subs, HMAS Sheean and HMAS Farncomb, are experiencing unprecedented levels of corrosion is the biggest concern. Much now seems to depend on the timely introduction into service of the Virginia Class. I am tipping that the Collins class will probably be withdrawn from service when the first batch of SSNs are delivered. The cost of sustaining nuclear and conventional submarines, the age of the Collins, as well as finding enough submariners to operate these boats doesn't bode well for their future in my opinion.

 

K.I.

Member
They are modular, scalable radars that are fully integrated with SAAB 9Lv CMS. Most of the load would be on SAAB to integrate their CMS into the platform.

Look at what they are doing with the Hobart's, SAAB is adapting 9Lv as an interface to sit on top of AEGIS and more easily integrate everything else.
The big question that won't be answered publicly for now, is how far along is Saab in developing an open architecture system (like the E-7). Saab and Mitsubishi teaming up to develop a common CMS would create a ground breaking second tier system that would simplify a lot of the integration issues without the cost of an Aegis system.
I think the language barrier is overstated as Japan have plenty of experience operating Aegis, I assume their version has been converted to Japanese?
 

Going Boeing

Well-Known Member
The Collins subs have been listed as a Product of Concern. To clarify it isn't the first time the Collins has been a Product of Concern. Probably the revelation that at least two subs, HMAS Sheean and HMAS Farncomb, are experiencing unprecedented levels of corrosion is the biggest concern. Much now seems to depend on the timely introduction into service of the Virginia Class. I am tipping that the Collins class will probably be withdrawn from service when the first batch of SSNs are delivered. The cost of sustaining nuclear and conventional submarines, the age of the Collins, as well as finding enough submariners to operate these boats doesn't bode well for their future in my opinion.

The previous government ordered an assessment on each Collins class submarine as to their suitability for LOTE. That assessment concluded that all 6 were suitable and now there are reports of excessive corrosion in at least two of the fleet - that doesn’t indicate a high level of competence in those who conducted the inspections.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
The previous government ordered an assessment on each Collins class submarine as to their suitability for LOTE. That assessment concluded that all 6 were suitable and now there are reports of excessive corrosion in at least two of the fleet - that doesn’t indicate a high level of competence in those who conducted the inspections.
It’s a dammed situation of lack of time, engineering challenges and politics.

For all the attributes of the Collin’s Class, does anyone seriously believe they will provide the service we expect from them in the time frame we need them to serve.

NO!

Complete folly and nonsense.

A Plan B is a must decision that needs action asap.
Peter Briggs recent article in ASPIs The Strategist may or may not be the answer, but relying on the expectation that our SSN endeavour will deliver both on time and in numbers is optimistic to say the least.

What’s better ,spending vast sums on Collin’s for a mixed result , or invest similar amounts of coin into a Plan B

We are reluctantly yet prudently building frigates overseas for our Navy

A modest number of Submarines may need to be apart of that mix as well.

A hard conversation that needs to happen

Cheers S
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
It’s a dammed situation of lack of time, engineering challenges and politics.

For all the attributes of the Collin’s Class, does anyone seriously believe they will provide the service we expect from them in the time frame we need them to serve.

NO!

Complete folly and nonsense.

A Plan B is a must decision that needs action asap.
Peter Briggs recent article in ASPIs The Strategist may or may not be the answer, but relying on the expectation that our SSN endeavour will deliver both on time and in numbers is optimistic to say the least.

What’s better ,spending vast sums on Collin’s for a mixed result , or invest similar amounts of coin into a Plan B

We are reluctantly yet prudently building frigates overseas for our Navy

A modest number of Submarines may need to be apart of that mix as well.

A hard conversation that needs to happen

Cheers S
It is not just about the coin involved, but also time and other resources. To be frank, I still hold significant reservations about multiple aspects of SEA 3000. Also at present, no decisions have been announced on a design or overseas yard selection which means, at least publicly, Australia is not actually building anything yet, either domestically or in facilities overseas.

Yes, Australia could work to develop a 'Plan B' for the Collins-class subs with some sort of order placed with overseas yards but, ignoring both initial and ongoing/through-life costs, how long would it actually take to implement and very importantly, is that implementation going to be faster and/or less risky and a Collins-class LOTE?

Due to circumstances of geography, Australia has some sub capability requirements that are, whilst not completely unique, are only shared or partially shared with a few other conventional sub operators. This in turn means that most available conventional sub designs really are not configured with capabilities appropriate for RAN CONOPS and needs. This in turn then means that selection of a new class of conventional sub to replace/augment the Collins-class until the SSN's start entering service is likely to be complicated, lest Australia end up ordering a class that is effectively useless. Or alternatively, due to whatever the overseas builder has in terms of production availability, the replacements might not start entering RAN service until after the LOTE could be completed and/or the SSN's start getting delivered.

Replacing the current RAN fleet is not just about cost, or even capability, but also when potential replacements could realistically be available for RAN service. For example, if Japan were to sell Mogami (FFM-1) to the RAN tomorrow, it would take some time before the RAN could actually have the vessel commissioned and in service because the vessel layout and configuration, as well as onboard weapons and ships systems are different from the RAN currently uses.
 
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