Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Can't see it being a viable tactic to be honest.
Why not just strike a target with an F18 instead.
I can see some challenges ,but I also see some attributes and suggest it’s a capability that should be explored.

it’s another deterrent in the ADF kit bag of denial.
An addition and compliment to the RAAF.

Cheers S
 
I’m a bit confused about why the Army needs this anti shipping capability. I can see an argument for littoral deployment of surveillance assets supported by mobile medium range air defence systems to provide persistent surveillance, but i think the kinetic effectors should be delivered by the RAAF using P-8, F/A-18F, F-35 + Growlers,(LRASM, JSM, AARG-ER) or the RAN (RGM-109, NSM). Greater flexibility, greater capacity for follow up and the ability to add SEAD/DEAD and electronic attack to the mix.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
I’m a bit confused about why the Army needs this anti shipping capability. I can see an argument for littoral deployment of surveillance assets supported by mobile medium range air defence systems to provide persistent surveillance, but i think the kinetic effectors should be delivered by the RAAF using P-8, F/A-18F, F-35 + Growlers,(LRASM, JSM, AARG-ER) or the RAN (RGM-109, NSM). Greater flexibility, greater capacity for follow up and the ability to add SEAD/DEAD and electronic attack to the mix.
As I understand it, it Is about predeploying the strike capability on islands within range to threaten adversaries in the northern approaches to Australia. Some of those deployments will be in locations with austere, difficult to protect air strips (especially for a land force with no sovereign ballistic missile defence) and in environments that will be extremely hazardous to operate major warships in (currently too few in number and/or inadequately protected and will be busy sub hunting/ lobbing missiles at other targets in a major conflict). Basically the Australian Army is preparing to contest environments where it does not have air supremacy (or even superiority).

So in an environment where the presence of the RAN and RAAF cannot be guaranteed the choice is either deploy the effectors on land ( as the other side will be doing to), deploy Army without any naval strike capacity (so the Australian presence can almost be ignored by the adversary until the battle is won) or not send Army at all to those locations (which necessitates a new strategy).
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I’m a bit confused about why the Army needs this anti shipping capability. I can see an argument for littoral deployment of surveillance assets supported by mobile medium range air defence systems to provide persistent surveillance, but i think the kinetic effectors should be delivered by the RAAF using P-8, F/A-18F, F-35 + Growlers,(LRASM, JSM, AARG-ER) or the RAN (RGM-109, NSM). Greater flexibility, greater capacity for follow up and the ability to add SEAD/DEAD and electronic attack to the mix.
Persistence. Something fast jets and MPA’s don’t and never will have.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
As I understand it, it Is about predeploying the strike capability on islands within range to threaten adversaries in the northern approaches to Australia. Some of those deployments will be in locations with austere, difficult to protect air strips (especially for a land force with no sovereign ballistic missile defence) and in environments that will be extremely hazardous to operate major warships in (currently too few in number and/or inadequately protected and will be busy sub hunting/ lobbing missiles at other targets in a major conflict). Basically the Australian Army is preparing to contest environments where it does not have air supremacy (or even superiority).

So in an environment where the presence of the RAN and RAAF cannot be guaranteed the choice is either deploy the effectors on land ( as the other side will be doing to), deploy Army without any naval strike capacity (so the Australian presence can almost be ignored by the adversary until the battle is won) or not send Army at all to those locations (which necessitates a new strategy).
Lets pause and consider that though.

All the territory to our north where 250km is useful belongs to someone else. Indonesia is highly likely to strive for neutrality; Singapore and Malaysia (while FPDA) have serious risk in supporting kinetic actions against Beijing; and the Philippines have it's own capabilities and triggers to engage the PLAN. Plus significant (likely) US support. So just where are our Strikemasters going to be?

If it's in an environment where air parity or worse exists, now you have to commit a SAM Bty. And boost up your protection. Now you are probably lifting a BG(+) - which rules out air transport and needs the amphibs. Which are - especially for the LSTs and mediums - slow and very poorly armed or defended. Meaning they are a sucker target for the PLAN or PLAAF. In fact, if it's too hazardous to operate a major fleet unit - what hope have the landing craft?

If I want a NSM Bty that can actually range threats, I have them already. On self-deploying, defensible and flexible platforms. At least 10 - with possibly more for the new FFG and Hunters.

On top of all that, if it's for Defence of Australia (urgh) and won't deploy forward, what's it going to do? The RAN and RAAF (and HiMARS) will be engaged with the PLAN well before they hit our EEZ (noting that Strikemaster cannot reach our EEZ edge). If enough escorts get through all that to continue to assault, what will Strikemaster do? And if enough escorts or ancillaries don't - they'll turn back.

HiMARS has the advantage of range (although access, basing and overflight is still the grand unanswered question), usefulness (it can shoot more than one type of missile), flexibility, and already exists in production. It's even to the point where there are uncrewed HiMARS launcher options, making the risk to our personnel even lower. Army needs a long range strike option. It just needs to be long range and it needs to do multiple missions. Strikemaster fails both. I've always thought that Army having AShM (especially while lacking in so many other areas core to a Land Force) was... not clever. At least with HiMARS it's an addition that doesn't really undermine the (increasingly restricted) resourcing of the force. Strikemaster doesn't add anything.
 
Don’t get me wrong, I like the littoral focus, holding and retaining territory and it being supported with deployable assets like HIMARS, NASSAMS and associated surveillance and targeting capabilities. If we were to assume contested control in Banda and or Bismarck sea’s, LRASSM could be expended in the anti shipping role on the borders of our EEZ and hit targets in the lower limits of those bodies without RAAF necessarily needing to enter contested airspace. I don’t think it’s unfair to suggest that a pair of air refuelled super Hornets could reach out to the Bismark or Banda Sea’s and deliver the same or greater effect as a troop of ground based anti ship missiles. I guess I’m asking what specifically does the land based Anti Ship missile system add to the deployed battle group that can’t be delivered externally from the battle group.
 

Aardvark144

Active Member
It was FA-18A/B not F-18
Without too much back and forth, the F/A-18F Super Hornet has never been given the moniker of F-18. The Super Hornet is an evolution of the classic but that is as close as it gets. It goes without saying that I would not call the AS-21 Redbank a tank even though they look similar.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
250km IS close to the enemy today.
Any airfield that close to your position will be under the microscope, or even destroyed by the bodies.
Even as far back as diamond dollar in 1987, the airfields close to the town of Coen were under surveillance.
I have had DZ briefs where the old RF111 s provided images of enemy SF on nearly every airfield. That's why DZs are never on or even near an objective.
Do you really believe that Himars would be used in the shoot and scoot scenario? Really?
That's the point, if you can't reach the threat, but the threat can reach you, they have the advantage.

What use is an infantry btn, let alone a brigade, providing security for a standoff missile capability, when the primary threats to that capability have longer ranged effectors than said infantry?

Perhaps what the army really needs is an equivalent to ADGs.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Can't see it being a viable tactic to be honest.
Why not just strike a target with an F18 instead.
Do that too.

With these they have to assume and island or coastal region with a C-130 capable airstrip could have a troop or even of these there.

This is on top of the Rhinos, Lightnings, subs, tier 1 and 2 surface combatants, soon, mines, UUVs etc.

The idea is to complicate the tactical picture and restrict movement options for an aggressor.

Is strike master / NSM the right option? I don't know. What I do know is the threat of maybe Strikemaster, HIMARs or Typhon (hopefully) complicates things to our advantage.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Thinking on it the fires brigade is going to need cavalry, isr, and air defence/missile defence more than infantry.

Depending of the system selected air defence could be either a separate capability, with its own platforms, added to the strike capability, or it could be integrated into the strike capability. NSM is a stand alone single purpose capability, HIMAS is an expanding multirole capability, and Typhon appears to have even more potential.

The key will be getting in, securing the area, and setting up defence against air and missile attack if they are located. I doubt even SOF will be a real threat, it will be air and missile attack that are the more likely response.

I can also envisage SOF conducting deception operations, deploying to islands and setting up dummy missile sites.
 

Maranoa

Active Member
Don’t get me wrong, I like the littoral focus, holding and retaining territory and it being supported with deployable assets like HIMARS, NASSAMS and associated surveillance and targeting capabilities. If we were to assume contested control in Banda and or Bismarck sea’s, LRASSM could be expended in the anti shipping role on the borders of our EEZ and hit targets in the lower limits of those bodies without RAAF necessarily needing to enter contested airspace. I don’t think it’s unfair to suggest that a pair of air refuelled super Hornets could reach out to the Bismark or Banda Sea’s and deliver the same or greater effect as a troop of ground based anti ship missiles. I guess I’m asking what specifically does the land based Anti Ship missile system add to the deployed battle group that can’t be delivered externally from the battle group.
Yeah, I agree. To me it looks like the Army is trying to find a role in this new EABO plan. The US Army has said as much, making major investments like the Typhon to make itself relevant to EABO. I doubt all of this, I can't see a light amphibious vessel surviving in a modern battlefield no matter how much we want it to.
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
Strikemaster must be alot cheaper than bushmaster? Surely less than 2 mill each?

Why can’t they develop an NSM pod for the himars?
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Strikemaster must be alot cheaper than bushmaster? Surely less than 2 mill each?
The vehicle is, the munitions are not. HIMARS doesn’t exclusively fire PRsM, it has the useful and much cheaper GMLRS and ER-GMLRS (coming) to employ as well.

But Strikemaster only has NSM which is going to be as expensive as PRsM snd seemingly less useful outside the short-ranged ship killing role.
 
The vehicle is, the munitions are not. HIMARS doesn’t exclusively fire PRsM, it has the useful and much cheaper GMLRS and ER-GMLRS (coming) to employ as well.

But Strikemaster only has NSM which is going to be as expensive as PRsM snd seemingly less useful outside the short-ranged ship killing role.
This a very good point, the PRsM is a flexible munition, it could be used to help displace the enemy in a contested ground operation as well provide a quick reaction response to a littoral counter attack and it’s already potentially part of the battle group.
 
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