I am struggling to understand what you mean.
For starters....trade training.
Ok, WW1 or WW2 is over, and the modern grunt can be trained quickly. But, as with any job, skilled junior managers can't be trained quickly, it's a combination of experience and training. Even a rifle section needs to be experienced.
When pitched a 20 week training period for a rifleman from IET to Bn, my infantry brethren (officers, SNCO and WO) reset that to 11 weeks. So yes, while any trade needs experience, and any JNCO+ needs experience, generating rifleman mass is easy. To generate the infantry you need for a Bde you need two ARA Bn - and coincidently the amount of enablers we have only allows for a Bde to deploy (even then I question the RAE or RAA assets). Assume the enablers magically appear, the follow on Bde needs two Inf Bn just like the first. You get that by splitting the 3rd ARA Bn in half, promoting everyone a rank to generate the JCNO+ and than back fill with 11 week graduates. Note that the second Bde is theoretically given at least 6 months notice there is plenty of time to raise those forces and even give training to ATL4 or so.
All of this means that the ARA only needs 3 Bn. And a solid mobilisation plan. But the latter isn't a RAInf responsibility - it's actually essential noting the paucity of enablers.
We will have HIMARs etc soon.
How will those assets be used.
They will need to be protected, by who?
By a combined arms team. The bedrock upon with which we fight is combined arms, hence the enablers. Even then, what protection is a Bty of HiMARS getting? It'll get a BG at best if operating independently. Meaning that the ARA Bde can support 3x Bty....which is what a Bde can produce. So again, you only need two ARA Bn. If the HiMARS is operating in this hypothetical land-shoot-scoot move using C-130s and the like, it doesn't even need to force protection, meaning in turn less ARA infantry.
What will the goals be for the ADF?
Just plonk HE at targets, then move on?
Role of the infantry...to size and hold ground. That is still and will always be relevant.
And it remains the unique attribute of the infantry. I'm not arguing to remove infantry - there will always be a need for some poor bloody rifleman to stand somewhere and say "this is Australia's". But, in the modern and future world, the infantry can only do this with it's combined arms enablers. It needs tanks, IFVs, artillery, engineer support, comms support and logistics. Some air power, some NGFS, some space-y stuff and some cyber-y stuff too will be welcome. Without that stuff, the infantry just dies. Which is my point - at the moment the ARA doesn't have enough enablers. So why hold more infantry than we can use, instead of the stuff that takes longer to raise and coincidently saves the lives of the infantry we keep?
You don't or shouldn't use other assets to do that, or you are wasting their particular capability.
During the Timor crisis, non infantry units such as Artillery and field engineers were used as infantry to make up for the lack of Infantry numbers, what if we suddenly needed arty and engineers....
Two things - it highlights that for low intensity stuff we can draw on other elements to provide an infantry effect - so we don't need extra ARA. And secondly, it highlights the need for a robust mobilisation plan. I don't know why infantry IETs were not accelerated in 1999, I imagine it's because as soon as the Indonesian's stepped back it was clear we could do INTERFET with what we had and didn't need to. If we rapidly needed artillery and engineers, then the mobilisation plan will give us ARes (was Ready Reserve a thing in 1999?) or, given enough warning, an accelerated IET pipeline.
Okay I will bite. What is trade is the fastest to train for Army?
Truckies. Specifically ECN274 - Driver. Cull the course down to what's needed and you'd be looking at 2-3 week IETs. And really, noting how many other Corps are expected to drive heavy vehicles (thinking RAEME, RAAOC, RAE and RASigs especially), I think there is valid reason for asking why RACT still exists when the majority of the Corps is 274. Fundamentally, driving vehicles isn't hard - except we (the Royal we) allow the School of Trucks to make it so (remember, to drive a G-Wagon is 5 days!).
As a side note, I still remain unsold on the notion of RAA fielding land-based AShM batteries as part of an A2/AD 'strategy'. I still believe that the chokepoints which could make A2/AD tactics work are just too far removed from Australia for the ADF to effectively make use of, or sustain.
100% behind you. I've argued against Army owned AShM for years. Strikemaster undermines it even more - now with missiles that cannot reach the edge of the EEZ and cannot fit on a C-130! Yay! And undermines what we've been arguing about the long in long-range strike.
Of course there is a place. A 'budgetary place' hence why Army has traditionally been light infantry based, when it should really be fires based...
But light infantry is cheap and easy to house, train and equip and anything else, isn't...
And upon which so many problems can be placed. Light infantry was excellent as an Army wide specialisation right up until 1914.
On Typhon, my thoughts exactly.
I know Typhon uses SM-6 as a strike missile, but is there any reason what so ever Typhon launch SM-6 couldn't be tasked by another system for its other roles, i.e. by an air defence battery or data from a CEC equipped wedgetail?
The third major strike against Strikemaster is exactly this. A long range strike launcher that can take SM-6 (like Typhon or Mk 70 VLS) can tie in with the integrated force so much better. Now an Air Defence commander can chose to (for instance) use HMAS Brisbane's SM-6 or 16 Regt's. It allows flexibility at the operational level, some tactical complication to the red commander and options. It complicates tactical log a little, but long range strike is already a bastards, so in the end it's not that much.