The $1.16 billion was a JMSDF request back in late 2023 for a build of 2 new FFM, recently a 2024 request by ministry for 3 new FFM frigates >(314 billion yen)-$2.2 billion USD.
So between $508-$733 million to build…
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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So between $508-$733 million to build…
Aardvark144
Active Member
I thought the idea was to keep partisan politics out of this site?
Aardvark144
Active Member
Well said.
I live in the NT, we have a liberal govt now, nothing has changed.
I remember my service, I was in during 1985-95.
I served under the Hawke Govt, things were fine, Beasley was a good defence minister.
Keating gutted defence during the recession we had.
Had it been a Liberal/Nat government at the time, and they gutted defence, then I would say exactly the same thing.
You obviously have a problem with politics which is why we don't discuss it.
for the record, I voted Labor NT after the libs sold the TIO, and the Port to the Chinese.
Any way. Us swinging voters are the smarter ones, I don,t support politicians like a footy team.
The point I was trying to make is, recruitment needs to be maintained and the ADF's ability to operate to defend the nation should not be compromised by any political party for any reason. playing catch up has never worked and will never work, our entire history has been boom and bust for defence which leads to inconsistency, and all political parties make these decisions that allow it to happen.
iambuzzard
Well-Known Member
Which is why the GPF program essentially has bipartisan support, as it should be.
Part of the problem is people best remember what affected them personally and the talking heads of the time, but the global situation fades from memory faster.
The mid 90s was at the tail end of a global recession, the end of the cold war, new world order, post Desert Storm showing the Wests undeniable supremacy.
In Australia the ready reserves had been established, there was lots of money and bullets for them and the existing ARA and reserve units supporting them. Army was reorganising into seven task forces, from memory, five motorised/mechanised, one airmobile, one SF.
RAAF was kicking off tankers and AEW, upgrades to F-111 and F/A-18, new guided weapons etc.
Navy was the big winner, ANZACs and Collins programs underway, planning for replacement of the Fremantle Class PBs with corvettes, and for all nine FFGs and DDGs started.
The government changed in 96 and everything was turned on its head. Things actually got worse, more cuts, wholesale cancellations, hitting of support, engineering and procurement functions. Hell Bushmaster was almost cancelled.
The four upgraded FFGs became the replacement for the DDGs, the corvettes were never ordered, and eventually the RAN got three Hobarts to replace nine FFGs and DDGs. The ANZACs were upgraded to fill in as major combatants.
The mid 90s was at the tail end of a global recession, the end of the cold war, new world order, post Desert Storm showing the Wests undeniable supremacy.
In Australia the ready reserves had been established, there was lots of money and bullets for them and the existing ARA and reserve units supporting them. Army was reorganising into seven task forces, from memory, five motorised/mechanised, one airmobile, one SF.
RAAF was kicking off tankers and AEW, upgrades to F-111 and F/A-18, new guided weapons etc.
Navy was the big winner, ANZACs and Collins programs underway, planning for replacement of the Fremantle Class PBs with corvettes, and for all nine FFGs and DDGs started.
The government changed in 96 and everything was turned on its head. Things actually got worse, more cuts, wholesale cancellations, hitting of support, engineering and procurement functions. Hell Bushmaster was almost cancelled.
The four upgraded FFGs became the replacement for the DDGs, the corvettes were never ordered, and eventually the RAN got three Hobarts to replace nine FFGs and DDGs. The ANZACs were upgraded to fill in as major combatants.
Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
You would probably welcome this news that the Port of Darwin lease may soon be terminated due to financial problems.
https://www.skynews.com.au/australi...e/news-story/ffa4068aeea20438dfade98db1096e83
It’s funny that people still bring up whoever happens to be the government of the day when the common denominator in a series of Defence failures across both the current and previous gov is in fact the department itself - free from legislatively required accountability and transparency. How convenient for them and the progression of their careers.
The fact so many blindly accept that we’re building Hunter (which at lightship displaces more than a flight IIA Burke) with a full AEGIS IAMD, BMD capable suite, a radar well beyond the capability or capacity of Hobart -yet - expending hundreds of tonnes of top weight margin on trying to also be an auxiliary carrying shipping containers and off board systems?
Would anyone seriously buy the argument that a new build Burke should swap her aft 64-cell silo for a mission bay? Like come on.
The fact so many blindly accept that we’re building Hunter (which at lightship displaces more than a flight IIA Burke) with a full AEGIS IAMD, BMD capable suite, a radar well beyond the capability or capacity of Hobart -yet - expending hundreds of tonnes of top weight margin on trying to also be an auxiliary carrying shipping containers and off board systems?
Would anyone seriously buy the argument that a new build Burke should swap her aft 64-cell silo for a mission bay? Like come on.
I remember a magazine article of the day that made it VERY CLEAR that Bushmaster was the perfect vehicle for long-range, long-term top end patrols to watch for... I dunno, people smugglers? This was pre-911. Definitely implied they'd be fighting off Indonesian insurgents or something in the Kimberley. This would have been about two years before INTERFET, so maybe they had a nightmare scenario written up.
I've since learnt that this was just the argument put forward by ADF brass to get the program over the line - "Definitely only for Defence Of Australia, certainly won't be deploying them to Afghanistan, no sir!"
I also recall reading at that time that an ANZAC FFH was around $500M AUD (so maybe $350M US). Does anyone actually know?
Seems to me a Mogami is cheap today at twice that price...
Another point, the Australian pivot in the early 90s was due to the end of the cold war and the strategic uncertainty it created.
Asia was rising, the US was looking inward and focussing on prosperity, we were alone. The entire pivot was built around providing a framework to protect vital assets, trade routes and maintain regional superiority.
Kim Beazley did a very good podcast about a year ago outlining how the plans of the early 90s were meant to provide the minimum required capability in uncertain times and the flexibility to expand within the ten year warning time.
He went on to explain how defence efficiency drives hollowed out defence, and how the war on terror unbalanced the ADF as a whole.
Basically the Army became a force protection focused counter insurgency force, while the RAN and RAAF became the Army's taxi service.
Each service maintained niche, big war capabilities, but they were much smaller than they needed to be.
The warning period is long gone, and we are building from, not the flexible minimum planned in the early 90s, but from a much smaller, much older, much less capable force, skewed to border protection and counter insurgency.
Corvettes were to be a vital assets protection capability, the Armidales were a constabulary / border force.
Asia was rising, the US was looking inward and focussing on prosperity, we were alone. The entire pivot was built around providing a framework to protect vital assets, trade routes and maintain regional superiority.
Kim Beazley did a very good podcast about a year ago outlining how the plans of the early 90s were meant to provide the minimum required capability in uncertain times and the flexibility to expand within the ten year warning time.
He went on to explain how defence efficiency drives hollowed out defence, and how the war on terror unbalanced the ADF as a whole.
Basically the Army became a force protection focused counter insurgency force, while the RAN and RAAF became the Army's taxi service.
Each service maintained niche, big war capabilities, but they were much smaller than they needed to be.
The warning period is long gone, and we are building from, not the flexible minimum planned in the early 90s, but from a much smaller, much older, much less capable force, skewed to border protection and counter insurgency.
Corvettes were to be a vital assets protection capability, the Armidales were a constabulary / border force.
The Hunter is something we haven't had since the 60s, a state of the art ASW platform. The Burke is a general purpose, but air defence oriented destroyer.
Go back a generation, the Hunter/Type 26 predecessors are the likes of the Type 23 and Type 22, maybe the Spuance and the large Japanese DDs.
Australia's River Class DEs were the best 1950s generation ASW escorts. Their replacement, the ANZACs were GP, not ASW platforms.
There’s no justification for the direction Hunter has taken in the context of the overall fleet plan.
The whole “specialist” combatant argument re Hunter to justify this simply doesn’t make sense.
Hunter by public spec is more capable than Hobart in all domains. Since when did we have the luxury of wasting that on being able to carry shipping containers rather than missiles?
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You would prefer 1 ship design that is both a specialist in ASW and AW?
I’m not sure one exists. Yet…
You need to broaden your reading beyond RN-doctrine based thinking my man.
Hobart and Burke don’t expend finite weight and space on towed arrays, hull mounted sonars, torpedo magazines and ASW helos for fun.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
I served from in the ARA from 1981-2001 and I can assure you that the Keating years were by far the worst, I had the displeasure of going on a major exercise in the early 90s and had to shout bullets, bullets, bullets instead of having real blank ammo. It was a joke.
Pretty much all current and proposed, deployable uncrewed capabilities are ISO container based. Basically the multi mission bay future proofs the design.
From day one they will be able to operate UAVs, UUVs etc. using the mission bay.
ADV Guidance with a core crew of 18 and at a cost of $110m can deploy and recover over a thousand tonnes more off board systems, in more conditions, and of pretty much any format.
Properly utilising available space and weight on Hunter for VLS would not remove the ability to deploy organic and appropriate UXVs for a major large surface combatant.
The fact Hunter right now doesn’t even have the capacity to carry the missiles it’s capable of utilising (let alone in meaningful quantities) is surely the most pressing concern?
But they are also nowhere near as quiet as a Type 22, or 23, let alone a Type 26.
Modern high end ASW platforms are so quiet that the submarines they are hunting often don't even know they are there.
The Hunter is even better, having a high end air defence capability in addition to their ASW.
Look outside the square, think seafloor based ASW sensors deployed by UUVs launched by the hunter. Think about mines placed in the same way. Off board sensors and weapons.
Versatility is the name of the game.