Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

ddxx

Well-Known Member
But they are also nowhere near as quiet as a Type 22, or 23, let alone a Type 26.

Modern high end ASW platforms are so quiet that the submarines they are hunting often don't even know they are there.

The Hunter is even better, having a high end air defence capability in addition to their ASW.
Please help me understand how using existing top weight margin for VLS rather than shipping containers changes that in any way?
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Pity they shut down Williamstown, good size yard for something like LCM, LCH and other vessels below 4,000ton - OPVs, LOSVs etc
Henderson could have focused on building frigates and larger ships.
Unfortunately days gone bye

Why would you build in Melbourne?
Still a major manufacturing hub with excellent educational facilities.
Constructed a significant proportion of the existing RAN fleet
Has a population greater than that of WA and SA combined.
Many other attributes

Why, Because we took a turn in the road and did not invest in “Willie”
It’s future is now residential and Lattes

Best of luck to SA and WA

We now need to make these two locations work.

No more changes , just commitment!

Cheers S
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Oh. So its Keating's fault and 'it has been the way it is now for at least the last 2 years'. So
ONLY when Labor is in power. So the 21 years out of the last thirty where the LNP was in power everything was fab in the ADF and look at our Navy now. Your obvious political bias makes everything you write about the RAN (which isn't much) to be not taken seriously. This forum should be 'Right-wing Australian Navy Forum 2.0'.
Hysterical overreaction. Right wing He pointed out a time when things went bad. That’s all. For a first post you have made a fool of yourself.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Please help me understand how using existing top weight margin for VLS rather than shipping containers changes that in any way?
They are not "shipping containers" they are deployable systems that use a container interface.

When they are not there the space can be used by additional RHIBs, fast interceptor craft, light amphibious craft, additional helicopters etc.

I hope a DDG version is ordered as an addition to the fleet. Actually, no park that, I hope a DLG type is ordered.

Six is a good number, in fact I know a few who were of the opinion we should have built six modified Type 23 instead of the MEKOs as the ANZACs, then three Flight IIA Burke's and six new FFGs, with twelve corvettes.

The FFGs would logically be F-100s, or F124s, maybe even something locally designed. They would be new, and the Type 23s would now be being replaced by Type 26.

The corvettes would be replaced by GPFs, the Burke's by Type 83(?) and the FFGs by Hunter FFGs.

Maybe adjust the numbers to five each DDG/DLG, FFG(ASW), FFG(GP) supported by ten GPF. Not an Armidale, Cape or Arafura in sight.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
If we go to war they'll have to reopen it.
Looking at things from a pragmatic POV, would it be realistic for the Williamstown Dockyard to be re-opened and effective? IIRC one of the reasons why BAE ended up closing the facility was that it was no longer really large enough to handle vessels larger than ~120 or 130 m LOA, and there was no economically viable way to expand the facility. If the workforce has dispersed by either moving onto other workplaces and/or retired, and the physical facility itself is both too small and would need to be updated/refurbished before being used again, then I do not see a way for Williamstown to be made useful again absent a prolonged conflict requiring a whole-of-nation response.

It is both a cost and time issue. There would be costs associated with acquiring the site and then making the infrastructure fit for purpose again, or significantly greater costs (and time) involved if the site were to be expanded so larger vessels could be worked on. IIRC the Adelaide-class FFG's were close to the max size Williamstown could build. Good for their time, but frigates and destroyers now are more into the 140m+ LOA, and 6,000+ tonnes displacement range.

I suspect that establishing the sort of skilled workforce such a hypothetical naval yard would require would take longer to raise and train than reconstruction would, unless the yard were to also be significantly expanded. Pretty much the only way to get skilled workers for such a facility would require either conscription of workers from mining industries, and/or poaching already experienced yard workers from other Australian yards. As little as I like the apparent plan to establish a naval construction facility in WA for warship production, I think that will be more efficient and effective than trying to get Williamstown back into service.

If there were to be any serious efforts made to get former Australian yards back into service, Codock in Sydney would be a better idea IMO, as the site, whilst space limited (it is on an island after all) did already have facilities large enough to construct ~150m long AOR's with full load displacement of 18,000 tonnes. These facilities would need to be refurbished or rebuilt in some fashion, and of course the workforce established but I suspect the end result would be a more useful facility, provided gov't could and would continue to sustain the facility by placing orders for work. Given Australia's boom-bust cycles for naval construction and the apparent demise of the national shipbuilding plan, I am dubious about Australia managing to keep Osborne and/or whatever ends up built in WA going as a viable, functioning facility.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Looking at things from a pragmatic POV, would it be realistic for the Williamstown Dockyard to be re-opened and effective? IIRC one of the reasons why BAE ended up closing the facility was that it was no longer really large enough to handle vessels larger than ~120 or 130 m LOA, and there was no economically viable way to expand the facility. If the workforce has dispersed by either moving onto other workplaces and/or retired, and the physical facility itself is both too small and would need to be updated/refurbished before being used again, then I do not see a way for Williamstown to be made useful again absent a prolonged conflict requiring a whole-of-nation response.

It is both a cost and time issue. There would be costs associated with acquiring the site and then making the infrastructure fit for purpose again, or significantly greater costs (and time) involved if the site were to be expanded so larger vessels could be worked on. IIRC the Adelaide-class FFG's were close to the max size Williamstown could build. Good for their time, but frigates and destroyers now are more into the 140m+ LOA, and 6,000+ tonnes displacement range.

I suspect that establishing the sort of skilled workforce such a hypothetical naval yard would require would take longer to raise and train than reconstruction would, unless the yard were to also be significantly expanded. Pretty much the only way to get skilled workers for such a facility would require either conscription of workers from mining industries, and/or poaching already experienced yard workers from other Australian yards. As little as I like the apparent plan to establish a naval construction facility in WA for warship production, I think that will be more efficient and effective than trying to get Williamstown back into service.

If there were to be any serious efforts made to get former Australian yards back into service, Codock in Sydney would be a better idea IMO, as the site, whilst space limited (it is on an island after all) did already have facilities large enough to construct ~150m long AOR's with full load displacement of 18,000 tonnes. These facilities would need to be refurbished or rebuilt in some fashion, and of course the workforce established but I suspect the end result would be a more useful facility, provided gov't could and would continue to sustain the facility by placing orders for work. Given Australia's boom-bust cycles for naval construction and the apparent demise of the national shipbuilding plan, I am dubious about Australia managing to keep Osborne and/or whatever ends up built in WA going as a viable, functioning facility.
The thing I never understood was closing Cockatoo Island and keeping Williamstown.

Codoc was out premier yard, it was established to build cruisers and did so during and after WWI. Success was built there.

It's an island, just reclaim land and expand it.

Too late now but in hindsight it was the one to keep.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
The thing I never understood was closing Cockatoo Island and keeping Williamstown.

Codoc was out premier yard, it was established to build cruisers and did so during and after WWI. Success was built there.

It's an island, just reclaim land and expand it.

Too late now but in hindsight it was the one to keep.
TBH I suspect politics was involved, which is in large measure why I remain so dubious about SEA 3000 or at least what has come out regarding it and the naval review itself.
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
I very much doubt the Henderson precinct can build 40-51 vessels in less than 2 decades.

-18 LCM
-8 LCH
-8 GPF
-6 LOSV
-11 Capes + what comes after (2030-2044)
-No larger ships planned.

LCM and LCH allow the skills and workforce to be built up before building MFUs, got no problem with that…
Still, going forward a third yard would be much better for the smaller vessels as Henderson transitions from small to large builds and hopefully in the future extra large ships, 15,000 + tons.

$200 million doesn’t seem like alot for the entire Williamstown yard.
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
LCM and LCH allow the skills and workforce to be built up before building MFUs, got no problem with that…
Still, going forward a third yard would be much better for the smaller vessels as Henderson transitions from small to large builds and hopefully in the future extra large ships, 15,000 + tons.
TBH I suspect that building the LCM and LCH will not do much in terms of upskilling a workforce into one which is really suitable for constructing warships. Sure, it can/will provide experience in cutting and shaping metal, but what about fitting, connecting and testing complex ship systems and subsystems? IIRC something like a third the cost of a new frigate or destroyer comes from the sensors and other shipboard electronics fitted. Last I checked, those types of systems fitted to LCM and LCH tend to be significantly less expensive, comprehensive, capable and perhaps most importantly, complex.

Also, whenever one talks about establishing a new yard, one really needs to keep in mind this question, "can and will Australia place a regular flow of naval construction orders which is necessary to sustain a yard and workforce as a going concern?" If we were to add in two additional Australian yards, one for MFU and/or large vessel construction and then a third for minor warfare and/or smaller logistics and support vessels, would that actually be sustainable, or would that just exacerbate Australia's historical trend of boom-bust naval construction?

From my POV, given the significantly greater complexity of modern warships vs. those built during WWII, the type of skilled workforce needed for such construction is not one which could be quickly established even if staggering sums were thrown at the problem. If that is an accurate assessment, then it would be far better for the progressive establishment and growth of such a skilled workforce along with sustaining the facilities and associated workforce by arranging continuous build activity.
 

Underway

Active Member
Also, whenever one talks about establishing a new yard, one really needs to keep in mind this question, "can and will Australia place a regular flow of naval construction orders which is necessary to sustain a yard and workforce as a going concern?" If we were to add in two additional Australian yards, one for MFU and/or large vessel construction and then a third for minor warfare and/or smaller logistics and support vessels, would that actually be sustainable, or would that just exacerbate Australia's historical trend of boom-bust naval construction?
So my question is "Does it matter if they have significant future orders?".

If Australia needs to build more ships faster, than today is more important than tomorrow. Future considerations are secondary to getting hulls in the water and people sailing those hulls. BAE is the strategic shipyard that needs to be protected for the future shipbuilding expertise, there is no doubt about that. But these other yards may not need to have a future, or at least one as full as what current needs point too. The expectation that the current build drumbeat will need to be sustained permanently is a false one.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
Please help me understand how using existing top weight margin for VLS rather than shipping containers changes that in any way?
The flexible space contains the equipment for conducting the undersea warfare (in independent operations not necessarily as part of a task force) that an extra 32 VLS cells are less relevant for. You are addressing a real problem but the solution the surface fleet analysis went for was to place the expanded magazine (for long range strike) on an auxiliary (LOCSV) rather than to place the flexible space on an auxiliary vessel. That hypothetical auxiliary would need the same speed, range and noise reduction as the Hunter as the anticipated adversary will be a minelaying submarine armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes (or a school of UUVs in the 2040s).
 

SammyC

Well-Known Member
I very much doubt the Henderson precinct can build 40-51 vessels in less than 2 decades.

-18 LCM
-8 LCH
-8 GPF
-6 LOSV
-11 Capes + what comes after (2030-2044)
-No larger ships planned.

LCM and LCH allow the skills and workforce to be built up before building MFUs, got no problem with that…
Still, going forward a third yard would be much better for the smaller vessels as Henderson transitions from small to large builds and hopefully in the future extra large ships, 15,000 + tons.

$200 million doesn’t seem like alot for the entire Williamstown yard.
I suspect establishing a third yard only compounds the skills problem. I've said before that Henderson will need resourcing from both the GPF builder and in my view Osborne to be successful and to shorten the learning curve. A third yard would require similar and stretch those limited skills for training/development even further.

A third yard could be considered after the second yard is established, with people then freed up from both Osborne and Henderson to support the third. But here you are talking about late 2030s, early 2040 at the earliest.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
So my question is "Does it matter if they have significant future orders?".

If Australia needs to build more ships faster, than today is more important than tomorrow. Future considerations are secondary to getting hulls in the water and people sailing those hulls. BAE is the strategic shipyard that needs to be protected for the future shipbuilding expertise, there is no doubt about that. But these other yards may not need to have a future, or at least one as full as what current needs point too. The expectation that the current build drumbeat will need to be sustained permanently is a false one.
Also the future orders need not come from the RAN. Australia is building armoured vehicles for Germany. would have been hard to predict that 20 years ago
There is also the possibility that Australia’s strategic circumstances improve and it (and the world) needs fewer warships.
 

SammyC

Well-Known Member
So my question is "Does it matter if they have significant future orders?".

If Australia needs to build more ships faster, than today is more important than tomorrow. Future considerations are secondary to getting hulls in the water and people sailing those hulls. BAE is the strategic shipyard that needs to be protected for the future shipbuilding expertise, there is no doubt about that. But these other yards may not need to have a future, or at least one as full as what current needs point too. The expectation that the current build drumbeat will need to be sustained permanently is a false one.
I haven't seen anything made public, however I assume a review was conducted by the Government to ascertain if the building programs allocated to Henderson could have been consolidated and conducted in Osborne. This would have made the most logical sense, and to your point protected the viability of this strategic shipyard.

I assume the answer to this was "no" for reasons of staffing (physically can't suck another 10,000 people out of Adelaide), facilities (existing facility will be at over capacity to the detriment of the Hunter program), and/or strategic (want future capacity as the world deteriorates).

The cost to set up a new second facility in Henderson will be enormus, and once it employs 10,000 people, almost politically impossible to shut down. I am hoping they thought about this.

In regards to the future drum beat. Everybody will have their view on this. Mine is the world will be a more uncertain place for about the next 50 years (I have no interest beyond this time as I will be well and truly gone). Australia will need to provide its own protection as America will pull back into isolationism. We will be alone in a hostile region with few friends and multiple unstable countries around us. On that basis the drum beat would likely increase, not decrease.

I can see it is likely that future Governments will commit to more ships and push the two yards harder. Same with army and air force gear.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
So my question is "Does it matter if they have significant future orders?".

If Australia needs to build more ships faster, than today is more important than tomorrow. Future considerations are secondary to getting hulls in the water and people sailing those hulls. BAE is the strategic shipyard that needs to be protected for the future shipbuilding expertise, there is no doubt about that. But these other yards may not need to have a future, or at least one as full as what current needs point too. The expectation that the current build drumbeat will need to be sustained permanently is a false one.
IMO the above is not quite accurate wrt Australia's current naval construction dilemmas. Right now, Australia only has a single yard operational which has experience in warship construction and it is currently working on the Hunter-class FFG's.

SEA 3000 functionally appears to be intended as a crash replacement programme for the decommissioning ANZAC-class FFH's as well as the establishment of a new naval ship construction centre.

A order for three or more GP frigates built in overseas yards by a yet to be named company of a yet to be decided (or at least announced) class and fitout might be able to cover some of the projected gap between when current FFH's need to be decommissioned and replacement FFG's are ready to be brought into service. The timeframe for this to happen though was tight to begin with and grows tighter as time progresses without announcements being made and especially contracts signed.

In addition to however many GP frigates actually get built for SEA 3000 in overseas yards, a new Australian facility is supposed to be getting established in WA which will then produce the built of the GP frigates for SEA 3000. Right now, it appears that WA GP frigate production is planned to start ahead of lead ship delivery for the Hunter-class FFG and that there is an expectation that there will be a significant amount of concurrent production and delivery for both SEA 3000 and SEA 5000. IIRC SEA 5000 was originally (when it was still planned for nine hulls) was going to run into the mid/late 2040's with the lead ship getting completed in 2029 and finishing trials ahead of entry into RAN service c. 2031/32. Lead ship delivery has now been pushed back to 2034, ten years after construction on it started, and the overall order book was reduced from nine to six.

Now I forget what all the expectations are about the Australian build run for the SEA 3000 GP frigate, but the impression I have is that some expect lead (Australian) vessel production could start as soon as ~2029 with delivery around or perhaps a year or so after the delivery of the lead Hunter-class frigate, with future deliveries then running towards the end of the 2040's if there actually are eight Australian-built GP frigates ordered.

This gets into the heart of one of the major problems I have with what current plans appear to be. This major problem as I see it is that, absent a major conflict breaking out which could smash any plans to bits, then there will be two Australian yards looking for work in the mid/late 2040's at a time when the only new construction programmes under way might be the replacement project for the Hobart-class DDG's and the whatever RAN sub programme is running. Potentially making things worse, as well as increasing competition between the yards, is that at this point in time the oldest active frigates in RAN service should only be about halfway through their expected service lives and therefore not up for replacement.

One of the other major issues, the 'today' issue if one will, is that there really is no way for Australian yards to get new/more/replacement vessels into Australian service before the early 2030's, so if there is a need 'today' or even just within the next few years, none of the plans can address any needs apart from orders placed overseas. Even with the expectation of three imported GP frigates being ordered, this will still take several years to be completed and brought into service assuming no problems occur. If one looks at the current composition and age of the ADF fleet overall, then one is looking at essentially the entire fleet needing replacement over the next 20 years with some elements requiring replacement much sooner than that. Given the number and variety of vessels which should be replaced in that timespan it seems unlikely that Australian yards could meet those needs, even if a second yard was established. In building a second yard, it appears that Australia would need to lean on overseas yards to meet short/near-term production demands, but would then end up with a production overcapacity at a time when the RAN might not need to order anything for a decade or more.

The final issue which currently springs to mind and concerns me is that there seem to be many assumptions about Australia's ability to build a second naval shipyard and then get it operational and delivering quality vessels and how quickly that could be done. If there expectations are overly optimistic, then the current plans (such as they appear to be) could quickly turn to custard and I rather doubt that there would be many viable alternatives by the time issues were recognized. As things stand now, it seems that the plans for Australian-built GP frigates are such that the following need to happen over the next 10-12 years or so;
  1. Build/modify appropriate physical plant to actually engage in warship production
  2. Establish and skill a new workforce in naval warship construction
  3. Cut first steel on the lead Australian-built GP frigate and then have it delivered into RAN service
IMO this sort of timeframe expectation is... optimistic? One needs to remember that first steel was cut on the lead Hunter-class frigate, after test blocks had already been built, was this year with lead ship delivery now not expected for a decade until 2034. Given that ASC already existed as a facility and had an in place workforce, expecting a new facility which does not even exist yet to get established and assemble a workforce to accomplish all of that and get new production both started and initial deliveries in almost the same amount of time is rather suspect IMO.

Time will tell
 

iambuzzard

Well-Known Member
Also the future orders need not come from the RAN. Australia is building armoured vehicles for Germany. would have been hard to predict that 20 years ago
There is also the possibility that Australia’s strategic circumstances improve and it (and the world) needs fewer warships.
Not likely. China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are not going to back down until they get a severe bloody nose. Authoritarian dictatorships are like that. The best military is the one you don't have to use. Show strength and they'll back down, show weakness and they'll walk all over you.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
IMO the above is not quite accurate wrt Australia's current naval construction dilemmas. Right now, Australia only has a single yard operational which has experience in warship construction and it is currently working on the Hunter-class FFG's.

SEA 3000 functionally appears to be intended as a crash replacement programme for the decommissioning ANZAC-class FFH's as well as the establishment of a new naval ship construction centre.

A order for three or more GP frigates built in overseas yards by a yet to be named company of a yet to be decided (or at least announced) class and fitout might be able to cover some of the projected gap between when current FFH's need to be decommissioned and replacement FFG's are ready to be brought into service. The timeframe for this to happen though was tight to begin with and grows tighter as time progresses without announcements being made and especially contracts signed.

In addition to however many GP frigates actually get built for SEA 3000 in overseas yards, a new Australian facility is supposed to be getting established in WA which will then produce the built of the GP frigates for SEA 3000. Right now, it appears that WA GP frigate production is planned to start ahead of lead ship delivery for the Hunter-class FFG and that there is an expectation that there will be a significant amount of concurrent production and delivery for both SEA 3000 and SEA 5000. IIRC SEA 5000 was originally (when it was still planned for nine hulls) was going to run into the mid/late 2040's with the lead ship getting completed in 2029 and finishing trials ahead of entry into RAN service c. 2031/32. Lead ship delivery has now been pushed back to 2034, ten years after construction on it started, and the overall order book was reduced from nine to six.

Now I forget what all the expectations are about the Australian build run for the SEA 3000 GP frigate, but the impression I have is that some expect lead (Australian) vessel production could start as soon as ~2029 with delivery around or perhaps a year or so after the delivery of the lead Hunter-class frigate, with future deliveries then running towards the end of the 2040's if there actually are eight Australian-built GP frigates ordered.

This gets into the heart of one of the major problems I have with what current plans appear to be. This major problem as I see it is that, absent a major conflict breaking out which could smash any plans to bits, then there will be two Australian yards looking for work in the mid/late 2040's at a time when the only new construction programmes under way might be the replacement project for the Hobart-class DDG's and the whatever RAN sub programme is running. Potentially making things worse, as well as increasing competition between the yards, is that at this point in time the oldest active frigates in RAN service should only be about halfway through their expected service lives and therefore not up for replacement.

One of the other major issues, the 'today' issue if one will, is that there really is no way for Australian yards to get new/more/replacement vessels into Australian service before the early 2030's, so if there is a need 'today' or even just within the next few years, none of the plans can address any needs apart from orders placed overseas. Even with the expectation of three imported GP frigates being ordered, this will still take several years to be completed and brought into service assuming no problems occur. If one looks at the current composition and age of the ADF fleet overall, then one is looking at essentially the entire fleet needing replacement over the next 20 years with some elements requiring replacement much sooner than that. Given the number and variety of vessels which should be replaced in that timespan it seems unlikely that Australian yards could meet those needs, even if a second yard was established. In building a second yard, it appears that Australia would need to lean on overseas yards to meet short/near-term production demands, but would then end up with a production overcapacity at a time when the RAN might not need to order anything for a decade or more.

The final issue which currently springs to mind and concerns me is that there seem to be many assumptions about Australia's ability to build a second naval shipyard and then get it operational and delivering quality vessels and how quickly that could be done. If there expectations are overly optimistic, then the current plans (such as they appear to be) could quickly turn to custard and I rather doubt that there would be many viable alternatives by the time issues were recognized. As things stand now, it seems that the plans for Australian-built GP frigates are such that the following need to happen over the next 10-12 years or so;
  1. Build/modify appropriate physical plant to actually engage in warship production
  2. Establish and skill a new workforce in naval warship construction
  3. Cut first steel on the lead Australian-built GP frigate and then have it delivered into RAN service
IMO this sort of timeframe expectation is... optimistic? One needs to remember that first steel was cut on the lead Hunter-class frigate, after test blocks had already been built, was this year with lead ship delivery now not expected for a decade until 2034. Given that ASC already existed as a facility and had an in place workforce, expecting a new facility which does not even exist yet to get established and assemble a workforce to accomplish all of that and get new production both started and initial deliveries in almost the same amount of time is rather suspect IMO.

Time will tell
A recurring issue is Australia's management and political class are technically incompetent.

They do not have STEM, trade or technical backgrounds, they are not researchers, designers or builders, they literally have no idea what is involved in actually making stuff.

However, with their MBAs, project management and contract management diplomas, they think they know it all. Most frighteningly they see themselves as smarter than the actual thinkers and makers.

There is also the maintainer trap, the people who maintain capability by returning to standard. When this is all you know, you fear big changes.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Please help me understand how using existing top weight margin for VLS rather than shipping containers changes that in any way?
The exact proposal from BAE was to switch propulsion systems to provide more power at the cost of extra radiated noise.

There is a big difference in radiated noise between different platforms and propulsion systems.
 
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