Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Not just Canadian submarine acquisitions, CCV, helicopters, fixed wing search and rescue aircraft, and other stuff, either cancelled or acquired at glacial speed.
Both the Canada class submarines and the Victoria class are examples where tendering countries likely lost significant money and opportunity costs in dealing with Canada, and also gained headaches. Two examples perhaps very clearly explain why AUKUS style submarines are probably off the table. I also agree that I think that they are a bridge too far for Canada and Canada is far more likely to get something useful much quicker with conventional submarines. Bearing in mind that the US also has limited submarine build capability, and isn't able to just direct submarines Canada's way. Even accommodating Australia required significant juggling.

The Canadian Surface Combatant program is another that seemed to burn bidders publically.

Further, the idea of Canada being a reliable ally in a conflict in Asia is also perhaps having other speed bumps like the Philippines helicopter deal.
Why did it take so long for Canada to kill the Philippines helicopter sale? . indicating perhaps not a strong stomach for international arms dealing and supply.

While Canada isn't alone, many other countries that have similar issues are at least not burning bridges publically and as badly as Canada.

I don't think anything is a deal breaker, but Canada seems to be approaching this like this a buyers market, and companies will do anything, absolutely anything to court Canada. I'm not sure that is the case. The Japanese may just not be interested. The Koreans may just be too busy, but may be happy to provide a design and some supply chain, capability if it allows second sourcing for them. Canada would be an excellent allied nation for both Japan and Korea, if they had significant submarine capability on the Pacific coast.

Canada should certainly seek out near immediate overseas build of say 2 hulls, ASAP. This would assist in filling issues that are going to arise with the Victoria class.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
It would make little sense for South Korea to buy a shipyard in Canada, it makes absolutely zero sense for South Korea to buy a shipyard in Canada and then try to build Canada's submarines domestically. Seaspan, Irving and Davie will not be allowed to be bought out by a foreign actor given their importance to Canada and any other shipyard is not remotely equipped to tackle the issue of submarine construction within the next few decades. If South Korea isn't willing to build Canada's submarines in their own yards, they won't get the contract.
I think SeaSpan has foreign control already, Atlas Corp.
 
Podcast from CDA Institute. In particular the Part 3 AUKUS and whether its important to Canada, and where they talk about nuclear submarines being a terrible idea. Timelines, crewing, cost, lost opportunity cost (what else could you spend that money on that would provide important capabilities). Lots of good stuff in the other two as well.
Thanks for the intro. I enjoyed listening to it. In reading between the lines, I thought they are saying that an SSN is completely unrealistic based upon the historic and current political climate, cost and timeframes.

That makes perfect sense on why it can't happen, but the argument is thinner on why it shouldn't happen.

Canada is a capable nation fringed by the major expanses of the Artic, the Pacific and the Atlantic. You'd think they should be a strong maritime nation, but it seems living in the shadow of the US is both a blessing and a curse.

Realistically Canada territorial integrity and security is assured given its proximity to the US. From an Australian pov we have no such security (and an inherent insecurity over that), and over time we've had to get on the front foot in our region. New Zealand is another country dominated by a bigger twin and the parallels in political disconnect and low defense spending are apparent.

The thing is, Canada should have SSN's. They have vast interests in both the European and Pacific realms, so should have a strong capable reach. Surely they should have an SSN on station in both the Pacific and Atlantic at any one time. Whether in the Norwegian Sea or off Hainan, shouldn't they be there, watching, preparing, contributing and effectively dettering? A conventional sub with a range of 3000nm means how long on station, assuming they can make it there at all? Is the RCN now a force focused on maratime approaches within close proximity of Canada alone? How does 3000nm at all cut it? The A26, Type 212 or even the ROK or JMSDF boats are all fit for purpose but not limited by range given they are deploying in the Baltic, or say the Sea of Japan, but how does anything but an SSN truely fit Canada's massive AOR?

Now that's not reality, largely as Govt's got complacent over the peace dividend and security that the US provided. But why is it fair for there taxpayers to bear that burden unfairly?

In AU we have to stand up for who we are, where we are and bear that burden in a destabilising strategic environment. We have to wear that cost. Whilst I hear the arguments on the podcast of 3 very experienced flag officers telling me why SSN's can't happen given existing limitations, I didn't quite hear any reasonable explanation for why Canada can't or shouldn't bear the effort or expense in doing so.

Not to say SSN's are everything, but they do scare the heck out of our adversaries and act as an effective deterrent to naked aggression. We all should bear the cost of collective security, not just because we are on the chopping board, but because we're safer sticking together, looking after your mates (and a rules based order that we all proper from) as well as being the right thing to do.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
@downunderblue …agree the case for not having SSNs is indeed weak given our geography and Canada’s GDP does allow acquisition with some program rearrangements and cancellations, especially the latter. The one valid obstacle is
delivery. A smaller SSK buy combined with a subsequent SSN buy would seem a better path forward assuming the other three AUKUS partners were willing, a big assumption.
 

CorvetteCrunch

New Member
Thanks for the intro. I enjoyed listening to it. In reading between the lines, I thought they are saying that an SSN is completely unrealistic based upon the historic and current political climate, cost and timeframes.

That makes perfect sense on why it can't happen, but the argument is thinner on why it shouldn't happen.

Canada is a capable nation fringed by the major expanses of the Artic, the Pacific and the Atlantic. You'd think they should be a strong maritime nation, but it seems living in the shadow of the US is both a blessing and a curse.

Realistically Canada territorial integrity and security is assured given its proximity to the US. From an Australian pov we have no such security (and an inherent insecurity over that), and over time we've had to get on the front foot in our region. New Zealand is another country dominated by a bigger twin and the parallels in political disconnect and low defense spending are apparent.

The thing is, Canada should have SSN's. They have vast interests in both the European and Pacific realms, so should have a strong capable reach. Surely they should have an SSN on station in both the Pacific and Atlantic at any one time. Whether in the Norwegian Sea or off Hainan, shouldn't they be there, watching, preparing, contributing and effectively dettering? A conventional sub with a range of 3000nm means how long on station, assuming they can make it there at all? Is the RCN now a force focused on maratime approaches within close proximity of Canada alone? How does 3000nm at all cut it? The A26, Type 212 or even the ROK or JMSDF boats are all fit for purpose but not limited by range given they are deploying in the Baltic, or say the Sea of Japan, but how does anything but an SSN truely fit Canada's massive AOR?

Now that's not reality, largely as Govt's got complacent over the peace dividend and security that the US provided. But why is it fair for there taxpayers to bear that burden unfairly?

In AU we have to stand up for who we are, where we are and bear that burden in a destabilising strategic environment. We have to wear that cost. Whilst I hear the arguments on the podcast of 3 very experienced flag officers telling me why SSN's can't happen given existing limitations, I didn't quite hear any reasonable explanation for why Canada can't or shouldn't bear the effort or expense in doing so.

Not to say SSN's are everything, but they do scare the heck out of our adversaries and act as an effective deterrent to naked aggression. We all should bear the cost of collective security, not just because we are on the chopping board, but because we're safer sticking together, looking after your mates (and a rules based order that we all proper from) as well as being the right thing to do.
Unlike Australia, Canada sits under the direct protection of the United States. Figures in each country will occasionally rattle off about one or another however when the chips are down, Canada and the US are each others largest allies and will act collectively to protect both of their sovereign territory even outside of the NATO perspective. Canada previously had a version of this relationship with Britain, although to a much lesser degree due to the distances involved. When you take this into consideration alongside the general disdain for defence spending that has been present for the entirety of Canadian history, it is not hard to see why the utterly eyewatering financial, personnel, infrastructure and political requirements of even a small SSN program have been entirely unpalatable for Canada.

The RCN did studies in the late 1950's regarding submarines and recommended 5 Skipjack class SSN's be procured in the 1960-1961 Naval estimates however, this was scrapped when the US pulled their support after Canada spent too much time waffling over the high costs. The Canada class SSN's of the late Cold War were also scrapped due to poorly done cost estimates and major blowouts to the budgets. Purchasing and having the boats built is one thing but people always forget the very demanding infrastructure and personnel requirements of SSN's as well.

I also wouldn't oversell out interests and commitments abroad, we certainly have them but they are nowhere close to important enough to demand procurements be built around them.

Canada will never have SSN's in all likelihood regardless of how beneficial of a capability they might be. We could bear the cost and effort to have a SSN program however, it would fundamentally require a total overhaul of not only the Royal Canadian Navy's fleet, procurement and doctrine but a larger overhaul of the entire Canadian Armed Forces regarding procurement, funding and doctrine. Funding fundamentally does not exist to properly equip the entire force to their current baselines, let alone what kind of developments you put forward.

I honestly do not see the endeavor as being practical nor worthwhile at this point.
 
@downunderblue …agree the case for not having SSNs is indeed weak given our geography and Canada’s GDP does allow acquisition with some program rearrangements and cancellations, especially the latter. The one valid obstacle is
delivery. A smaller SSK buy combined with a subsequent SSN buy would seem a better path forward assuming the other three AUKUS partners were willing, a big assumption.
Hey John. The CDA Institute podcast mentioned that (worth listening to if you haven't yet), with key emphasis on needing a capability asap (to overcome prior political delay and serviceability issues with the orphaned Upholder class- limited spare parts etc), and issues over crewing any future solution off a depleted base.

Clearly the quickest solution would be conventional OTS, likely in a ROK or (less likely) Japanese shipyard. I'm no expert and would defer to others but finding excess foreign construction capacity isn't easy or timely, esp when comparing subs vs surface combatants.

Anything is better than nothing though, SSN or conventional .

I fear though, OTS should strictly mean OTS. I say that because once HQ start making changes then program risk, cost and delay just expands rapidly. leaving you again with capability gaps and lots of negative headlines. Program risk/ potential delay is important here, so its just best to take when you can get and make do, especially in this destabilised strategic environment we now face.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Hey John. The CDA Institute podcast mentioned that (worth listening to if you haven't yet), with key emphasis on needing a capability asap (to overcome prior political delay and serviceability issues with the orphaned Upholder class- limited spare parts etc), and issues over crewing any future solution off a depleted base.

Clearly the quickest solution would be conventional OTS, likely in a ROK or (less likely) Japanese shipyard. I'm no expert and would defer to others but finding excess foreign construction capacity isn't easy or timely, esp when comparing subs vs surface combatants.

Anything is better than nothing though, SSN or conventional .

I fear though, OTS should strictly mean OTS. I say that because once HQ start making changes then program risk, cost and delay just expands rapidly. leaving you again with capability gaps and lots of negative headlines. Program risk/ potential delay is important here, so its just best to take when you can get and make do, especially in this destabilised strategic environment we now face.
Yes, a strictly OTS SSK would be the quickest solution. Unfortunately our idiot in charge along with the previous spineless minions before him
have delayed this requirement for so long there is likely little chance either Asian supplier can deliver anything soon due to their own requirements and with other clients pending and already committed, why waste time with Canada given our dismal acquisition record?
 
Last edited:

Sender

Active Member
Thanks for the intro. I enjoyed listening to it. In reading between the lines, I thought they are saying that an SSN is completely unrealistic based upon the historic and current political climate, cost and timeframes.

That makes perfect sense on why it can't happen, but the argument is thinner on why it shouldn't happen.

Canada is a capable nation fringed by the major expanses of the Artic, the Pacific and the Atlantic. You'd think they should be a strong maritime nation, but it seems living in the shadow of the US is both a blessing and a curse.

Realistically Canada territorial integrity and security is assured given its proximity to the US. From an Australian pov we have no such security (and an inherent insecurity over that), and over time we've had to get on the front foot in our region. New Zealand is another country dominated by a bigger twin and the parallels in political disconnect and low defense spending are apparent.

The thing is, Canada should have SSN's. They have vast interests in both the European and Pacific realms, so should have a strong capable reach. Surely they should have an SSN on station in both the Pacific and Atlantic at any one time. Whether in the Norwegian Sea or off Hainan, shouldn't they be there, watching, preparing, contributing and effectively dettering? A conventional sub with a range of 3000nm means how long on station, assuming they can make it there at all? Is the RCN now a force focused on maratime approaches within close proximity of Canada alone? How does 3000nm at all cut it? The A26, Type 212 or even the ROK or JMSDF boats are all fit for purpose but not limited by range given they are deploying in the Baltic, or say the Sea of Japan, but how does anything but an SSN truely fit Canada's massive AOR?

Now that's not reality, largely as Govt's got complacent over the peace dividend and security that the US provided. But why is it fair for there taxpayers to bear that burden unfairly?

In AU we have to stand up for who we are, where we are and bear that burden in a destabilising strategic environment. We have to wear that cost. Whilst I hear the arguments on the podcast of 3 very experienced flag officers telling me why SSN's can't happen given existing limitations, I didn't quite hear any reasonable explanation for why Canada can't or shouldn't bear the effort or expense in doing so.

Not to say SSN's are everything, but they do scare the heck out of our adversaries and act as an effective deterrent to naked aggression. We all should bear the cost of collective security, not just because we are on the chopping board, but because we're safer sticking together, looking after your mates (and a rules based order that we all proper from) as well as being the right thing to do.
It's important to understand that there is no particular objection within government or the RCN to nuclear subs - they come up all the time as the best option for Canada. However, after some pretty extensive market surveys, including discussions with the French, British, and American governments, the project team came to the conclusion that there was no spare industrial capacity until at least 2050 to build anything for Canada, and so recommended pursuit of an SSK option. (I'm not entirely convinced Australia will get anything much before then either, but hopefully I am wrong (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/09/navy-nuclear-submarines-shortage/). In any case, nuclear submarines remain an aspirational goal for the RCN, some time after 2050, but in the interim, SSKs are the only real option. A fleet of SSKs allows Canada to remain in the submarine business, and when it comes time to replace those, perhaps we will be able to buy nucs from Australia, who, if all goes according to plan, will have a hot production line going.
 

Meriv90

Active Member
May I ask if Canada and Australia ever thought of pursuing a common defence procurement? Needs and timing are pretty similar, similar economies and with the major problem of lacking critical mass.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
SSKs are the only possible choice for a reasonable delivery time but even then delivery is questionable, especially if we select the seemingly best capability availability option, IMO, SKorea.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
May I ask if Canada and Australia ever thought of pursuing a common defence procurement? Needs and timing are pretty similar, similar economies and with the major problem of lacking critical mass.
Given our track record during the last thirty plus years, a common procurement arrangement would have proved very disappointing to Australia. Also our defence requirements are somewhat different due NORAD and NATO obligations. Still, if Canada ever gets serious, potentially there could be some common acquisitions.
 

CorvetteCrunch

New Member
May I ask if Canada and Australia ever thought of pursuing a common defence procurement? Needs and timing are pretty similar, similar economies and with the major problem of lacking critical mass.
Given the nonsense that European joint procurement programs usually see alongside the geographic/strategic differences between Canada and Australia, I would see minimal benefit to shackling these two nations procurement together. Canada and Australia have different requirements for a variety of roles given what we are going to be using our militaries for, it would be an uphill battle to square the circle regarding this. Trying to mesh timelines, requirements and budgets together to make joint procurements work alongside both nations militantly wanting domestic work seems like a disaster to me. If there is anybody Canada should be looking to partner with for procurement, it should likely be the United States when the situation is applicable, not a nation on the other side of the Pacific.

The two nations have never meaningfully done this in the past and I see no reason to start now.
 

Underway

Member
@downunderblue …agree the case for not having SSNs is indeed weak...
I think as a fellow armchair admiral I'm gonna give the two retired Admirals (including one who is The Guy in submarines) the benifit of the doubt on SSN vs SSK on Canadian requirements and the pros vs cons of both systems.

As for spare capacity (mentioned earlier) Hanwha told Poland that signature to delivery 6 years for their first KSS should they want it.
 
I think as a fellow armchair admiral I'm gonna give the two retired Admirals (including one who is The Guy in submarines) the benifit of the doubt on SSN vs SSK on Canadian requirements and the pros vs cons of both systems.
I feel my point was lost. I'm not challenging the reasoning of the three retired RCN Admirals for the RCN to select a SSK based upon the current constraints facing them.

To make this easier, I have listened to the podcast again and have summarised their commentary from 15:10 to 25:00 where they elaborate, as follows:

  • SSN's will unrealistically stretch existing RCN workforce concerns (existing recruitment challenges, on top of an already small trained skill base) on the basis that SSN's have substantially larger crewing- i.e. 130 to 30;
  • SSN's require additional infrastructure (reactor refuelling) and new specific training requirements (nuke school etc);
  • Capability- conceded that SSN's have advantages- range/time on station advantages- but within their expected AOR (specifically references icecap operations) an SSK can achieve the same capability (doesn't require long under-ice transit as Allies are already that capability);
  • The procurement schedule is already too tight as it, but to "go back" and do another analysis of already aware challenges is the "last thing we need";
  • RCN Commander is quoted as saying "they" don't want an SSN based upon above and that it is a "bridge to far";
  • "We can't get there" [as] Allied SSN construction is already under existing stress. Specifically references US issues, Australia and UK;
  • Infers SSN's require "nation building and long term planning" taking 30 years to build the capacity to "get there" (inferring this is too late for the RCN/CAF);
  • Asks "do we really need to 'get there"? Highlights how RCN can complement their allies (US) specifically with continental defence. Noted that 'their' allies (inferring the USN) like "very capable" complementary SSK's in a force mix;
  • The level of investment required is politically unrealistic (too expensive for a Canadian population to consider)- references a required 3% of GDP spending on defence to sustain SSN's;
  • SSN cost would be exorbitant and bankrupt the CAF;
  • Political concerns- just not practical in an environment where CAF procurement is politicised. References past damaging debates i.e. F-35 where "arbitrary and stupid decisions" were made. Throwing SSN into the mix would be "unhelpful";
  • Suspects RAN are having challenges (procuring their SSN's) and suspect these will get harder as they go forward;
  • Mention of "a lot of other high-end capabilities across the spectrum" of the CAF which could be "far more useful strategically (at lower cost) than pursuing" SSN's;
  • References alleged current AU concerns about "what they have signed up to" with "that train not going anywhere fast for Australia" and that "we are going to be much better off not being on a nuclear submarine train like they are"; and
  • References other elements of AUKUS (inferred as pillar 2) that are important. Mentions "Four Eyes" and infers RCN will be 'ok as long as they continue to exchange information of submarine domains through Four Eyes, then we won’t need to be in Aukus necessarily' (infers Pilar 1/ SSNs).
It was noted that "there are a lot of armchair experts clamouring for us to go down that path ..."

I largely agree with them and the CAF/RCN are definitely in a bind. My question to them though (and others) 'as an armchair expert' and foreigner seeing it from a different perspective is as follows:
  • "Where does the Canada government see itself in the world, and what do they truly value"?
I'd argue that the ambition of Canada/the RCN doesn't match her size, position or responsibility. A lot is referenced regarding the importance of their allied relationships, but is Canadian Government actually a dependable, reliable and capable ally themselves (same can be said for NZ tbh- another topic)? Individually I've found Canadians to be the opposite and incredible people so please see this as a challenge to their political class and decision making alone.

In reviewing above, the Admirals look defeated from years of politicking, underinvestment, and complications/ dependency from a powerful neighbour to the south. They talk about "other high-end capabilities across the spectrum" of the CAF which could be "far more useful strategically", but I question how they could summon any strategic capability to deter a potential enemy when their ability to project hard power is quite limited (and will be for some time ahead).

The 2024 CAF revised their defence policy with the release of "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence".

I note it aims for Canada to be:
  • "STRONG at home, SECURE in North America, ENGAGED in the world … Canada must continue to be a responsible partner that adds value to traditional alliances, including NORAD, NATO, and the Five-Eyes community. Canada must balance these fundamental relationships with the need to engage with emerging powers, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region".
I read "must balance" and pondered. It sounded almost appeasist and the sound of ‘that friend’ who goes always missing when you need them.

Again I question where Canada sees itself in this world, as my answer based upon observations is "not where it should be". You are a relatively prosperous nation geolocated across three major maritime domains, yet your ability to hinder or deter aggression or act decisively across those domains is nearly zero.

I previously worked in an environment where I represented my country and the values we espouse. I’d like to think we ‘did our bit’ and overachieved based upon the more limited resources possessed. You knew where we stood and collectively we were part of a team that stood for something.

Canada should stand for so much more (and I think they want/ can be). Greater leadership, ambition, dependability and presence. Canada has greatly benefited from the rules-based order and the prosperity it has provided since WWII, yet contributes very little to it. If that requires 3+% of GDP, then it is an investment in the collective security that we all embrace and prosper from. If that is hard politically then call your politicians and ask them why. You get the political leaders you elect so make them accountable.

I used to look at that flag and was jealous how unique and uniting it is. On the surface it alludes to a confident/ proud, prosperous and values-based nation. Very unique, but what does it truly stand for? Again, FWIW I was massively jealous considering we have a flag of a foreign nation on ours, but that’s another story.

Whether or not the debate is about an SSN, or another 'strategic capability' capable of deterring aggression, can I ask the Admirals to always contrast their debate around where they should be (in the world, based upon their capability and values), not solely around what they are capable of salvaging. The absence of this counterbalance in the debate is jarring, as in my eyes I will always see you as a nation capable of much, much more.

There is my 2 cents. Next.

PS- What the heck is "Four Eyes" as opposed to FVEY. Did someone kick out NZ without telling me? :)
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Realistically FVEY is now 3EYE. WRT to Canada, our political parties are all losers and the country is on a path towards eventual break-up. I expect a reduced number of River class destroyers and F-35s, maybe 4 SSKs not 8-12, and minimal new kit for the army.

My view on our flag is a big negative. The Pearson rag marks the start of Canada’s political, economic, and military decline IMO.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Assuming Canada does proceed with subs 5 years from now, SKorea may be going nuclear if NKorea is actually building a SSN. Therefore a pathway to transition from SSKs to SSNs may develop albeit a very long timeframe. As Canada and SKorea have a nuclear technology relationship, there may be a opportunity for the Canadian nuclear industry in any future SKorean SSN program.

 

swerve

Super Moderator
...
  • SSN's will unrealistically stretch existing RCN workforce concerns (existing recruitment challenges, on top of an already small trained skill base) on the basis that SSN's have substantially larger crewing- i.e. 130 to 30;...
The Suffren class is reported to have a substantially smaller crew (as few as 63), & the Astute class 98, while the Taigei class is said online to have 70 & Soryu class 65 (but I'm a bit suspicious of that 70. More than its predecessor?). The Victoria class are reported to have 53 crew.
 

shadow99

Member
My view on our flag is a big negative. The Pearson rag marks the start of Canada’s political, economic, and military decline IMO.
I think Diefenbaker cancelling and then destroying the Avro Arrow was the start of our military decline.
Our pollies are bubbleheads living in a bubble world. Where other countries are doing everything they can to increase its military, Canada cuts 1 billion dollars from its budget this year! wtf?

Both Russia and China must be laughing their heads off at Canada's non action to defend itself.

The elephant in the room are our Pollies that have been shown time and time again to be incapable of making sound decisions in defending Canada and worse, to use the military for political gain. This must change.

Maybe the answer is to call out Canada publicly on the world stage where the average Canadian citizen will see how we have become deadbeats in the world as we are not pulling our weight.

One way to change the system is to hit the pollies where it hurts the most, which is money.

How that is done I do not know, but enough is enough, there has to be a change.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
@shadow99 I have mixed feelings about the Arrow program cancellation. No doubt Diefenbaker was an idiot in the way he terminated the project. The program should have evolved with a different jet (multi mission instead of interceptor) due to the ICBMs displacing bombers. At an absolute minimum, the Iroquois engine development should have been continued as it had both military and commercial prospects and would have been highly beneficial to Canadian industry. Therefore you are partially correct, it can be viewed as the start of an our military decline. The reason I believe the Pearson era is the start of the military decline is his government’s ill conceived military unification plan of the early 1960s. Navy guys expecting to walk around in puke green uniforms, great morale booster for serving sailors at the time….not! Anyways I guess we should move on.
 
Top