Middle East Defence & Security

[Big_Zucchini]

Yep, but they have to be in Iran to be of much use. Unfortunately for the world there are too many regimes that don't think that leaving people to live there lives in peace is a good idea.

Iran's diaspora are not disconnected from Iran's population. Their ideology stems from the same factors.
They view Israel as an ally against the regime (enemy of my enemy), and share some of the core ideological principles with Israel like education, westernization, nationalism over tribalism, diplomacy over violence etc etc.


Also Nasrallah is (probably) kil.

 

[koxinga]

Also Nasrallah is (probably) kil.

He dead. Along with Brigadier General Abbas Nilforooshan, and reportedly much of the leadership. With the on-going (air) campaign, much of whatever fancy hardware they acquired before are pretty much going up in smoke. They (Hezbollah) were preparing to fight the last war (2006).

Guess the question now is the response from Iran. They didn't response for Haniyeh, which makes their threats less and less credible. Yet, if they do and the Israelis are openly inviting it, it might well show their top end capabilities are less impressive than suggested.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

He dead. Along with Brigadier General Abbas Nilforooshan, and reportedly much of the leadership. With the on-going (air) campaign, much of whatever fancy hardware they acquired before are pretty much going up in smoke. They (Hezbollah) were preparing to fight the last war (2006).

Guess the question now is the response from Iran. They didn't response for Haniyeh, which makes their threats less and less credible. Yet, if they do and the Israelis are openly inviting it, it might well show their top end capabilities are less impressive than suggested.

My analysis on the current situation:

1. Hezbollah's force structure relies tremendously on a first strike (not the nuclear type). The Radwan Force and a first strike on Israeli AFBs is seen as a significant force multiplier. Failure to execute that properly, nullifies Hezbollah's primary role as a deterrent force for Iran against Israel. It's still capable of fighting an attritional war, but it's a secondary effort at best.
   1. Lebanese demographic considerations make such attritional war a very risky undertaking for Hezbollah.
2. Hezbollah may still pose a threat to Israel so assassinating Nasrallah isn't going to end this. It's definitely possible for Hezbollah to calculate that the best course of action would be to go all in while they can, lest Israel chooses to do it first and then the gains would be even further mitigated.
   1. While Israel hit Hezbollah's fire capabilities, Hezbollah was practically left untouched when it comes to combat capable manpower - the grunts.
   2. Israel may yet commit to a limited ground incursion to dismantle Hezbollah's short range rocket arsenal and to push Hezbollah completely out from souther Lebanon, and replace them with the Lebanese Army. This is where Hezbollah may attempt to hunker down.
   3. A full incursion up to Beirut and Baalbek would provide only a marginally increased gain but at much higher costs, making it a much less worthwhile strategy from a cost efficiency point of view.
3. With Hamas gone, the possibilty of using Iran's proxies in a concerted effort has been nullified. There too they are only capable of an attritional warfare for which they were not built.
   
   
4. Iran is exposed to Israeli airstrikes. The best course of action would be to push for a ceasefire on all fronts and attempt to rebuild. As Hezbollah constituted the majority of Iran's conventional warfare capability with Israel, a shooting war between Iran and Israel would really not make any sense for Iran.
   
   
5. Under Netanyahu, who ruled for 16 years almost consecutively, Israel adopted a reactionary stance. Netanyahu is a dovish and socialist leader. It's thus logical to assume that during his rule, Iran could build up its forces unhindered, and that was true. It was also possible, given experience in Gaza, to assume Israel would not make the first strike on anyone. But they miscalculated. And eventually, for reasons unknown to me, Netanyahu approved the IDF to conduct warfare in a more proactive manner.
   1. With this in mind, Iran must now recalculate its approach.
   2. Iran knows Israel took a serious economical blow, incurring 3 credit rating downgrades in less than 2 years. But by all means it has much more to lose than Israel does. And that even when disregarding the US as a party in this conflict.
6. Much like Hezbollah, Iran is vulnerable. The capabilities Israel demonstrated in Lebanon are also applicable in Iran. Iran's infrastructure and high profile targets are more centralized. Any Iranian miscalculation could lead to the crippling of its strategic assets.
   
   
7. Under Biden's administration, the US disengaged from global conflicts like Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan and others, and as said by Biden himself, replaced with diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy is always doomed to fail if it's taken as a substitute to credible military power, hence the eruption of global conflicts during his term.
   1. One of the symptoms to this is wearing down of soft power and influence, and consequently the level at which allies take American requests into consideration. What was once a veto may now become a serious consideration. And what was once a serious consideration may now become merely a suggestion.
   2. Critical targets like Iran's infrastructure, if one might have considered them a vetoed target last year, are likely deemed somewhat viable targets right now. We saw the strike in the port of Hodeidah as such example. Had the US wanted to do it, they'd conduct the strike themselves, but Israel showed willingness to do it, even if it disrupts regional oil trade.
8. Syria under Assad remains a curious case. It is by all means part of the axis, enabling the operation of other members on its territory, like Hezbollah, IRGC, and other militias, as well as operation of infrastructure for their activities. Most importantly, it functions as a logistical hub. Yet the SAA itself does not take part in any hostile action vs Israel, and it remains as merely an observer of axis activities. Iran would surely want Syria as an integral part of the axis but Assad does not relent. He understands that if he does that, his fate might be that of Nasrallah's. And he's not a Shaheed. He's rightfully scared for his life.
   
   
9. A serious consideration for Iran is the IRGC's survivability. What is known to have largely saved Hamas is the fact they took hostages. Had they failed to take hostages, Hamas would have been finished in about 4-6 months, and Gaza would be deep in the process of the establishment of a new government and restoration of infrastructure.
   1. One potential course of action for Iran is to take hostages. Not in Israel, but abroad. Iran's activities span much of the European continent, and are quite free to act there too. Same applies to North America. Although Israel too acts there via intelligence cooperation with various national agencies, the territory is vast as is the population of Jews. Iran could attempt to kidnap a sizable number of Jews and smuggle them into Iran to safeguard its programs. It would certainly not be an easy task, but everyone must be vigilant to prevent this.
10. Re: Hamas, Israel is stuck in negotiations that have not shown progress in months. A paradigm change must be made to get Hamas to concede, if the goal is the release of at least half the hostages now, and all of them later.
    1. One option is the "Generals' Plan" which asserts that Israel could expand its buffer zone in Gaza (depth of the border), occupy and apply a siege on northern Gaza, north of the Netzarim corridor. This is thought to potentially cause an upheaval among Gazans and apply tremendous pressure on Hamas. If it fails, it can be repeated in other areas.
11. Generally speaking, in terms of the activities of the IDF's ground forces - Israel needs a break. Its economy took a hit, and hundreds of thousands of reservists need to go home to revive the economy. This is likely a major consideration going forward. However, now with only Iran remaining, the ground forces are nearly irrelevant anyway.
    1. There is some chatter about Israel preparing for a ground incursion into Lebanon. Training and preparing for a contingency is the smart and healthy thing to do. It doesn't mean the IDF has any approved plan to go into Lebanon at any certain date. These should not be conflated.

I'm not following American internal politics. I do know Kushner is considered controversial there. But then, what politician isn't? I don't know his ideology but I do find this post to be highly agreeable. In essence, the middle east needs hawkish western leadership. We didn't start the war, but we can sure finish it on good terms that will benefit everyone in the region, and hopefully open many doors to increased cooperation and freedom of movement across the region. Peace can only be achieved when an aggressor faces a determined opposition.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1840181053572690060

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/01/politics/iran-missile-attack-israel/index.html

Not really sure what Iran's plan is here. Maybe they assume their missiles will mostly be shot down and Israel would just complain? Seems like a pretty dangerous game given it's always possible a few will get through and kill people. In that scenario I expect an Israeli counterattack would be inevitable.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/01/politics/iran-missile-attack-israel/index.html

Not really sure what Iran's plan is here. Maybe they assume their missiles will mostly be shot down and Israel would just complain? Seems like a pretty dangerous game given it's always possible a few will get through and kill people. In that scenario I expect an Israeli counterattack would be inevitable.

You expect correctly.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1841185787641270430

In April, Israel retaliated with a very symbolic attack aimed at humiliating the IRGC. It struck with a single inert munition at an Iranian radar in the middle of an S-300 battery, deep in Iran.

This time however, the calculus is different. Not only has Israel taken a more proactive approach to its conflicts, likely driven by its struggling economy, but also its supply of BMD interceptors is dwindling. Several hundreds in about half a year is insane. I'm not sure the production lines can cope with that, nor existing stockpiles. Israel must quickly change the equation, else next time it'd be hundreds of MRBMs landing unhindered in Israel, killing potentially thousands at a time.

It must choose its targets in a way that prevents Iran from conducting such strikes in the near future, and massively slows down its production. Therefore I assume the IDF will strike at dozens of locations around Iran. Due to the urgency, I hope some will also be directed at nuclear assets. This is a casus belli like no other.

 

[John Fedup]

You expect correctly.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1841185787641270430

In April, Israel retaliated with a very symbolic attack aimed at humiliating the IRGC. It struck with a single inert munition at an Iranian radar in the middle of an S-300 battery, deep in Iran.

This time however, the calculus is different. Not only has Israel taken a more proactive approach to its conflicts, likely driven by its struggling economy, but also its supply of BMD interceptors is dwindling. Several hundreds in about half a year is insane. I'm not sure the production lines can cope with that, nor existing stockpiles. Israel must quickly change the equation, else next time it'd be hundreds of MRBMs landing unhindered in Israel, killing potentially thousands at a time.

It must choose its targets in a way that prevents Iran from conducting such strikes in the near future, and massively slows down its production. Therefore I assume the IDF will strike at dozens of locations around Iran. Due to the urgency, I hope some will also be directed at nuclear assets. This is a casus belli like no other.

What about serious hits on their ability to ship oil, where most of the money comes from?

 

[T.C.P]

The number of impact videos I am seeing is not matching the interception reports from Journos. Israel is going to dismantle Iran now...

I remembering discussing on reddit right after Israeli groun operations in gaza, would it have been better for Iran and Hezbollah to go all out on Israel from the beginning??

Now if Irangets their nuclear operations hit, then they really would have been better off going all out fromthe beginning. With Hezbollah this badly degraded and Hamas being almost combat ineffective, Iran does not really have much to offer. They have what like estimated 1000-1500 ballistic missiles that can even reach Israel? they just spent 1/7ths of their entire arsenal tonight.

Per the uploader the Nevatim airbase

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1ftuuwc
The first casualty published from the missile attack is a Palestinian

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1ftxvh1

from this video you can see some interceptions as well

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1ftulqy

 

[John Fedup]

I think many militaries are having concerns about missile inventories, the cost, and the ability to replace quickly. WRT to the latter, not very quick for most so carefully selecting important targets is essential.

 

[T.C.P]

Being completely honest, I did not think Iran had the capability of actually getting this many missiles to hit Israel. We wont really know what damage was caused by those missile until reports come out. But they did not just hit empty runways.

Visible secondaries in this video
https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1ftwuz7
The question is how much capabilties do Hamas and Hezbollah retain? There was also a seperate terrorist attack in Israel today.

 

[Feanor]

Being completely honest, I did not think Iran had the capability of actually getting this many missiles to hit Israel. We wont really know what damage was caused by those missile until reports come out. But they did not just hit empty runways.

Visible secondaries in this video
https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1ftwuz7
The question is how much capabilties do Hamas and Hezbollah retain? There was also a seperate terrorist attack in Israel today.

We won't really know even after reports come out unless someone not friendly with Israel publishes some sort of BDA, like satellite images. Imagine Israel comes out with a "minimal damage done" type of public statement. We certainly won't know if it's true or not, and if somehow Iran did manage to destroy a substantial quantity of Israeli combat jets, one wouldn't necessarily expect them to openly admit the exact extent of the damage. Both sides here have good reasons to be circumspect at best, and openly dishonest at worst, for both OPSEC and political reasons.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

This is what's currently available as far as BDA goes:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1841887127908348244

And this is footage of the strikes from Amman, Jordan:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1841592593592852981

The impacts on the runways and hangar are precise. Runway impacts, of course, are not to be considered real damage. These are easily fixed within less than 24 hours and are only relevant in a persistent strike campaign. The strike on the hangar is curious. Normally it houses strategic aircraft based on G550 like Nachshon and Eitam. However, it is highly likely that a successful hit on such aircraft would result in substantially more visible damage including burn damage.

The IDF had prior knowledge of the attack. A few acquaintances of mine said they were personally warned to vacate certain areas around 10 AM.
The attack started at 19:30. Meaning the IDF knew well in advance where and when it'll be.
Shortly before the attack, OSINT accounts spotted on FlightRadar a large number of aircraft based in Nevatim circling over Israel.
The IDF released a statement saying bases were hit, but that damage occurred only in some buildings, and that aircraft and critical infrastructure weren't impacted, and neither did combat readiness.
The US has also stated that the attack was ineffective.
This is so far in line with available footage.

AFBs are huge. Trying to hit a specific target with an MRBM with no ability to verify its location or do BDA, especially when the enemy knows your intentions - is a futile task.

I won't elaborate on it much, but capabilities Israel has shown against Hezbollah, also exist vs Iran, and certainly while some MRBMs have shown precision, it's not at all trivial that all of them would be precise. Israel's intelligence infiltration in Iran is incredible.
In some of the impact areas, we saw considerable inaccuracy.
Arrow and David's Sling of course are programmed to intercept only what is deemed likely to hit a protected target.
So while it seems like there were fewer interceptions this time than the April attack, it's certainly not a sign of Iranian success.

Edit:
New footage available. We now see that with 32-33 impacts, Iran did not manage to deal any real damage to airframes or critical and expensive infrastructure.
Iran's claim to have destroyed 25 F-35s is obviously wrong.
Regarding F-35s, these are stored in specially designed armored underground hangars of a new generation.
In my last visit to Nevatim I saw that other fighter aircraft are also stored in such, albeit older, armored hangars.
IMO the IAF should invest in similar hangars for its fleet of tankers, ISR, and other large aircraft.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1842007681957077238

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Good news on the hostage situation front. With Lebanon again on a backburner, Israel is taking proactive steps in Gaza toward a hostage deal.
IDF has ordered evacuation of northern Gaza, or Gaza City, and the 162nd armored division is moving in. This is part of the so called "Generals' Plan" to pressure Hamas to concede and sign a deal by getting the Gaza population to pressure Hamas themselves.

The 162nd armored division transferred control over the Philadelphi route to the Gaza territorial division so it could redeploy to northern Gaza.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1842796107702702523

I'm not getting my hopes up just yet. But action is better than inaction. And if it can get us a hostage deal sooner, it's worth the money.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1842801458997010630

Commentator Roni Eitan on Twitter (aka X) added that this move would be worthless if it did not include a siege on the evacuated area. That is, everyone's out, none gets in.

Indeed the "Generals' Plan" does call for the besieging of northern Gaza, with evacuation being just a natural stepping stone for it. Can't cut it off from everything if there are still people inside who need humanitarian supplies.
I, too, hope this is not merely a clearing operation but indeed the IDF following the plan to besiege it. If matters fail, the siege could be reproduced also in Rafah (south) or Khan Younis (center), but if it comes to that then it's likely the general strategy would have to be revised anyway.


I'm not sure if the claim of a legal obstacle is credible.
The Israeli and American ways of conflict resolution are exact opposites of one another. Israel chooses the path of escalation to de-escalate, and the US prefers the path of de-escalation to escalate. The key to understanding this is that Israel has no strategic depth to concede and its homefront is under massive attacks. The US has a lot it can concede.
It seems natural that the US, with such strategy, would choose appeasement of Iran to maintain its oil trade, even if it means Iran becomes fully entrenched as a nuclear power. Small price to pay. For Israel it's a strategic catastrophe if it were to happen.

What I'm about to say has a major caveat and that is no matter what happens, Israel still puts tremendous weight on the US's opinion on things and believes the maintenance of this relationship to be of utmost importance. No ally has been as reliable to Israel as the US, particularly in the context of the Anglo-French competition of who can impose more embargoes on allies per minute.

Since the war began on October 7th, Israel has faced tremendous condemnation from its allies. Countries like UK, France, and Germany have imposed arms embargoes on Israel, and while the US ramped up some of its aid, it has also chosen to withold some of the more critical items Israel requested - particularly munitions necessary to end the war more quickly. This is quite similar to the war in Ukraine, where the collective west has chosen to deny Ukraine the right to use western weapons on Russian territory with the aim of prolonging the war. Instead, if Ukraine wishes to attack deep in Russia, it must use locally developed munitions. The idea behind that is that Ukraine would need quite a long time to establish production of the wide variety of munitions and platforms necessary for this task, and those would depend on foreign aid regardless.
The same applies in Israel's case, except it's not production that's missing, but the economical stability of Israel. Since October 7th, 2023, Israel suffered 2 credit rank downgrades, forcing it to hike taxes.
Still, Israel did not relent, and has prosecuted the war marvelously. It let off the brakes and allowed the IDF to dismantle Hezbollah quickly. The results are spectacular. Not only is it now safer to live in northern Israel, but also the condemnations for strikes in Lebanon are practically non-existent. If any message of condemnation occurs, it's usually about Gaza where the fighting has practically ended months ago.

The simple reason is that Israel acquired significant political capital and soft power by flexing muscles and employing its policies irrespective of foreign pressure. Despite some condemnations, this is something the global community respects. This is not without effect on the US as well. Israel has taken more and more steps contrary to US opinion, as the US approach to conflict resolution has cost it significant soft power. The balance shifted in a way that Israel now has more freedom of movement, and if the US was to object to Israeli actions, the chances of Israel doing it regardless, have grown quite dramatically. This effect further reinforces with every major attack on Israel, be it from Iran's proxies, or Iran itself.

In April, Israel relented and allowed the US to dictate a very limited response - hitting just one radar with the aim of simply humiliating the Ayatollah. But this humiliation had no tangible effect. Iran persisted in its regional strategy, and attacked Israel a second time. Israel may respond more forcefully this time. And if Iran attacks again, then more forcefully yet. But the US must understand that continued pressure on Israel to de-escalate will only yield the opposite effect over time. De-escalation always leads to escalation if it's a unilateral policy.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1842824612515860932

 

[Big_Zucchini]

It's now a whole year since.
This image right here sparked arguably the largest scale war in the middle east since 1967.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1842948735644639290

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Interesting posts in a Lebanese pro-Hezbollah Telegram account with 77k followers. They did a Q&A about the ongoing war and some of the answers there are fascinating.
This is a Twitter (formerly X) post explaining it, but I'll translate just in case something is missed in the automatic translation:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1843180410152402989

Q: Was Hezbollah right to join Hamas?
A: Yes, it was their moral duty.

Q: Did Hezbollah gamble?
A: Yes, a gamble that seemed reasonable given the deterrence (vs Israel) that existed before the war. At some point Hezbollah did not have the ability to climb down the tree, because of the humiliation of abandoning Gaza.

Q: Why did Hezbollah not escalate?
A: Nasrallah didn't want to burden the Lebanese people. When no appropriate response came to the assassinations in Beirut, it was clear Hezbollah wore down its deterrence. The important event was the killing of the children in Majdal Shams that gave Israel a good excuse to escalate.

* OP on Twitter adds: "He returns to this event a lot, and pushes Hezbollah's narrative that it's a false accusation, that Hezbollah was not responsible for the killing, and that it's a good excuse for Israel that change the course of the war".

Q: Did Hezbollah underestimate Israel?
A: Yes. They trusted the rules of the game and did not understand that Israel was about to escalate. Nasrallah always said that Israel just needs to cease fire in Gaza and that it'll all stop.

* OP on Twitter adds: "There is a lot of anger toward Israel that it stopped playing by the rules".

Q: What were the effects on Hezbollah? Why did Hezbollah not take precautions?
A: Hezbollah did not understand Israel was about to escalate. The Israeli strikes stunned Hezbollah, threw it off balance and did not allow it to respond. This is not what Hezbollah had planned. The intelligence penetration was too deep. Israel's strikes were a catastrophe.

Q: What is Hezbollah's status right now?
A: I don't know. Militarily it's too early to say, but we expected more from it. Na'im Qasem's "wiping off sweat" speech was not good and he did not look good. Not at all on the level of Nasrallah's speeches.

Q: Who's responsible for the destruction in Lebanon?
A: Israel. They killed, they destroyed. Make sure everyone understands that.

My notes:

1. It's always important to know the mentality of your enemy. What they're thinking and how they assess the progression of warfare. The people inside could be hurting even if externally the military appears resilient.
   
   
2. Escalation to de-escalation is an effective tool. Israel's previous strategy of containment and de-escalation was central to the Axis' strategy. They banked on Israel responding "proportionately". But when Israel escalated, Hezbollah's entire strategy and force buildup over the last 20 years, have fallen apart.
   
   
3. The Hezbollah rocket attack on Majdal Shams that killed 12 children is seen as a pivotal moment for Hezbollah's population base. It's not so much for Israel though. What was more pivotal IMO was the IDF wrapping up operations in Gaza, finishing training of all combat units for Lebanon, and various covert actions against Hezbollah's strategic border area infrastructure.

To elaborate on point #2:
What we're seeing right now across the west is a strategy of de-escalation to escalation, which is opposite to Israel's. This means that western nations choose to de-escalate fights unilaterally so that they will escalate later. It's always more comfortable to deal with problems later, when it's someone else's problem. This is also an effective election strategy. When their respective ruling parties are no longer at the helm, they can use these escalated wars to bash their opponents and promise a much delayed response.
Evidently, this is not working. Not against Iran, not against Russia, not against China. Things would be generally going pretty well for the Axis had Israel chosen to stay on course. But it didn't, and thankfully it has enough munitions to get a lot of job done before it has to settle down and let its economy rest.

The clock is ticking on Israel though. Its economy cannot hold for too long under such pressure, and so to get back to normal, it must accelerate its operational tempo.

On the more tactical front, it's worth saying the war in Lebanon is looking VERY different from what it was envisioned had Hezbollah been able to execute its strategy.
Israel anticipated a massive Radwan force invasion across northern Israel, in a way that would dwarf October 7th. It also anticipated many thousands of projectiles per day, every day, for a full month or two. It anticipated its energy infrastructure, air force bases, air defense assets - all to be hit hard in Hezbollah's opening strike. Gloomy predictions of 15,000 dead Israelis, overflown hospitals, and days or weeks without electricity.
The IDF also anticipated it would have to rush several divisions through Lebanon. No clearings, just a single blitz toward every potential rocket launch site to dismantle while Hezbollah still had rockets remaining there.
Instead, what we're seeing is VERY different. The ground incursion is very limited, only a few km from the border. Much of the work is done by infantry - searching for weapons caches, tunnel shafts, and any infrastructure and tools used to try infiltrate Israel. Most of the work is done by the air force which currently focuses not on Hezbollah's rocket and missile arsenal but its leadership. And even 200 rockets per day is now considered a large number.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

It appears a siege is now being laid upon the very northern areas of Gaza. The main urban area between the northern border and Netzarim corridor is Gaza City which is not under siege, but is likely going to be the main target of this siege as the IDF advanced in the area again.

In the previous round of fighting, the IDF allowed approximately 300k people to remain in the area. They'll likely be evacuated to the maximum ability.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1845176208587141180

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Sheer number of Hamasniks are dead. This guy puts the current estimate at 21,000 dead combatants. I don't remember the IDF updating the claimed number since April.

At least 58% of Hamas's top leadership is confirmed dead. Remember the IDF does not announce an assassination until it can 100% verify the person is dead.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1847252634501062860

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I refrained from posting this because I couldn't confirm its validity, but now it seems reputable journalists are quoting US officials saying the leaks are real, not linking the text but making direct references to it.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1847038585557352493

 

[kato]

German corvette Ludwigshafen shot down an attacking UAV of unknown origin in Lebanese waters a few days ago. A "defense system" resulted in a "controlled crash" of the drone during which a charge carried onboard exploded. The system used is not publicized, but is rumoured to likely have been a shoulder-fired anti-drone jammer rather than the ship's weapons. Parts of the fixed-wing UAV crashed within the close defense layer of the ship.

The Israeli Embassy initially "thanked Germany for shooting down a Hisb'Allah drone" in a tweet, then deleted that tweet shortly after. In the meantime it had become public that the German ship retrieved parts of the drone for analysis.

The incident occured fairly close to the coast about 30 km northwest of UNIFIL HQ in Nakura, possibly while taking on personnel by boat. The HQ itself has been fired on by the IDF before several times now.

The ship has since been rotated out of position and replaced by a Greek frigate in its surveillance/cover position for the HQ. Besides K130 corvette Ludwigshafen as part of UNIFIL Germany also has F124 AAW frigate Hamburg operating in the area, both based out of Limassol in Cyprus.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

but is rumoured to likely have been a shoulder-fired anti-drone jammer rather than the ship's weapons. Parts of the fixed-wing UAV crashed within the close defense layer of the ship.

If that is true then it should be treated as a major incident. A drone should not be able to get that close to a warship, even if its supposed attack vector doesn't put it in harm's way. It could quickly turn and strike the ship, causing major damage.

 

[kato]

A drone should not be able to get that close to a warship, even if its supposed attack vector doesn't put it in harm's way.

The "close defense layer" on Germany ships is several km distance, i.e. at the point where MLG27 takes over and hoses a target down with FAP shrapnel shots. Rumours-wise the ship was closer to the shore than that distance at the time of attack anyway, so basically anything that would make it past the shoreline would fall into the "close defense layer".