What does Army look like going forward
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Little in the public domain so lots of speculation.
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Must be hush, hush, secret stuff!
Cheers S
The context for Australia is that the threat is very powerful, is its largest trading partner, and is closely connected in economic terms to every country in its region. That is further complicated by the fact that the China’s primary military objective (Taiwan) is tangentially related to Australia (at least from the point of view of the majority of the Australian public) and by some domestic political factors that apply in Australia but less so in (say) the US or Japan. A Japanese minister or a US general can talk openly about preparing for war with China. That language would be career ending in Australia.
Given all that very little of the threat analysis is put to the public domain in clear terms (except from some unhinged sabre rattling in a certain newspaper and the occasional opinion piece in ASPI).
My speculation is that the threat that the Australian Army needs to respond to is the formation of security agreements between China and nations in Australia’s northern approaches. If those security agreements allow prepositioned force protection for the security forces (if you think of the force protection elements that INTERFET brought to East Timor and then add shore based missiles then you get the picture) then that force protection would need to be neutralised in a major conflict.
Currently the threat of unfavourable security agreements has reduced (diplomacy and good luck) but that could all change (e.g., due to US and Australian political events that are out of scope of the thread).
Littoral lift is therefore about getting Army to the northern approaches for operations other than war, for prepositioning in advance of a conflict, and for reconnecting when it is safe to go to sea, rather than for amphibious assault (if it is intended for amphibious assault the ADF has an inadequate force structure to protect it).