Here a little bit more details.
On 4 January 2024, EL coded Rockwell B-1B Lancer 85-0085 crashlanded near the runway of Ellsworth AFB (SD).
This B-1B is definitely totally written off, but the good news is that the crew of four successfully bailed out. The B-1B, part of the 28th Bomb Wing, crashed at approximately 17:50 hrs LT while attempting to land on Ellsworth.
Tigers B-1B bomber crashes at Ellsworth AFB On 4 January 2024, EL coded Rockwell B-1B Lancer 85-0085 crashlanded near the runway of Ellsworth AFB (SD). At this moment, information ...
Some decent updates on the USAF Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.
what stick out to me
Higher end performance over range is trending (looks to be an air to air asset to increase magazine load out for 5/6 gen fighters
may be able to aerial refuel
price trending to be higher (range goal in the 20-30% of full size aircraft)
The last time William "Bill" Pedeaux had flown in the B-52 was when he was on active-duty at now defunct Castle Air Force Base, California...almost three
Another article supporting the continued use of A-10s versus the USAF claims ground forces can be supported with drones and F-35s. I see two options to settle this debate. One, simply offer the A-10s to the army. Option two, see how useful the A-10s are over the Ukrainian battle space. The latter option is problematic from an escalation POV and US pilots would be needed to properly determine performance in a reasonable timeframe.
Another article supporting the continued use of A-10s versus the USAF claims ground forces can be supported with drones and F-35s. I see two options to settle this debate. One, simply offer the A-10s to the army. Option two, see how useful the A-10s are over the Ukrainian battle space. The latter option is problematic from an escalation POV and US pilots would be needed to properly determine performance in a reasonable timeframe.
I like to compare the A-10s to the Stuka Dive Bombers of WW2, over Poland and France with little to no effective enemy fighter opposition, they were very effective but were sitting ducks when used in the early days of the Battle of Britain and very quickly withdrawn.
I like to compare the A-10s to the Stuka Dive Bombers of WW2, over Poland and France with little to no effective enemy fighter opposition, they were very effective but were sitting ducks when used in the early days of the Battle of Britain and very quickly withdrawn.
Sadly, some vested interests won’t be convinced until they can observe A-10s being decimated by modern ant-air defence performing close air support. I guess the opposite is true, soldiers dying because drones and F-35s couldn’t do the job. I think most here are convinced they can and similarly the A-10s won’t survive. I believe this also based on what I have read.
Sadly, some vested interests won’t be convinced until they can observe A-10s being decimated by modern ant-air defence performing close air support. I guess the opposite is true, soldiers dying because drones and F-35s couldn’t do the job. I think most here are convinced they can and similarly the A-10s won’t survive. I believe this also based on what I have read.
Although I was sceptical of the claim that a damaged A-10 could limp back to base missing an “entire wing” I could not fault the author‘s logic that the A-10 had a “titanium bathtub” to protect the pilot, a feature that was “unmatched by any attack drone”.
Well Alexander Mitchell’s problem is this right here. “low-altitude support aircraft” he despite an economics degree hasn't realized that low-altitude support aircraft and Close Air support are not the same definition. It’s the common misconception. That Close means the aircraft is close to the ground forces. Rather than Close as in danger close where the effects are close to the ground forces.
If you restrict yourself to that definition than A10 is great but once you factor in the ability to drop a SDB from high altitude into an enemy latrine via the vent in the roof. Than the A10 is out of the job.
Well Alexander Mitchell’s problem is this right here. “low-altitude support aircraft” he despite an economics degree hasn't realized that low-altitude support aircraft and Close Air support are not the same definition. It’s the common misconception. That Close means the aircraft is close to the ground forces. Rather than Close as in danger close where the effects are close to the ground forces.
If you restrict yourself to that definition than A10 is great but once you factor in the ability to drop a SDB from high altitude into an enemy latrine via the vent in the roof. Than the A10 is out of the job.
More delays for the Air Force One replacement. Costs to Boeing now have reached $2 billion. The KC-46, 737 MAX, and concerns about the 787 must have shareholders concerned. Guessing the 777 NG will be late. Starliner looks good though.
Boeing is currently revising the schedule for the presidential jetliner once again, which is expected to be updated later this summer, according to an Air Force spokesperson.
I like to compare the A-10s to the Stuka Dive Bombers of WW2, over Poland and France with little to no effective enemy fighter opposition, they were very effective but were sitting ducks when used in the early days of the Battle of Britain and very quickly withdrawn.
The A-10 is not capable of dive bombing. The Ju 87 undoubtedly was a sitting duck during the Battle of Britain because its lack of maneuverability, speed, or defensive armament meant that it required a heavy fighter escort to operate effectively in that battle. The Ju 87G was the Ju 87 variant built for tank-busting, and the A-10 is also best compared to the Henschel Hs 129 twin-engine tank buster and llyushin Il-2.
The A-10 is not capable of dive bombing. The Ju 87 undoubtedly was a sitting duck during the Battle of Britain because its lack of maneuverability, speed, or defensive armament meant that it required a heavy fighter escort to operate effectively in that battle. The Ju 87G was the Ju 87 variant built for tank-busting, and the A-10 is also best compared to the Henschel Hs 129 twin-engine tank buster and llyushin Il-2.
My reference was not meant to compare mission profiles to other aircraft but in reference to its ability to penetrate a modern integrated AD system. Which all Attack aircraft, irrespective of how they conduct their missions, must first accomplish. The A-10 like the Stuka lacks manoeuvrability, speed and defensive armament and would be a sitting duck against fighters or modern SAM systems.
I doubt either the HS129 or IL-2 would have lasted any longer than the Stuka did over Britain in 1940. Ground attack aircraft whether dive bombing, level bombing or close to the ground need air superiority to be established first or in the case of the IL-2 (36,000 built) simply overwhelm enemy AD by sheer weight of numbers.
Although the SHEPARD (Series Hybrid Electric Propulsion AiRcraft Demonstration) program for a hybrid-electric stealthy flying wing UAV has been around since the beginning of this decade, the official designation of the SHEPARD as XRQ-73 and Northrop Grumman's work on the SHEPARD is yet another reminder of Northrop Grumman's continued tradition of design and development of reconnaissance/surveillance flying wing UAVs which goes back to a few of its design studies for the SensorCraft program, one of which evolved into the "RQ-180" stealthy strategic reconnaissance flying wing UAV. Like the XRQ-72 Great Horned Owl, the XRQ-73 is a hybrid-electric flying wing, but it is intended to apply stealth properties to a hybrid-electric flying wing UAV, and publicly released CG images of the XRQ-73 indicate that its engine layout is probably similar to that of the "RQ-180".
A B-1B once consigned to the boneyard flies again.
It is probable that B-1B serial number 86-0115 has been restored to operational airworthiness to replace the one B-1B which crashed earlier this year in South Dakota.
An interesting article about the choices for future fighters in an era of tight budgets wrt the USAF. The digital design/short life cycle versus exotic longterm jets like NGAD both have uncertain outcomes and as the article correctly points out, huge companies like LM like big longterm sustainment contracts that guarantee income for 50 years!
I have re-edited this because I keep using the term NGAD. That’s not right. NGAD is the program portfolio. What we have been talking about is Penetrating Counter Air.
An interesting article about the choices for future fighters in an era of tight budgets wrt the USAF. The digital design/short life cycle versus exotic longterm jets like NGAD both have uncertain outcomes and as the article correctly points out, huge companies like LM like big longterm sustainment contracts that guarantee income for 50 years!
It’s not just the Contractors it’s the Congress.
This so called “light fighter” is really a rebrand of the “Digital Century series” proposed by General Roper.
The Idea is basically a procurement spiritual successor to the F104 fighter where the fighter is developed and designed then cycles through a 10 year main line lifecycle (F104 USAF entered service 1958 retired USAF 1969, retired USANG 1975 of course other nations used it until the edge of the 1990s). The current USAF leadership seems to want in on this.
Rapid digital development cycle of a next generation followed by an accelerated production of a base fighter that serves for a decade or so until the next next generation, a Fighter that may share elements of the first next generation fighter like wings and engines but has received a significant amount of new technology.
The problem is will Congress want this? When in 2034 The next USAF generation of general officers and officials (today’s middle rank) march into the Chambers of Congress to ask for their next fighter will the then Congress say yes?
The Minuteman conundrum.
When the USAF introduced the Minuteman ICBM systems they planed a 10 year lifecycle They aimed to have a replacement system ready to deploy roughly a decade after IOC. With the Minuteman I that worked service 1962 retired 1968. However the Minuteman II which entered service in 1965 didn’t leave it until 30 years later and the Minuteman III entered service in 1970 is still in service today and not likely to leave it before 2030. A projected 10 year lifespan became potentially over 60 years because of political considerations. If it weren’t for the fact that the Minuteman III has begun reaching a point where sustainment would cost more than replacement and the rise of coldwar 2.5 we probably would be talking about Minuteman IV upgrades or disarmament of the ground based deterrent all together.
This may seem unrelated but it’s actually common in the DOD. The C130 is crossing 70 years of service this month has outlived its would be successors by a large margin. The Army’s Stryker ICV was meant as an Interim solution until the Army’s Future combat Systems Manned ground combat vehicles family was rolled out. We know how that went.
So if Congress instead of rubber stamping the request sends the Air Force packing what happens next? The whole Raison d'être of the Century series is predicated on adapting and moving ahead of the potential adversary. It’s meant to keep one step ahead. But if it stumbles?
Well we think on that let’s move on to the next issue.
The Light fighter?
The other problem I see for the concept is the “light fighter”. For an unmanned aircraft concept like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft CCA the Digital century series scheme works. Because the aim is for a product that is rapidly developed and low cost with attrition as part of the idea. That last part I have issue with for a manned craft. Attrition of a manned aircraft means attrition of your men.
Yes ejection seats are a thing but not exactly a thing you want to have to use. Ejection is not a safe exercise it’s safer than staying with a fighter turned lawn dart but it’s risky. Particularly if a pilot drops behind the lines and is hurt in the process.
For CCA no problem. Drones don’t have family or children. Digital century however isn’t being associated with CCA it’s being associated with NGAD (PCA). That is a problem.
The aim of CCA is an unmanned wingman aircraft that serves to augment manned aircraft and provide additional missiles and weapons. Said aircraft plays a lower tier than F22 or F35 aircraft it’s meant to serve them. It doesn’t need the same degree of payload or range as it’s meant to be allowed to be destroyed.
A manned CCA or light 6th generation fighter is a role set that just doesn’t seem to fit for the USAF. Perhaps for an export fighter to countries like Taiwan (-50 to my social credit score) to serve as an interceptor.
For the USAF however there is a literal Ocean between the home base and potential operations. The Pacific Ocean to be exact.
To meet that a fighter needs to be big with efficient engines to allow it to cross vast distances. Since it needs to be big it should carry a good sized payload and carry a large radar and sensor suite. It also should have a high altitude to allow long range flight and give its air to air missiles maximum range to guillotine enemy aircraft before they know what is happening.
These don’t lend themselves to a “light fighter”. These characteristics have caused some to think B21 is the secret identity of PCA NGAD
it’s not. .
As the future of near peer and pacing threat conflict planning is going to be centered around penetration into airspace denial zones where the enemy has gathered nodes of surface and air based radar and missiles to try and fortify a wall to keep invaders out… a Great Wall of air and sea. Operating against said foe would make penetrating missions the backbone of offensive operations.
Fortunately F22 set the mold in thinking on this as during the Cold War it became clear that the Soviets viewed air and Sea denial as essential for their military strategy. This meant that the effectiveness of support aircraft like E3 Sentry was limited as they had to remain away from very long range AWACS killer missiles.
To work around this problem F22 was built with one of the most Sophisticated radar systems ever developed and networked with a sophisticated line of sight datalink. This meant a formation of F22 could network across each other forming a pseudo AWACS.
F35 would take this beyond with even more powerful sensors and an even better datalink with future low observable aircraft like B21 taking these so as to expand the network. As the adversary air space denial expanded. These sensors able to passively detect radar emissions in their organic electronic warfare suite, thermal energy via UV and IR distributed camera systems and low observable data distribution allowing creation of a map of the threat airspace.
F35 however was not intended to operate as the prime air to air asset in penetration it was meant to provide a means of destroying surface based nodes of the system and striking at the adversaries front line surface tactical support. Farther it suffers the tyranny of range. Although A and especially C versions have more internal fuel capacity than most fourth generation fighters its still falling short.
B21 isn’t meant to either. It’s to strike at the adversary’s strategic interests and nodes.
It has the legs much of the sensors but being subsonic it lacks the ability to dash too the threat.
CCA is supposed to augment the payload of both potentially also providing escort. Not operating on top as a overwatch sniper.
Conventional fourth generation and upgraded four point five gen air superiority fighters like the F15, F15EX and FA18 fault at this as there radar cross section are exactly what long range sophisticated surface to air missiles and Adversary fifth generation fighters like the J20 and even to a substantially lesser extent SU57 are looking for. The Chinese and Russians are both known to be trying to upgrade their AWACS killers to be effective at killing fighters at stand off ranges.
F22 sustainment is getting harder and with the latest update including external sensors and fuel tanks to try and extend its range it becomes less effective in stealth and more susceptible to interception by J20 and SU57 (again to a substantially lesser degree). So the F22 may be fine for the near to mid term but longer term that gap exists.
We may be able to via other means augment the range of fighters in the future closer to the line of demarcation between safe airspace where allied forces have dominance and denied airspace where the adversary has dominance by combining low observable drop tanks and even low observable air to air refueling but long run we still need more range.
What this means is that trying to digital century PCA, we still end up buying a big high end fighter but we try and cheap out on the sustainment costs by buying another in 10 years as opposed a upgrade at 10 years and then replacement at 30-40 years.
If Congress doesn’t rubber stamp 10 years into Century NGAD the General’s in the USAF then have to ask for a major investment in sustainment funds and a major upgrade program a few years later well cutting back unit numbers to reduce wear and tear on vehicles.
It’s not just the Contractors it’s the Congress.
This so called “light fighter” is really a rebrand of the “Digital Century series” proposed by General Roper.
The Idea is basically a procurement spiritual successor to the F104 fighter where the fighter is developed and designed then cycles through a 10 year main line lifecycle (F104 USAF entered service 1958 retired USAF 1969, retired USANG 1975 of course other nations used it until the edge of the 1990s). The current USAF leadership seems to want in on this.
Rapid digital development cycle of a next generation followed by an accelerated production of a base fighter that serves for a decade or so until the next next generation, a Fighter that may share elements of the first next generation fighter like wings and engines but has received a significant amount of new technology.
The problem is will Congress want this? When in 2034 The next USAF generation of general officers and officials (today’s middle rank) march into the Chambers of Congress to ask for their next fighter will the then Congress say yes?
The Minuteman conundrum.
When the USAF introduced the Minuteman ICBM systems they planed a 10 year lifecycle They aimed to have a replacement system ready to deploy roughly a decade after IOC. With the Minuteman I that worked service 1962 retired 1968. However the Minuteman II which entered service in 1965 didn’t leave it until 30 years later and the Minuteman III entered service in 1970 is still in service today and not likely to leave it before 2030. A projected 10 year lifespan became potentially over 60 years because of political considerations. If it weren’t for the fact that the Minuteman III has begun reaching a point where sustainment would cost more than replacement and the rise of coldwar 2.5 we probably would be talking about Minuteman IV upgrades or disarmament of the ground based deterrent all together.
This may seem unrelated but it’s actually common in the DOD. The C130 is crossing 70 years of service this month has outlived its would be successors by a large margin. The Army’s Stryker ICV was meant as an Interim solution until the Army’s Future combat Systems Manned ground combat vehicles family was rolled out. We know how that went.
So if Congress instead of rubber stamping the request sends the Air Force packing what happens next? The whole Raison d'être of the Century series is predicated on adapting and moving ahead of the potential adversary. It’s meant to keep one step ahead. But if it stumbles?
Well we think on that let’s move on to the next issue.
The Light fighter?
The other problem I see for the concept is the “light fighter”. For an unmanned aircraft concept like the Common Combat Aircraft, Digital Century series scheme works. Because the aim is for a product that is rapidly developed and low cost with attrition as part of the idea. That last part I have issue with for a manned craft. Attrition of a manned aircraft means attrition of your men.
Yes ejection seats are a thing but not exactly a thing you want to have to use. Ejection is not a safe exercise it’s safer than staying with a fighter turned lawn dart but it’s risky. Particularly if a pilot drops behind the lines and is hurt in the process.
For CCA no problem. Drones don’t have family or children. Digital century however isn’t being associated with CCA it’s being associated with NGAD. That is a problem.
The aim of CCA is an unmanned wingman aircraft that serves to augment manned aircraft and provide additional missiles and weapons. Said aircraft plays a lower tier than F22 or F35 aircraft it’s meant to serve them. It doesn’t need the same degree of payload or range as it’s meant to be allowed to be destroyed.
A manned CCA or light 6th generation fighter is a role set that just doesn’t seem to fit for the USAF. Perhaps for an export fighter to countries like Taiwan (-50 to my social credit score) to serve as an interceptor.
For the USAF however there is a literal Ocean between the home base and potential operations. The Pacific Ocean to be exact.
To meet that a fighter needs to be big with efficient engines to allow it to cross vast distances. Since it needs to be big it should carry a good sized payload and carry a large radar and sensor suite. It also should have a high altitude to allow long range flight and give its air to air missiles maximum range to guillotine enemy aircraft before they know what is happening.
These don’t lend themselves to a “light fighter”. These characteristics have caused some to think B21 is the secret identity of NGAD
it’s not. .
As the future of near peer and pacing threat conflict planning is going to be centered around penetration into airspace denial zones where the enemy has gathered nodes of surface and air based radar and missiles to try and fortify a wall to keep invaders out… a Great Wall of air and sea. Operating against said foe would make penetrating missions the backbone of offensive operations.
Fortunately F22 set the mold in thinking on this as during the Cold War it became clear that the Soviets viewed air and Sea denial as essential for their military strategy. This meant that the effectiveness of support aircraft like E3 Sentry was limited as they had to remain away from very long range AWACS killer missiles.
To work around this problem F22 was built with one of the most Sophisticated radar systems ever developed and networked with a sophisticated line of sight datalink. This meant a formation of F22 could network across each other forming a pseudo AWACS.
F35 would take this beyond with even more powerful sensors and an even better datalink with future low observable aircraft like B21 taking these so as to expand the network. As the adversary air space denial expanded. These sensors able to passively detect radar emissions in their organic electronic warfare suite, thermal energy via UV and IR distributed camera systems and low observable data distribution allowing creation of a map of the threat airspace.
F35 however was not intended to operate as the prime air to air asset in penetration it was meant to provide a meant of destroying surface based nodes of the system and striking at the adversaries front line surface tactical support. Farther it suffers the tyranny of range. Although A and especially C versions have more internal fuel capacity than most fourth generation fighters its still falling short.
B21 isn’t meant to either. It’s to strike at the adversary’s strategic interests and nodes.
CCA is supposed to augment the payload of both potentially also providing escort. It has the legs but being subsonic it lacks the ability to dash too the threat.
Conventional fourth generation and upgraded four point five gen air superiority fighters like the F15, F15EX and FA18 fault at this as there radar cross section are exactly what long range sophisticated surface to air missiles and Adversary fifth generation fighters like the J20 and even to a substantially lesser extent SU57 are looking for. The Chinese and Russians are both known to be trying to upgrade their AWACS killers to be effective at killing fighters at stand off ranges.
F22 sustainment is getting harder and with the latest update including external sensors and fuel tanks to try and extend its range it becomes less effective in stealth and more susceptible to interception by J20 and SU57 (again to a substantially lesser degree). So the F22 may be fine for the near to mid term but longer term that gap exists.
We may be able to via other means augment the range of fighters in the future closer to the line of demarcation between safe airspace where allied forces have dominance and denied airspace where the adversary has dominance by combining low observable drop tanks and even low observable air to air refueling but long run we still need more range.
What this means is that trying to digital century NGAD, we still end up buying a big high end fighter but we try and cheap out on the sustainment costs by buying another in 10 years as opposed a upgrade at 10 years and then replacement at 30-40 years.
If Congress doesn’t rubber stamp 10 years into Century NGAD the General’s in the USAF then have to ask for a major investment in sustainment funds and a major upgrade program a few years later well cutting back unit numbers to reduce wear and tear on vehicles.
Agree about Congressional obstacles. Seems like a B-21 derivative that could be made supersonic would be desirable but is likely a bridge too far as a NGAD fighter/bomber. As NGAD progress seems to be limited by budgetary pressures, it is shame there can't be a joint NGAD/GCAP collaboration. I assume FCAS wouldn't be possible but I doubt the former option is plausible either. A Chinese 6 Gen introduction likely see the release of significant funds for NGAD, albeit perhaps too late.
Agree about Congressional obstacles. Seems like a B-21 derivative that could be made supersonic would be desirable but is likely a bridge too far as a NGAD fighter/bomber. As NGAD progress seems to be limited by budgetary pressures, it is shame there can't be a joint NGAD/GCAP collaboration. I assume FCAS wouldn't be possible but I doubt the former option is plausible either. A Chinese 6 Gen introduction likely see the release of significant funds for NGAD, albeit perhaps too late.
Really can’t shoe horn B21 into the right class. It would need to be more than just supersonic but also super cruise.
Although I can see potential for subsystems exchange between the three. The problem is the three have dramatically different missions in mind.
Well most people think they are all doing the same jobs realistically well they overlap they all have different needs to address.
NGAD PCA is high altitude long range. It’s likely to be pulling a super cruise at Mach 1.7 at over 60,000 feet that’s something Raptor is said to be able to do. But we also want it to have its fuel and burn it too. That’s why there was a lot of talk of a variable cycle engine. An engine that can sip fuel line an airliner well crossing the Pacific and fire breathing well supersonic at Mach 2.1.
GCAP is much more oriented to European defense needs so shorter range and much more multirole. GCAP is much more a Eurofighter fifth gen. The only partner who may want some more PCA capabilities in GCAP would be Japan who sits at the heart of the First and second island chains with multiple geopolitical, Historical issues vs China. As such I just don’t see a GCAP exchange happening unless the U.S. basically redesigned it.
FCAS if either of these projects had potential to exchange with the U.S. it would be FCAS but not to the USAF.
The USN.
FCAS is more likely to be closer to F/A-XX because the French Navy wants that Carrier capability vs GCAP. The only other Navy on earth that uses (currently*) cats is the USN. Though it’s highly unlikely that the USN would buy French.
With NGAD a question mark, NGAS is also a question mark as per the article link. Strange there is no mention of a stealthy new air lifter. With limited development funds, a design for a new strategic transport that could be adapted for aerial refuelling seems to me to be a no brainer but I am no expert.
A new advanced airlifter concept from Boeing with stealth features reflects growing demand for more survivable cargo and tanker aircraft.
www.twz.com
I mean a very low observable transport would be a very expensive thing not suited to regular Military airlift missions. Its size would likely be limited maybe at most to the size of a C390 and its stealth materials would have to be maintained. It’s sensitive mission and technology would likely require additional security clearances which would favor SOF.
In terms of mission it only really suits penetration operations again the upkeep costs make this a poor concept to fly MREs on milk runs.
If you have a penetration aircraft like that then it’s probably going to be used in Airstrip seizing. That would come into setting up a FOB or a FARP establishing an air defense system.
The problem is if you’re going to do that it’s a shoe string logistics and you’re going to be foregoing the normal support and supply chain western armies depend upon. So again SOF mission set. Because they would be in Enemy airspace and ground.
As such that is a lot of risk, though I think justifiable. Like the Ghosthawks from Operation Neptune Spear that’s not something that is likely to leave the Black side of the classification system until after the U.S. DOD has deemed it obsolet. Where NGAD comments by the USAF are in regard to aspects of the Portfolio of programs in the Grey. Black development that will progressively move to openness. CCA and PCA even NGAS are going to be open projects eventually. With large orders and even potential export.
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