John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Perhaps restricting a possible new thread strictly to T26 and its RCN/RAN derivatives rather than all modern surface combatants would minimize the this versus that scenario.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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AndyinOz
Member
Slipping beneath the surface again for a moment AFR posted another article that for the moment is not behind a paywall that discusses a bit of a dissenting view as to the "Optimal Pathway' for the acquisition of SSN's by the RAN. I have not read much myself about the 'Submarines for Australia' group including Peter Briggs, Paul Greenfield and Jon Stanford but he TDLR is that they consider the Optimal Pathway to be overly complicated, with too many points or failure where politics and requirements for the RN and USN may see our needs slip to the back of the queue leaving timelines in serious doubt.
www.afr.com
‘A cruel joke’: Why AUKUS might leave Australia stranded
A group of defence experts says that the Albanese government is on course for a financial and strategic AUKUS disaster, in the final part of an exclusive series.
My own discussion with people in Canadian military circles.
I couldn’t get through the paywall but I can imagine what it is suggesting.Slipping beneath the surface again for a moment AFR posted another article that for the moment is not behind a paywall that discusses a bit of a dissenting view as to the "Optimal Pathway' for the acquisition of SSN's by the RAN. I have not read much myself about the 'Submarines for Australia' group including Peter Briggs, Paul Greenfield and Jon Stanford but he TDLR is that they consider the Optimal Pathway to be overly complicated, with too many points or failure where politics and requirements for the RN and USN may see our needs slip to the back of the queue leaving timelines in serious doubt.
‘A cruel joke’: Why AUKUS might leave Australia stranded
A group of defence experts says that the Albanese government is on course for a financial and strategic AUKUS disaster, in the final part of an exclusive series.
The way I see it Australia has several pathways available to it as far as acquiring nuclear submarines.
The optimal path we are currently on involves second hand SSNs from the US followed by one or more Virginia new builds followed by locally manufacturing AUKUS boats.
There are variations of that pathway however.
If the USN refused to provide second hand boats we could still receive new builds from the Virginia production line although this could push introduction of new boats until the late 30s.
If the US also block us from new builds as well then we are still looking at building our own boats which will push deliveries back to around the early forties.
Obviously a lot will then hinge on keeping the Collins class operational as long as possible.
The final option if everything hits the fan has kind of been hinted at with Australia’s planned acquisition of Tier 2 GP frigates. In my opinion if we are willing to buy new frigates with minimal changes directly off the shelf then the precedent has now been set for doing the same thing with submarines.
In the absolute worst case scenario where we will no longer be able to acquire SSNs and the plans to carry out LOTE on our rusty old Collins class has to be abandoned I wouldn’t discount the possibility of us simply having off the shelf, conventional subs built overseas.
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It may not be, depending how far it has been procured.
I find it funny it being blamed on integration. The Canadians integrated camm onto nz anzacs.... and cms330, which is the Canadian combat system...
I suspect the Canadians don't want to reengineer anything.
Some clarity
15% of all Virginias RAN crewed short term while we learn or as a future construct.
Ie these SSNs will be joint crewed going forward
cheers S
I'm thinking there is a long term USN Virginia crewing requirement.
With three Virginia subs we would never have critical mass to train and maintain skills, so would still need to use the American system.
As we then grow and expand the sub corp for additional AUKUS platforms, we would still need to lean on the USN pipeline to develop these extra crews.
So call it through to late 40's before we have any level of self sufficiency. I suspect we will have that kind of number in the USN pipeline for at least 15-20 years.
Just finished reading parts 1 and 2.
The way i read that part was ALL US Navy Virginia class having 15% Australians to get the Sub fleet from 850 to 3000 crew to go into a warzone etc.
I appreciate that this article is about the secrecy of the deal and that alot of peoples noses were out of joint for "Not being consulted" or part of the inner circle of discussions.
The biggest critics of AUKUS were everyone not involved or replaced during planning, such as those involved in this article. Referred multiple times to not involving Dept of Finance or Treasury, why would be bring in the bean counters when we already know it will be expensive. The group involved in this planning was kept so small because, as raised in the article, it could politically fall apart like all Defence procurement. Once you bring in focus groups, "Defence experts", defence journalists (who have never served but discuss defence like they know best) then it becomes another pipe dream.
Yes there are flaws with this AUKUS program, but the efforts to start it were done in small scope to ensure it got the ball rolling.
If Govt had of done all this in the open, with Finance, Treasury, Defence bureaucrats and every opinion piece out there over the next 10yrs discussing its pros and cons...do we honestly think we would be anywhere closer?
The way its being done now is to create the goal and sort through the problems within ASA. We dont know all of it as it will take years to plan, which is better then years to discuss without result.
And Chilean Type 23s.
No not official as far as I'm aware, but it would align with the recent US Burke move where new Aegis gets Mk49 GMLS, older Aegis gets SeaRAM. Furthermore Canada would be the only nation in the world paying extra to pointlessly integrate what is essentially an inferior soft-launched ESSM blk2 which they've already used forever now and requires no such integration cost. At least RAM Blk2 requires no such cost and gives you another tool in the shed so to speak with another guidance method and a direct attack profile (w/ Mk49 GMLS). The only clear top down view I've seen is from far away on the RCN X account. It's difficult to tell, but the aft VLS seems a little larger than what I've seen in past display models. It's undoubtedly a new configuration though, as no others have shoulder Mk87 canisters for NSM arranged this way. Question begs will they go with 24-36 VL RAM with spherical coverage or 2x21 MK49 GMLS direct fire with limited 50/50 arcs.
The selection of CAMM was surprising (at least, to me) because of the overlap in performance with ESSM, but dismissing it as "an inferior soft-launched ESSM blk2" ignores the stated reason for its selection: better close-in performance.
Putting VL RAM in ExLS seems rather silly. It's contrary to the best reasons for switching CAMM to RAM, i.e. greater magazine depth, both in ready to use rounds & the ability to reload at sea. Since each ExLS cell holds the same number of CAMM or RAM, it'd be a downgrade of performance (same numbers of inferior missiles) without the counteravailing advantages. One can see the point of the standard above deck RAM installation instead of CAMM, especially if you're expecting to need to shoot down a lot of low-value, low-performance (but still dangerous) threats, though I can't help feeling that something with even more & cheaper stowed kills might be preferable, such as guns.
And given that CAMM is marketed as easy to integrate, which appears to be accurate, given the variety of systems it's been integrated with, I don't see why the cost of integrating it with AEGIS is prohibitive unless the USA's being wantonly obstructive. LM Canada's already integrated it with CMS 330, with two different radars, & it's been or is being integrated with other radars & CMS's, in both ship & ground-launched versions.
One interesting question is why it's taken three years to get to this point from Canada ordering CAMM. Given some of the other timescales around CAMM, I'd expect it to be a bit too late to save all the cost of integration. Work probably started quite a long time ago. Pakistan's already commissioned the first of class Babur, for which CAMM-ER was ordered very slightly earlier than Canada ordered CAMM.
Putting VL RAM in ExLS seems rather silly. It's contrary to the best reasons for switching CAMM to RAM, i.e. greater magazine depth, both in ready to use rounds & the ability to reload at sea. Since each ExLS cell holds the same number of CAMM or RAM, it'd be a downgrade of performance (same numbers of inferior missiles) without the counteravailing advantages. One can see the point of the standard above deck RAM installation instead of CAMM, especially if you're expecting to need to shoot down a lot of low-value, low-performance (but still dangerous) threats, though I can't help feeling that something with even more & cheaper stowed kills might be preferable, such as guns.
And given that CAMM is marketed as easy to integrate, which appears to be accurate, given the variety of systems it's been integrated with, I don't see why the cost of integrating it with AEGIS is prohibitive unless the USA's being wantonly obstructive. LM Canada's already integrated it with CMS 330, with two different radars, & it's been or is being integrated with other radars & CMS's, in both ship & ground-launched versions.
One interesting question is why it's taken three years to get to this point from Canada ordering CAMM. Given some of the other timescales around CAMM, I'd expect it to be a bit too late to save all the cost of integration. Work probably started quite a long time ago. Pakistan's already commissioned the first of class Babur, for which CAMM-ER was ordered very slightly earlier than Canada ordered CAMM.
Underway
Active Member
AEGIS integration is not CMS 330 integration. AEGIS is the entire above water suite, CMS is the below water suite. Not to mention the US allows one to use their software, not modify or even see how it works. Using AEGIS is surrendering your soveriegnty on combat management control. (I only mention this here as its directly related to how the RAN are running their AEGIS ships as well with 9LV standing in for CMS in this case).
The 9LV in the Hobarts (and presumably the Hunters) will not just manage UWW. It will integrate a number of systems not integrated to Aegis because not used by the USN - as the present Kongsberg developed ATI currently does.
I would suspect that CMS in the Rivers will have to do much the same as the Canadians are procuring a number of items not in USN service. The USN is perfectly happy to provide the necessary interface specs and simulation and stimulation devices to allow this to happen.
I would suspect that CMS in the Rivers will have to do much the same as the Canadians are procuring a number of items not in USN service. The USN is perfectly happy to provide the necessary interface specs and simulation and stimulation devices to allow this to happen.
As far as I understand it, this is not perhaps true as most people understand it.
Spoz is I believe correct.
The Koreans and Japanese for examples have Aegis ships and non-American weapon systems and sensors on those ships. However, it things do not have to be integrated through Aegis.
I believe they are typically integrated through the console which can talk to aegis and essentially have it own combat systems. However, AEGIS is now more or less a set of open standard libraries, not just a sealed up compiled binary, so things are more complicated in that space. Or it can be done through a translation layer. Sometimes the US does this to integrate legacy systems with new systems, as it then doesn't impact the development of the primary code tree. ON a platform like a ship, finding room for a small box that does translation is often not an issue, on a F-22 it can be, so that translation box may need to be on a wholely unique platform.
The Aegis/CMS330 debate has been had. And CMS330 has even been integrated with 9LV..
CMS 330
CMS 330 is a tested, fielded, exported and in-service next generation Combat Management System originally developed for the Royal Canadian Navy.
If you are running pure AEGIS and American style/built aegis consoles, then yes, its all American. But choosing Aegis doesn't have to limit your sovereignty over combat capability, weapons or consoles or even radar. Trying to replicate all the capabilities of Aegis, particularly CEC, in a 3rd party stack would be a fruitless and impossible venture, because you would be having to replicate Aegis by reverse engineering, and Aegis itself moves along with regular software updates.
While CMS330/9LV may look after sonar and torpedo's (MU90 for Australia), it can also integrate things like remote weapon stations, decoys, cameras, EW, guns, missiles, etc. From the console, it can be seamless.
But as with anything, how much integration do you want? Are there issues of latency? How do you support it over time? For underwater weapons latency may not be an issue, same for a camera, but for ballistic missile defence and firing SM-3 intercepting space craft and blending network data from half a dozen different platforms, latency is a very real thing.
I will however, point out I am not an Aegis integrator or developer, and there are perhaps people who do exactly this on this forum that are sitting there. They may or may not comment, but blood vessels may explode if we make overtly simplistic statements.
Underway
Active Member
Concerns about latency are the exact reason the RCN is going with CMS for UWW and AEGIS for AWW. You've also covered the integration challenges/reasoning very well.
Not sure how far I want to push the conversation past relatively simplistic honestly. There is only so far one can go before I start Warthundering myself or making suppositions that are untrue. I'll try to be more specific in the future.
I am just got the worries about how statements are interpreted, by others, and how thing may get interpreted or parroted. There is lots of knowledgeable people in here, but also any one can read and join and get confused. Hence why may statements included lots of flexibility and context about interpretation. I'm not particularly worried about a random internet person, but media people looking for info and printing a headline based around it.
I am very interested how all 3 type 26 ships take integration and combat management and the selection of weapons. As they all seem to be taking different paths. I had though that Canada with CMS330 and Aegis both being lockmart products, perhaps their was going to be a very tight integration perhaps into aegis itself, as there was selection of systems way different from the RAN who went more USN generally but still needed a more complex approach. Where as the UK, does its own very different thing, and I am still waiting to see SM-2 or if SM-6/TLAM gets integrated with them.
Australia has been burnt badly on integration before. Submarine combat systems, even with the 40mm gun on the Arafura OPV.
NZ seems to be an interesting case, as it frigates use 9LV and CMS330? NZ has concerns on occasion on being too reliant on the nearby militaristic hyper power, Australia. But I am sure NZ'ers are even more confused about Canada seemingly ditching CAMM than Canadians are. I bet they are wondering where it leaves them on any future developments and support.
I still have concerns about AUSPAR radar integration onto Hunter particularly as it seemly becoming more of a destroyer than just a frigate and may need to operate and carry high capability weapons like SM-6 and Sm-3 etc.
Is there any concrete information re the 40mm main gun for the Arafura Class in the public domain.
Why that calibre
Why that manufacturer
Why was it cancelled.
Lots of speculation, but is there some solid information
Curious S
Not that I know about. It just all kinda went all quiet, and it isn't exactly clear what is happening to the class etc. I think there is still a lot going on behind the scenes. I imagine when they are FOC, we might get the whole story.
IMO it was just a bit of an odd selection. If we wanted, cheap and fast, 25mm/30mm typhoon. I wonder if we just spec the bigger gun because concerns of a peashooter and being lacking firepower. But the 40mm doesn't really change that, and not that those calls are really valid.
The ADF have a lot of new platforms and complex projects going on. So unless its really key critical capability, it should probably get canned on that alone. The money/people involved in just doing it, isn't worth it, let alone procurement and operation.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Purely a personal view, I have had reservations myself about the AUKUS "optimal pathway" since it was announced in March 2023. From a cost and risk perspective it does not look optimal. It is very complicated, and places huge loads on the future RAN if any step fails, while assuming future governments will continue to fund it heavily. I support the idea of the RAN getting SSNs, but I perceive we are doing it in a slow and risky way.Slipping beneath the surface again for a moment AFR posted another article that for the moment is not behind a paywall that discusses a bit of a dissenting view as to the "Optimal Pathway' for the acquisition of SSN's by the RAN. I have not read much myself about the 'Submarines for Australia' group including Peter Briggs, Paul Greenfield and Jon Stanford but he TDLR is that they consider the Optimal Pathway to be overly complicated, with too many points or failure where politics and requirements for the RN and USN may see our needs slip to the back of the queue leaving timelines in serious doubt.
‘A cruel joke’: Why AUKUS might leave Australia stranded
A group of defence experts says that the Albanese government is on course for a financial and strategic AUKUS disaster, in the final part of an exclusive series.
My first concern is that we are getting both Virginia and SSN AUKUS SSNs, requiring the RAN to maintain two different classes of SSN, built by different supply chains. This is a huge challenge. It means different spare parts, equipment, maintenance procedures, safety protocols, crew training, maintenance staff training, training facilities (e.g. simulators). We should have picked one and stuck to it.
If the main objective was to maintain USN Virginias in Australia, we should have sought to build or buy Virginias. I don't understand why this could not have been done similar to the F35 program, with Australian firms contributing components to US Virginia production, perhaps building modules at ASC for final assembly in the USA, then getting some of the resulting SSNs. Setting out to learn all about Virginias, then switching to building the product of a different industry, seems risky and wasteful to me. Now that we know the USA is continuing with Virginia Block VI construction well into the 2040s, I don't see a reason we could not do the same. The design risk would be eliminated.
My second concern is with the design of SSN AUKUS in UK. In an operational sense, it is not clear to me that the RN and RAN's operational requirements will be the same. I doubt we need an ice -strengthened fin for example. We need something designed to operate optimally in warmer waters. It is much larger and probably more expensive, to accomodate the PWR 3 reactor. I question whether the RAN has internal technical experts that can meaningfully contribute to the design process. Few countries do.
I also question why we need 8 SSNs? That seemed to be part of the original Morrison announcement without any Navy analysis to back it up. UK and France only have 7 and 6 SSNs respectively. There is provision for Australia to first get 3 to 5 Virginias under AUKUS. If the RAN ended up with "just" 6 Virginias, I suspect that would be perfectly adequate, allowing a squadron of 3 on each coast. That force would easily be equivalent in capability to the previously proposed 12 Attack Class SSKs, with far greater range and additional capabilities via VLS tubes.