Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[spoz]

I think @StingrayOZ was probably using “Tokyo” as a generic for Japan. NCB would almost certainly have people in Japan (as their predecessor organisation did in Spain, led for a time by now RADM Tiffen) as they have a remit to oversight all shipbuilding for Defence. The Australian shipbuilder would almost certainly have people there as well.

Again Japanese would very probably have to send people here, too, if for no other reason than we are likely to be unfamiliar with their material and work management system which, given who uses it, will almost certainly be in Japanese

I’m unaware if the Japanese build on a slip or on the level; as the DDG proved, it does make a difference to the lessons to be learned!

The above applies to the Koreans as well, of course, with appropriate geographic changes, and may apply to the Germans. The Spanish Necora NCB (and of course ASC) are familiar with, at least as it was a few years ago.

 

[SammyC]

Thanks Sammy. Unlike a lot of people on this forum I don't have a lot have a lot of knowledge on the technicalities of what is discussed on this group but I have a keen interest in the future direction of our defence forces and what we face in the coming years. As an outsider I try to look at the big picture and try to keep my BS detector on full all the time! Lol.
As I see it the Mogami FFM seems the best option with a 127mm gun and 32 VLS. As long as the language issue is sorted and we have the option to upgrade to CEAFAR2.
Sammy C's explanation is very informative and even without CEAFAR2 initially the FFMs will be very effective additions to the fleet if we choose them.
Whatever we get must have room and power available to expand on the capabilities of the platform.
Look what we did to the Anzacs!
As long as we have decent AAW and ASW capabilities and the ability to upgrade the ships we should be ok.
I personally think we should think beyond the planned 11 hulls and have an ongoing ship building plan in place.
Have a rolling production line of future combatants sorted out now beyond the current plans.
The Hunter AAW destroyer variant or an alternative should be talked about now, not in ten years time.
Look at what the Japanese are doing with their ASEVs and future destroyers.
Plan now as tomorrow may be too late.

Cheers buzz, a good bs detector never goes out of fashion.

My personal view is that the Mogami, either the original or the new are good platforms and would serve us well. It would be my pick of the bunch, technically and strategically, however if we ended up with one of the other three, that would still be OK.

I know the RAN is wedded to things like 9LV, however I actually think we might like the Japanese equivalent, and may actually end up wanting it more. We would adapt regardless, just as we have to earlier systems that have come and gone.

Your point on the evolution of the ANZACs is something that can go unnoticed. It is an incredibly different ship now to what it started out as (and what I served on). And we have been very successful in doing this. It is a credit to the defence organisation. Hunters and GPFs would probably get a refresh around the 10 year mark, just as the Hobarts are doing now.

I think the recent IIP from the government gave a start date to evaluate the options for the Hobart replacement by 2027. So expect it to be kicked off by then. I would be suprised if it wasn't an evolution of the Hunter.

In regards to continuous ship building, we could learn a lot from the Japanese and Koreans. Both picked baseline tier 1 and tier 2 platforms some time ago (Japan: Kongo, Murasame and Mogami for instance), and have continued to evolve them in batches over time. Same general hull and machinery, updated combat and contol systems, improved reliability/functionality/automation. A little bit longer here, a little bit fatter there. They didn't chop and change to entirely different platforms each time and wildly swing the pendulum.

The Americans did this as well with the burke, perhaps the most successful platform of all time, evolved in batches.

This consistency underpins their efficiency and ability to produce, and allows local industry to mature alongside and establish long term investment programs. Australia has set itself up for a similar strategy with the Hunter as the tier 1 and the GPF as the tier 2. Hunters 7-9 will be an evolution, as likely will GPF 7-11. There would be space to further evolve beyond this, as some of the earlier versions of each type reach end of life (consider GPFs 12-14 replacing hulls 1-3 some time around 2050).

I hope that a future government doesn't then go and upend all of this good work (I say my prayers nightly) for some short term desire, or simply because it was somebody elses idea.

If Hunters and GPFs are added to future replacement landing and amphibious craft (LHDs, LCH and LCM), patrol boats, LOCSVs and AORs (and we might get another one or two of these in the distant future), combined with a 20-25 year lifespan (no life extension upgrades) then Australia has sufficient platforms to maintain continuous ship building at two yards at the cadence currently planned for (about 18 months for each new ship at each yard).

Additionally 8 submarines, on a 3-4 year cadence also provides for a third specialised continuous submarine yard.

I see our medium term future as grim, and I would view we are going to rely on the Hunter, GPF, LOCSV and SSN programs more than we currently realise.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I’m unaware if the Japanese build on a slip or on the level; as the DDG proved, it does make a difference to the lessons to be learned!

AFAIK they are on slip. But they have built them at two different yards, which means its not just all secret business at one yard. But yeh, local yard will be a whole thing in it self. But important, both for the Japanese and Australians.

Again Japanese would very probably have to send people here, too, if for no other reason than we are likely to be unfamiliar with their material and work management system which, given who uses it, will almost certainly be in Japanese

I think there will be a lot of inter country support. There is talk about trying to increase sovereignty levels with equipment support. Japan was looking at exporting this, according to media speculation, and may have meant that there has been some effort to use English in documentation. However, anyone familiar with Japanese business practice, it may also be hand written and faxed. If we are intending to build here, then we will need a lot of support for their systems.

I know the RAN is wedded to things like 9LV, however I actually think we might like the Japanese equivalent, and may actually end up wanting it more. We would adapt regardless, just as we have to earlier systems that have come and gone.

The Japanese system is apparently very flexible and modular. I would imagine we may use it, but later on integrate 9LV consoles on the ships like we are doing with the Hobarts. The combat system is just one system on this ship, its probably not even the most advanced and complicated system.

While I agree in general with your post, I'm not sure anyone would be sent to Tokyo to observe warships being built for the RAN. The Mogami-class, for example, is being built mostly in Nagasaki, like the Asahi & Akizuki classes.

I was being generic there. There is a large navy base in near Tokyo, with both Japanese and American fleets. Realistically, Australian people could spend time in various places as part of the program. From Japans point of view, it is a National bid. Not a Mitsubishi bid. its not just about welding steel, its about transfer of technology, skills, understanding their new alliance and client partner. If they were selected. The Japanese want to harden their supply chain out of country, and Australia is the ideal partner for that.

Having Americans looking in on the project would be very valuable to the Japanese, Americans and Australians. The Constellation program has pretty serious issues. The Americans are looking very seriously at a similar crash program like Australia is doing.

Benchmarking naval shipbuilding from Japan is always useful, because they do things differently, but seemingly quite efficiently. I actually think Australia might have people over in Spain, Germany and Korea regardless of who wins. We need to train up people on these kind of projects, and Australia by itself doesn't do enough of them.

But again, talk is cheap. We will have to see what happens. Perhaps no one will be selected. Perhaps the program delayed or cancelled. Perhaps no ships will be built.

 

[76mmGuns]

I just noticed that Canada, like Australia, has announced the name of their Type 26 (River Class for Canada), but not mentioned how many VLS cells it's getting. I find this quite unusual, tbh.

 

[Volkodav]

Ships are systems of systems.

Many, if not most, modern systems are modular and scalable, they can be used for different (but similar) applications on, outwardly, quite different platforms.

This can streamline logistics and training to a surprising degree.

There are huge potential synergies across systems, however, what we tend to do is manage everything at the platform level, not the systems level.

 

[JBRobbo]

I just noticed that Canada, like Australia, has announced the name of their Type 26 (River Class for Canada), but not mentioned how many VLS cells it's getting. I find this quite unusual, tbh.

It's only getting 24 Mk41 cells in the released infographics by the Royal Canadian Navy. Interesting that they've dropped Seaceptor for RAM Blk2 to simplify integration with Aegis. According to the official released images it appears that the 2x3-cell ExLS is retained (RAM quad-pack compatible) although some on the Canadian forums have suggested it will be 2x Mk49 GMLS in the current Phalanx positions instead. The source also suggests that this was a shared viewpoint amongst the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Australian Navy in the face of the Houthi Rebel attacks.

 

[ADMk2]

It's only getting 24 Mk41 cells in the released infographics by the Royal Canadian Navy. Interesting that they've dropped Seaceptor for RAM Blk2 to simplify integration with Aegis. According to the official released images it appears that the 2x3-cell ExLS is retained (RAM quad-pack compatible) although some on the Canadian forums have suggested it will be 2x Mk49 GMLS in the current Phalanx positions instead. The source also suggests that this was a shared viewpoint amongst the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Australian Navy in the face of the Houthi Rebel attacks.

When they all realised that their dinky little peacetime budget equipped ships with next to no warload were all but useless, when a real conflict happened and they actually had to engage real threats?

Shock, horror. Imagine that ever happening?

 

[Going Boeing]

I’m unaware if the Japanese build on a slip or on the level; as the DDG proved, it does make a difference to the lessons to be learned!

These Google Maps screenshots of the MHI Shipbuilding site in Nagasaki and the Mitsui Shipbuilding site appears to show Mogami’s being constructed within Dry Docks.

 

[John Fedup]

It's only getting 24 Mk41 cells in the released infographics by the Royal Canadian Navy. Interesting that they've dropped Seaceptor for RAM Blk2 to simplify integration with Aegis. According to the official released images it appears that the 2x3-cell ExLS is retained (RAM quad-pack compatible) although some on the Canadian forums have suggested it will be 2x Mk49 GMLS in the current Phalanx positions instead. The source also suggests that this was a shared viewpoint amongst the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Australian Navy in the face of the Houthi Rebel attacks.

CAMM has been ordered for the ExLS cells.

 

[devo99]

Everything I've seen suggests CAMM has been completely abandoned and quite possibly ExLS as well with the VLS shown on renders being an outdated holdover.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Everything I've seen suggests CAMM has been completely abandoned and quite possibly ExLS as well with the VLS shown on renders being an outdated holdover.

River-class destroyer - Canada.ca

The River class destroyer will ensure that Canada can continue to monitor and defend its waters and make significant contributions to international naval operations.

www.canada.ca

Its no longer listed. SeaRAM seems to be listed.

 

[Underway]

VLS number discussions are an inprecise stand in for the real discussion, magazine depth. Technically T26 has the most VLS with 72. Because they have 48 individual CAMM VLS combined with 24 Mk 41. Which also means they have the most magazine depth as well of all the T26 derivatives. So why aren't we all screaming to have CAMM added to the RCN and RAN versions if that gives us more VLS?

What if you add two Mk49 RAM launchers. Thats 42 more missiles with a reload capability. Does it matter there aren't more VLS now? The magazine depth for self defence has increased significantly with that addition, but it has nothing to do with VLS.

We all know things like CMS, Radar, matter more. Those make the ship have a fast and effective detect to engage sequence, which increases the virtual depth of their magazines (higher PKill = less wasted shots). The RN version doesn't have as effective sensors or CMS as the RCN and RAN one does. So its magazine depth may be to compensate for a lower expected PKill and its inability to re-engage a target because of the short range of the CAMM.

As far as ships own defence EW is far far more important than magazine depth. Like 49 out of 50 times more important. But that's a conversation that we can't have on a public forum, this isn't Warthunder... lol

 

[swerve]

It's only getting 24 Mk41 cells in the released infographics by the Royal Canadian Navy. Interesting that they've dropped Seaceptor for RAM Blk2 to simplify integration with Aegis. According to the official released images it appears that the 2x3-cell ExLS is retained (RAM quad-pack compatible) although some on the Canadian forums have suggested it will be 2x Mk49 GMLS in the current Phalanx positions instead. The source also suggests that this was a shared viewpoint amongst the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Australian Navy in the face of the Houthi Rebel attacks.

Has that been officially given as the reason?

I've also not seen anything about Canada's CAMM order being cancelled.

 

[swerve]

Everything I've seen suggests CAMM has been completely abandoned and quite possibly ExLS as well with the VLS shown on renders being an outdated holdover.

What have you seen, apart from what's been posted here?

 

[OldTex]

Perhaps these discussions of what the RCN River class may or may not be fitted with, or for, should really be on the RCN thread. The mention of the RCN River class as an example of how the base Type 26 vessel has been selected and modified, is sufficient. It will effectively become a 2nd benchmark for the RAN Hunter class evaluation in the future (like 10 years after they are actually in service). Until then it is just a distraction.

 

[swerve]

There is a large navy base in near Tokyo, with both Japanese and American fleets.

Yokosuka. Been there, but not to the base. Google Earth shows two Mogami-class tied up

 

[Volkodav]

Perhaps these discussions of what the RCN River class may or may not be fitted with, or for, should really be on the RCN thread. The mention of the RCN River class as an example of how the base Type 26 vessel has been selected and modified, is sufficient. It will effectively become a 2nd benchmark for the RAN Hunter class evaluation in the future (like 10 years after they are actually in service). Until then it is just a distraction.

Or a Type 26 thread is created, possibly a modern surface combatant thread?

The risk is it will become a this versus that discussion, however it would be interesting to group a lot of the various modern projects together and look at the different solutions.

 

[SammyC]

Morrison’s ‘longest night’: Inside the making of AUKUS

The above is a somewhat extraordinary article in the AFR. Apologies it is behind a pay wall, however key details below. The author is James Curran.

• It outlines the series of conversations/decisions back in the Morrison era for exactly how the AUKUS deal came about.
• It indicates that the original arrangement was intended to be between Australia and the UK only. The US was involved only because its approval was required
• It provided a way for Australia to get SSNs and for the UK to obtain a funding lifeline to the SSN and SSBN program, that was otherwise financially floundering.
• The US wanted to be included, and used their right of veto to do so.
• The US proposed the Virginia option as a bridge to the AUKUS submarine.
• The US saw this as a way to bind Australia to its China policy for the next several decades.
• The view at the time was that Trump would have been favourable to the deal, but it was finalised under Biden.
• Australians will shortly make up 15% of the total Virginia crew force, with up to three Australian officer on each boat. Australian crew will be fully integrated, not extras.

US objectives were straightforward. Australia could be “locked in”, to quote Kurt Campbell, to America’s China containment policy for the next 40 years. The US would be able to absorb the new SSN-AUKUS submarine to confront China, establish an intermediate maintenance base for its own submarines in Western Australia at Canberra’s expense, and shore up Britain’s submarine enterprise, vital to US operations in the North Atlantic.

If an American president went to war, how, Hellyer and Shoebridge ask, would an Australian prime minister be able to realistically ask for Australian submariners to be removed from a US submarine about to cruise into military conflict?

 

[spoz]

What was Hellyer and Shoebridges’s involvement? They are analysts with individual points of view that may well colour how they interpret events. And what was the source of the information on which the article was based? The AFR has taken editorial positions in the past which may, again, colour its interpretation. It is, after all, primarily a business review.

 

[SammyC]

Concur with the AFR's tendency to colour interpretations.

The article alludes to interviews with people integral to the decisions in the Morison government but does not provide the names (not surprising). It refers to actions from Morison himself, Adm Mead, CDRE Brown, Beazley, Shearer, Chan and Moriarty in reasonable detail, more than has otherwise been available publicly.

The reference to Hellyer and Shoebridge in the article was drawn from some of their other public comments, rather than as direct involvement in decisions.

I will note the article is highly critical of the Morison government regarding decisions made on AUKUS, however I elected not to include this in the above summary as I felt it was potentially biased, and distracted from some of the more useful bits of information.

Interestingly, the article finishes with a tantalising tast of part two due for release next week.