Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) is a term that is critical in defence, and to be honest, industry in general.

It doesn't matter if a ship's crew is 50, 100, 200 or over 300, if you don't have sufficient SQEP to operate it.

A patrol boat does not grow the required SQEP to operate a frigate, an OPV with representative systems, including combat systems, and the required crewing structures does.

A GP frigate, with non representative systems could be either good or bad. The crews, in general, will build SQEP in how to operate the capability, but the maintainers in particular will not be as proficient in the different systems used on the majors.

SQEP in general is problematic as the decentralisation of the training sector in the late 90s and 2000s means it is much harder to determine what supposedly qualified technical people actually know and can do.

There are literally people who did a two or three days course, plus an assignment, who have received a diploma. While others, who may already have a trade, have undertaken several years part time study, 600 hours plus contact time, plus personal study, completing the equivalent of the first year of an engineering degree, while working in the industry, also get a diploma.

How do you determine who has SQEP?

Panels, boards etc. but they often require a minimum qualification of a degree before they will assess someone.

So you get a SNCO with twenty years experience, a trade, a diploma and they can't get SQEP. So they do a business or arts degree and they can??????

The problem is a lack of SQEP specifically, not a lack of people in general.

The other factor is, new shiny things attract recruits and encourage current personnel to stay. Old, hard to maintain gear does the opposite.

 

[Armchair]

I understand that is a problem. However from this viewpoint doesn’t it speak more in favour of the GPF build (whichever option is chosen) than more “majors”? The Anzacs have an RAN listed crew of 177, Hobarts 180 and the Hunters are reportedly 183-208 depending on helicopters. Whereas all the GPF conrenders have crews of 90 to 120 each. So the RAN could crew 3 or 4 GPFs for every 2 Anzacs withdrawn from service, or every two more “majors” (Hobart/Hunter) built or fielded. If crew really is the primary constraint we should be choosing the most automated GPF and building lots, not the cheapest GPF or most capable ”tier one”.

But crew size is not one of the five criteria.
They have limited the competition to exemplars with low crew sizes (due to the constrajnt you refer to). If the design with the lowest crew size wins that will be because it will have beaten the other designs on the criteria they are actually using.

Same goes for capability. They are not looking for the most capable ship - they have deemed all of the contenders to have the required capability.

 

[Redlands18]

But crew size is not one of the five criteria.
They have limited the competition to exemplars with low crew sizes (due to the constrajnt you refer to). If the design with the lowest crew size wins that will be because it will have beaten the other designs on the criteria they are actually using.

Same goes for capability. They are not looking for the most capable ship - they have deemed all of the contenders to have the required capability.

Basically, all the modern Frigate designs being built today have low manning, because that is what the Navies that originally commissioned the design require but most of them don't have the range and endurance requirements Australia has. No one is designing 5000t Frigates that require 200 crew. It goes back to the same old problem; we are not designing our own ships from the keel up that suits our requirements.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

SQEP in general is problematic as the decentralisation of the training sector in the late 90s and 2000s means it is much harder to determine what supposedly qualified technical people actually know and can do.

There are literally people who did a two or three days course, plus an assignment, who have received a diploma. While others, who may already have a trade, have undertaken several years part time study, 600 hours plus contact time, plus personal study, completing the equivalent of the first year of an engineering degree, while working in the industry, also get a diploma.

How do you determine who has SQEP?

Thanks for clarifying re: skills and people shortage. The Navy isn’t alone in this problem. In an era of rapid technological change it can be difficult to define what is a skilled person (SQEP).

That being said, every industry still has to do it. If the Navy has not defined different occupational skill categories and specified levels of skill within them, then frankly that is a damning failure of the navy hierarchy. Skill recognition is a thing. It is tedious and time consuming, but once you do it it becomes obvious which activities must continue simply to maintain a flow of trained people into the system.

To illustrate, I am an engineer with four degrees and 35 years experience. Most of my recent experience is in planning, design and economics, not construction. So I could not just walk onto a building site and say I am qualified. I have to show I have up to date certification in construction. If Navy isn’t regulating and tracking this sort of thing then they need to ASAP.

Ap9logies if I have misunderstood comments, but it sounds like Navy has both a skill shortage problem, and a skill recognition problem.

 

[seaspear]

Ukraine is claiming to have shot down the Russian hypersonic missiles Zircon with the its Patriot system would an SM-6 or other missiles produce a similar result in interception from ships at sea

Ukrainian air defense shoots down Russian Zircon hypersonic missile

During a morning Russian missile attack on Kyiv, Ukrainian air defense successfully intercepted two Zircon hypersonic missiles

mil.in.ua

 

[spoz]

Yes, if positioned appropriately relative to the threat access. In fact, possibly with a higher probability of success. Even ESSM or RAM would able to in the right circumstances.

 

[hauritz]

Smaller crews and in some cases no crew will create their own challenges. I am imagining maintenance will be a problem.

We might need in to bring back the idea of an escort maintenance ship. Does anyone remember HMAS Stalwart?

Nicknamed Building 215 because it never went anywhere but maybe it’s time will come.

 

[koxinga]

Not exactly related to RAN but I don't see anywhere good to put this.

The program seems to be plagued by a combination of poor training/seamanship on the part of the recipients, and also niggling technical issues.

Fiji works to recover patrol boat that ran aground after being gifted by Australia

Australia has sent specialised recovery equipment to Fiji to help with the recovery of RFNS Puamau, with Fijian authorities working to prevent any potential oil spill from the accident.

www.abc.net.au

 

[devo99]

Honestly both the cases of Guardian-class groundings could very well be put down to just outdated charts for the reefs. The boats don't have any form of sonar that I'm aware of so they'd presumably be completely reliant on whatever charts they have.

 

[koxinga]

It is an issue that the Fijians seem to be aware of and they have made a concerted effort to address. (e.g RFNS Volasiga)

https://iho.int/uploads/user/Inter-Regional%20Coordination/RHC/SWPHC/SWPHC18/SWPHC18_07C_2021_Fiji_Hydrographic_Service_Report.pdf

I supposed armchair analysis won't be helpful, since we don't have much details.

But from my own experience, reefs/submerged rocks/wrecks seldom appear overnight, it was one of the first few things I learned (known hazards), as a trainee on a small patrol boat. The charts are there to help, useful nowadays with ECDIS, but visual navigation with an experienced OOW is key.

 

[MickB]

Yep, originally I read it was all Phalanx mounts in USN, but with clarification the recent decision seems to be DDG only…

Rolling Airframe Missiles To Arm Arleigh Burke Destroyer Fleet

New point defenses, which come amid growing missile and drone threats, are just one Navy modernization effort for the Arleigh Burke class.

www.twz.com

In the spirit of "any protection is better than no protection" is this an oppertunity to pick up additional CWIS mounts for the phat ships at a budget price?

 

[InterestedParty]

Honestly both the cases of Guardian-class groundings could very well be put down to just outdated charts for the reefs. The boats don't have any form of sonar that I'm aware of so they'd presumably be completely reliant on whatever charts they have.

Do we have a program of assisting our Pacific friends to improve the quality of their charts. That would seem to be helpful, for them as well as the RAN

 

[icelord]

Do we have a program of assisting our Pacific friends to improve the quality of their charts. That would seem to be helpful, for them as well as the RAN

Increase in using Commercial Hydrographic operators and reduction in RAN assets. While the fleet is reduced without replacement, the ADF is unable to prioritise any Pacific Island survey but utilise what Commercial operations are available

 

[spoz]

I wonder how many civilian droggies are trained each year. Why do I rather think that most of them come from Pusser’s, and that if we cut back because of the availability of commercial operators we will, as with technical sailors in the 90s, be cutting our own throats?

 

[SammyC]

Smaller crews and in some cases no crew will create their own challenges. I am imagining maintenance will be a problem.

We might need in to bring back the idea of an escort maintenance ship. Does anyone remember HMAS Stalwart?

Nicknamed Building 215 because it never went anywhere but maybe it’s time will come.

My memory is a little tired, however I remember we had about 25 marine engineering staff on an ANZAC frigate. Three engineering officers two chiefs, four petty officers and 16 junior sailors. The engine room watchkeeping crew was three per watch, for a total of nine when cruising. Typically we would have 2-3 extra watchkeepers on training as well. So taking out the officers, seniors, watchkeepers and trainees, it left about 5 people for day working. This was the total number of people in a 25 person team who would actually be available for maintenance. Everybody not on watch would pitch in for other ship activities (RAS evolutions and damage control for instance) so you had about 14 people for that kind of stuff (I used to do the refuelling, damage control, technical training, and was very competent at cleaning toilets for instance).

Not suprisingly this allowed for basic regular planned maintenance and some minor breakdown repairs, however the vast majority of work was conducted alongside by contractors. An excessive portion of my time as a young engineer at sea was submitting maintenance requests for contractor assistance at the next port, or for during the next maintenance availability back home. (Side note: The relevant SPO would always write back asking why we too lazy to do it ourselves, resulting in a protracted argument for many months).

If we extrapolate this for a 90 person crew (so half an ANZAC), the marine engineering department needs to be no more than 15 people. That's a breakdown of something like 2 officers, 3 seniors and 10 juniors. So watchkeeping needs to be limited to 1 person per watch for a start (3 total, maybe 5 with trainees). Engine rooms need to be unmanned, and watchkeeping say transferred to a bridge station. From what I have read this is what the Mogami's do. It leaves about 3-4 day workers once you back out the administration, training and watchkeeping obligations. Likewise about 9-10 people would be available for general evolutions. So still some maintenance and general duties capability and not drastically less than an ANZAC.

The end point is that small crews can function, however it requires a significant change in watchkeeping practices and general ship evolutions. Ships will have more reliance on alongside contracted maintenance, but that is already happening.

 

[Bevan]

Just a observation about the Mogami's 90 person crew discussion. Is it a hard maximum the ship can accommodate, or the minimum needed to crew the vessel? I haven't read anywhere that says this is a hard maximum the ship can accommodate, only that the ship can be operated by a crew of 90. Does anyone have a reference or read anywhere to show the total number of crew the ship can accommodate? I'm wondering if its similar to the Arrowhead 140, which can be operated with a crew of 100, but can accommodate more depending on the mission.

 

[SammyC]

My assumption is the 90 crew number quoted for the Mogami (and the corresponding numbers for other platforms) excludes an air wing and trainees. I suspect it also does not factor in specialised mission requirements (such as mine hunting and medical).

So add 20 for a helo attachment and 10 for trainees across all departments, and maybe 5 for special deployments.

Makes for a full war time complement of about 125.

 

[icelord]

My memory is a little tired, however I remember we had about 25 marine engineering staff on an ANZAC frigate. Three engineering officers two chiefs, four petty officers and 16 junior sailors. The engine room watchkeeping crew was three per watch, for a total of nine when cruising. Typically we would have 2-3 extra watchkeepers on training as well. So taking out the officers, seniors, watchkeepers and trainees, it left about 5 people for day working. This was the total number of people in a 25 person team who would actually be available for maintenance. Everybody not on watch would pitch in for other ship activities (RAS evolutions and damage control for instance) so you had about 14 people for that kind of stuff (I used to do the refuelling, damage control, technical training, and was very competent at cleaning toilets for instance).

Not suprisingly this allowed for basic regular planned maintenance and some minor breakdown repairs, however the vast majority of work was conducted alongside by contractors. An excessive portion of my time as a young engineer at sea was submitting maintenance requests for contractor assistance at the next port, or for during the next maintenance availability back home. (Side note: The relevant SPO would always write back asking why we too lazy to do it ourselves, resulting in a protracted argument for many months).

If we extrapolate this for a 90 person crew (so half an ANZAC), the marine engineering department needs to be no more than 15 people. That's a breakdown of something like 2 officers, 3 seniors and 10 juniors. So watchkeeping needs to be limited to 1 person per watch for a start (3 total, maybe 5 with trainees). Engine rooms need to be unmanned, and watchkeeping say transferred to a bridge station. From what I have read this is what the Mogami's do. It leaves about 3-4 day workers once you back out the administration, training and watchkeeping obligations. Likewise about 9-10 people would be available for general evolutions. So still some maintenance and general duties capability and not drastically less than an ANZAC.

The end point is that small crews can function, however it requires a significant change in watchkeeping practices and general ship evolutions. Ships will have more reliance on alongside contracted maintenance, but that is already happening.

Add in Exec Dept itself would be low manning.
Boatswains who run the evolution as well as safety and maintain the equipment would be small, nearly Patrol Boat levels.

Japans advantage for Mogami is they dont deploy overseas to much and are primarily for Defence of the Island with nearby ports for refuel.
South Korea is of the same position.
While they have been used in Gulf of Aden for counter piracy in 2010s, sustained operations would be draining on the small crew for two watches

Having done Operations on Patrol Boats where everyone was involved in boardings, it can be taxing on the body when you finish 10hr boarding and still need to go on watch. That was for 4 weeks with maybe a relief for port visit before return to patrol on 8 week rotation.
Do those Gulf of Aden patrols over 5 months where there is no guarantee of port visit in 6 weeks of sailing, will drain the crew hard.

 

[Volkodav]

My memory is a little tired, however I remember we had about 25 marine engineering staff on an ANZAC frigate. Three engineering officers two chiefs, four petty officers and 16 junior sailors. The engine room watchkeeping crew was three per watch, for a total of nine when cruising. Typically we would have 2-3 extra watchkeepers on training as well. So taking out the officers, seniors, watchkeepers and trainees, it left about 5 people for day working. This was the total number of people in a 25 person team who would actually be available for maintenance. Everybody not on watch would pitch in for other ship activities (RAS evolutions and damage control for instance) so you had about 14 people for that kind of stuff (I used to do the refuelling, damage control, technical training, and was very competent at cleaning toilets for instance).

Not suprisingly this allowed for basic regular planned maintenance and some minor breakdown repairs, however the vast majority of work was conducted alongside by contractors. An excessive portion of my time as a young engineer at sea was submitting maintenance requests for contractor assistance at the next port, or for during the next maintenance availability back home. (Side note: The relevant SPO would always write back asking why we too lazy to do it ourselves, resulting in a protracted argument for many months).

If we extrapolate this for a 90 person crew (so half an ANZAC), the marine engineering department needs to be no more than 15 people. That's a breakdown of something like 2 officers, 3 seniors and 10 juniors. So watchkeeping needs to be limited to 1 person per watch for a start (3 total, maybe 5 with trainees). Engine rooms need to be unmanned, and watchkeeping say transferred to a bridge station. From what I have read this is what the Mogami's do. It leaves about 3-4 day workers once you back out the administration, training and watchkeeping obligations. Likewise about 9-10 people would be available for general evolutions. So still some maintenance and general duties capability and not drastically less than an ANZAC.

The end point is that small crews can function, however it requires a significant change in watchkeeping practices and general ship evolutions. Ships will have more reliance on alongside contracted maintenance, but that is already happening.

There are ways around it, i.e. operator maintainers instead of operators, would take some pressure off. High reliability electrical instead of hydraulic and pneumatic systems that tend to be higher maintenance, less reliable and less robust than modern electrical.

Other options include remote monitoring, automation of processes, design of systems to permit easy access and replacement.

It can be done but drives up acquisition costs.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I think the main advantage of low manning is that for a ship to go to sea, the core crew could be quite light.

Hopefully, the RAN doesn't operate these ships with the bare crew levels, but with an additional 20-30 bodies. Historically the RAN has tended to operate with larger crews than the design size, in some cases this has been problematic finding bunk space. Because of the type of deployments and operations we do.

If a ship has a core crew of 90 and another has a core crew of 110, but both have 120 crew on board when deployed, you would hope the workload of the 90 is potentially a bit more bearable for long endurance missions. Of course that may not be the case, and the problems of just comparing numbers off a spec sheet. Many of these are very modern designs, that share much in concept.

I actually think the crewing requirement are not as wildly different as some marketing material leads us to believe.

Remembering these aren't the only ships in the RAN. Hunter and Hobarts exist. I could see a Tier 2 operating out of say Singapore, perhaps with a crew change flying in. Or perhaps, Japan, again with the crew flying in. Perhaps out of Lombrum.

Not sure if that may be part of the factor. Would young people be attracted to a navy role, flying in flying out of Okinawa?
I don't think these ships would be good choices for wide open ocean patrols, or middle east deployments.