In the late 1990's the Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Parliamentary Select Committee's
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 laid the foundation for the actual disbandment of the "Air Combat Force" (the A-4's and their intended F-16 replacements). The then Labour/Alliance Opposition parties actually (and unusually) had a majority on the Select Committee and in essence drove the outcomes. (Incidentally the report also proposed cutting 2/3 of NZDF's combat capabilities (ACF/Frigates/P-3 Orions) preferring to instead prioritise the Army in order to better support UN Peace Keeping operations).
Now perhaps normally this wouldn't matter ... except when the Labour Party won the 1999 general election a few months later they were in prime position to action the Inquiry/report outcomes.
In essence there was an agenda at play (a long running one but won't get into NZ domestic left-wing politics, but many a commentator has highlighted these issues here in the past). (BTW I voted for Labour during these times, for other reasons other than defence, I simply state this to not appear too partisan).
Some defence analysts raised concerns about the
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 and questioned how they reached their conclusions.
I could easily list a dozen or so quotes from the following Independent Review of the
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 and its Interim Report written by Dr David Dickens (the then Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at VUW) calling out the Inquiry and its logic.
Dr Dicken's review is worth reading for context. It holds true, both then and now. In fact he highlighted back then many issues we are now seeing playing out in contemporary global geo-politics (eg in terms of NZ Govt/NZDF responses and structures etc).
Now for my partisan views. Back then these left-wing politicians (and for balance some on the right) and their so-called
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 group-think and subsequent perspectives and policies are wrong. Wrongly wrong. Wrongly wrong wrong so f'ing wrong!
So embarasingly wrong they just need to get the heck of contemporary debate and need to stop undermining current (and even the previous Govt's) efforts to re-establish connections with like-minded allies and partners and re-build capabilities.
Yes there are many capabilites and new technologies the NZDF will require, across the spectrum, which will need to be prioritised. Clearly personnel and infrastructure are vital and so is "mass" (building upon what we already have experience in operating and sustaining).
But for the pupose of singling out the current debate here on "jets", I still think the views of Dr Dickens still holds true back in 1999 as it does today in terms of NZDF jet training and operational aircraft. So I will quote this part in full:
Air Combat Force
I found the Interim Report’s handling of the issues relating to the air combat force weak. The authors of this section of the Report did not appear to grasp the importance of the air combat force in contemporary land and maritime contexts (the main roles for the New Zealand air combat force). There are good reasons for retaining and modernising the air combat force. The air combat force meets New Zealand’s defence needs. An air combat force is a versatile contribution (for maritime strike, close air support and interdiction roles) that can be dispatched quickly on conventional or peacekeeping operations for maximum effect and minimal risk of casualties. Modern effective air combat force contributions are sought by our allies and friends for both coalition and peacekeeping operations. The No 2 Squadron detachment at Nowra, on the Southern New South Wales coast, is one of the most sought after New Zealand contributions to Closer Defence Relations (CDR) with Australia.
If New Zealand is to provide either ground, air or maritime units for active service overseas they will need to be thoroughly trained in joint operations. Trends in modern peacekeeping and conventional warfare stress the growing fusion of sea‐air and land‐air operating methods. This means that our frigates, Orions, and ground forces need to be thoroughly familiar with fast jet strike before they deploy from New Zealand. This interoperability takes skill, is technically complicated, and must be routinely refreshed in individual and collective training. This trend in seamless jointary is increasing in importance. Joint operations of the future will require even closer inter‐ service teamwork. This is why fast jet strike is so important for New Zealand. The effectiveness of this country’s other units (ANZACs, Orions, battalion groups) are dependent on fast jet strike.
If New Zealand discards its fast jet strike the combat viability of its ANZACs, Orions and ground forces will be significantly degraded. For these units will not be able to train with fast jet strike. If they don’t have the knowledge and skills needed to operate with fast jets then they will be of limited viability in either a peacekeeping or coalition environment.
The Interim Report resorts to a straw men argument to support its general view that there are good grounds to question the future of the air combat force. The Interim Report insinuates that the air combat force is not as useful as the A4s “have never been used in combat” (p 29). This is not the point. Hopefully we will never use our forces in combat. It is also selective. The C 130s, Iroquois, and Orions have never been used in combat either.
The Interim Report also dismissed the MoD assessment that it would take up to 15 years to build a air combat force up from scratch. The Interim Report claims the MoD “overstates the difficulties and is quite hypothetical, taking into account the wide range of institutional knowledge that would continue to reside in other parts of the Air Force” (p30). Yet aside from this speculation what evidence does the Interim Report provide in support of its assertion. If the air combat force goes how could the air force keep up to date with new developments in the field. If the air combat force was to be disbanded why would fast jet weapons, avionics, engineering and air crew specialists stay on in the air force. What future would they have?
As it will take a number of years to rebuild capabilities (recruit and train pilots and maintainers etc) there are ways to help this such as lateral recruitment, utilising contractors and training providers. And we don't need to spend billions and purchase new types because we can learn the basics on cheaper second hand aircraft in the interim. And to be viable one squadron's worth won't cut it, so suggest the orginal post war plan be re-adopted (and updated) over time.
Initially perhaps we could re-introduce jet trainers back into the advanced training syllabus (for example multi-role trainers are available now eg M-346 or T-50 etc) or start with private providers?
In terms of funding an ACF capability, longer term defence spending would need to start rising reach to 2% of GDP but surely upcoming Defence Capability Plans would be providing future pathways showing increasing NZDF capabilities/mass across the spectrum over time (as expenditure is projected to increase).
Ideally with the global strategic situation being re-shaped (eg by a number of non-democratic nations) the NZ Govt should be following their counterparts such as Australia and the UK by defining when expenditure targets are to be reached (eg 2% GDP in 5 years time, 2.5-3% in 10 years time and so on).
Finally one last point about an ACF capability (and land/sea based anti-air capabilities), where and when does NZ factor in the "revolution" in mass/drone warfare, like what we are seeing in Ukraine and via the Houthies in the Red Sea (and in the near future in the Indo-Pacific)? Does NZ need to restore a "dedicated" fighter air-to-air capability, that was lost many decades ago when it was thought that manned fighters would become obsolete (i.e. when we followed UK policy), to patrol and defend its Pacific interests (in association with joint sea, land and space based systems)?