Yes and no, on the one hand the first 3 are being built overseas so if we were to select an evolved or 'bespoke' design like the A210 then the onus is totally on them to work out the nooks and crannies before we can embarrass ourselves, and if they get it right, you beauty, it's a shot across the bow to challenge Australian industry to match overseas productivity.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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On the other hand is time. The existing design is literally perfect for our needs, it's like replacing a 100 series landcruiser with a 300 series in the simplest of terms.
Fair enough. Makes sense and a good way to achieve a goal for Australian shipbuilding industry. Need to possibly offer incentives for people to look at the trades and training with regards to the current economic downturn, but also offer jobs and immigration opportunities for overseas tradespeople to move to Australia for a continuous role of shipbuilding (if any government ever actually does so, and not do the stop start, ummm and aaahh then pursue ships being built offshore due to lower costs.
Context is critical!
What are the ships required to do?
I can assure you the only reason the RAN operates MEKO 200 ANZs as the ANZAC class is because the government of the day made a deliberate decision to build eight patrol frigates instead of six high end ASW frigates to support the three DDGs and four plus two FFGs.
One of the previous plans had been to continue building FFGs out to a total of ten, the four US built plus six, instead of two, Australian built ships.
Other options had been to build two M class GP frigates instead of the last pair of FFGs, which would have made eight additional M Class a no brainer for the patrol frigate program.
If I recall an early article on the ANZACs mentioned that they really needed to be about ten metres longer to improve seakeeping in our southern waters and a second helicopter hangar would have been helpful.
Do not mistake the fact that the ANZACs have served as the core of our fleet for twenty years, to mean they were ever intended to be the core of our fleet. That was meant to be the DDGs FFGs and their replacements.
If there had been any knowledge that the ANZACs would have to serve in the roles they have, for as long as they have, I can guarantee they would not have been Meko 200 ANZs. They would have been 130m or longer, had a second GT and they would have had space and weight for 32 cell mk 41 and either a second helicopter or a larger type.
What are the ships required to do?
I can assure you the only reason the RAN operates MEKO 200 ANZs as the ANZAC class is because the government of the day made a deliberate decision to build eight patrol frigates instead of six high end ASW frigates to support the three DDGs and four plus two FFGs.
One of the previous plans had been to continue building FFGs out to a total of ten, the four US built plus six, instead of two, Australian built ships.
Other options had been to build two M class GP frigates instead of the last pair of FFGs, which would have made eight additional M Class a no brainer for the patrol frigate program.
If I recall an early article on the ANZACs mentioned that they really needed to be about ten metres longer to improve seakeeping in our southern waters and a second helicopter hangar would have been helpful.
Do not mistake the fact that the ANZACs have served as the core of our fleet for twenty years, to mean they were ever intended to be the core of our fleet. That was meant to be the DDGs FFGs and their replacements.
If there had been any knowledge that the ANZACs would have to serve in the roles they have, for as long as they have, I can guarantee they would not have been Meko 200 ANZs. They would have been 130m or longer, had a second GT and they would have had space and weight for 32 cell mk 41 and either a second helicopter or a larger type.
Once there is continuous ship building in SA and WA it will be difficult for any incoming government to cancel ships and/or move the program offshore without enormous political risk (or offering alternative shipbuilding programs). The dangers are in my view that the on shore WA program never starts (e.g. due to strategic circumstances), governments slow down actual production to maintain work, or that they continue with onshore build of ships that are not fit for purpose. Same risks apply for SSNs.
I have had time to relect on the navy review and to be honest the more I think about it the more concerns I have. The two things that are most concerning me are the centre piece projects of 11 smallish GP frigates and 6 LOCSVs. In principle I am happy with the idea of expanding the surface combat fleet but the choice of a smallish GP frigate and a seperate missile barge have me perplexed.
Why not just simplify and de-risk the program and just go with something like 11 X Type 31 and just forget the LOCSVs. In terms of VLS you would end up with the same number of missiles. You would have perhaps 352 VLS with the Type 31 as opposed to maybe 368 VLS for you GP frigate/LOCSV combo. The crewing requirements would be about the same and what you would have is ship large enough to accept further upgrades over its operational life.
It makes me wonder how much influence AUSTAL have had over this project. Austal gave their approval to it of course and so they should. Sounds like they could have co-authored the damn thing. It gives them the opportunity to push their own LOCSV concept. Remember these are the people who bought us the LCS.
Now isn't the time to take risks on unknown technology. Let the USN build them and revisit the idea 10 years from now.
Time to service I suspect will be a big factor for the future Tier 2 Frigate.
That said so will capability.
Would Navy trade off numbers for capability?
7 instead of 11 ships.
While potentially a long term project it's anticipated a decision will be made next year.
Choices and trade-offs will need to be made.
A big decision.
Always thought the old Adelaide Class struct a nice balance in size for capability.
Anything smaller becomes a ANZAC with its limitations in size.
Anything too much larger and you may as well order additional Hunters.
It will be a very interesting call
Cheers S
The LOCSV are new tech for Australia but the US have been heading this way for years.
What they are, in reality is prototypes for a war emergency program. They are our modern day Bathurst Class corvette.
Once in service their capabilities can be determined and doctrine written and perfected. Commanders can see what they can do and become comfortable using them.
As confidence increases the roles they conduct will increase and they will become a true force multiplier.
When operating with major combatants I could easily see them loaded with mostly Tomahawk, but in local or litoral SM-6 and ESSM block 2 could be preferred, providing a general purpose strike and defence capability against most air and surface targets that detected by other assets.
Our logistics vessels will be crewed, they will be screened and supported by MALE UAVs, imagine there is a LOCSV loaded with 24 SM-6 and 32 ESSM as well?
AGREE
The LOCSV is an interesting concept and probably technically doable, but I feel it will fall down on a number of levels.
Main one will be cost.
I think the drone / disposable concept certainly has a place : land, sea, air.
Its based on outcome versus numbers and price.
A missile barge approach will not be cheap.
The launch systems alone and the basic systems to support them I understand are a considerable expense.
Then there's the cost of the missiles.
Then you need a vessel of appropriate size to employ all of this over the sort of distance and perseverance required by the fleet.
Yes it's a reusable craft, but as a floating magazine I bet it will increasingly need crew to the point it becomes something it's not.......
Too many questions about such a vessels capability and vulnerability.
I'm afraid it just doesn't make sense.
Certainly not for the RAN at this stage.
Let's see what the USN do with this concept and then come on board when the bugs are ironed out.
We should keep it simple and work with what we know..
RAAF with the loyal wing man I get, not this.
We just need more crewed ships ASAP.
Cheers S
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Reducing numbers from 11-7 (as well as reducing ability for ships to be present) also halves the Australian industrial contribution, that pushes up the cost per unit and helps creates subsequent valleys of death. Hobart might (or might not) have been the wrong ship but the big mistake was acquiring 3 and not 4 (or 5 or 6) — we now see ANZACs retire without replacement and Hobarts will be out of the water and the loss of skills in Osborne contribute to Hunter being still 10 years off.
Stampede, with the current timeframes for builds, I think we get to eat our cake and have it too.
The staffed GP frigates are being prioritised, initially overseas, then with first dibs with our own yards (WA).
The LOCSVs are the last of the ships to be built and come after the GP frigates. So that really means we won't see them until the latter part of the 2030's. I doubt the first steel cut will occur before 2035.
As such we will get to observe the US program for the best part of a decade and only build them when the kinks are ironed out.
I would have the view that the US naval autonomous program will develop fairly rapidly and they will have another two or three evolutions of design before 2030. What they have now with say Vanguard is probably already usable in a pinch.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I do tend to think that the Hobart-class DDG design was the wrong choice for Australia, and that it was selected for the wrong reasons. Compounding that was the in the end, the options for a fourth vehicle were allowed to expire rather than have an additional vessel built. However, even had a fourth destroyer been ordered there would still have been a 'valley of death' simply because of the amount of time between orders placed for RAN warships.
Mention of the OCV's which ended up becoming SEA 1180 and the Arafura-class OPV's goes back to the 2009 DWP, but it was not until 2017 that the designers were selected. Similarly, SEA 5000 which became the Hunter-class FFG also had it's genesis in the 2009 DWP, but what ended up becoming the new frigate was not selected until 2018. This means there was a gap of about a decade where no major warships were ordered for the RAN, from 2007 when the Hobart-class DDG's were ordered until the first of the Arafura-class OPV's (and these are not really even proper warships). Had the Hobart-class build been sized at six vessels like a 1992 review recommended for air defence vessels, that might have provided sufficient work to stave off a shipbuilding 'valley of death' since the yard and workforce would stay active. Unfortunately though, the order was only planned around building three or four vessels and even with the delays (planned and unplanned) there was a gap in ship construction. Given that there were five different PM's and six gov'ts in that period of time, that does not speak well for Australian gov't given the lack of orders placed. I do not really fault the Rudd gov'ts, in part because of how short the 2nd one was, but also because of some of the ideas kicked off by the 2009 DWP in the first Rudd gov't.
Given that the continuous build programme was not looked at by the RAND corp on behalf of the Abbot gov't until ~2015 IIRC, it would not really have been possible for the Hobart-class destroyers ordered in 2007 to be a part of that, since that was not supposed to start until ~2020 when the destroyer build was supposed to already be in service.
As far as the Hobart is concerned woulda, coulda, shoulda. Life would be so much easier now if we had simply kept building them until another ship design replaced it in production. Bizarre that the Rudd government came out with a white paper in 2009 that more or less said that we need to expand the fleet and then when given a chance to actually achieve that declined to continue production of the Hobart.
As you said ten years before we see the first Hunter. At a two year drumbeat we could have seen another 5 Hobarts roll of the production line in that time.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
One of the things these means though is that the GP frigates will be dependent on their own organic VLS cell loadouts until LOCSV's are available to deploy and operate in close proximity, likely until the late 2030's if not later. This is also assuming that potential issues with the LOCSV's and that area of technology can in fact be adequately resolved, rather than turning out to be a conceptual dead end.
At this point I do wish to point out that the USN's Constellation-class FFG is the modern replacement for the Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG, and the new USN frigates are fitted with 32 VLS cells. That does suggest to me that perhaps 16 VLS cells for new frigates might end up being too few in number, particularly for a new class which is to enter service in the early/mid-2030's and likely to see service until the 2060's.
What's worse is the Hawke government came out with a DWP that said the same thing in the late 80s. There are no DWPs I can think to point to in earlier period but if you look at the concept of the DDL, ten second line light destroyers to complement the Perth's, Darings and Rivers you can see the need for numbers was recognised in the 60s.
Go back to the 50s and there was serious consideration to acquiring surplus USN destroyers to boost our numbers.
Post WWI Jellicoe recommended doubling the size of the RAN and introducing aircraft carriers.
Pre WWII Henderson produced a comprehensive analysis recommending a two ocean navy built around eight armoured cruisers and supporting protected cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
There has always been the professional acknowledgment that numbers are needed, there has never been the consistent investment required to achieve the needs.
I can envision three things going forward.
The Australian built tier 2 frigates will be to an evolved design, maybe based on the three bought overseas, maybe not.
If the Hunters prove successful the tier 2 frigates may be curtailed at 7 to allow for additional Hunters, or additional FFG or DDG variants.
If the LOCSV proves successful, we will see additional orders for them and evolved versions of them.
Imagine a VLOCSV (the extra V is for Very), with 64, 96, or 128 VLS, a true arsenal ship. One of these for each fat ship (LHD, LPD, AOR), would make a very interesting problem for any aggressor.
The only public statement i am aware of is that LOCSVs would operate with Tier 1s (with the same Aegis baseline) for strike rather than with GP frigates. That reinforces the point of your second para though.
Meanwhile back in the present the crew of HMAS Hobart with accompanying RAN band was honored with a Freedom of Entry march to the lawns of Parliament House. The ship itself was relegated to berthing in a totally inaccessible (for unauthorized citizens) part of the port, despite being in dressed ship state. Had to take to the water to get a photo!
Tas
Tas
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iambuzzard
Active Member
For a layman I don't like the 57mm gun, it is too small. At the minimum it should be a 76mm or 127mm if weight allowances permit it. The Constellation class will have 32VLS, 16 NSM and a RIM-116 with 21 cells. If we can at least have the first two missile options a bigger main gun should be able to be fitted. I don't think 16 VLS cuts it anymore.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
TBH I myself feel that a 57mm gun is either too much gun, or too little gun. They tend to be big enough and displace enough to require a mounting space that could take a 76mm or 127mm gun, but have a weight of shot that tends to be low enough as well as shorter range to limit the effects of that shot. Also whilst the guns might have reported high ROF, in reality those ROF claims tend to be overestimated calculations which ignore the gun mounting/ready round ammunition capacity. It is rather difficult to achieve a 220 RPM ROF via a Mk 110 57mm gun that can only hold 120 ready rounds two sets of two 20 round cassettes which replenish the ready rounds from the magazine via a hoist.
I suspect a 16 cell VLS might be sufficient at least for the next couple of years but by next decade would be insufficient for safe operations in areas of potential threat. Unfort the current plan seems to have tier 2 vessels entering service with 16 VLS cells around the time that they would likely have become insufficient/inappropriate vs. the likely array of potential threats.