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Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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Nothing which could be described as "small" is fitting 32 Mk41 cells and a capable ASW and AAW suite.
In unfortunate news, retired Rear Admiral Griffiths died yesterday (5th March) at the age of 101. He was the last remaining survivor of HMS Repulse and served in the RAN for 43 years from 1937 to 1980 including seeing much combat through all of WW2, Korea and Vietnam. Quite the career going from serving on a battlecruiser built in 1916 to commanding a DDG in Vietnam, ending up as Flag Officer Naval Support Command.
My only expectation is that these Arafuras are likely to have one of the shortest service lives of any RAN ship not sunk in combat or by any accident…
If RAN / Government actually manage to pull of a viable “General Purpose” frigate program, I suspect they will keep building them and drawn down the rather useless Arafuras very quickly. They may well then be gifted off...
They admitted as much in the surface review when they committed to the evolved Capes being the mainstay of our Constabulary function.
To be honest I would try to sell them off and recoup some of our losses.
We still have to do the constabulary stuff, and there are tasks which tha Armidales (and by extension, probably the Capes) struggle to do - that’s why the OPV Program was set up in the first place.
Vale Guy Griffiths - a true gentleman, a great Naval Officer, a terrific (if demanding) boss, and one of the nicest people I’ve met.
Vale Guy Griffiths - a true gentleman, a great Naval Officer, a terrific (if demanding) boss, and one of the nicest people I’ve met.
Well they are evaluating that (with a decision process beginning in 2027). Consider the RAN ANZAC. It has 32 self defence missiles and 8 (oldish short range) strike missiles. After rearming it will have 32 self defence and 16 modern strike missiles. Could an ANZAC defend itself from a ANZAC? Maybe but the margin of safety is likely to be low. Are 64 self defence missiles necessary (e.g. to defend and then survive to rearm)? 128? Something else?
If the main threat is underwater (which is what the surface fleet analysis suggests) then I am not sure Hunter is underarmed but the RAN is underarmed in relation to the strike mission and force protection in relation to ballistic missiles. LOCSV is their attempt to address that magazine deficiency.
What is the justification for a surface launched strike capability whether it is labelled Tier 1 or Tier 2, apart from the obvious political angle. Why send a $6 billion plus very easily detectable warship with 150+ souls aboard and another billion or so worth of munitions to do a job that a $80 million strike aircraft can do better and then do it again that afternoon. Surface warships and surface fleets have been the ultimate victims of modern warfare since the 1930s, Ukraine has shown us just how vulnerable surface fleets are. It is a combat reality since the Second World War. The sea is ruled by the sky! Surface warfare are a peacetime/low intensity conflict scenario participant, in high intensity environments they will be confined to port or well away from the fire and brimstone.
I thought one of the purposes of a balanced constabulary force was to prevent major fleet units having to perform this function.
Do we need an inshore and a off shore class of patrol vessel?
As capable as the Capes are can they meet all our Constabulary needs.
Suggest an OPV is relavent to Australia.
To be fare I would of much preferred something a bit bigger the 80m Arafura Class.
Helicopter,hanger,flight deck and handling systems plus a medium calibre main gun.
An OPV/ Cutter typical of many first world maritime nations in Northern Anericua / Asia and Europe.
That said we have what we have.
Let's work with the Arafura Class and make them a success within the parameters of their design.
Cheers S
Roughly speaking in what region are the targets you are envisaging the ADF needs to hit and where are the strike aircraft to be based?
The reason I ask is because it relates to the justification requested.
edited: to provide context
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I would suggest when considering strike/defence missile holdings and optimal platforms, it is useful to reflect on some of the underpinning principles of the recent defence reviews.
The first is decentralised warfare. The current strategy is to move away from large platforms to smaller ones spread over a wide region. This is an asymetic tactic aligned with the US distributed maritime operations doctrine.
The second is network centric warfare. This has been around for a while, however the reviews stepped this up. The principle here is that ADF platforms will work together and share functions.
A decentralised network centric approach to a land strike (lets say an enemy island outpost), might be to position a Hobart with a couple of TLAM laden LOCSVs (lets say two barges for 64 TLAMs) in some sheltered and safe littoral waters (lets say in amongst the Philipine islands), with the Hobart covering the LOCSVs and some F35 aircraft providing the missiles protection to break through the enemy island defences (TLAMs are not very stealthy and have limited manoeuvring capability. Lambs to the slaughter comes to mind).
In this case the Hobart and the F35 are potentially best fitted with point defence, air to air, or HARM missiles to provide their protection function, and to leave the TLAM holding to the LOCSVs.
I'll add an extra bit here, perhaps the Hobart is surrounded by several army portable missile platforms (say some NASAMS and NSM trucks) to provide a wide area AA and ASu denial bubble around the Hobart. And our shiny new LCM/LCHs are moving around relocating and resupplying these units to keep them mobile and hidden.
The point is to play to the relative strengths. Hobarts/Hunters are very good quarterbacks with huge sensory and coordination capabilities. LOCSVs are mass missile mules with greater weapons carrying capacity than any ship or aircraft fleet, F35s can penetrate/neutralise enemy air defences better than any other asset, and army can move/hide covalently more effectively than others.
Its less about which platform is better, but more on how can they coordinate such that the sum is better than the parts.
I will note in this model frigates and destroyers don't need to have big missile holdings as they can call on other units to provide this. This aligns with the review recommendation of combat ships providing point defence, ASW and naval (NSM) strike.
The first is decentralised warfare. The current strategy is to move away from large platforms to smaller ones spread over a wide region. This is an asymetic tactic aligned with the US distributed maritime operations doctrine.
The second is network centric warfare. This has been around for a while, however the reviews stepped this up. The principle here is that ADF platforms will work together and share functions.
A decentralised network centric approach to a land strike (lets say an enemy island outpost), might be to position a Hobart with a couple of TLAM laden LOCSVs (lets say two barges for 64 TLAMs) in some sheltered and safe littoral waters (lets say in amongst the Philipine islands), with the Hobart covering the LOCSVs and some F35 aircraft providing the missiles protection to break through the enemy island defences (TLAMs are not very stealthy and have limited manoeuvring capability. Lambs to the slaughter comes to mind).
In this case the Hobart and the F35 are potentially best fitted with point defence, air to air, or HARM missiles to provide their protection function, and to leave the TLAM holding to the LOCSVs.
I'll add an extra bit here, perhaps the Hobart is surrounded by several army portable missile platforms (say some NASAMS and NSM trucks) to provide a wide area AA and ASu denial bubble around the Hobart. And our shiny new LCM/LCHs are moving around relocating and resupplying these units to keep them mobile and hidden.
The point is to play to the relative strengths. Hobarts/Hunters are very good quarterbacks with huge sensory and coordination capabilities. LOCSVs are mass missile mules with greater weapons carrying capacity than any ship or aircraft fleet, F35s can penetrate/neutralise enemy air defences better than any other asset, and army can move/hide covalently more effectively than others.
Its less about which platform is better, but more on how can they coordinate such that the sum is better than the parts.
I will note in this model frigates and destroyers don't need to have big missile holdings as they can call on other units to provide this. This aligns with the review recommendation of combat ships providing point defence, ASW and naval (NSM) strike.
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iambuzzard
Active Member
I was very fortunate to count the late Mackenzie Gregory, Lieutenant Commander (retired) as a personal friend whom I met through my job at a hobby shop in Melbourne. He survived the sinking of HMAS Canberra in WWII. He was also very fortunate to survive 9/11 in Washington DC due to a request from Janette Howard I believe to cancel his and his wife's flight reservations on the aircraft that hit the Pentagon. They had gone over to receive the ship's bell from the USS Canberra (CA-70) to bring home to Australia. They were invited to join the dedication of a new memorial at Arlington Cemetery the next day. Like a lot of ex navy men he was also a thorough gentleman. RIP.
Then by that logic, why are countries still spending billions of dollars building/upgrading their navies ? What do you know that the US, China, India, etc don't know ? Maybe you should tell them and save them some money ? Or is this just a troll ?
Imagine is Australia gifts/sells at steep discount to the neighbouring non China bribed Pacific nations. Those nations will suddenly have a much bigger presence, showing up in 80m vessels instead of 20-40m ones.
And the other networked ingredient that I am sure you just ran out of space to cover in one post is the submarine capability. If potential adversaries cannot operate their own submarines effectively, and they cannot operate their own surface ships safely, then the massive missile cell capacity of ships in ports become nominal. That is a massive “If”, of course.
A doyen of the RAN has crossed the bar, a great CO and ship driver and I could never figure why he wasn’t promoted CNS (CN).
Only thing I have seen pop up on this is an article behind a subcription paywall if anyone has one with them ? Otherwise I have not seen and can't find anything from Defence, Navy or any relevant ministers.
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Cheers
You got me intrigued by him- just read a few paragraphs about him- he was only 13 years old when he was a cadet at the RAN college!!!!
The level of service by him boggles my mind. I'm still reading, hope to see if he has an opinion of warships changing to missiles and nil armour and dependence on electronics
Takao
The Bunker Group
Among many things, persistence and range. I know airpower adherents think that jets/drones can replace everything - but a frigate or sub can strike anywhere in the Pacific (and the majority of human habitats are within range of the water) or other oceans, it can escort convoys 24/7, regardless of weather, it provides a tangible statement of Australian political will and it can take a hit. Sure, aircraft can be fast (kinda - how do we strike something north of Indonesia if they don't allow airspace access?) and responsive, but range and weather (as well as limited fuel) kills them
Fundamentally you are correct, and this is the argument I use to shut up people complaining about VLS numbers - these ships don't fight alone.
However - these two theories remain very untested, especially against a threat who has actual EW capabilities (unlike Serbia or Iraq). Against a threat that has lots of EW capabilities and has been watching US network-centric warfare for 20 years to deliberately and systematically identify weaknesses? I think that's an increasing bold choice.
Actually, on second thoughts, I'm not sold on decentralised warfare at all. The need for protection forces elements close to each other - especially for psychological reasons. Remember, we fight as teams. And lots of small platforms drives attrition rates really high - for platforms that are crazy expensive. At least big platforms like Hunter or Hobart can carry decent self-protection suites.
I heard him interviewed on the radio several times over the last few years-fascinating stories from an impressive man. Another sad passing from that great generation.