Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[devo99]

Only thing I have seen pop up on this is an article behind a subcription paywall if anyone has one with them ? Otherwise I have not seen and can't find anything from Defence, Navy or any relevant ministers.

Australian & NZ Defender Australia's leading defence news and military history reporting

www.australiandefender.com.au

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Cheers

Bought the subscription out of curiosity. The article is basically just commenting on the fact that the upgrade has been done quietly and that no information has been disclosed about it. And then spends a few paragraphs explaining what CEAFAR is and then what HMAS Choules is.
A bit of a nothing burger article really, some of the other articles seem good at least so it wasn't a complete waste of money.

 

[ADMk2]

Only thing I have seen pop up on this is an article behind a subcription paywall if anyone has one with them ? Otherwise I have not seen and can't find anything from Defence, Navy or any relevant ministers.

Australian & NZ Defender Australia's leading defence news and military history reporting

www.australiandefender.com.au

<iframe src="Facebook" width="500" height="436" style="border:none;overflow:hidden" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; picture-in-picture; web-share"></iframe>

Cheers

There’s nothing more in that article. He took it off here when we were discussing it a few days back…

He just trawls the internet looking for any “scoop” he can find these days, unfortunately.

 

[seaspear]

Could the installation on the HMAS Choules be a trial ? if not why not the Canberra class ships

 

[Todjaeger]

Fundamentally you are correct, and this is the argument I use to shut up people complaining about VLS numbers - these ships don't fight alone.

However - these two theories remain very untested, especially against a threat who has actual EW capabilities (unlike Serbia or Iraq). Against a threat that has lots of EW capabilities and has been watching US network-centric warfare for 20 years to deliberately and systematically identify weaknesses? I think that's an increasing bold choice.

Actually, on second thoughts, I'm not sold on decentralised warfare at all. The need for protection forces elements close to each other - especially for psychological reasons. Remember, we fight as teams. And lots of small platforms drives attrition rates really high - for platforms that are crazy expensive. At least big platforms like Hunter or Hobart can carry decent self-protection suites.

I have been quietly watching this thread for the past week or so without posting as I noted the content posted by others as well as what seem to be directions and assumptions that have been made, both by posters and likely gov't too.

TBH though I have been growing increasingly concerned about how vulnerable announced plans seem to be to disruption, particularly if one or more of the apparent assumptions made prove to be incorrect.

Take the 'plan' to have 11 Tier 2 GP frigates of a new to the RAN design built, with the initial getting constructed in an overseas yard and first steel cut for the lead ship to occur sometime in 2026. IMO much is being assumed if gov't is betting that it can go from identifying the need for new/more MFU's, to the start of actual MFU construction within about three years. All of this is also not really even considering whether or not the to be determined design is appropriate or useful, especially in a RAN context.

For instance, in order for an overseas yard to have first steel cut for the lead vessel cut sometime in 2026, the to-be-determined yard has to have the capacity needed from ~2026 onwards for their portion of the project, and Australia would need to contract ahead of time for that production capacity, lest someone else contract for those spots in the yard's build queue. Further, Australia would need to have selected a design (including any/all possible modifications required) and contracted for the rights to build the design, including at the yards Australia has chosen for the builds to take place at. Also, all of these selection and contracting processes would need to be completed with sufficient lead times so that materials can be ordered and the yards configured to engage in the build work which they would be contracted for. So far, it does seem as though people have been considering what might be selected, or who could conduct such an overseas build, but not really looking at whether what Australia might select could be built in the related yard in the timeframe so far specified. Or to put it another way, gov't could be assuming that it could select a Spanish or German design, to be built in a S. Korean or Japanese yard, or vice versa, and get everything contracted for and in place for the 2026 first steel cutting. If this is an accurate assessment of the current state of plans, then things could easily go wrong if one of the designers objected to Australia selecting an overseas yard not partnered with the designer.

As for the concept of RAN MFU's being accompanied by LOCSV's, that is an 'interesting' concept to provide a technical solution to a personnel problem. AFAIK though, R&D work is being done to look into the concept but it currently exists in tech demonstrator form, not operationally capable, deployable units. One natural concern of mine is that Australian plans might hinge upon such a tech solution, when it might very well prove to not be viable, particularly in the apparently short timeframe before Australia expects such capabilities to be needed. As the US has demonstrated with a number of fairly recent naval programmes, even with their vast resources for research, development, and testing, not all of the concepts prove to be viable, and some of the tech is ultimately impractical, with the Zumwalt-class DDG, and the Freedom-class and Independence-class LCS all being either good examples.

As @Takao mentioned EW measures, particularly those conducted out by a peer level adversary, or a Great Power peer adversary of the US, could significantly reduce or even possibly eliminate LOCSV's as viable operational assets. My own personal take is that there is still potential value in the concept of Distributed Lethality and decentralized warfare, but there are some important considerations. One of the first is that whilst there is value in having separate assets that are sensing or shooting assets, it is important that deployed units be capable of being functionally effective not only in a networked/decentralized environment, but also able to operate independently. Australia and allies have been working towards developing and fielding integrated warfighting systems, which have multiple elements that are supposed to work together to have an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts. That is naturally good, when it works. However, adversaries and potential adversaries have certainly noticed such work and the outcomes, which in turn has led to these adversaries to not only work towards developing their own warfighting systems, but trying to find ways to disrupt the warfighting systems of others.

 

[Redlands18]

I have been quietly watching this thread for the past week or so without posting as I noted the content posted by others as well as what seem to be directions and assumptions that have been made, both by posters and likely gov't too.

TBH though I have been growing increasingly concerned about how vulnerable announced plans seem to be to disruption, particularly if one or more of the apparent assumptions made prove to be incorrect.

Take the 'plan' to have 11 Tier 2 GP frigates of a new to the RAN design built, with the initial getting constructed in an overseas yard and first steel cut for the lead ship to occur sometime in 2026. IMO much is being assumed if gov't is betting that it can go from identifying the need for new/more MFU's, to the start of actual MFU construction within about three years. All of this is also not really even considering whether or not the to be determined design is appropriate or useful, especially in a RAN context.

For instance, in order for an overseas yard to have first steel cut for the lead vessel cut sometime in 2026, the to-be-determined yard has to have the capacity needed from ~2026 onwards for their portion of the project, and Australia would need to contract ahead of time for that production capacity, lest someone else contract for those spots in the yard's build queue. Further, Australia would need to have selected a design (including any/all possible modifications required) and contracted for the rights to build the design, including at the yards Australia has chosen for the builds to take place at. Also, all of these selection and contracting processes would need to be completed with sufficient lead times so that materials can be ordered and the yards configured to engage in the build work which they would be contracted for. So far, it does seem as though people have been considering what might be selected, or who could conduct such an overseas build, but not really looking at whether what Australia might select could be built in the related yard in the timeframe so far specified. Or to put it another way, gov't could be assuming that it could select a Spanish or German design, to be built in a S. Korean or Japanese yard, or vice versa, and get everything contracted for and in place for the 2026 first steel cutting. If this is an accurate assessment of the current state of plans, then things could easily go wrong if one of the designers objected to Australia selecting an overseas yard not partnered with the designer.

As for the concept of RAN MFU's being accompanied by LOCSV's, that is an 'interesting' concept to provide a technical solution to a personnel problem. AFAIK though, R&D work is being done to look into the concept but it currently exists in tech demonstrator form, not operationally capable, deployable units. One natural concern of mine is that Australian plans might hinge upon such a tech solution, when it might very well prove to not be viable, particularly in the apparently short timeframe before Australia expects such capabilities to be needed. As the US has demonstrated with a number of fairly recent naval programmes, even with their vast resources for research, development, and testing, not all of the concepts prove to be viable, and some of the tech is ultimately impractical, with the Zumwalt-class DDG, and the Freedom-class and Independence-class LCS all being either good examples.

As @Takao mentioned EW measures, particularly those conducted out by a peer level adversary, or a Great Power peer adversary of the US, could significantly reduce or even possibly eliminate LOCSV's as viable operational assets. My own personal take is that there is still potential value in the concept of Distributed Lethality and decentralized warfare, but there are some important considerations. One of the first is that whilst there is value in having separate assets that are sensing or shooting assets, it is important that deployed units be capable of being functionally effective not only in a networked/decentralized environment, but also able to operate independently. Australia and allies have been working towards developing and fielding integrated warfighting systems, which have multiple elements that are supposed to work together to have an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts. That is naturally good, when it works. However, adversaries and potential adversaries have certainly noticed such work and the outcomes, which in turn has led to these adversaries to not only work towards developing their own warfighting systems, but trying to find ways to disrupt the warfighting systems of others.

The proven ability to build the named designs in their own shipyards within the exacting timeframe, I think is a major factor in the down selection of the designs and this is probably why, Babcock who would have to set up a shipyard, Fincantieri, no suitable design in construction, Damen, NVL no suitable design in production, missed out. I can't see the government moving designs between shipyards for a 3 ship build.

 

[Volkodav]

The proven ability to build the named designs in their own shipyards within the exacting timeframe, I think is a major factor in the down selection of the designs and this is probably why, Babcock who would have to set up a shipyard, Fincantieri, no suitable design in construction, Damen, NVL no suitable design in production, missed out. I can't see the government moving designs between shipyards for a 3 ship build.

Very much my suspicion too, these primes have advised they have capacity to build a version of their design with 9LV and CEAFAR, plus other specified GFE, within the required time frame.

The retirement of ANZAC and the slipping of Hunter may well tie into this in that it frees up CAE and SAAB capacity in the near term to support the overseas build.

As follow on ships start the capacity of suppliers and the necessary slots will be there.

 

[Maranoa]

Then by that logic, why are countries still spending billions of dollars building/upgrading their navies ? What do you know that the US, China, India, etc don't know ? Maybe you should tell them and save them some money ? Or is this just a troll ?

No just someone with a good grasp of military history and tactical realilty.

 

[Armchair]

Actually, on second thoughts, I'm not sold on decentralised warfare at all. The need for protection forces elements close to each other - especially for psychological reasons. Remember, we fight as teams. And lots of small platforms drives attrition rates really high - for platforms that are crazy expensive. At least big platforms like Hunter or Hobart can carry decent self-protection suites.

I think the naval problem is that the ability of the “centre“ (a big platform) to protect itself and other elements from land based anti-ship ballistic missiles is uncertain.

In the (sovereign) RAN context the centre is the DDG (itself smaller and less capable than the traditional screening units for the USN) that provides much of the protection and now is being tasked with the majority of the strike (in the form of 200 Tomahawks). For the next 10 years until Hunters arrive the RAN will be very centralised. If the ADF more broadly is less centralised (land based AD and strike) that sounds appealing.

 

[Volkodav]

No just someone with a good grasp of military history and tactical realilty.

Try reading a few books on the bomber delusion and you may change your view.

Malcolm Gladwell "The Bomber Mafia" is a good start.

Greg Baughen "The Rise of the Bomber" is another.

An another good source is Dr Alex Clarke, he does a lot of YouTube videos on naval history, or more specifically on how certain platforms and capabilities eventuated.

Never under estimate the value of presence.

Never under estimate the ability of warships to survive and endure, even to continue to fight.

Never over estimate the wonder weapons of the other side.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Or to put it another way, gov't could be assuming that it could select a Spanish or German design, to be built in a S. Korean or Japanese yard, or vice versa, and get everything contracted for and in place for the 2026 first steel cutting. If this is an accurate assessment of the current state of plans, then things could easily go wrong if one of the designers objected to Australia selecting an overseas yard not partnered with the designer.

Part of the issue is who is playing in this.

Mitsubishi, in terms of defence it kinda like an extension of the Japanese government
Navantia is part owned and an extension of the Spanish government
Hanwa is an extension of the korean government

If Babcock or NVL want to play, fine, but they would have to do the heavy lifting to facilitate that. TBH there are other programs that probably fit them better, even within the RAN. AFAIK Babcock in Australia seemed to be frantically upskilling for AUKUS subs stuff. They won't be prime, but there is a bunch of stuff they are ideal for and are trying to position themselves.

That is just where this program is at the moment. Like the AUKUS submarines, at some point, its more than just a commercial contract, there is a lot of government to government, and then both governments telling corporations what they need, and then they working out how that can happen. TBH this whole tier 2 thing sounds like a very high pressure contract, and probably one that is going to be easy money and easy work. As we have seen with the Hunters, expect daily grillings, constant newspaper headlines that we are building too slow or the wrong thing and heavy oversight and political interference, for an extremely demanding client.. The sort of project many would run away from.

No just someone with a good grasp of military history and tactical realilty.

The weapons we are building are probably not exactly the right ones for after the war, but like all wars, you go to war with what you have. Typically the first part of wars are very much fought with stuff build and common before the war started. As we have seen in Ukraine, often, the later part is also fought with older stuff, because all the new stuff is consumed. Historically, ships have been used for around 5,000-10,000 years of human history. They have a special job, which is to do with controlling space on and around the water. That seems likely to continue.

We all thought nuclear weapons would make conventional warfare all but impossible. But here we are, where one of the largest nuclear powers just lost 500,000 soldiers in a conventional war. Very effective new weapons may not be used, because they may be used in kind. Start fire bombing or chemical weapons or nuclear weapons, and guess what comes your way tomorrow.

We don't know for sure if this will be a hot war, or just a cold war, or somewhere in between.

 

[Tasman]

Pleasing to see the Green Ghost, aka HMAS Hobart, returning to its name port for a visit. A bit of haze about but still looked like a 'proper' warship according to the grandkids!



Tas

 

[SammyC]

I have been quietly watching this thread for the past week or so without posting as I noted the content posted by others as well as what seem to be directions and assumptions that have been made, both by posters and likely gov't too.

TBH though I have been growing increasingly concerned about how vulnerable announced plans seem to be to disruption, particularly if one or more of the apparent assumptions made prove to be incorrect.

Take the 'plan' to have 11 Tier 2 GP frigates of a new to the RAN design built, with the initial getting constructed in an overseas yard and first steel cut for the lead ship to occur sometime in 2026. IMO much is being assumed if gov't is betting that it can go from identifying the need for new/more MFU's, to the start of actual MFU construction within about three years. All of this is also not really even considering whether or not the to be determined design is appropriate or useful, especially in a RAN context.

For instance, in order for an overseas yard to have first steel cut for the lead vessel cut sometime in 2026, the to-be-determined yard has to have the capacity needed from ~2026 onwards for their portion of the project, and Australia would need to contract ahead of time for that production capacity, lest someone else contract for those spots in the yard's build queue. Further, Australia would need to have selected a design (including any/all possible modifications required) and contracted for the rights to build the design, including at the yards Australia has chosen for the builds to take place at. Also, all of these selection and contracting processes would need to be completed with sufficient lead times so that materials can be ordered and the yards configured to engage in the build work which they would be contracted for. So far, it does seem as though people have been considering what might be selected, or who could conduct such an overseas build, but not really looking at whether what Australia might select could be built in the related yard in the timeframe so far specified. Or to put it another way, gov't could be assuming that it could select a Spanish or German design, to be built in a S. Korean or Japanese yard, or vice versa, and get everything contracted for and in place for the 2026 first steel cutting. If this is an accurate assessment of the current state of plans, then things could easily go wrong if one of the designers objected to Australia selecting an overseas yard not partnered with the designer.

As for the concept of RAN MFU's being accompanied by LOCSV's, that is an 'interesting' concept to provide a technical solution to a personnel problem. AFAIK though, R&D work is being done to look into the concept but it currently exists in tech demonstrator form, not operationally capable, deployable units. One natural concern of mine is that Australian plans might hinge upon such a tech solution, when it might very well prove to not be viable, particularly in the apparently short timeframe before Australia expects such capabilities to be needed. As the US has demonstrated with a number of fairly recent naval programmes, even with their vast resources for research, development, and testing, not all of the concepts prove to be viable, and some of the tech is ultimately impractical, with the Zumwalt-class DDG, and the Freedom-class and Independence-class LCS all being either good examples.

As @Takao mentioned EW measures, particularly those conducted out by a peer level adversary, or a Great Power peer adversary of the US, could significantly reduce or even possibly eliminate LOCSV's as viable operational assets. My own personal take is that there is still potential value in the concept of Distributed Lethality and decentralized warfare, but there are some important considerations. One of the first is that whilst there is value in having separate assets that are sensing or shooting assets, it is important that deployed units be capable of being functionally effective not only in a networked/decentralized environment, but also able to operate independently. Australia and allies have been working towards developing and fielding integrated warfighting systems, which have multiple elements that are supposed to work together to have an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts. That is naturally good, when it works. However, adversaries and potential adversaries have certainly noticed such work and the outcomes, which in turn has led to these adversaries to not only work towards developing their own warfighting systems, but trying to find ways to disrupt the warfighting systems of others.

Takao, Todjaeger and Armchair, very thought provoking responses.

Modern western warfare relies heavility on communication systems. While it is a powerful strength, it is also its archiles heel. To this end, training exercises frequently include navigation without GPS, ships still use morse code lamp signalling when in close company, and they routinely travel dark to practice emissions minimisation. On this point, one of the observations I have made from the Ukraine war has been the reliance on missile inertial navigation over GPS.

I will acknowledge that the western combined arms methodology is complex and requires very high levels of training to successfully pull off. It's also never been tested against a near peer adversary, so remains theoretical.

In reflection on the LOCSV concept, I note this will have the CEC comms link, which is one of the most hardened of the hardened western systems, even though this (along with Aegis) will come close to doubling the cost of the base vessel. There are probably cheaper options to remotely operate a missile, but this aligns with the risk. I suppose the ultimate fall back is to put an operator back onboard to conduct firing, hence the retention of the optionally crewed component.

In my view, the current strategies, such as distributed lethality, are less a bold new approach, and more a reactive response. There is a realisation that countries like China can out build every western nation with ships and missiles and there is no longer the advantage of mass presence or overwhelming force.

Irrespective of how many point defence missiles a single ship may have, if it is faced with say a 100 incomming missiles it is unlikely to survive. In the same contex, it is possible that 1 or 2 vessels out of 5 or 6 spead out over a similar sized attack might survive, and with that residual, the mission might still remain achievable.

Additionally with dwindling demographics, we can't staff resource intensive equipment, and this will only deteriorate. I would consider that mastering autonomous craft, be it planes or ships, is somewhat essential to being able to maintain a viable future defence force. The six LOCSVs and the Ghost bat are only the beginning.

For the first time we need to consider ourselves as the underdog against bigger opponents, and we need to adopt and learn the asymetic war forms that our opponents previously utilised, if we are to cope with this new reality.

Its a switch in realisation.

 

[hauritz]

Takao, Todjaeger and Armchair, very thought provoking responses.

Modern western warfare relies heavility on communication systems. While it is a powerful strength, it is also its archiles heel. To this end, training exercises frequently include navigation without GPS, ships still use morse code lamp signalling when in close company, and they routinely travel dark to practice emissions minimisation. On this point, one of the observations I have made from the Ukraine war has been the reliance on missile inertial navigation over GPS.

I will acknowledge that the western combined arms methodology is complex and requires very high levels of training to successfully pull off. It's also never been tested against a near peer adversary, so remains theoretical.

In reflection on the LOCSV concept, I note this will have the CEC comms link, which is one of the most hardened of the hardened western systems, even though this (along with Aegis) will come close to doubling the cost of the base vessel. There are probably cheaper options to remotely operate a missile, but this aligns with the risk. I suppose the ultimate fall back is to put an operator back onboard to conduct firing, hence the retention of the optionally crewed component.

In my view, the current strategies, such as distributed lethality, are less a bold new approach, and more a reactive response. There is a realisation that countries like China can out build every western nation with ships and missiles and there is no longer the advantage of mass presence or overwhelming force.

Irrespective of how many point defence missiles a single ship may have, if it is faced with say a 100 incomming missiles it is unlikely to survive. In the same contex, it is possible that 1 or 2 vessels out of 5 or 6 spead out over a similar sized attack might survive, and with that residual, the mission might still remain achievable.

Additionally with dwindling demographics, we can't staff resource intensive equipment, and this will only deteriorate. I would consider that mastering autonomous craft, be it planes or ships, is somewhat essential to being able to maintain a viable future defence force. The six LOCSVs and the Ghost bat are only the beginning.

For the first time we need to consider ourselves as the underdog against bigger opponents, and we need to adopt and learn the asymetic war forms that our opponents previously utilised, if we are to cope with this new reality.

Its a switch in realisation.

I think one of the myths about automated systems is that it will magically fix the ADFs manpower shortage problem. Not really the case. For starters these systems will still need to be maintained and repaired. Maybe not so much in peacetime but if war breaks out these systems will probably be expected to carry out more sortes then manned systems. Also these systems will need to be monitored and controlled. I was surprised to find out for example that a single RQ-4 Global Hawk mission requires a crew of 45 intelligence staff to handle the returns. Even with AI you are still going to require mission controllers to make all the decisions.

Ironically the number of these systems we buy might ultimately be determined by our ability to find enough personel to operate them.

Something like the LOCSV for example will give our warships access to additional VLS but really it does nothing to alleviate the manpower issue. If anything you will now require even more crew to operate the LOCSV than you would if you simply had a bigger destroyer that could carry more missiles.

 

[Volkodav]

I think one of the myths about automated systems is that it will magically fix the ADFs manpower shortage problem. Not really the case. For starters these systems will still need to be maintained and repaired. Maybe not so much in peacetime but if war breaks out these systems will probably be expected to carry out more sortes then manned systems. Also these systems will need to be monitored and controlled. I was surprised to find out for example that a single RQ-4 Global Hawk mission requires a crew of 45 intelligence staff to handle the returns. Even with AI you are still going to require mission controllers to make all the decisions.

Ironically the number of these systems we buy might ultimately be determined by our ability to find enough personel to operate them.

Something like the LOCSV for example will give our warships access to additional VLS but really it does nothing to alleviate the manpower issue. If anything you will now require even more crew to operate the LOCSV than you would if you simply had a bigger destroyer that could carry more missiles.

It obviously varies system to system but there are overheads in maintaining capability that are constant whether you are talking one or half a dozen. That is the minimum number of maintainers you need to support a single platform could easily support five or six of the same platform.

Then there are specialities that overlap different platforms, imagine if you would a mechanic who is competent to work on nany different types of cars.

There are overheads you have with manned platforms that the unmanned also have. The thing is, these overheads reduce when fleet size increases.

 

[Armchair]

AusGov said it will join the US program (I am repeating some info that is back up the thread, sorry).

The UN LUSV program request for information is here

SAM.gov

sam.gov

Interesting that their terminology is “adjunct magazine for a manned combatant”

This source says 1500 tons and 200’ in length.

U.S. Navy Successfully Completes Large Unmanned Surface Vessel Testing Milestone

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Navy successfully completed a milestone “no touch” 720-hour continuous power demonstration of a diesel generator for Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) operations. Demonstrating the

www.navsea.navy.mil

Also

Navy Calls on Industry for Info on Large Unmanned Surface Vessel Program - USNI News

The Navy wants information from industry for its Large Unmanned Surface Vessel, as the service finishes requirements before buying the first ship in the next fiscal year. In a request for information solicitation posted Friday, Naval Sea Systems Command asked industry for input on its fleet of...

news.usni.org

states that the LUSV will be incapable of firing without an off hull command (so the optional crew is not for that purpose in the US program).

 

[Stampede]

I have been quietly watching this thread for the past week or so without posting as I noted the content posted by others as well as what seem to be directions and assumptions that have been made, both by posters and likely gov't too.

TBH though I have been growing increasingly concerned about how vulnerable announced plans seem to be to disruption, particularly if one or more of the apparent assumptions made prove to be incorrect.

Take the 'plan' to have 11 Tier 2 GP frigates of a new to the RAN design built, with the initial getting constructed in an overseas yard and first steel cut for the lead ship to occur sometime in 2026. IMO much is being assumed if gov't is betting that it can go from identifying the need for new/more MFU's, to the start of actual MFU construction within about three years. All of this is also not really even considering whether or not the to be determined design is appropriate or useful, especially in a RAN context.

For instance, in order for an overseas yard to have first steel cut for the lead vessel cut sometime in 2026, the to-be-determined yard has to have the capacity needed from ~2026 onwards for their portion of the project, and Australia would need to contract ahead of time for that production capacity, lest someone else contract for those spots in the yard's build queue. Further, Australia would need to have selected a design (including any/all possible modifications required) and contracted for the rights to build the design, including at the yards Australia has chosen for the builds to take place at. Also, all of these selection and contracting processes would need to be completed with sufficient lead times so that materials can be ordered and the yards configured to engage in the build work which they would be contracted for. So far, it does seem as though people have been considering what might be selected, or who could conduct such an overseas build, but not really looking at whether what Australia might select could be built in the related yard in the timeframe so far specified. Or to put it another way, gov't could be assuming that it could select a Spanish or German design, to be built in a S. Korean or Japanese yard, or vice versa, and get everything contracted for and in place for the 2026 first steel cutting. If this is an accurate assessment of the current state of plans, then things could easily go wrong if one of the designers objected to Australia selecting an overseas yard not partnered with the designer.

As for the concept of RAN MFU's being accompanied by LOCSV's, that is an 'interesting' concept to provide a technical solution to a personnel problem. AFAIK though, R&D work is being done to look into the concept but it currently exists in tech demonstrator form, not operationally capable, deployable units. One natural concern of mine is that Australian plans might hinge upon such a tech solution, when it might very well prove to not be viable, particularly in the apparently short timeframe before Australia expects such capabilities to be needed. As the US has demonstrated with a number of fairly recent naval programmes, even with their vast resources for research, development, and testing, not all of the concepts prove to be viable, and some of the tech is ultimately impractical, with the Zumwalt-class DDG, and the Freedom-class and Independence-class LCS all being either good examples.

As @Takao mentioned EW measures, particularly those conducted out by a peer level adversary, or a Great Power peer adversary of the US, could significantly reduce or even possibly eliminate LOCSV's as viable operational assets. My own personal take is that there is still potential value in the concept of Distributed Lethality and decentralized warfare, but there are some important considerations. One of the first is that whilst there is value in having separate assets that are sensing or shooting assets, it is important that deployed units be capable of being functionally effective not only in a networked/decentralized environment, but also able to operate independently. Australia and allies have been working towards developing and fielding integrated warfighting systems, which have multiple elements that are supposed to work together to have an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts. That is naturally good, when it works. However, adversaries and potential adversaries have certainly noticed such work and the outcomes, which in turn has led to these adversaries to not only work towards developing their own warfighting systems, but trying to find ways to disrupt the warfighting systems of others.

We have our current fleet and some OPVs and Capes in various states of construction.
These are the constants today
Everything in the Review and AUKUS is aspirational.
Some good ideas and concepts.
Some may actually come to fruition.
However we are dealing with very long timeframes and with many variables.
So please everyone some perspective going forward.
If there's some ink on a contract for a new frigate next year all well and good.

Until then let's consolidate with what we have today.

Cheers S

 

[MickB]

Rather interested in the Damen MPSS designed for Portuguese navy.
Decended into fandoi behavior by trying to invent conops for such a ship in the RAN.
MCM, SAR, survey, HADR, OPV with exceptional coverage, ISR asset?
With changes of modules perhaps all of the above as requierd.

 

[Stampede]

Rather interested in the Damen MPSS designed for Portuguese navy.
Decended into fandoi behavior by trying to invent conops for such a ship in the RAN.
MCM, SAR, survey, HADR, OPV with exceptional coverage, ISR asset?
With changes of modules perhaps all of the above as requierd.

New concepts abound
The Netherlands are to replace their two Rotterdam Class LPDs and their four Holland Class Ocean going Patrol ships with six like vessels to perform the above functions in the one class of ship.
.Patrol, amphibious and HADR.
Now that will be an interesting design.
Like the concept on many levels.

Cheers S

 

[JBRobbo]

... Keep saying but keep[s falling on deaf ears. The Meko A200 is not large enough to outfit it with the weapons payload people expect. It has stability issues in rough sea's if over loaded which is why the Anzac only ever had the 1 x 8 cell Mk 41 and not 2 as previously planned. The meko 200's globally that have up to 32 cells are for different missiles smaller and less capable then the ESSM's.

In terms of SSM's yes Egypt and Algeria have 16 fitted but they also operate in far calmer sea's, South Africa on other hand operating in rough sea's has just 8 like our Anzac's.

Yes Meko A200 be easiest to acquire but it is also stuck with no growth margin and extreme limitations on what we can mount on it.

if we outfit them as some have suggested we will have to ask the enemy to wait until the weather improves before we can come out and fight them.

Australia and New Zealand continue and have happily operated their smaller predecessors for 30 years, are you suggesting we need the weather to improve now before we fight with what we have? Compared to our ANZAC's, as far as stability is concerned, the MEKO-A200AN is 3m longer overall, 10% wider in beam, and massively reduces top weight through the elimination of the vertical exhaust funnels (CODAG-WARP) and relocation of the high-mounted Mk41 VLS to a far lower position at the bow. Furthermore. the RGM-184 NSM (400-410kg w/ booster) is roughly half the weight per missile of the 16x RBS-15 Mk3 (810-820kg w/ booster) you suggest that are packed high on the Algerian variants, their Mk87 topside canister launchers as a result, are no doubt significantly lighter as well. Presumably, the only thing that could worsen the centre-of-gravity in comparison would be the certain fit of a far taller all-aluminium mast similar to the ASMD/AMCAP for the CEAFAR -SXL/ES-3701S or equivalent. In focus – the MEKO A-200 Type 31e frigate candidate | Navy Lookout
It's not your daddy's ANZAC, quite an impressive design.

 

[Alberto32]

Australia and New Zealand continue and have happily operated their smaller predecessors for 30 years, are you suggesting we need the weather to improve now before we fight with what we have? Compared to our ANZAC's, as far as stability is concerned, the MEKO-A200AN is 3m longer overall, 10% wider in beam, and massively reduces top weight through the elimination of the vertical exhaust funnels (CODAG-WARP) and relocation of the high-mounted Mk41 VLS to a far lower position at the bow. Furthermore. the RGM-184 NSM (400-410kg w/ booster) is roughly half the weight per missile of the 16x RBS-15 Mk3 (810-820kg w/ booster) you suggest that are packed high on the Algerian variants, their Mk87 topside canister launchers as a result, are no doubt significantly lighter as well. Presumably, the only thing that could worsen the centre-of-gravity in comparison would be the certain fit of a far taller all-aluminium mast similar to the ASMD/AMCAP for the CEAFAR -SXL/ES-3701S or equivalent. In focus – the MEKO A-200 Type 31e frigate candidate | Navy Lookout
It's not your daddy's ANZAC, quite an impressive design.

Surely the MEKO 210 is the better offering on the table?