The sad thing is with the current reviews and strategic situation it is the perfect time to dust off the proposed, never realised, structures of decades past.
The fantasy fleet circle jerks send to be very platform centric when what is needed is an analysis of what effect is required in where.
This is numbers, availability, survivability, and capability, not which shiny platform or widget various suppliers want to sell us, and especially not what people think looks cool.
There are multiple serious analysis going back over a hundred years that are still relevant because of geography alone. Patrol boats with missiles, just like notional fast attack craft and torpedo boats of the past are simply irrelevant in our strategic environment.
Let's take the Bathurst Class Corvette of WWII fame as an example of a bare minimum surface combatant. It's dual purpose armament, sensors and role would be equivalent to ANZACs updated systems on a new, more survivable hull. Not a PB, not an FAC, not an OPV based Corvette.
The sloops and later frigates would be equivalent to the Hunters and notional GP frigates. The Hobart's are very much akin to the fleet destroyers (Ns and Q's, not the Scrap Iron Flotilla, that's the ANZACs).
There is no functional equivalent to the cruisers we used to have. That sort of capability would be something like Burke's, Ticonderogas or even Japan's DDHs.
Every single asset we have is smaller, less capable, older and available in fewer numbers than what every single serious review has indicated we need. Yet we have continual discussions if more if the same but newer with extra bits added.
Volk I agree with you on so many levels but one.
The reality that long term plans inevitably change with the passage of time.
Sometimes a single build will stay the distance. 10 ANZACs (not 12) comes to mind.
But as you have often talked about re the history of the RAN and what we had planned for or better , had hoped for , for usually does not come to fruition.
ANZACS on their own are fine, but the intended fleet they were to sail with was altered substantially and therfore were forced to become something they were not designed for.
We await the Naval Review and I'd guess it will provide a road map for the RAN going forward and the type and numbers of vessels required to give government and Navy a maritime response to the challenges of the future.
Appropriate and all good stuff, if both the force mix is correct and equally important and this is the key point........... Implemented!
Take one item out of mx and the balance is lost with compromises having to be made.
It's almost like you have to plan your fantasy fleet around the fact that long term expectations will not be met.
All very negative on my behalf , but its an observation mirrored on the reality that we have today , versus the aspiration we aspired to over the decades.
It's why we talk about up gunning OPVs and bolting on bits to ANZACs when there's no weight margin left. Why we talk of more Hobart's and other options when what we should of done is ordered more in the first place.
Up gun the Cape class is met with comedy, buy if all had gone well the Evolved Cape series would not have been built and OPVs would be in service today doing their job.
Admirals tlold they were out of control wanting a third LHD, yet since the Canberra Class came into service what's the ADFs go to asset for some many activities etc etc.
Reluctantly fantasy fleets play a role due to expediancy.
I guess it's a form of reluctant adaptability.
I hope the Naval Review gets bipartisan support for decades to come.
Cheers S
.
