Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Redlands18]

Other examples of their independent selection is the Anzac upgrades, AOR, purchasing MB-339’s when the RAAF was interested in the Hawk 127’s, purchasing the T-6C Texan 2 aircraft instead of the RAAF’s PC-21. They have been much more successful in the purchase and operation of naval helicopters, eg Seasprites than the ADF.

I would actually say Australia is way ahead in the purchase and operation of Naval Helicopters. Australia decided to dump the Seasprite program and go with an all MH-60R fleet, a Helicopter that is still in production and that has allowed Australia to buy 12 more to replace the troubled MRH-90 logistic fleet as well. The original NZ brand new build SH-2G served for just 15 years before being replaced by the ex RAN machines, because they didn't buy a big enough fleet. NZ now has a tiny orphan fleet of five aircraft that is becoming increasingly difficult to operate and are currently looking at new Helicopters and all the contenders were available when they purchased the ex Australian Seasprites in 2016. Unless they buy the NFH-90 to replace the Seasprite, the RNZAF is going to end up with 2 small fleets of Helicopters of 8 NH-90s+ 4-6 Naval Helicopters of a completely different type, at the same time Australia will be operating a fleet of 36 MH-60Rs and 40 UH-60Ms.

 

[Going Boeing]

I would actually say Australia is way ahead in the purchase and operation of Naval Helicopters. Australia decided to dump the Seasprite program and go with an all MH-60R fleet, a Helicopter that is still in production and that has allowed Australia to buy 12 more to replace the troubled MRH-90 logistic fleet as well. The original NZ brand new build SH-2G served for just 15 years before being replaced by the ex RAN machines, because they didn't buy a big enough fleet. NZ now has a tiny orphan fleet of five aircraft that is becoming increasingly difficult to operate and are currently looking at new Helicopters and all the contenders were available when they purchased the ex Australian Seasprites in 2016. Unless they buy the NFH-90 to replace the Seasprite, the RNZAF is going to end up with 2 small fleets of Helicopters of 8 NH-90s+ 4-6 Naval Helicopters of a completely different type, at the same time Australia will be operating a fleet of 36 MH-60Rs and 40 UH-60Ms.

I agree with the current NZ helicopter fleet issues, I was mainly alluding to the fact that they bought off the shelf Seasprites whereas the RAN wasted $billions on trying to fit maximum capability into a small airframe. The lead test pilot had a lot of pressure applied to him to sign off on the project but it had so many problems that he was sure that lives would be lost if it went into service so he kept refusing.

 

[spoz]

1. The total cost of the SH-2G(A) program was less than $1 billion in then year dollars.

2. There was no pressure applied to anybody to "sign off" on it; we were all trying to bring it into service, and to deal with the problems as they arose - that was, after all, the job. Now retired RADM Tony Dalton was the then Program Manager; as a most competent helo pilot himself he would not have "signed off" on the aircraft, which never had anything except a special permit to fly, if it was not safe to do so. Nor would the relevant Engineering Authority, towards the end of the Project headed by later RADM Col Lawrence have permitted it. To suggest otherwise is to impugn the integrity of those working on the Project. And, of course, the data on which the GOTD made the decision to cancel, and the recommendation to do so if other possible options were unpalatable, came from the project.

3. Over the period of the Program, a number of officers commanded AMAFTU, so were the lead test authority. At least one of them became the Sea Sprite Project Director late in the Project's life. There is always discussion between the test authority and the procurement authority, but there was never any attempt to either override their advice, or to not make that advice available to the appropriate chains of command. As, of course, was the separate and independent advice from DGTA.

4. There was, certainly, a media event in 2003 which introduced the aircraft and when 805 recommissioned; but that's all it was, a media event. Nobody at that time thought the aircraft was fit to be introduced as it was at what was virtually the start of the flight test program.

 

[Armchair]

And the final decision maker would not have been the Secretary of the Department (who probably wished he could have been) - for a project of that size it is the National Security Committee of Cabinet. And their deliberations are closed, including to ANAO so far as I know, for 30 years. The Secretary would have had departmental sign off on the process, but he would have had to get the agreement of the Secretaries’ Committee first; and even then the whole thing would have been reviewed during the decision on the source selection.

According to the article it was the department that admitted the error. They are not saying their processes were fine, but were hidden from ANAO due to national security or cabinet confidentiality, they are saying their processes were flawed.
I don’t think Richardson was corrupt (even remotely) but if the reasons were missing on the decision then it seems most likely (given Richardson’s level of experience) they were omitted because including them would have been inconvenient ( either for Richardson or for the government). With the federal anti corruption processes and robodebt royal commission outcomes senior bureaucrats are less likely now to allow themselves to be positioned to take the fall.

None of this relates to the merit of the outcome. It is also a positive when it comes to trusting future procurement (which is the context it was raised in). Problems have been admitted and (presumably) fixed rather than uncovered by investigators.

 

[iambuzzard]

The Hunter approx $2.7 billion AUD per unit(first batch), $5+ billion is through life cost.

Speaking of costs…

Per unit(Australian built / overseas purchase), Tier 2 Approx

Arrowhead 140 - $1+ billion AUD / $900 million AUD(U.K)
Mogami(B2) - $1 billion AUD / $700 million AUD(Japan)
MEKO A210 - unknown, likely the most expensive to build and possibly buy(Germany)
Alpha 5000 - unknown, likely close to $1 billion to build, $800 million AUD to buy(Spain)
AUS Light frigate - $900 million AUD / $500 million AUD(Taiwan)
Tasman class - $800 million AUD / $600 million AUD(Spain)
C90 - $600million AUD / $450 million AUD(Germany)
Arafura - $400 million AUD / $250 million AUD(Germany)

Not through life.

Thanks Reptilia. That clarifies it a lot. Through life costs are significantly more than the sail away cost. Cheers,
Buzzard.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

The Hunter approx $2.7 billion AUD per unit(first batch), $5+ billion is through life cost.

Speaking of costs…

Reptilia

Where do you get these costs from?
I have never seen a public break up of costs for the Attack or Hunter Classes. I think this is one of the reasons both programs attracted so much scepticism.

 

[spoz]

And in other news, NUSHIP Eyre was launched today.

 

[spoz]

According to the article it was the department that admitted the error. They are not saying their processes were fine, but were hidden from ANAO due to national security or cabinet confidentiality, they are saying their processes were flawed.
I don’t think Richardson was corrupt (even remotely) but if the reasons were missing on the decision then it seems most likely (given Richardson’s level of experience) they were omitted because including them would have been inconvenient ( either for Richardson or for the government). With the federal anti corruption processes and robodebt royal commission outcomes senior bureaucrats are less likely now to allow themselves to be positioned to take the fall.

None of this relates to the merit of the outcome. It is also a positive when it comes to trusting future procurement (which is the context it was raised in). Problems have been admitted and (presumably) fixed rather than uncovered by investigators.

The point being that it is a whole of Government, not just a Defence, process. The Defence part of the process may have been flawed in some way; but the reason why Attorney General's, Finance et al are involved in these very large decisions is to review Defence's approaches and confirm they meet whole of Government intent. They can't reassess the technical aspects of course, although sometimes it seems they would like to. And then it is the Goverment (in NSC) who make the decision to procure or not procure - certainly based on a Defence submission but one that has already been thoroughly aired with the other Departments. So if there was a failure in process, it was in fact a whole of Government failure of process. Given that is the way it works, it would be surprising if a failure of process to the level of being actionable occurred.

By the same token, these processes are extremely complex and it is difficult for any one person to get their mind around the detail of everything that is involved. So it may well have been that some things didn't go as well as they should have or could have, but that such shortcomings did not at the time percolate to the top of the decision tree at the time. I dare say that an honest review of any major project in any sphere in any country could probably find, in hindsight, that the process was less that 100% satisfactory. Process is always subject to improvement particularly with 20/20 hindsight - if one chooses to learn of course. But whether that short coming is visible as it is occurring, and is therfore capable of being corrected or overcome in the stream of activity, is quite a different issue.

 

[Reptilia]

Reptilia

Where do you get these costs from?
I have never seen a public break up of costs for the Attack or Hunter Classes. I think this is one of the reasons both programs attracted so much scepticism.

I used the U.K(2021) and presumed Canadian per unit cost which was easier to find, converted it to AUD and then added estimated redesign cost + adjusted costs that apply with an Australian build. $2.78 billion was the figure I came up with. Through life costs are much harder to calculate, I have little information until we see city class in service.
if anyone was watching the news yesterday, RSV Nuyina was $528 million to design and build, was $1.6 billion through 30 year life(including design and build), now over $2 billion(+ design/build).

 

[Scott Elaurant]

I used the U.K(2021) and presumed Canadian per unit cost which was easier to find, converted it to AUD and then added estimated redesign cost + adjusted costs that apply with an Australian build. $2.78 billion was the figure I came up with. Through life costs are much harder to calculate, I have little information until we see city class in service.
if anyone was watching the news yesterday, RSV Nuyina was $528 million to design and build, was $1.6 billion through 30 year life(including design and build), now over $2 billion(+ design/build).

Reptila

Thanks. I am not sure if that is correct. (As a taxpayer I hope I am wrong!) From my reading the RAN, RCN and RN prices seem to be quite different.

From the statements in the ANAO Audit the original out-turn (i.e. all construction, including inflation over the construction period) price was $35 billion for 9 ships (ANAO page 7). This has risen to $45 billion (ANAO page 7) for 9 ships, with not all costs included.

Sustainment cost estimates were not included, and in fact had not yet been made (S21 page 10). The lack of a whole of life cost for the Hunter program was one of the criticisms ANAO made (summary, page 1).

Later the ANAO report says the acquisition cost is $44.3 billion, not all costs included, and obviously not including sustainment (S38, page 12).
"As of January 2023, Defence’s internal estimate of total acquisition costs, for the project as a whole, was that it was likely to be significantly higher than the $44.3 billion advised to government at second pass in June 2018."

The $6 billion spent to date has included design development ($2.5 billion), production of test modules, and ordering of long lead time components.

So it looks like the real construction contract cost per ship is $45B/9 = $5 billion Aus per ship and counting.

https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Auditor-General_Report_2022-23_21a.pdf

I am not suggesting the workforce at ASC is getting anything like $5 billion per Hunter. The Parliamentary hearing I mentioned a few weeks ago asked questions about the amount of local content of the BAE CEO. He said it was intended to rise from 54% to 58%. So that would suggest ASC's construction cost per Hunter was $2.9 billion per ship. That is close to what you suggested.

But that does not include BAE design (+$2.5 billion for 9 ships) or the balance of UK work, which seems to add to $16.4 billion Aus ($45 billion - $2.5 billion design - $26.1 billion ASC work), or +$1.8 billion per ship for UK components. So each Hunter is costing $4.7 billion Aus to build, unless somebody thinks my maths is wrong, or has a better figure.

The radar and combat system costs are also presumably in that total. Items like helicopters and missiles like Tomahawk are in other budget items.

 

[iambuzzard]

Reptila

Thanks. I am not sure if that is correct. (As a taxpayer I hope I am wrong!) From my reading the RAN, RCN and RN prices seem to be quite different.

From the statements in the ANAO Audit the original out-turn (i.e. all construction, including inflation over the construction period) price was $35 billion for 9 ships (ANAO page 7). This has risen to $45 billion (ANAO page 7) for 9 ships, with not all costs included.

Sustainment cost estimates were not included, and in fact had not yet been made (S21 page 10). The lack of a whole of life cost for the Hunter program was one of the criticisms ANAO made (summary, page 1).

Later the ANAO report says the acquisition cost is $44.3 billion, not all costs included, and obviously not including sustainment (S38, page 12).
"As of January 2023, Defence’s internal estimate of total acquisition costs, for the project as a whole, was that it was likely to be significantly higher than the $44.3 billion advised to government at second pass in June 2018."

The $6 billion spent to date has included design development ($2.5 billion), production of test modules, and ordering of long lead time components.

So it looks like the real construction contract cost per ship is $45B/9 = $5 billion Aus per ship and counting.

https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Auditor-General_Report_2022-23_21a.pdf

I am not suggesting the workforce at ASC is getting anything like $5 billion per Hunter. The Parliamentary hearing I mentioned a few weeks ago asked questions about the amount of local content of the BAE CEO. He said it was intended to rise from 54% to 58%. So that would suggest ASC's construction cost per Hunter was $2.9 billion per ship.

But that does not include BAE design (+$2.5 billion for 9 ships) or the balance of UK work, which seems to add to $16.4 billion Aus ($45 billion - $2.5 billion design - $26.1 billion ASC work), or +$1.8 billion per ship for UK components. So each Hunter is costing $4.7 billion Aus to build, unless somebody thinks my maths is wrong, or has a better figure.

The radar and combat system costs are also presumably in that total. Items like helicopters and missiles liek Tomahawk are in other budget items.

I'm glad I'm a layman. These figures are doing my head in. I just run a hobby shop! lol

 

[Reptilia]

Reptila

Thanks. I am not sure if that is correct. (As a taxpayer I hope I am wrong!) From my reading the RAN, RCN and RN prices seem to be quite different.

From the statements in the ANAO Audit the original out-turn (i.e. all construction, including inflation over the construction period) price was $35 billion for 9 ships (ANAO page 7). This has risen to $45 billion (ANAO page 7) for 9 ships, with not all costs included.

Sustainment cost estimates were not included, and in fact had not yet been made (S21 page 10). The lack of a whole of life cost for the Hunter program was one of the criticisms ANAO made (summary, page 1).

Later the ANAO report says the acquisition cost is $44.3 billion, not all costs included, and obviously not including sustainment (S38, page 12).
"As of January 2023, Defence’s internal estimate of total acquisition costs, for the project as a whole, was that it was likely to be significantly higher than the $44.3 billion advised to government at second pass in June 2018."

The $6 billion spent to date has included design development ($2.5 billion), production of test modules, and ordering of long lead time components.

So it looks like the real construction contract cost per ship is $45B/9 = $5 billion Aus per ship and counting.

https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Auditor-General_Report_2022-23_21a.pdf

I am not suggesting the workforce at ASC is getting anything like $5 billion per Hunter. The Parliamentary hearing I mentioned a few weeks ago asked questions about the amount of local content of the BAE CEO. He said it was intended to rise from 54% to 58%. So that would suggest ASC's construction cost per Hunter was $2.9 billion per ship. That is close to what you suggested.

But that does not include BAE design (+$2.5 billion for 9 ships) or the balance of UK work, which seems to add to $16.4 billion Aus ($45 billion - $2.5 billion design - $26.1 billion ASC work), or +$1.8 billion per ship for UK components. So each Hunter is costing $4.7 billion Aus to build, unless somebody thinks my maths is wrong, or has a better figure.

The radar and combat system costs are also presumably in that total. Items like helicopters and missiles like Tomahawk are in other budget items.

$10 or so billion of the $45 billion was allocated to things outside of unit cost from what I have read. First of class unit cost was listed at $3.84 billion in 20/21 with all 9 ships being built by 2044. Successor ships to foc were to reduce in price and over the timeline would reduce to an average per unit cost of $2.7 something billion. $10 or so billion included non acquisition costs related to infrastructure, facilities and contingency etc etc. The paper is somewhere… 2020 or 2021.
2023 now though… bae still believe they can Catch up to the original timeline set and recover cost overuns, not including redesign costs or upgrades. Possibly $3.4 billion per unit as of today?

 

[John Fedup]

Reptila

Thanks. I am not sure if that is correct. (As a taxpayer I hope I am wrong!) From my reading the RAN, RCN and RN prices seem to be quite different.

From the statements in the ANAO Audit the original out-turn (i.e. all construction, including inflation over the construction period) price was $35 billion for 9 ships (ANAO page 7). This has risen to $45 billion (ANAO page 7) for 9 ships, with not all costs included.

Sustainment cost estimates were not included, and in fact had not yet been made (S21 page 10). The lack of a whole of life cost for the Hunter program was one of the criticisms ANAO made (summary, page 1).

Later the ANAO report says the acquisition cost is $44.3 billion, not all costs included, and obviously not including sustainment (S38, page 12).
"As of January 2023, Defence’s internal estimate of total acquisition costs, for the project as a whole, was that it was likely to be significantly higher than the $44.3 billion advised to government at second pass in June 2018."

The $6 billion spent to date has included design development ($2.5 billion), production of test modules, and ordering of long lead time components.

So it looks like the real construction contract cost per ship is $45B/9 = $5 billion Aus per ship and counting.

https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Auditor-General_Report_2022-23_21a.pdf

I am not suggesting the workforce at ASC is getting anything like $5 billion per Hunter. The Parliamentary hearing I mentioned a few weeks ago asked questions about the amount of local content of the BAE CEO. He said it was intended to rise from 54% to 58%. So that would suggest ASC's construction cost per Hunter was $2.9 billion per ship. That is close to what you suggested.

But that does not include BAE design (+$2.5 billion for 9 ships) or the balance of UK work, which seems to add to $16.4 billion Aus ($45 billion - $2.5 billion design - $26.1 billion ASC work), or +$1.8 billion per ship for UK components. So each Hunter is costing $4.7 billion Aus to build, unless somebody thinks my maths is wrong, or has a better figure.

The radar and combat system costs are also presumably in that total. Items like helicopters and missiles like Tomahawk are in other budget items.

Your calculations seem to align much better with the CSC unit cost than the 2.5 billion Hunter cost mentioned earlier in the thread.

 

[ADMk2]

HMAS ANZAC being up on blocks and not going through TRANSCAP has finally hit the media…

The talking heads will have a field day now…

 

[devo99]

Is there any public info on what TRANSCAP will entail yet?

 

[old faithful]

Transcap.

Is there any public info on what TRANSCAP will entail yet?

ANZAC frigates to gain capability, lose weight - Australian Defence Magazine

Due to delays in fielding the Hunter-class frigate, the scope of the Anzac life extension program has been expanded.

www.australiandefence.com.au

 

[Milne Bay]

Transcap.

ANZAC frigates to gain capability, lose weight - Australian Defence Magazine

Due to delays in fielding the Hunter-class frigate, the scope of the Anzac life extension program has been expanded.

www.australiandefence.com.au

I am at a loss to understand why:
While HMAS Anzac has the weight margin available to accommodate all of the TransCap upgrades, HMAS Warramunga does not unless more weight savings are found.
What makes these two ships of the same class different?
MB

 

[Wombat000]

I’m hopeful that Towed Sonar will be one of those capabilities included.

 

[StingrayOZ]

While HMAS Anzac has the weight margin available to accommodate all of the TransCap upgrades, HMAS Warramunga does not unless more weight savings are found.
What makes these two ships of the same class different?

Not much, but that shows how close margins are with these ships.
Anzac which has the margin, is being shelved, while Warramunga, which doesn't is going through.

HMAS ANZAC being up on blocks and not going through TRANSCAP has finally hit the media…

It will be interesting what they will say.

RAN has serious challenges ahead of it. Being asked so much, but being given so little and taking away what little they already have.

 

[Volkodav]

An eye opening reveal from the Lehmann defemation case.

Rape accusations aside the evidence given was astounding in regards to what he was doing at parliament house that night.

He was apparently shoring up support, on the instruction of his minister, WA Senator Reynolds, to move construction of the now cancelled Attack Class Submarines, to WA!

WTAF!

The reason given was to sure up WA votes for the government in the upcoming election where the governing party anticipated a total (and actually realised) electoral drubing in that state.