Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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Does this open possibilities for legal actions from Fincantieri or Navantia?I think so. When I saw the video over the weekend, I thought that it would be quite easily operated off the Canberra Class ships.
Don't tell lies; you Aussies don't love us.
Of course, I have my prejudices.FYI I am a diehard Broncos and Maroons rugby league supporter and being Cantabrian I wear eyepatches on both eyes.
I think that we have been stung by the RAN, AU Def Dept and AU pollies to be too keen on the idea. We would probably avoid the Hunters like the plague after the recent ANAO Report and the subsequent Department of Defence has admitted that it "... 'did not conduct an effective limited tender process’ for the design of the $45 billion Hunter class frigates".
Defence admits flawed Hunter tender process | The Australian Naval Institute
navalinstitute.com.au
That admission would be a real warning flag for us because since 2015 we have been very strong on due and proper processes in our defence acquisition programs. Our pollies would not support some of the "questionable" acquisition practices of the Australian Dept of Defence. Cost, actually VfM (Value for Money) is very important to us, given that historically our govts of either stripe have been loath to spend money on defence.
However, I do understand interoperability and, on the surface, having common ships etc., and a common CMS would simplify matters much between the two navies. The problem is that our requirements are different and that would still apply even if we were joined at the hip defence wise. We require ships that can operate in the Southern Ocean and in Antarctica, whereas the RAN aren't interested in anything below 48 South. So that is one area where we could be complimentary, by providing a capability set that is Southern Ocean and Antarctica capable. We found out the hard way that Anzac frigates don't like the Southern Ocean and even our OPVs are struggling down there.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Probably not, any legal action should have started right after the award notification. Starting something now would likely poison chances for future opportunities.
What it comes down to is those who think a ship is a ship, versus those who see ASW frigates, ASW destroyers, air defence frigates, GP frigates and GP destroyers.
The requirement was an existing high end ASW ship design with a core AEGIS combat system and significant future growth. Selection of the Type 26 as the reference design was self evident.
Same with the F/A-18F as an interim combat aircraft and the F-35 as the future fighter, there were no other viable options that met requirements.
In fact, had the same commonsense been applied to the destroyer program the Hobart's would be very different ships, i.e. they would likely either be evolved F-100s that better met requirements, or minimum change Burke's.
Look how following procurement rules left us with MRH90 and Super Seasprite, MU-90 and Mk-54 torpedoes. Commonsense needs to be applied as the rules only go so far. Follow the rules to the letter and the RAAF would be flying Rafael and the RAN would be building refueling infrastructure in the north west to get our mini submarines to their patrol areas.
The requirement was an existing high end ASW ship design with a core AEGIS combat system and significant future growth. Selection of the Type 26 as the reference design was self evident.
Same with the F/A-18F as an interim combat aircraft and the F-35 as the future fighter, there were no other viable options that met requirements.
In fact, had the same commonsense been applied to the destroyer program the Hobart's would be very different ships, i.e. they would likely either be evolved F-100s that better met requirements, or minimum change Burke's.
Look how following procurement rules left us with MRH90 and Super Seasprite, MU-90 and Mk-54 torpedoes. Commonsense needs to be applied as the rules only go so far. Follow the rules to the letter and the RAAF would be flying Rafael and the RAN would be building refueling infrastructure in the north west to get our mini submarines to their patrol areas.
On what basis? How would they possibly have a claim against us?
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Legally the statute of limitations on civil damages here is 3 years from discovery of the information, or 12 years from when the loss suffered. So legally yes a court case over Hunter could still occur up to 2030. In some overseas jurisdictions court cases over awarding of defense contracts are quite common (e.g. Germany). However practically, I agree it seems very unlikely a supplier would do it.
As for the basis, you would have to show some form of procedural impropriety or bias damaged your bid. You don't have to show you would have won to be damaged. It has been done before, especially in USA and Germany.
Major army tender cancelled after bias allegations
A multimillion-dollar tender for essential battlefield equipment has been cancelled following allegations that the army's tender process was biased.
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The article says the decision maker (Secretary of Defence) did not retain records of the reasons for the decision on T26. Australia has a federal corruption watchdog now. It’s worth keeping some paperwork when things get into the $45bn range. Even if the true reason was “AusGov believes it will help us get a fantastic trade deal with the booming post-Brexit UK economy” then he could have listed Volkodav’s reasons which were in the public domain at the time.I think that we have been stung by the RAN, AU Def Dept and AU pollies to be too keen on the idea. We would probably avoid the Hunters like the plague after the recent ANAO Report and the subsequent Department of Defence has admitted that it "... 'did not conduct an effective limited tender process’ for the design of the $45 billion Hunter class frigates".
Defence admits flawed Hunter tender process | The Australian Naval Institute
That admission would be a real warning flag for us because since 2015 we have been very strong on due and proper processes in our defence acquisition programs. Our pollies would not support some of the "questionable" acquisition practices of the Australian Dept of Defence. Cost, actually VfM (Value for Money) is very important to us, given that historically our govts of either stripe have been loath to spend money on defence.
I am confused, I can't see how there could be any consideration of legal action or serious accusations of corruption.
To be honest this really appears to be a case of the tail wagging the dog.
The competitive evaluation process is a bodged together process, developed after Tony Abbot said it existed. A group was formed in Canberra to come up with something as a matter of urgency so the PM didn't get embarrassed.
Prior to this the process was Kinaird, where the best evolved option was run off against the best existing, i.e. modified or new that meets requirements, run off against MOTS (military off the shelf). This process was intended to be used to select trucks and such, but was used to choose the RANs main combatant.
Prior to that Defence actually had some technical depth and was able to properly advise government. This was back in the days when we selected stuff that works and much is still in service, long after it should have been replaced.
Besides that there's been a lot of captain's picks and dodgy pork barreling, not talking about SA but crappy aluminium patrol boats from WA.
The Type 26 was the best option within the constraints placed on the project by the GotD.
To be honest this really appears to be a case of the tail wagging the dog.
The competitive evaluation process is a bodged together process, developed after Tony Abbot said it existed. A group was formed in Canberra to come up with something as a matter of urgency so the PM didn't get embarrassed.
Prior to this the process was Kinaird, where the best evolved option was run off against the best existing, i.e. modified or new that meets requirements, run off against MOTS (military off the shelf). This process was intended to be used to select trucks and such, but was used to choose the RANs main combatant.
Prior to that Defence actually had some technical depth and was able to properly advise government. This was back in the days when we selected stuff that works and much is still in service, long after it should have been replaced.
Besides that there's been a lot of captain's picks and dodgy pork barreling, not talking about SA but crappy aluminium patrol boats from WA.
The Type 26 was the best option within the constraints placed on the project by the GotD.
And the final decision maker would not have been the Secretary of the Department (who probably wished he could have been) - for a project of that size it is the National Security Committee of Cabinet. And their deliberations are closed, including to ANAO so far as I know, for 30 years. The Secretary would have had departmental sign off on the process, but he would have had to get the agreement of the Secretaries’ Committee first; and even then the whole thing would have been reviewed during the decision on the source selection.
iambuzzard
Well-Known Member
Agreed Volks. To this layman, and understanding that the $45 Billion is the total cost for the life of the T26 Hunter fleet, and not just the float away from the dockyard cost, I think they are a good choice.
As you said, they were the best option for us at the time and have more room for growth than the Anzacs have ever had.
Craig Lockart has proven the hull is adaptable and as long as they have available power for future laser and other new technology weapons they will have been a good choice. The process in obtaining them may have been crap but as long as we get the most effective ship in the end for the RAN that's all that matters.
After all it's our fellow men and women that we want to come home after their deployments.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I believe the 45 billion is the acquisition cost not the lifetime cost. The CSC acquisition cost was 70 billion in 2019 for 15 ships (higher now).
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
This appears to be incorrect. I checked an ADM article from 2019 which reported a then AUD$35 bil. programme life cost.
Also an ANAO report on the Hunter-class frigate acquisition from 10 May 2023 references AUD$45.6 bil. out-turned. Between these things, and how Australia tends to report defence and programme costs (whole of programme life, not just flyaway/sailaway...) this does make sense.
The Hunter approx $2.7 billion AUD per unit(first batch), $5+ billion is through life cost.
Speaking of costs…
Per unit(Australian built / overseas purchase), Tier 2 Approx
Arrowhead 140 - $1+ billion AUD / $900 million AUD(U.K)
Mogami(B2) - $1 billion AUD / $700 million AUD(Japan)
MEKO A210 - unknown, likely the most expensive to build and possibly buy(Germany)
Alpha 5000 - unknown, likely close to $1 billion to build, $800 million AUD to buy(Spain)
AUS Light frigate - $900 million AUD / $500 million AUD(Taiwan)
Tasman class - $800 million AUD / $600 million AUD(Spain)
C90 - $600million AUD / $450 million AUD(Germany)
Arafura - $400 million AUD / $250 million AUD(Germany)
Not through life.
@Reptilia Sources please.
Ngatimozart.
Speaking of costs…
Per unit(Australian built / overseas purchase), Tier 2 Approx
Arrowhead 140 - $1+ billion AUD / $900 million AUD(U.K)
Mogami(B2) - $1 billion AUD / $700 million AUD(Japan)
MEKO A210 - unknown, likely the most expensive to build and possibly buy(Germany)
Alpha 5000 - unknown, likely close to $1 billion to build, $800 million AUD to buy(Spain)
AUS Light frigate - $900 million AUD / $500 million AUD(Taiwan)
Tasman class - $800 million AUD / $600 million AUD(Spain)
C90 - $600million AUD / $450 million AUD(Germany)
Arafura - $400 million AUD / $250 million AUD(Germany)
Not through life.
@Reptilia Sources please.
Ngatimozart.
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Clearly Canada and Australia must have different definitions on overall life time costs for frigates. Life cycle costs for SSNs seem more realistic. I have attached the most recent cost estimates for CSC. If the numbers are correct, there is a huge difference between the Hunter and CSC acquisition costs AND life time costs). Hunter 2.5 billion AUD versus CSC 5.3 billion CDN (5.83 AUD). I can appreciate certain things may be included in one version and not in the other but a 3 billion dollar difference!! There must be some serious BS in one of these estimates. I can believe Irving greed could explain maybe 1 billion but not 3 billion. If the 2.5 billion AUD for Hunter is correct Canada should order 15 Hunters. That might drive the price down to 2 billion per ship based on a 24 ship order. Would like to know how realistic the Hunter price of 2.5 billion really is. I am under the impression Hunter has more modifications than CSC.
YN5-253-2022-eng.pdf (publications.gc.ca)
My Google Foo is on the blink this morning but I do recall the unit cost of the core AEGIS combat system being somewhere in the order of $1 billion US.
Add this, let alone any other enhanced capability to any of the cheap and cheerful options being discussed and you have a smaller, less capable, more compromised platform that costs pretty much the same as a Hunter. That is assuming it is actually structurally capable of shipping AEGIS.
Factor in who the potential enemy is and their possession of anti ship ballistic missiles and AEGIS Baseline 9 or similar, and a capable active phased array radar, becomes pretty much your minimum requirement.
By all means, buy three dozen super cape class missile corvettes from Austal, but don't expect them to survive let alone be usefull.
@Volkodav You having been holding your mouth wrong. You know that the Google Foo is fussy about things like that.
Ngatimozart.
Add this, let alone any other enhanced capability to any of the cheap and cheerful options being discussed and you have a smaller, less capable, more compromised platform that costs pretty much the same as a Hunter. That is assuming it is actually structurally capable of shipping AEGIS.
Factor in who the potential enemy is and their possession of anti ship ballistic missiles and AEGIS Baseline 9 or similar, and a capable active phased array radar, becomes pretty much your minimum requirement.
By all means, buy three dozen super cape class missile corvettes from Austal, but don't expect them to survive let alone be usefull.
@Volkodav You having been holding your mouth wrong. You know that the Google Foo is fussy about things like that.
Ngatimozart.
Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
I thought that the Type 26/Hunter platform is too high end for the RNZN requirements and that they are more interested in General Purpose frigates such as AH-140/Type 31. It would make sense if the capabilities of the proposed RAN Tier 2 vessels aligned with the RNZN’s needs but the Kiwis have always wanted to do things independently.I think that we have been stung by the RAN, AU Def Dept and AU pollies to be too keen on the idea. We would probably avoid the Hunters like the plague after the recent ANAO Report and the subsequent Department of Defence has admitted that it "... 'did not conduct an effective limited tender process’ for the design of the $45 billion Hunter class frigates".
Defence admits flawed Hunter tender process | The Australian Naval Institute
That admission would be a real warning flag for us because since 2015 we have been very strong on due and proper processes in our defence acquisition programs. Our pollies would not support some of the "questionable" acquisition practices of the Australian Dept of Defence. Cost, actually VfM (Value for Money) is very important to us, given that historically our govts of either stripe have been loath to spend money on defence.
However, I do understand interoperability and, on the surface, having common ships etc., and a common CMS would simplify matters much between the two navies. The problem is that our requirements are different and that would still apply even if we were joined at the hip defence wise. We require ships that can operate in the Southern Ocean and in Antarctica, whereas the RAN aren't interested in anything below 48 South. So that is one area where we could be complimentary, by providing a capability set that is Southern Ocean and Antarctica capable. We found out the hard way that Anzac frigates don't like the Southern Ocean and even our OPVs are struggling down there.
A prime example was when the RNZAF P-3B’s were upgraded to P-3K’s instead of taking advantage of highly discounted new P-3C Update 2 (an 18 month window of opportunity which allowed the RAAF to cheaply standardise their fleet and cancel plans to upgrade their P-3B’s). Thus the RNZAF operated an orphan fleet of just 6 aircraft for another 4 decades when they could have benefited from having commonality with other operators. I understand that Boeing wanted to break Lockheed’s monopoly of the MPA market and offered the RNZAF a cheap package for their upgrade. This was the program where Boeing gained the expertise to eventually put together the P-8 systems. While the P-8 is now the dominant MPA, some of its systems (eg radar, ESM, etc) are not as good as was fitted to the upgraded AP-3C’s but they have been integrated well and are onboard a reliable airframe.
Other examples of their independent selection is the Anzac upgrades, AOR, purchasing MB-339’s when the RAAF was interested in the Hawk 127’s, purchasing the T-6C Texan 2 aircraft instead of the RAAF’s PC-21. They have been much more successful in the purchase and operation of naval helicopters, eg Seasprites than the ADF.
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If this was the reason (and I know you were just citing it as a potential “hidden justification”) he should be sacked immediately for not consulting Treasury or the RBA. Or DFAT for that matter.
No credible economist thought Brexit would be a net positive for the British economy. And the UK was always going to be desperate to do trade deals after it happened.
Now if the justification was to better enmesh someone who is still a major power that we have strong historical and cultural links to in the Indo-Pacific I could get behind it.
But at the end of the day as @Volkodav says I think the reality is that it was just clearly the best option, and is shaping up to be a tremendous national asset for decades to come (despite the naysayers).