Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Armchair]

Steel is cheap and air is free.

Smaller rarely (never) results significantly cheaper, but nearly always results in compromised capability and poor value for money.

For a given system baseline, larger is not just more capable, it's better value for money. Core combat system, platform performance and loadout of equipment, weapons etc. sets a minimum cost and crew, that is not substantially affected by increasing size.

Space and weight for a larger VLS, extra consoles, a bigger gun, cost very little. Even fitting a larger VLS doesn't cost much in the grand scheme of things if you don't fill it.

I am familiar with the arguments from your posts (thanks btw) and I agree on the general point.

I was not really talking about size though. I meant a corvette system baseline (8-16 VLS, no Aegis rather than 32+ VLS and Aegis) and that range may not be important as common sense would dictate.

on size though

Are large warships quicker to build than small warships (I have no idea of the capacity of Osborne or Henderson to build any new order) which is the variable I raised?

is it true that bigger ships come with no cost in terms of increased signatures (agree they are more likely to survive, and preserve life, after a missile hit but a torpedo kills either)?

coming back to dollars.

Given the RAN’s major surface fleet base is in a very expensive city is it true that longer ships are cheaper to base and operate than shorter ships?

Doesn’t the extra weight and size cost more to move? There must be some tradeoff point.

Are there extra costs in basing larger ships in northern Australia (offset by improved sea keeping)?

 

[Redlands18]

I am familiar with the arguments from your posts (thanks btw) and I agree on the general point.

I was not really talking about size though. I meant a corvette system baseline (8-16 VLS, no Aegis rather than 32+ VLS and Aegis) and that range may not be important as common sense would dictate.

on size though

Are large warships quicker to build than small warships (I have no idea of the capacity of Osborne or Henderson to build any new order) which is the variable I raised?

is it true that bigger ships come with no cost in terms of increased signatures (agree they are more likely to survive, and preserve life, after a missile hit but a torpedo kills either)?

coming back to dollars.

Given the RAN’s major surface fleet base is in a very expensive city is it true that longer ships are cheaper to base and operate than shorter ships?

Doesn’t the extra weight and size cost more to move? There must be some tradeoff point.

Are there extra costs in basing larger ships in northern Australia (offset by improved sea keeping)?

The major problem with Northern Australia is lack of suitable bases for MFUs, there is a reason why all our MFUs are based in Sydney and Perth, large Naval bases require a huge amount of civil support, Cairns and Darwin simply have neither the civil infrastructure nor the civilian population required to support much above the naval bases they have now. and Sydney and Perth is where the Companies involved in maintaining and refitting the ships are based.
Don't underestimate the number of civilians, who are employed fulltime for Defence, either as Defence Civilians or work for companies contracted by Defence it's in the 10s of thousands and many more are working for Defence suppliers.

 

[Armchair]

The major problem with Northern Australia is lack of suitable bases for MFUs, there is a reason why all our MFUs are based in Sydney and Perth, large Naval bases require a huge amount of civil support, Cairns and Darwin simply have neither the civil infrastructure nor the civilian population required to support much above the naval bases they have now. and Sydney and Perth is where the Companies involved in maintaining and refitting the ships are based.
Don't underestimate the number of civilians, who are employed fulltime for Defence, either as Defence Civilians or work for companies contracted by Defence it's in the 10s of thousands and many more are working for Defence suppliers.

understood. So with the same crew numbers and systems on a 90m warship and a 120m warship (with unused space) the costs would be similar because they would both need to be based in Sydney or Perth?

 

[iambuzzard]

Steel is cheap and air is free.

Smaller rarely (never) results significantly cheaper, but nearly always results in compromised capability and poor value for money.

For a given system baseline, larger is not just more capable, it's better value for money. Core combat system, platform performance and loadout of equipment, weapons etc. sets a minimum cost and crew, that is not substantially affected by increasing size.

Space and weight for a larger VLS, extra consoles, a bigger gun, cost very little. Even fitting a larger VLS doesn't cost much in the grand scheme of things if you don't fill it.

You are right in that regard. Fitted with a 127mm gun, 32 VLS and a decent close in weapon system a larger hull will have room to expand the weapons fit out. Better to have it available for an upgrade than have no room to do it.

 

[Todjaeger]

I am familiar with the arguments from your posts (thanks btw) and I agree on the general point.

I was not really talking about size though. I meant a corvette system baseline (8-16 VLS, no Aegis rather than 32+ VLS and Aegis) and that range may not be important as common sense would dictate.

on size though

Are large warships quicker to build than small warships (I have no idea of the capacity of Osborne or Henderson to build any new order) which is the variable I raised?

is it true that bigger ships come with no cost in terms of increased signatures (agree they are more likely to survive, and preserve life, after a missile hit but a torpedo kills either)?

coming back to dollars.

Given the RAN’s major surface fleet base is in a very expensive city is it true that longer ships are cheaper to base and operate than shorter ships?

Doesn’t the extra weight and size cost more to move? There must be some tradeoff point.

Are there extra costs in basing larger ships in northern Australia (offset by improved sea keeping)?

A few points to make regarding the above. One of the first is that 8-16 VLS cells is not really a corvette-type system, such a loadout is more typically found aboard frigates. Relating to that, one of the major drivers of the cost of a warship is the systems fitted, as opposed to the overall size, hence the adage that, "steel is cheap and air is free..." IIRC additional weapons systems, and more advanced weapons systems, sensors and shipboard electronics, can often be a third to half the cost of acquisition. To provide perhaps another perspective on this, Israel's Sa'ar 6-class corvette, itself based upon the German MEKO 100 patrol corvette has an estimated cost of ~USD480 mil. per vessel according to Naval Technology, with an overall length of 90m and displacement of ~2,000 tons.

The planned Type 31 frigates for the RN are estimated to cost ~USD$514 mil. (USD$2.57 bil. for five vessels, again per Naval Technology) with an overall length of ~139m and displacement of ~5,700 tons or more.

The weapons systems are somewhat different, with the Israeli corvette having a larger gun (76 mm vs. 57 mm), but one is also talking about a difference in cost of ~USD$35 mil. per vessel, with the more expensive vessel having nearly three times the displacement whilst being fitted with overall comparable systems. One major difference is that the larger Type 31 frigates are going to have more room and potential displacement for future growth and upgrades, as well as the potential for significantly greater range (~7,500 n miles vs. 2,500 miles).

The basic gist of what I am trying to illustrate is that it gets difficult and especially expensive, to try and cram highly capable systems into smaller sized hulls, to the point that there is very little if any cost savings upfront. Long-term, smaller hulls which are intended to be highly capable likely end up becoming more expensive, because of the costs and difficulties associated with managing weight and displacement issues as upgrade programmes are done to keep a vessel and systems relevant.

Now I cannot speak knowledgeably about the actual shipbuilding process (there are others here on DT who can) but I would imagine that the steel-bashing part of constructing a smaller vessel/hull would be faster than a larger vessel, but that difference might not be all that significant. However, fitting out a vessel with all the systems required to make it useful and usable, this includes all internal wiring, cabling, and piping, as well as the installation of all shipboard systems like machinery, gen sets, sensors, weapons, electronics and CMS, etc. then one could very well find that installing everything required into a smaller hull takes just as long, since there is less space available to get everything fitted.

Now one area which has been repeatedly mentioned is that most corvettes, at least those fitted with comprehensive weapon and sensor/CMS packages, tend to be rather limited in terms of range and/or endurance. Others might still persist in disagreeing, but from my POV this is a critical issue for Australia. To once again provide some context, once of the potential transit routes that a RAN vessel sailing between Singapore and Darwin might take is ~3,600 km or just under 2,000 n miles. A corvette transiting this SLOC would likely find itself on a one-way trip absent being able to stop and refuel and re-provision en route or get RAS whilst underway. A larger vessel like a frigate with fuel of perhaps 6,000 n miles and a 21 or 28 day endurance would likely be able to make a round trip transit if need be. As an additional aside, the larger frigate might also be able to operate with a higher cruising speed which would shorten the time required for the transit, thus eating less into the mission endurance. Using the German Braunschweig-class corvette as an example, they are listed with a range of ~4,000 n miles at 15 kts, but cruising at that speed it would take ~5.5 days to complete a one-way transit whilst the corvette only has an endurance of seven days without a tender.

 

[iambuzzard]

A few points to make regarding the above. One of the first is that 8-16 VLS cells is not really a corvette-type system, such a loadout is more typically found aboard frigates. Relating to that, one of the major drivers of the cost of a warship is the systems fitted, as opposed to the overall size, hence the adage that, "steel is cheap and air is free..." IIRC additional weapons systems, and more advanced weapons systems, sensors and shipboard electronics, can often be a third to half the cost of acquisition. To provide perhaps another perspective on this, Israel's Sa'ar 6-class corvette, itself based upon the German MEKO 100 patrol corvette has an estimated cost of ~USD480 mil. per vessel according to Naval Technology, with an overall length of 90m and displacement of ~2,000 tons.

The planned Type 31 frigates for the RN are estimated to cost ~USD$514 mil. (USD$2.57 bil. for five vessels, again per Naval Technology) with an overall length of ~139m and displacement of ~5,700 tons or more.

The weapons systems are somewhat different, with the Israeli corvette having a larger gun (76 mm vs. 57 mm), but one is also talking about a difference in cost of ~USD$35 mil. per vessel, with the more expensive vessel having nearly three times the displacement whilst being fitted with overall comparable systems. One major difference is that the larger Type 31 frigates are going to have more room and potential displacement for future growth and upgrades, as well as the potential for significantly greater range (~7,500 n miles vs. 2,500 miles).

The basic gist of what I am trying to illustrate is that it gets difficult and especially expensive, to try and cram highly capable systems into smaller sized hulls, to the point that there is very little if any cost savings upfront. Long-term, smaller hulls which are intended to be highly capable likely end up becoming more expensive, because of the costs and difficulties associated with managing weight and displacement issues as upgrade programmes are done to keep a vessel and systems relevant.

Now I cannot speak knowledgeably about the actual shipbuilding process (there are others here on DT who can) but I would imagine that the steel-bashing part of constructing a smaller vessel/hull would be faster than a larger vessel, but that difference might not be all that significant. However, fitting out a vessel with all the systems required to make it useful and usable, this includes all internal wiring, cabling, and piping, as well as the installation of all shipboard systems like machinery, gen sets, sensors, weapons, electronics and CMS, etc. then one could very well find that installing everything required into a smaller hull takes just as long, since there is less space available to get everything fitted.

Now one area which has been repeatedly mentioned is that most corvettes, at least those fitted with comprehensive weapon and sensor/CMS packages, tend to be rather limited in terms of range and/or endurance. Others might still persist in disagreeing, but from my POV this is a critical issue for Australia. To once again provide some context, once of the potential transit routes that a RAN vessel sailing between Singapore and Darwin might take is ~3,600 km or just under 2,000 n miles. A corvette transiting this SLOC would likely find itself on a one-way trip absent being able to stop and refuel and re-provision en route or get RAS whilst underway. A larger vessel like a frigate with fuel of perhaps 6,000 n miles and a 21 or 28 day endurance would likely be able to make a round trip transit if need be. As an additional aside, the larger frigate might also be able to operate with a higher cruising speed which would shorten the time required for the transit, thus eating less into the mission endurance. Using the German Braunschweig-class corvette as an example, they are listed with a range of ~4,000 n miles at 15 kts, but cruising at that speed it would take ~5.5 days to complete a one-way transit whilst the corvette only has an endurance of seven days without a tender.

One can only hope that the decision made by the government is sensible taking this into account.
We need hulls in the water, and fast as I fear the risk of a kinetic war in the near future is growing.

 

[Redlands18]

A few points to make regarding the above. One of the first is that 8-16 VLS cells is not really a corvette-type system, such a loadout is more typically found aboard frigates. Relating to that, one of the major drivers of the cost of a warship is the systems fitted, as opposed to the overall size, hence the adage that, "steel is cheap and air is free..." IIRC additional weapons systems, and more advanced weapons systems, sensors and shipboard electronics, can often be a third to half the cost of acquisition. To provide perhaps another perspective on this, Israel's Sa'ar 6-class corvette, itself based upon the German MEKO 100 patrol corvette has an estimated cost of ~USD480 mil. per vessel according to Naval Technology, with an overall length of 90m and displacement of ~2,000 tons.

The planned Type 31 frigates for the RN are estimated to cost ~USD$514 mil. (USD$2.57 bil. for five vessels, again per Naval Technology) with an overall length of ~139m and displacement of ~5,700 tons or more.

The weapons systems are somewhat different, with the Israeli corvette having a larger gun (76 mm vs. 57 mm), but one is also talking about a difference in cost of ~USD$35 mil. per vessel, with the more expensive vessel having nearly three times the displacement whilst being fitted with overall comparable systems. One major difference is that the larger Type 31 frigates are going to have more room and potential displacement for future growth and upgrades, as well as the potential for significantly greater range (~7,500 n miles vs. 2,500 miles).

The basic gist of what I am trying to illustrate is that it gets difficult and especially expensive, to try and cram highly capable systems into smaller sized hulls, to the point that there is very little if any cost savings upfront. Long-term, smaller hulls which are intended to be highly capable likely end up becoming more expensive, because of the costs and difficulties associated with managing weight and displacement issues as upgrade programmes are done to keep a vessel and systems relevant.

Now I cannot speak knowledgeably about the actual shipbuilding process (there are others here on DT who can) but I would imagine that the steel-bashing part of constructing a smaller vessel/hull would be faster than a larger vessel, but that difference might not be all that significant. However, fitting out a vessel with all the systems required to make it useful and usable, this includes all internal wiring, cabling, and piping, as well as the installation of all shipboard systems like machinery, gen sets, sensors, weapons, electronics and CMS, etc. then one could very well find that installing everything required into a smaller hull takes just as long, since there is less space available to get everything fitted.

Now one area which has been repeatedly mentioned is that most corvettes, at least those fitted with comprehensive weapon and sensor/CMS packages, tend to be rather limited in terms of range and/or endurance. Others might still persist in disagreeing, but from my POV this is a critical issue for Australia. To once again provide some context, once of the potential transit routes that a RAN vessel sailing between Singapore and Darwin might take is ~3,600 km or just under 2,000 n miles. A corvette transiting this SLOC would likely find itself on a one-way trip absent being able to stop and refuel and re-provision en route or get RAS whilst underway. A larger vessel like a frigate with fuel of perhaps 6,000 n miles and a 21 or 28 day endurance would likely be able to make a round trip transit if need be. As an additional aside, the larger frigate might also be able to operate with a higher cruising speed which would shorten the time required for the transit, thus eating less into the mission endurance. Using the German Braunschweig-class corvette as an example, they are listed with a range of ~4,000 n miles at 15 kts, but cruising at that speed it would take ~5.5 days to complete a one-way transit whilst the corvette only has an endurance of seven days without a tender.

Just need to look at the Anzacs which are very long legged, most sources will give their range at around 7000nm@18kt, that would be the equivalent of the Israeli Navy sailing a SAAR 6 from Port of Haifa to New York and have fuel to spare, Israel does not need that sort of range, the RAN does. The AH140/Type 31 has even longer legs at around 9000nm.

 

[Armchair]

A few points to make regarding the above. One of the first is that 8-16 VLS cells is not really a corvette-type system, such a loadout is more typically found aboard frigates. Relating to that, one of the major drivers of the cost of a warship is the systems fitted, as opposed to the overall size, hence the adage that, "steel is cheap and air is free..." IIRC additional weapons systems, and more advanced weapons systems, sensors and shipboard electronics, can often be a third to half the cost of acquisition. To provide perhaps another perspective on this, Israel's Sa'ar 6-class corvette, itself based upon the German MEKO 100 patrol corvette has an estimated cost of ~USD480 mil. per vessel according to Naval Technology, with an overall length of 90m and displacement of ~2,000 tons.

The planned Type 31 frigates for the RN are estimated to cost ~USD$514 mil. (USD$2.57 bil. for five vessels, again per Naval Technology) with an overall length of ~139m and displacement of ~5,700 tons or more.

The weapons systems are somewhat different, with the Israeli corvette having a larger gun (76 mm vs. 57 mm), but one is also talking about a difference in cost of ~USD$35 mil. per vessel, with the more expensive vessel having nearly three times the displacement whilst being fitted with overall comparable systems. One major difference is that the larger Type 31 frigates are going to have more room and potential displacement for future growth and upgrades, as well as the potential for significantly greater range (~7,500 n miles vs. 2,500 miles).

The basic gist of what I am trying to illustrate is that it gets difficult and especially expensive, to try and cram highly capable systems into smaller sized hulls, to the point that there is very little if any cost savings upfront. Long-term, smaller hulls which are intended to be highly capable likely end up becoming more expensive, because of the costs and difficulties associated with managing weight and displacement issues as upgrade programmes are done to keep a vessel and systems relevant.

Now I cannot speak knowledgeably about the actual shipbuilding process (there are others here on DT who can) but I would imagine that the steel-bashing part of constructing a smaller vessel/hull would be faster than a larger vessel, but that difference might not be all that significant. However, fitting out a vessel with all the systems required to make it useful and usable, this includes all internal wiring, cabling, and piping, as well as the installation of all shipboard systems like machinery, gen sets, sensors, weapons, electronics and CMS, etc. then one could very well find that installing everything required into a smaller hull takes just as long, since there is less space available to get everything fitted.

Now one area which has been repeatedly mentioned is that most corvettes, at least those fitted with comprehensive weapon and sensor/CMS packages, tend to be rather limited in terms of range and/or endurance. Others might still persist in disagreeing, but from my POV this is a critical issue for Australia. To once again provide some context, once of the potential transit routes that a RAN vessel sailing between Singapore and Darwin might take is ~3,600 km or just under 2,000 n miles. A corvette transiting this SLOC would likely find itself on a one-way trip absent being able to stop and refuel and re-provision en route or get RAS whilst underway. A larger vessel like a frigate with fuel of perhaps 6,000 n miles and a 21 or 28 day endurance would likely be able to make a round trip transit if need be. As an additional aside, the larger frigate might also be able to operate with a higher cruising speed which would shorten the time required for the transit, thus eating less into the mission endurance. Using the German Braunschweig-class corvette as an example, they are listed with a range of ~4,000 n miles at 15 kts, but cruising at that speed it would take ~5.5 days to complete a one-way transit whilst the corvette only has an endurance of seven days without a tender.

Thank you for this and your illuminating contributions in the past.

i think your example of the Sa’ar fits what I had in mind with “8-16 VLS and no Aegis”

Of course I don’t know the RAN requirements or what the DSR means by Tier 2 or whether the surface fleet review leaks are true (they smack to me of authorised leaks to test reaction - haven’t heard of an AFP investigation). Looking at the army reorg and littoral lift priorities I suspect some of the transits contemplated are less than 3000km from Townsville or Darwin. I also think the RAN wants new vessels as soon as possible

 

[Armchair]

sorry continuing the previous.

Given the urgency (if genuine) then upgrade paths for tier 2 vessels may be less important.

again though, I get that it is much easier to make a bigger vessel better. I also fully understand that range is a critical factor for most posters here including defence professionals who have expressed views.

I just imagine (based on the army reorg and public bits of the DSR) that the job of a Tier 2 vessel in (say) Darwin would be escorting a short ranged amphibious vessel or dropping off commandoes or protected missile teams in the northern approaches (preferably never but if at all, then hopefully with the permission and support of the people who live in those islands).

Anyway, I don’t think short range corvettes are good ideas for Australia in general but it might be the case that 3-6 fit now.

 

[iambuzzard]

Just need to look at the Anzacs which are very long legged, most sources will give their range at around 7000nm@18kt, that would be the equivalent of the Israeli Navy sailing a SAAR 6 from Port of Haifa to New York and have fuel to spare, Israel does not need that sort of range, the RAN does. The AH140/Type 31 has even longer legs at around 9000nm.

I'm thinking the AH140 with a 127mm gun would be the right fit for us. Commonality of ammunition is important. 57mm is too small for us as the ships will likely be operating independently and not under the umbrella of a task force with DDGs with 127mm.

 

[Bob53]

They haven't reduced the weight capacity of the flight deck on the Arafura. That one was a media led furphy that has been thoroughly debunked.

What RAN hasn't done is specify a helicopter landing capability for the class - no approach radar, landing systems, aviation support systems and so on.

Maritime UAV (whenever that cluster is resolved) will be the only aviation capability for the class.

Thanks your the first I have read to say otherwise and I accept that is correct. It seemed like an incredibly stupid thing to request.

 

[Armchair]

I'm thinking the AH140 with a 127mm gun would be the right fit for us. Commonality of ammunition is important. 57mm is too small for us as the ships will likely be operating independently and not under the umbrella of a task force with DDGs with 127mm.

I know this is rehashing matters that have been widely discussed here but I hope I add a slightly new perspective on some matters. Again I don’t disagree on AH140 (or Mogami) but I don’t think it is realistic for Australia to acquire those vessels in a timely manner.

I don’t think Australia has the capacity to pursue another onshore major fleet unit acquisition at the same time as acquiring SSNs. Almost all of the procurement disasters have been for the RAN (followed by the Army). A 5700 ton design would become a 8000 ton redesign delivered 8 years behind schedule. It might be perfect for Australia’s blue water needs (after years of addressing top weight issues) but it would still be under construction in the mid 2030s. The range of the AH140 in a shipyard is 0 nautical miles (regardless of whether it has been upgunned to 127mm or not).

I don’t think there would be the political will for an offshore build of a major fleet unit (for a vessel of a size within the capacity of the current yards). State governments in South Australia and/or Western Australia (as well as industry and unions) would add their voices to whichever party was in opposition in Canberra at the time the decision was taken. After the proposal was killed off the new government (or the new PM of the old government) would cancel the off shore build.

 

[Volkodav]

I know this is rehashing matters that have been widely discussed here but I hope I add a slightly new perspective on some matters. Again I don’t disagree on AH140 (or Mogami) but I don’t think it is realistic for Australia to acquire those vessels in a timely manner.

I don’t think Australia has the capacity to pursue another onshore major fleet unit acquisition at the same time as acquiring SSNs. Almost all of the procurement disasters have been for the RAN (followed by the Army). A 5700 ton design would become a 8000 ton redesign delivered 8 years behind schedule. It might be perfect for Australia’s blue water needs (after years of addressing top weight issues) but it would still be under construction in the mid 2030s. The range of the AH140 in a shipyard is 0 nautical miles (regardless of whether it has been upgunned to 127mm or not).

I don’t think there would be the political will for an offshore build of a major fleet unit (for a vessel of a size within the capacity of the current yards). State governments in South Australia and/or Western Australia (as well as industry and unions) would add their voices to whichever party was in opposition in Canberra at the time the decision was taken. After the proposal was killed off the new government (or the new PM of the old government) would cancel the off shore build.

Australia has established capable shipbuilding enterprises on a number of occasions then starved them of work, forcing a reboot several or more years down the track.

Capacity is an issue but planning and funding can fix that.

One project I am aware of clearly articulated X number of apprentices / trainees were needed by Y date to ensure they were up to speed by the time physical work kicked off. This project is going ahead, never any doubt about it, but eighteen months on, there is still no authorisation to hire and train, the window has been missed and schedule will be affected.

Another angle, we are currently updating support "stuff" for a project. The existing "stuff" is quite problematic so I sought some context from an old and bold. I discovered the road blocks I am dealing with now we're indentified twelve years ago, a solution determined, and the only thing required was government sign off. Now we are repeating the entire process again.

There are more than enough smart people out there, the issue however is poor management and poor leadership. This eminates from political decisions on workforce structure, and the types of people recruited to senior roles. Hint, conformance is seen to be more important than compliance or intelligence.

 

[Milne Bay]

I don’t think there would be the political will for an offshore build of a major fleet unit (for a vessel of a size within the capacity of the current yards). State governments in South Australia and/or Western Australia (as well as industry and unions) would add their voices to whichever party was in opposition in Canberra at the time the decision was taken. After the proposal was killed off the new government (or the new PM of the old government) would cancel the off shore build.

This story from the ABC this morning certainly bears that out.
After the problems with the Navantia built ships, the appetite for further work to them overseas would have disappeared I would think.

Sailors forced to drink bottled water as new overseas-built warships suffer 'poor quality manufacture'

Sailors serving on board two new overseas-built Australian warships are being forced to drink bottled water as the navy works to urgently fix a contamination problem.

www.abc.net.au

 

[Armchair]

Australia has established capable shipbuilding enterprises on a number of occasions then starved them of work, forcing a reboot several or more years down the track.

Capacity is an issue but planning and funding can fix that.

One project I am aware of clearly articulated X number of apprentices / trainees were needed by Y date to ensure they were up to speed by the time physical work kicked off. This project is going ahead, never any doubt about it, but eighteen months on, there is still no authorisation to hire and train, the window has been missed and schedule will be affected.

Another angle, we are currently updating support "stuff" for a project. The existing "stuff" is quite problematic so I sought some context from an old and bold. I discovered the road blocks I am dealing with now we're indentified twelve years ago, a solution determined, and the only thing required was government sign off. Now we are repeating the entire process again.

There are more than enough smart people out there, the issue however is poor management and poor leadership. This eminates from political decisions on workforce structure, and the types of people recruited to senior roles. Hint, conformance is seen to be more important than compliance or intelligence.

yes sorry I mean the capacity of the nation right now (given politics and decision making and everything else) to procure new complex ships rather than shipbuilding capacity specifically (or the possible future capacity).

My betting would be that Australia will successfully acquire, build and operate SSNs (so the previous delays and bad decisions on Collins replacement may have a silver lining)

 

[iambuzzard]

Australia has established capable shipbuilding enterprises on a number of occasions then starved them of work, forcing a reboot several or more years down the track.

Capacity is an issue but planning and funding can fix that.

One project I am aware of clearly articulated X number of apprentices / trainees were needed by Y date to ensure they were up to speed by the time physical work kicked off. This project is going ahead, never any doubt about it, but eighteen months on, there is still no authorisation to hire and train, the window has been missed and schedule will be affected.

Another angle, we are currently updating support "stuff" for a project. The existing "stuff" is quite problematic so I sought some context from an old and bold. I discovered the road blocks I am dealing with now we're indentified twelve years ago, a solution determined, and the only thing required was government sign off. Now we are repeating the entire process again.

There are more than enough smart people out there, the issue however is poor management and poor leadership. This eminates from political decisions on workforce structure, and the types of people recruited to senior roles. Hint, conformance is seen to be more important than compliance or intelligence.

What would be required to re-activate Williamstown for shipbuilding, or has it passed the point of no return?
They did an effective job of building FFGs.

 

[Maranoa]

Why are we building warships at all? It seems the dumbest of the dumbest manufacturing industries to invest in. We don't own the intellectual property so have no capacity to sell export hulls without foreign perimission and their is no potential for a 'sovereign' capability. All we seem to achieve is featherbedding South Australian jobs. Imagine how much better it would have been to have sunk the shipbuilding money from the Anzacs into the Bushmaster and had an active production line during 2002-2008 when South Africa scored $15 billion worth of rattlebox RG31 contracts.

 

[Volkodav]

What would be required to re-activate Williamstown for shipbuilding, or has it passed the point of no return?
They did an effective job of building FFGs.

Williamstown is long gone.

Physical space isn't the issue, it's the failure to maintain the workforce. Facilities are useless without people.

We have a situation now that they need to attract as many competent and experienced people back as they can. They are out there but they have been burnt and are reluctant.

If you have gone off and retrained in something different, because your career disappeared would you go back?

Would you go back after you lost several years of study, done mostly in your own time, because they stopped supporting you and you couldn't afford to keep going on your own?

Would you go back into a more junior role, on less money than you used to be on, getting told how to suck eggs by people twenty plus years younger than you?

If they can fix the workforce side of it, pay people appropriately, recognise knowledge and experience, and perhaps most importantly, get the APS middle management under control, it could be done.

 

[Volkodav]

Why are we building warships at all? It seems the dumbest of the dumbest manufacturing industries to invest in. We don't own the intellectual property so have no capacity to sell export hulls without foreign perimission and their is no potential for a 'sovereign' capability. All we seem to achieve is featherbedding South Australian jobs. Imagine how much better it would have been to have sunk the shipbuilding money from the Anzacs into the Bushmaster and had an active production line during 2002-2008 when South Africa scored $15 billion worth of rattlebox RG31 contracts.

Yes, let's fit house boat pontoons and an outboard motor to bushmasters to patrol our EEZ! Give that man a prize!

Bushmaster was inline for massive US contracts but some DF sold ADI to Thales, which the US had an issue with.

We need warships, simple as that. We could buy them from overseas but we still need to sustain them. I could be wrong, but I can't think of a blue water navy that isn't supported by a shipbuilding industry. So, if you have a blue water navy, you have a shipbuilding industry, the question is, are your political types smart enough to make it sustainable?

Reality check, sustainment, updates, upgrades etc. are often more difficult and complex than builds. These are a necessity, whether the ships are built locally or not.

Google issues with RAN ships. You will find problems with the LHDs, AORs etc. but not so much with the far more complex Hobart's or ANZACs. The Armidales had lots of issues, the Capes similar ones, but these are the sorts of ships that will continue to be built here????

Google issues with submarines, not specifically Collins, and you will find every class of submarine in every navy has problems. That's because they are incredibly difficult to build and maintain, for everyone.

What is your solution? We don't have a navy at all?

That was a serious proposal back in the day, Australia would pay a fee and the RN would station a Squadron here to defend us. Well it would until a bigger threat required they be somewhere else.

 

[Morgo]

I know this is rehashing matters that have been widely discussed here but I hope I add a slightly new perspective on some matters. Again I don’t disagree on AH140 (or Mogami) but I don’t think it is realistic for Australia to acquire those vessels in a timely manner.

Depends what you mean by “timely.”

The appropriate time horizon isn’t a crash course to get something in the water in the next 3 to 5 years. This is done. It’s not happening.

This is about setting up the fleet size and supporting industry for the long term so we don’t ever find ourselves in this scenario again.

What we should be thinking about now is:

1) How many MFUs do we need?
2) Of what mix?
3) Where should they be built?

My personal view is that we need a minimum of 18 MFUs, and a mix of 6x DDGs, 6x FFGs and 6x GP/patrol frigates. I think for scale’s sake these should all be built in SA, but can see that there is some capability in WA we can potentially leverage but this is a suboptimal long term solution.

The above will take a minimum of 10 years to achieve at very best, and probably more like 20.

If we need capability before that it’s not going to come from MFUs. If we’re going to splash the cash to get something quickly that can sink ships we should be buying more P-8s and LRASM.