Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The T26 design for Canada’s CSC was selected in 2019. It is now 2023 and apparently the final Canadianization of the design isn’t quite finished yet. Sometime in 2024 is when steel being cut might occur. First delivery, 2030?
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
Okay, several points to cover here.



Regarding Lurssen's claim, the devil is very much in the details. The company itself might have already done the detailed design work on a purely speculative basis, to take their base C90 design and make it into something fit for Australian service as well as something which can be built and fitted out in Australia but TBH I rather doubt that. I suspect that instead, Lurssen is pitching the idea so that they might receive a contract to do the detailed design work which would be needed for Australian C90's. One of the reasons I suspect this is that the detailed design work required to actually build a warship costs millions. Looking at the USN's FFG(X) programme, which has become the future Constellation-class frigate, five of the six shipbuilders that submitted proposals were issued contracts worth USD$15 mil. to produce conceptual designs. Fincantieri Marinette Marine was selected and awarded a contract for detailed design work and construction of the first ship with the contract worth USD$795 mil. I have not been able to determine how much of that USD$795 mil. was specifically for the detailed design work, but if the conceptual designs were USD$15 mil. I would expect detailed designs to be in the hundreds of millions. Meanwhile, the USN's FY2020 budgeting for the lead ship was USD$1.281 bil. which means that the contract for the detailed design and construction was not including the material and labor costs to build the lead vessel.

Now if the detailed design work still needs to be done, that is something which is going to take time, and also would need to be completed before long lead items can be ordered, and the detailed design work is also something which has to be done well before first steel can be cut.





Again, when are you benchmarking the times? If you are just going off of when first steel is cut, or a vessel is laid down, that is not considering several things which need to get done before cutting steel or laying down a hull, and that is starting with an already complete design. If one does not have a completed design to begin with, that adds more time.
Gowind for Egypt and Sigma for Morocco are two quick comparator classes. I was going off the time from order to commissioning.
My guess is that Luerssen and other concerns will have done detailed design work (I have no way of knowing).

I would expect the lead time for 9LV and CEAFAR could be quite short given the customer’s business relationships. If Australia can get FMS for 220 Tomahawks I reckon it has people doing good work on approvals In the US.

The customer probably also has 4 (possibly 5! ) 76mm guns in storage plus some other systems.

whatever happens I expect a lot of the procurement process to go on behind the scenes in advance of public announcements (analogous to Growler for RAAF and Huntsman for Army). The govt might just say we are building “3 AH140 in Adelaide” or “6 <whatever> in Fremantle”
 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
My personal suspicion would be that either the CEA radar
You would have to basically design a unique mast and CEA installation. They are smaller ships than Anzacs, so trying to squeeze a Anzac mast onto it would cause huge issue. You could do it, and then in 10 years when its ready and you have a land base integration all complete, retrofit it. Given the type of ship it is, and that we don't already have a mast ready to go for the OPV80 Arafuras, and then on ships like Canberra, which could take advantage of a CEA radar, we fitted giraffe, I think the logical choice would keep it with a Giraffe radar and maybe a CEAMOUNT type array.

From the linked article, it mentions several potential systems which it could be equipped with
Lurrsens offer is based around what they are building for Bulgaria. So I do believe the engineering work is done on the design. They cut steel back in 2021, and are expected delivery in 2025+6.

Its not the dumbest proposal to ever be mooted. Its from an existing builder, at an existing yard, based off an existing design, integrated mostly with systems that the RAN would probably live with.

However you dig deeper, and its only 8 VLS, of MICA, so much like the Anzac, depending on top weight you may not get 8VLS of quad packed ESSM (32), probably not 16 vls (64). RBS isn't of interest to RAN, but NSM could be fitted, and the 35mm gun may also not be of interest and may have to be ditched in RAN application again with top weight. So now we are down to a pretty light fitted OPV. Is that what we want?

Then if you want to extend the hangar, well we are back to modifying a design significantly. We already borked the OPV80 build, by changing the specs, and specing a 40mm gun.

Does a combat OPV or a corvette, or a gun boat, or what ever, what we should be focused on? Maybe it can do low risk stuff in completely uncontested water in the indo and the pacific. But what is the exact capability we are seeking? What are the threats we are trying to manage on this platform?

Lurrsen is applying a bit of salesmanship to the current situation.

I can see them breathing heavily. Its an existing supplier, selected by the previous government, now in opposition. Its got "64% local content and rising!", its based off a design that is basically in the water now, that has been probably 80% spec to something the RAN could live with. Existing builders, existing yard, family design we are already building and will have 12 of, won't interfere with Hunter class, and a pretty low spec build. And we are desperate. We know the Anzacs are falling apart and the Hunters aren't on time and we have a decade of nearly every platform out of the water. If it goes pear shaped, blame the previous government for selecting OPV80 and Lurrsen, and because of that fact, I would imagine opposition would likely shut up about the whole thing. Its a low risk option, existing jobs are kept, existing suppliers are happy, and something pops out the other end. To even select another builder costs ~$1b and 5 years in a program that was only ~$2billion and 5 years to begin with.

Which just reminds everyone why its important to select the right platform, the right cooperate structure, the right contract outcomes, at the beginning. Really Sea1180 should have been a bit clearer about how related platforms are going to work, and what are our options if geopolitical threats change. There were other more capable ships.

Deep dive into Sea 1180's OPV - Australian Defence Magazine

I do think the government would find it very hard to attempt to change socks and shoes while running in a marathon.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Gowind for Egypt and Sigma for Morocco are two quick comparator classes. I was going off the time from order to commissioning.
My guess is that Luerssen and other concerns will have done detailed design work (I have no way of knowing).

I would expect the lead time for 9LV and CEAFAR could be quite short given the customer’s business relationships. If Australia can get FMS for 220 Tomahawks I reckon it has people doing good work on approvals In the US.

The customer probably also has 4 (possibly 5! ) 76mm guns in storage plus some other systems.

whatever happens I expect a lot of the procurement process to go on behind the scenes in advance of public announcements (analogous to Growler for RAAF and Huntsman for Army). The govt might just say we are building “3 AH140 in Adelaide” or “6 <whatever> in Fremantle”
I can pretty much guarantee detail design has not been done. Hobart was a "build to print" F-104 with minimal peripheral changes, yet the baseline still hadn't been set as completed blocks were being consolidated.

Before anyone blames ASC, they weren't the designer and often work was held up or had to be redone due to the late arrival of updated drawings. Remember, this was the "existing design".
 
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Todjaeger

Potstirrer
You would have to basically design a unique mast and CEA installation. They are smaller ships than Anzacs, so trying to squeeze a Anzac mast onto it would cause huge issue. You could do it, and then in 10 years when its ready and you have a land base integration all complete, retrofit it. Given the type of ship it is, and that we don't already have a mast ready to go for the OPV80 Arafuras, and then on ships like Canberra, which could take advantage of a CEA radar, we fitted giraffe, I think the logical choice would keep it with a Giraffe radar and maybe a CEAMOUNT type array.


Lurrsens offer is based around what they are building for Bulgaria. So I do believe the engineering work is done on the design. They cut steel back in 2021, and are expected delivery in 2025+6.
The detailed design for the Bulgarian MMPV90 certainly has been completed given that they are already well underway in terms of construction. There would still need to be detailed design work before ships could be built for Australia since Australia would not be using exactly the same systems as the Bulgarian vessels.

Also, the detailed design work would need to account for changes in a number of areas which many likely overlook because they just are not 'sexy' like weapons and sensor systems. This covers ship systems like the fire suppression system, electrical generation and distribution, ship environmental controls (heating, cooling and air circulation, etc.) water and sewage piping, and so on.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Gowind for Egypt and Sigma for Morocco are two quick comparator classes. I was going off the time from order to commissioning.
My guess is that Luerssen and other concerns will have done detailed design work (I have no way of knowing).

I would expect the lead time for 9LV and CEAFAR could be quite short given the customer’s business relationships. If Australia can get FMS for 220 Tomahawks I reckon it has people doing good work on approvals In the US.

The customer probably also has 4 (possibly 5! ) 76mm guns in storage plus some other systems.

whatever happens I expect a lot of the procurement process to go on behind the scenes in advance of public announcements (analogous to Growler for RAAF and Huntsman for Army). The govt might just say we are building “3 AH140 in Adelaide” or “6 <whatever> in Fremantle”
I rather doubt that a shipbuilding company would have copies of detailed designs sitting around in part because of the potential variation different nations and naval services might require. Even minor differences in specifications can have an impact on where certain systems can or need to be placed. By this I am talking about much of the very necessary but almost always overlooked or overshadowed by things like weapons systems. For instance, imagine two vessels based off the same base or parent design, but one designed with a 57 mm gun in the 'A' position, whilst the other design has a 76 mm gun in the same location. If the base design had the 'A' position designed for a 76 mm gun, then there would likely be little issue, OTOH if the base design planned for only a 57 mm gun, or perhaps something even smaller like a 40 mm, 35 mm or something else similar, then the 'A' position mounting would need to be redesigned and likely reinforced before a 76 mm gun could be fitted. Also depending on the specific gun selected, there could be different requirements for power, cabling (to connect the gun to the CMS) as well as cooling.

Regarding Australia getting CEA radars like CEAFAR, that could certainly be done. The question though is how long it would take? I do not have any answer to this question, but it would depend on how quickly the company CEA can produce radars which are ready to be fitted to warships, and how many orders CEA has to fulfill delivery on before production capacity would become available to meet a new order from Australia. An element (hah, pun intended) of more potential issues relate to the availability of materials which CEA uses in the radar systems, this could mean rare earths, as well as chip sets, of which there remains some issues with a global chip shortage.

A similar situation can exist with getting the Saab 9LV CMS, and potentially for the exact same reasons.

With anything which would fall under ITARS rules and the FMS processes (defence kit sourced from the US and/or including US IP) then there are approval processes which need to be completed and the approvals granted, before Australia could order the approved kit. US and Australian defence procurement is familiar with the necessary processes and the two nations and their respective armed forces have good relationships with each other, so I would not be particularly concerned that the requests might get denied. The issue which IMO should be of concern is the time required to get the necessary approvals, and how this would impact the delivery of the kit so that it could be fitted aboard a warship under construction or fitting out. Once again, the production time for a specific piece of kit would be impacted by the production capacity of the defence company making the items, the size of their order book, and the company's access to needed parts and materials to complete the build.

I absolutely agree about there being procurement processes which are largely behind the scenes and that most are unaware of but in many respects that is exactly my point. If Australia were to start building a new warship today, there is work which would need to have been completed ahead of the start of construction and the work required would likely have taken at least a couple of years. This is why I, and I suspect several others as well, do not consider new warships for the RAN delivered within five years as being feasible. The RAN and gov't would need to have started working on getting new/additional warships several years ago if they wanted construction to start now.
 

H_K

Member
This is why I, and I suspect several others as well, do not consider new warships for the RAN delivered within five years as being feasible.
It *is* feasible but would require a change in acquisition paradigm that I can’t see happening in Australia:

- Off the shelf platform (eg. Meko A200, Damen 10514, Fincantieri FCX-30, Naval Group Gowind or FTI, Hyundai HDF-3800, Navantia Alfa 3000 etc)
- Short competitive tender & negotiations
- MOTS equipment already integrated on the platform
- Building the first 1-2 hulls abroad while Australian production ramps up

Basically this allows for only a limited amount of configuration - eg. you may get your choice of NSM/Exocet, ESSM/Mica/CAAM, 57/76mm gun, 9LV/Tacticos CMS, Thales/Saab radars etc. The menu of options would still be good enough to satisfy most small navies, but would not allow for extensive customization - this likely won’t work for the RAN.

But within those constraints, <5 years should be possible and has been done by Damen, Naval Group, Fincantieri, TKMS and the Koreans for various export clients.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
There are thousands of little things you have to do to an overseas design to make it suitable for use in Australia even if, as Volk noted, the design is complete for another Navy. These range from those required to meet Australian standards which, in a wide range of areas, are different to those in Europe or the US, to the seemingly trivial such as the type of domestic electric output sockets, or the dispensing machine for soft drinks. But they all have to be done or the ship cannot be accepted - and there are currently two sets of regulators to satisfy, AMSA for sea trials and the RAN for intro into service. Doing so is neither simple nor quickly done.

This is not the 1930s or 40s we we could just take over ships built for someone else. Even in the 60s, when we got the Charles F Adams, we had to do considerable work to make them suitable.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
It *is* feasible but would require a change in acquisition paradigm that I can’t see happening in Australia:

- Off the shelf platform (eg. Meko A200, Damen 10514, Fincantieri FCX-30, Naval Group Gowind or FTI, Hyundai HDF-3800, Navantia Alfa 3000 etc)
- Short competitive tender & negotiations
- MOTS equipment already integrated on the platform
- Building the first 1-2 hulls abroad while Australian production ramps up

Basically this allows for only a limited amount of configuration - eg. you may get your choice of NSM/Exocet, ESSM/Mica/CAAM, 57/76mm gun, 9LV/Tacticos CMS, Thales/Saab radars etc. The menu of options would still be good enough to satisfy most small navies, but would not allow for extensive customization - this likely won’t work for the RAN.

But within those constraints, <5 years should be possible and has been done by Damen, Naval Group, Fincantieri, TKMS and the Koreans for various export clients.
Disagree.

You maybe could get the platform but it would be to someone else's spec. You definately wouldn't get the support system. Training, maintenance documentation, tools, equipment, spares.

You wouldn't know how it works in our environment and how this would require the support system to be tailored. In fact, you wouldn't know if critical systems would function in our environment.

You may achieve IOC, you may not, but FOC will be a long way off.

The more engineering work you do upfront before steel is cut, the smoother and more efficiently a program will run. When you push through without change or updates, you are left with expensive, time consuming remedial work that often takes longer to sort than if it had been factored in before the build.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Then there are the big things, such as adjusting the build strategy to a different environment. That is always an issue if you build in a yard which hasn’t built the design before- you have to turn the design into work orders appropriate for that yard and workforce so that it all gets created; each environment is unique. That can take, and has taken, years. And trying to do it on the fly really is asking for trouble.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
To my understanding the DSR /Naval review were looking at three time frames which if I recall were from now to 2025 , 2025 to 2030 and 2031 and beyond.
There would be a reason for these time groups.
Why three and why these years.
I'd speculate they have some significance.
At a guess from 2031 onwards we may have a SSN. Doubtful but maybe!
So what of the period between today and 2031!
Do we maintain our existing fleet and pursue our current ships builds and upgrades.
Or will there be a new " something " allied to these blocks of years specified in the review?

I acknowledge and respect the recent commentary about the limitations of acquiring ships and the timetables needed for service.

That said it will be interesting as to what comes out or the review next year.

Those blocks of years must have some significance and I can only speculate it will involve a change to current plans.


Cheers S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Then there are the big things, such as adjusting the build strategy to a different environment. That is always an issue if you build in a yard which hasn’t built the design before- you have to turn the design into work orders appropriate for that yard and workforce so that it all gets created; each environment is unique. That can take, and has taken, years. And trying to do it on the fly really is asking for trouble.
Such as building a design that had only ever been built on a traditional slipway, on a hard stand.

Other fun things, paint specs. It's more than just colour, its durability, corrosion resistance, micro biological resistance, climatic factors and so much more. For instance, the application of the Navantia paint spec not only was illegal under Australian WHS and environmental laws, it literally could not be applied to specification in the Adelaide weather.

Early in the AWD program there were a large number of Americans from Bath Iron Works embedded in Adelaide. These guys had been building ships for the USN decades. They were stunned and confused by many parts of the Navantia design and build strategy. The weird thing is the F-100 was the evolution of a US G&C design, based on a ship spec derived from the previous Spanish frigates that were derivatives of US designs (FFG-07 and Knox).

So we were adapting a Spanish adaption of a US design and build strategy.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I
To my understanding the DSR /Naval review were looking at three time frames which if I recall were from now to 2025 , 2025 to 2030 and 2031 and beyond.
There would be a reason for these time groups.
Why three and why these years.
I'd speculate they have some significance.
At a guess from 2031 onwards we may have a SSN. Doubtful but maybe!
So what of the period between today and 2031!
Do we maintain our existing fleet and pursue our current ships builds and upgrades.
Or will there be a new " something " allied to these blocks of years specified in the review?

I acknowledge and respect the recent commentary about the limitations of acquiring ships and the timetables needed for service.

That said it will be interesting as to what comes out or the review next year.

Those blocks of years must have some significance and I can only speculate it will involve a change to current plans.


Cheers S
Would suggest 2025 is getting the Arafura into service, perhaps with some sort of enhanced capability. Maybe selecting a proper tier 2 design.
2025-2030, getting the Hunter underway, deciding on and getting tier 2 underway. Selecting and kicking off design of a new destroyer.
2031 and beyond, commissioning the first Hunters and tier 2 ships, starting work on the first destroyers.
 
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Armchair

Well-Known Member
You would have to basically design a unique mast and CEA installation. They are smaller ships than Anzacs, so trying to squeeze a Anzac mast onto it would cause huge issue. You could do it, and then in 10 years when its ready and you have a land base integration all complete, retrofit it. Given the type of ship it is, and that we don't already have a mast ready to go for the OPV80 Arafuras, and then on ships like Canberra, which could take advantage of a CEA radar, we fitted giraffe, I think the logical choice would keep it with a Giraffe radar and maybe a CEAMOUNT type array.


Lurrsens offer is based around what they are building for Bulgaria. So I do believe the engineering work is done on the design. They cut steel back in 2021, and are expected delivery in 2025+6.

Does a combat OPV or a corvette, or a gun boat, or what ever, what we should be focused on? Maybe it can do low risk stuff in completely uncontested water in the indo and the pacific. But what is the exact capability we are seeking? What are the threats we are trying to manage on this platform?
The Australia Army is basing littoral battalions in Darwin and Townsville and retaining a brigade structure in Darwin for a single infantry battalion and is prioritising littoral lift and long range fires (including land based anti ship missiles).

When I look at a map I wonder how a smallish amphibious vessel in say 2030 would get from Darwin to anywhere north in an environment where there was any threat at all (shore based missiles, insurgents with rockets, perhaps opportunistic long range air launched cruise missiles, ill advised but courageous subs, or an armed “fishing” vessel). Those threats might not be operated (directly) by an adversary with aircraft carriers and thousands of missiles but Australia is not planning to attack anybody so it does not get to choose its adversaries (it just wants to deter all adversaries by showing it could project force if it had to).

Currently the only sovereign escort solution would be to rely on air cover and/or send a major fleet unit to escort the small amphibious vessel from Darwin,

Now assume Australia has a mechanised brigade in Townsville with an LHD, other lift, and thousands of personnel ready to deploy to some other place for some other urgent contingency (not necessarily world war 3 but perhaps like INTERFET). If you (very generously) imagine that the RAN has 2 Hobarts and 4 Anzacs available at that moment would the RAN send one or more of those 6 vessels to Darwin (through the Torres Strait) to escort the small amphibious vessel and deplete the screen of the LHD (loss of which is multiply catastrophic)? Does the RAAF have the refueling capacity to cover the small task force leaving Darwin and the big task force? My guess is no and the troops in Darwin wouldn’t get sent to address the urgent contingency. Australia’s capacity to project power off shore in two places at once is therefore limited by the willingness of allies to provide escorts.

Now imagine the Darwin force never leaves and the mechanised brigade is deployed to islands not a terribly long way from Townsville but challenging for land based air at Scherger or Townsville. The task force wishes to detach a landing craft to secure another lightly defended island but which MIGHT have limited numbers of missiles and/or rockets, helicopters, VSHORAD and sea mines. Escort?

Now in the 2009 plan, IIRC, Australia was supposed to have 8 future frigates and 20 offshore combatants (with hydrographic and mine warfare capability) and 12 future submarines by 2030 (100 F 35 with Block IV would be handy too but I think the Super Hornet / Growler combo were examples of excellent rapid procurement). Apparently it won’t have a single one of any of those partly because it has been very slow in procurement and has made poor choices that have sought near perfect solutions (and governments have repeatedly misused the forces they did have for other tasks).

If the RAN can’t escort littoral lift from two places at once then Army probably doesn’t need a 1st Division (certainly not in Northern bases). I don’t think Australia will have a credible sovereign capacity to project force off shore to deter aggression until the RAN has more escorts. If the minimum time for new escorts is beyond 2030 then other expensive and dangerous solutions (that are potentially quicker) need to be found to provide projection for the purpose of deterrence until more escorts are available.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
It *is* feasible but would require a change in acquisition paradigm that I can’t see happening in Australia:

- Off the shelf platform (eg. Meko A200, Damen 10514, Fincantieri FCX-30, Naval Group Gowind or FTI, Hyundai HDF-3800, Navantia Alfa 3000 etc)
- Short competitive tender & negotiations
- MOTS equipment already integrated on the platform
- Building the first 1-2 hulls abroad while Australian production ramps up

Basically this allows for only a limited amount of configuration - eg. you may get your choice of NSM/Exocet, ESSM/Mica/CAAM, 57/76mm gun, 9LV/Tacticos CMS, Thales/Saab radars etc. The menu of options would still be good enough to satisfy most small navies, but would not allow for extensive customization - this likely won’t work for the RAN.

But within those constraints, <5 years should be possible and has been done by Damen, Naval Group, Fincantieri, TKMS and the Koreans for various export clients.
Just on this will the RAN be allowed the choice for customization by government?
The analogies I would draw is SPH acquisition for Army and the cancellation of Attack class for RAN and procurement of Virginia’s for RAN. These were built for USN to their specifications but are intended to be operated by the RAN in the early 2030s.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
It *is* feasible but would require a change in acquisition paradigm that I can’t see happening in Australia:

- Off the shelf platform (eg. Meko A200, Damen 10514, Fincantieri FCX-30, Naval Group Gowind or FTI, Hyundai HDF-3800, Navantia Alfa 3000 etc)
- Short competitive tender & negotiations
- MOTS equipment already integrated on the platform
- Building the first 1-2 hulls abroad while Australian production ramps up

Basically this allows for only a limited amount of configuration - eg. you may get your choice of NSM/Exocet, ESSM/Mica/CAAM, 57/76mm gun, 9LV/Tacticos CMS, Thales/Saab radars etc. The menu of options would still be good enough to satisfy most small navies, but would not allow for extensive customization - this likely won’t work for the RAN.

But within those constraints, <5 years should be possible and has been done by Damen, Naval Group, Fincantieri, TKMS and the Koreans for various export clients.
Not really, since that might get one a platform, but Australia being able to operate, support and sustain that platform would be an enormous and enormously expensive and time consuming issue.

Purchasing a warship designed and built to another end-user's specifications really is not a change in acquisition paradigm, rather it is desperate invitation to waste time and resources, since any piece of kit not already in RAN service is one that RAN personnel would need to become familiar with both operating, as well as maintaining and repair. In addition, an ongoing supply chain would need to be established so that the RAN has the parts needed to keep a system in operation, as well as the ordnance it might use, once the operations and support capabilities have been reached.

Another thing to consider, particularly for those MOTS systems which are not in use by Australia, is whether there is support documentation and interfaces available in English.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Just on this will the RAN be allowed the choice for customization by government?
The analogies I would draw is SPH acquisition for Army and the cancellation of Attack class for RAN and procurement of Virginia’s for RAN. These were built for USN to their specifications but are intended to be operated by the RAN in the early 2030s.
The Virginia's come with a complete support package and network, that we will be required to join. Anything that is not FMS or in service with the US military does not have this.

Perfect example, the C27J was selected for the RAAF under FMS, the USAF took control of the capability and then killed it. Australia was left with a difficult to support orphan that has never met expectations or requirements.

Just imagine where we would be had we followed Johnston's (ex defmin) desire to acquire fast frigates. All BS aside, he wanted LCS 2 aluminium trimerans from Austal. Just imagine us having them as the USN stopped development of the mission modules and started divesting the capability?
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
The Australia Army is basing littoral battalions in Darwin and Townsville and retaining a brigade structure in Darwin for a single infantry battalion and is prioritising littoral lift and long range fires (including land based anti ship missiles).

When I look at a map I wonder how a smallish amphibious vessel in say 2030 would get from Darwin to anywhere north in an environment where there was any threat at all (shore based missiles, insurgents with rockets, perhaps opportunistic long range air launched cruise missiles, ill advised but courageous subs, or an armed “fishing” vessel). Those threats might not be operated (directly) by an adversary with aircraft carriers and thousands of missiles but Australia is not planning to attack anybody so it does not get to choose its adversaries (it just wants to deter all adversaries by showing it could project force if it had to).

Currently the only sovereign escort solution would be to rely on air cover and/or send a major fleet unit to escort the small amphibious vessel from Darwin,

Now assume Australia has a mechanised brigade in Townsville with an LHD, other lift, and thousands of personnel ready to deploy to some other place for some other urgent contingency (not necessarily world war 3 but perhaps like INTERFET). If you (very generously) imagine that the RAN has 2 Hobarts and 4 Anzacs available at that moment would the RAN send one or more of those 6 vessels to Darwin (through the Torres Strait) to escort the small amphibious vessel and deplete the screen of the LHD (loss of which is multiply catastrophic)? Does the RAAF have the refueling capacity to cover the small task force leaving Darwin and the big task force? My guess is no and the troops in Darwin wouldn’t get sent to address the urgent contingency. Australia’s capacity to project power off shore in two places at once is therefore limited by the willingness of allies to provide escorts.

Now imagine the Darwin force never leaves and the mechanised brigade is deployed to islands not a terribly long way from Townsville but challenging for land based air at Scherger or Townsville. The task force wishes to detach a landing craft to secure another lightly defended island but which MIGHT have limited numbers of missiles and/or rockets, helicopters, VSHORAD and sea mines. Escort?

Now in the 2009 plan, IIRC, Australia was supposed to have 8 future frigates and 20 offshore combatants (with hydrographic and mine warfare capability) and 12 future submarines by 2030 (100 F 35 with Block IV would be handy too but I think the Super Hornet / Growler combo were examples of excellent rapid procurement). Apparently it won’t have a single one of any of those partly because it has been very slow in procurement and has made poor choices that have sought near perfect solutions (and governments have repeatedly misused the forces they did have for other tasks).

If the RAN can’t escort littoral lift from two places at once then Army probably doesn’t need a 1st Division (certainly not in Northern bases). I don’t think Australia will have a credible sovereign capacity to project force off shore to deter aggression until the RAN has more escorts. If the minimum time for new escorts is beyond 2030 then other expensive and dangerous solutions (that are potentially quicker) need to be found to provide projection for the purpose of deterrence until more escorts are available.
Need to look at the full range of scenarios with the "minor stuff" getting some attention.
Agree with the above.

Cheers S
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
The Virginia's come with a complete support package and network, that we will be required to join. Anything that is not FMS or in service with the US military does not have this.

Perfect example, the C27J was selected for the RAAF under FMS, the USAF took control of the capability and then killed it. Australia was left with a difficult to support orphan that has never met expectations or requirements.

Just imagine where we would be had we followed Johnston's (ex defmin) desire to acquire fast frigates. All BS aside, he wanted LCS 2 aluminium trimerans from Austal. Just imagine us having them as the USN stopped development of the mission modules and started divesting the capability?
i was conflating several points across posters.

To unpack
Decisions on cancelling Attacks and acquiring Virginia’s were very quick, and made in secret (apart from one prominent comment) at very high level ( and Virginia’s are someone else’s vessels, that Australia won’t be able to customise). A normal RAN procurement process for SSNs after cancelling Attack would have taken decades. I don’t believe that long careful procurement for the RAN have resulted in any good outcomes for large projects this century.

C27 was, and LCS2 would have been, bad choices for Australia (in financial terms and some others) but both would be much better than no capability at all (C27 should go when there are enough c130s). This is especially true for the purpose of deterrence. Could LCS2 protect itself and an escorted vessel from a low level of threat? If it possibly could then a potential adversary has to plan for that possibility. If it is known not to exist at all then their task is easier.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
Need to look at the full range of scenarios with the "minor stuff" getting some attention.
Agree with the above.

Cheers S
Thanks! The bit I would change in the scenario above is that the task force for an INTERFET level crisis might leave from Brisbane (but in any case in East Timor in 1999 and 2006 both used large numbers of RAN escorts).
 
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