It reduces the Russian ability to block Ukrainian food exports, & IIRC Russia's been using the ships & subs to fire land attack missiles against Ukraine.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
vikingatespam
Well-Known Member
UKR will have to do a lot more to meaningfully reduce the # of launch tubes available, but at least this is a good start.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #8,743
Small update. Russian precision strikes deep into Ukrainian territory continue. We saw a MiG-29 get hit by a loitering munition, we now have another video of the same airfield, with another MiG-29 getting hit, this time allegedly by a cruise missile (though rybar claims another loitering munition). The explosion this time is much larger and there appears to be a secondary detonation. I guess this could be a larger loitering munition, or something like a Shahed-style drone. On the other hand the speed looks a little too quick (assuming it's not an edited video). This is being reported as part of the same incidence and gives a little more credibility to the original claim that Russia hit 5 jets there. Note, we don't know the sequence of strikes.
colonelcassad.livejournal.com
t.me
Meanwhile in Donetsk region Russia struck a Ukrainian troop train 40kms from the front, near Rodinskoe. This is the third military train Russia has hit recently. The improved strikes at the 30-70km range to me indicate some improvement in Russian capabilities, though again it's fairly early. Note Russia has always had the ability to strike targets there, the issue is finding the targets. You'll note Russia expended large amounts of munitions pounding Ukrainian energy infrastructure, hitting more substations then military trains during this war. The means are not the issue. And we're getting consistent BDA footage of these strikes from Russian UAVs, suggesting Russia has fielded some relatively long range UAV that support this. Another possible interpretation of course is some qualitative gain in HUMINT that's making this possible.
t.me
If this patterns continues to grow, Ukraine is going to have to do its own dispersing of supply lines and will have to push it's aircraft further back from the front. None of this is impossible to do but will require time and effort, and it does not bode well for Ukraine's offensive efforts. On the other hand the number of strikes I've seen at this range is still only about ~10 or so within the past 3-4 weeks. Each one appears to be a carefully planned and executed operation. One interesting possibility suggested by rybar is that Russian loitering munitions haven't gained range at all but instead it's Russian SOF operating in the Ukrainian rear. If true, I can't help but wonder... why now? Why not sooner?
Поражение МиГ-29 на аэродроме Долгинцево
На аэродроме Долгинцево уничтожен еще один украинский МиГ-29, который использовался для запуска американских противорадиолокационных ракет HARM. Ночью по аэродрому было несколько прилетов, отмечались вторичные детонации.
colonelcassad.livejournal.com
Рыбарь
В Сети появилось еще одно видео удара по аэродрому Долгинцево к востоку от Кривого Рога. Целью стал МиГ-29 на стоянке в северной части объекта: после прилета барражирующего боеприпаса истребитель восстановлению не подлежит. Координаты: 47.8987798, 33.5307616 Это уже второе задокументированное...
t.me
Meanwhile in Donetsk region Russia struck a Ukrainian troop train 40kms from the front, near Rodinskoe. This is the third military train Russia has hit recently. The improved strikes at the 30-70km range to me indicate some improvement in Russian capabilities, though again it's fairly early. Note Russia has always had the ability to strike targets there, the issue is finding the targets. You'll note Russia expended large amounts of munitions pounding Ukrainian energy infrastructure, hitting more substations then military trains during this war. The means are not the issue. And we're getting consistent BDA footage of these strikes from Russian UAVs, suggesting Russia has fielded some relatively long range UAV that support this. Another possible interpretation of course is some qualitative gain in HUMINT that's making this possible.
Рыбарь
Удар ВС РФ по эшелону ВСУ в Родинском Вчера в Сети появились кадры удара ВС РФ по эшелону у населенного пункта Родинское в оккупированной части ДНР, который произошел несколько дней назад. Судя по записи, на платформах среди нескольких десятков единиц колесной техники также стояли РСЗО. Живая...
t.me
If this patterns continues to grow, Ukraine is going to have to do its own dispersing of supply lines and will have to push it's aircraft further back from the front. None of this is impossible to do but will require time and effort, and it does not bode well for Ukraine's offensive efforts. On the other hand the number of strikes I've seen at this range is still only about ~10 or so within the past 3-4 weeks. Each one appears to be a carefully planned and executed operation. One interesting possibility suggested by rybar is that Russian loitering munitions haven't gained range at all but instead it's Russian SOF operating in the Ukrainian rear. If true, I can't help but wonder... why now? Why not sooner?
Militarily it is a common tactic, used to divert defence resources away from the main area of the conflict similar to the drone attacks on Moscow which did little damage but meant an increase in defensive measures were needed and also were good at bring the war home to the local population and raising the spirits of the Ukrainian population.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
Yeah, absolutely. The Ukes call it a breakthrough, the RU probably call it tactical retreat or something along the lines (or don’t call it anything at all), our media of course parrot the Ukrainian claims without much analysis and thinking. Especially Sky News and the like.That's why Rybar and Russian telegram is more counter claim toward Ukrainian claim, like this one that's being shown by several Western media.
Ukraine War: Kyiv claims major breakthrough in western Zaporizhzhia
Ukrainian intelligence is saying its army penetrated through Russian field fortifications from the village of Verbove in western Zaporizhzhia, a day after Kyiv reportedly launched further attacks in Russian-occupied Crimea.news.sky.com
I don't read Russian thus only relied with Google Translate. Seems Rybar claim related to overall Zaporozhye front.
This is probably more or less realistic situation on the ground, as well as a forecast of what’s to come (or not come any time soon), but could, of course, change:
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
This is funny:
Admiral Viktor Sokolov, the commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, was shown on Russian state television on Tuesday attending a defence leaders' meeting remotely, a day after Ukrainian special forces said they had killed him.[…]
Ukraine's special forces said on Monday that Sokolov had been killed along with 33 other officers in a missile attack last week on the headquarters of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol in Crimea, seized from Ukraine in 2014.
In response to the Russian video, the Ukraine special forces said on Telegram: "Since the Russians were urgently forced to publish a response with Sokolov allegedly alive, our units are clarifying the information."
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/WE5JGPOB6NIIXGRGHSSJWCCJQ4.jpg)
www.reuters.com
An interesting tidbit from the same article:
According to a Sept. 19 scorecard by the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School, Russia has gained 35 sq miles (91 sq km) from Ukraine in the past month while Ukrainian forces have taken 16 sq miles (41 sq km) from Russian forces.
Admiral Viktor Sokolov, the commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, was shown on Russian state television on Tuesday attending a defence leaders' meeting remotely, a day after Ukrainian special forces said they had killed him.[…]
Ukraine's special forces said on Monday that Sokolov had been killed along with 33 other officers in a missile attack last week on the headquarters of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol in Crimea, seized from Ukraine in 2014.
In response to the Russian video, the Ukraine special forces said on Telegram: "Since the Russians were urgently forced to publish a response with Sokolov allegedly alive, our units are clarifying the information."
Russian Black Sea commander shown on video call after Ukraine said it killed him
Admiral Viktor Sokolov, the commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, was shown on Russian state television attending meeting remotely, a day after Ukrainian special forces said they had killed him.
www.reuters.com
An interesting tidbit from the same article:
According to a Sept. 19 scorecard by the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School, Russia has gained 35 sq miles (91 sq km) from Ukraine in the past month while Ukrainian forces have taken 16 sq miles (41 sq km) from Russian forces.
Yes, it's almost as funny as "Moskva is lightly damaged and being towed home" or "the Rostov on don suffered minor damage while in dry dock" or "oops a perfectly good passenger aeroplane has exploded and crashed to the ground for no reason whatsoever"This is funny:
Admiral Viktor Sokolov, the commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, was shown on Russian state television on Tuesday attending a defence leaders' meeting remotely, a day after Ukrainian special forces said they had killed him.[…]
Ukraine's special forces said on Monday that Sokolov had been killed along with 33 other officers in a missile attack last week on the headquarters of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol in Crimea, seized from Ukraine in 2014.
In response to the Russian video, the Ukraine special forces said on Telegram: "Since the Russians were urgently forced to publish a response with Sokolov allegedly alive, our units are clarifying the information."
Russian Black Sea commander shown on video call after Ukraine said it killed him
Admiral Viktor Sokolov, the commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, was shown on Russian state television attending meeting remotely, a day after Ukrainian special forces said they had killed him.
An interesting tidbit from the same article:
According to a Sept. 19 scorecard by the Belfer Center at Harvard's Kennedy School, Russia has gained 35 sq miles (91 sq km) from Ukraine in the past month while Ukrainian forces have taken 16 sq miles (41 sq km) from Russian forces.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
I’d say more like “Budanov was killed in the strike on the headquarters in Kiev” or “Zaluzhny was critically wounded during the visit to the frontline and is treated in Germany but things aren’t looking too good for him”.
Russian soldiers raped women aged 19 to 83 in Kherson region, placing relatives nearby so they could hear the screams, UN Commission says.
According to the head of the UN commission of inquiry into violations in Ukraine, Erik Møse, in some cases torture was used with such cruelty that it led to the victim's death.
"The team has gathered evidence that indicates that the use of torture by the Russian military was widespread and systematic," Mr. Møse emphasized.
Russian soldiers have a long history of rape and torture. During WW2 Russian soldiers raped more than 2 million German women and girls. ‘The Russian soldiers raped every German female from eight to 80’ | Books | The Guardian
According to the head of the UN commission of inquiry into violations in Ukraine, Erik Møse, in some cases torture was used with such cruelty that it led to the victim's death.
"The team has gathered evidence that indicates that the use of torture by the Russian military was widespread and systematic," Mr. Møse emphasized.
Russian soldiers have a long history of rape and torture. During WW2 Russian soldiers raped more than 2 million German women and girls. ‘The Russian soldiers raped every German female from eight to 80’ | Books | The Guardian
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #8,750
Well... during WW2 it was Soviet soldiers. Which presumably included many Ukrainians (also Kazakh, Georgian, Belorussian, Kirgiz, etc.)
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Agreed but I guess it is also a question of ratios as to who did what, virtually impossible to figure out now. Can’t really see non-Russian troops interfering, almost a certainty of getting a bullet in the back of the head by a Soviet army political officer.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #8,752
The Soviet Army wasn't divided by ethnicity. What I disagree with is Vivendi's implied attempt at a narrative about Russian soldiers being exclusive prone to this behavior. One could just as easily suppose it was the non-Russian parts of the Soviet and now Russian armies responsible. Crime being attributed by ethnicity is about one hair-breadth away from phrenology and other nonsense.
25/9/23 Update #1.
ISW
- The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 25.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive assaults in the Bakhmut direction, inflicting losses on Russian manpower and equipment and depleting Russian forces along the entire front line.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces reached northern Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) but that Russian forces pushed them back to their original positions.[2] Russian sources have yet to directly address a claim from a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces that Ukrainian forces control half of Verbove as of September 24.[3]
- The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported on September 25 that a precision Ukrainian strike on the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, on September 22 killed 34 Russian officers, including BSF Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov
Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported that the strike, which occurred during a meeting of senior BSF leadership, also wounded 105 Russian personnel.[5] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 23 that the strike seriously wounded the commander of the Russian 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet), Lieutenant General Oleg Tsekov, and the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in Zaporizhia Oblast, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk.[6] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces also reported that the Ukrainian strike on the Minsk landing ship in Sevastopol on September 13 killed 62 personnel, noting that many personnel were present as the Minsk was scheduled to go on combat duty on September 14.[7] ISW has yet to observe confirmation that these Ukrainian strikes killed Sokolov or any other high-ranking Russian commanders, although the Russian command would be able to easily disprove Ukrainian reporting if these reports are false. Sokolov's and other Russian officers’ reported deaths would create significant disruptions in command and control in the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Khalino Airfield and a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) building in Kursk Oblast during a series of drone strikes on September 24.
Ukrainian media reported on September 24 that sources connected to the Ukrainian GUR stated that Ukrainian forces struck an FSB building and an oil refinery near the Khalino Airfield in Kursk Oblast.[8] Russian Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoyt confirmed that a Ukrainian drone struck an administrative building in the Central District of Kursk City.[9] Ukrainian news outlet RBC-Ukraine's sources clarified on September 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Khalino Airfield and killed an unspecified number of officers of the Russian 14th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (105th Guards Composite Aviation Division, 6th Air and Air Defense Forces Army, Russia Aerospace [VSK] Forces), which is based at the airfield.[10] The Russian 14th Guards Fighting Aviation Regiment is equipped with Su-30SM aircraft.[11] Russian sources confirmed the strike on the Khalino Airfield and the death of an unspecified number of Russian servicemen.[12]
- Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone and missile strikes on the night of September 24-25 against Ukrainian port, grain, and military targets.
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 12 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles from the Black Sea, two Onyx cruise missiles from the Sevastopol area, and 19 Shahed drones from Krasnodar Krai.[13] Ukrainian air defenses shot down 11 Kalibr missiles and all 19 drones.[14] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck port and grain infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, and footage shows that Russian strikes damaged a hotel in Odesa City.[15] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft at the Dolhintsevo airfield in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[16] Moldovan government officials stated on September 25 that fragments of an S-300 missile fell in Chitcani (5km south of Tiraspol) in Transnistria and that the missile’s origin and flight path have not been confirmed.[17]
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on September 25 that US-provided Abrams tanks have arrived in Ukraine.
[18] The New York Times reported that US officials stated that the US delivered an unspecified number of Abrams tanks to Ukraine on September 23 and that the Biden administration intends to send 31 Abrams in total.[19] Politico previously reported on August 31 that Ukraine would receive the first 10 of 31 Abrams tanks in mid-September.[20]
- Russian military officials continue efforts to build out the Russian armed forces to suit the needs of Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
Russian outlet Izvestia, citing sources in the Russian military, claimed on September 25 that the Russian armed forces are forming reconnaissance and assault brigades in combined arms armies and newly formed army corps and that these brigades are already actively recruiting.[21] Izvestia reported that the new units will be comprised of assault troops intended to break through layered defenses and reconnaissance troops that will conduct reconnaissance at “tactical depth,” and noted that each brigade will receive tanks, light armored vehicles, artillery, and various drones.[22] Izvestia emphasized that these new brigades are meant to overcome pre-prepared Ukrainian defensive positions, particularly in areas of Donbas, where Ukrainian forces have been expanding and equipping fortifications since Russia’s first invasion in 2014. Colonel Valery Yuryev, chairman of the Russian Union of Paratroopers, told Izvestia that the war has stressed the “need to have specialized units for storming fortified areas” and that “separate assault units and formations are necessary.”[23]
- The Kremlin and the Armenian government continue to deflect blame onto one another over the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan amidst deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivered an address on September 24 in which he criticized Russia by stating that the Russian-led security structures of which Armenia is a part are ineffective and by questioning the motives of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh.[26] Pashinyan blamed Azerbaijan and Russian peacekeepers for the recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Pashinyan labeled as “a policy of ethnic cleansing.” The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to Pashinyan’s statement on September 25, blamed Pashinyan for avoiding personal responsibility for “failures in [Armenian] domestic and foreign policy,” and heavily criticized Pashinyan’s recent turn to the West.[27] Russian milbloggers have consistently focused on anti-Pashinyan protests in Yerevan since the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities accepted a Russian peacekeeper-mediated ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan on September 20.[28] ISW previously reported that the Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual on September 19 instructing Kremlin-affiliated media to blame the West and Pashinyan for recognizing Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.[29] The initial protests in Armenia following the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan appear to be skewing in the direction of the Kremlin’s preferred narrative, although it is unclear if the Kremlin will retain strong Armenian support for Russia in the long-term following the inaction of Russian peacekeeping forces.
ISW
- The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 25.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive assaults in the Bakhmut direction, inflicting losses on Russian manpower and equipment and depleting Russian forces along the entire front line.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces reached northern Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) but that Russian forces pushed them back to their original positions.[2] Russian sources have yet to directly address a claim from a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces that Ukrainian forces control half of Verbove as of September 24.[3]
- The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported on September 25 that a precision Ukrainian strike on the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, on September 22 killed 34 Russian officers, including BSF Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov
Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reported that the strike, which occurred during a meeting of senior BSF leadership, also wounded 105 Russian personnel.[5] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 23 that the strike seriously wounded the commander of the Russian 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet), Lieutenant General Oleg Tsekov, and the commander of the Russian grouping of forces in Zaporizhia Oblast, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk.[6] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces also reported that the Ukrainian strike on the Minsk landing ship in Sevastopol on September 13 killed 62 personnel, noting that many personnel were present as the Minsk was scheduled to go on combat duty on September 14.[7] ISW has yet to observe confirmation that these Ukrainian strikes killed Sokolov or any other high-ranking Russian commanders, although the Russian command would be able to easily disprove Ukrainian reporting if these reports are false. Sokolov's and other Russian officers’ reported deaths would create significant disruptions in command and control in the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Khalino Airfield and a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) building in Kursk Oblast during a series of drone strikes on September 24.
Ukrainian media reported on September 24 that sources connected to the Ukrainian GUR stated that Ukrainian forces struck an FSB building and an oil refinery near the Khalino Airfield in Kursk Oblast.[8] Russian Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoyt confirmed that a Ukrainian drone struck an administrative building in the Central District of Kursk City.[9] Ukrainian news outlet RBC-Ukraine's sources clarified on September 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Khalino Airfield and killed an unspecified number of officers of the Russian 14th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (105th Guards Composite Aviation Division, 6th Air and Air Defense Forces Army, Russia Aerospace [VSK] Forces), which is based at the airfield.[10] The Russian 14th Guards Fighting Aviation Regiment is equipped with Su-30SM aircraft.[11] Russian sources confirmed the strike on the Khalino Airfield and the death of an unspecified number of Russian servicemen.[12]
- Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone and missile strikes on the night of September 24-25 against Ukrainian port, grain, and military targets.
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 12 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles from the Black Sea, two Onyx cruise missiles from the Sevastopol area, and 19 Shahed drones from Krasnodar Krai.[13] Ukrainian air defenses shot down 11 Kalibr missiles and all 19 drones.[14] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck port and grain infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, and footage shows that Russian strikes damaged a hotel in Odesa City.[15] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft at the Dolhintsevo airfield in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[16] Moldovan government officials stated on September 25 that fragments of an S-300 missile fell in Chitcani (5km south of Tiraspol) in Transnistria and that the missile’s origin and flight path have not been confirmed.[17]
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on September 25 that US-provided Abrams tanks have arrived in Ukraine.
[18] The New York Times reported that US officials stated that the US delivered an unspecified number of Abrams tanks to Ukraine on September 23 and that the Biden administration intends to send 31 Abrams in total.[19] Politico previously reported on August 31 that Ukraine would receive the first 10 of 31 Abrams tanks in mid-September.[20]
- Russian military officials continue efforts to build out the Russian armed forces to suit the needs of Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
Russian outlet Izvestia, citing sources in the Russian military, claimed on September 25 that the Russian armed forces are forming reconnaissance and assault brigades in combined arms armies and newly formed army corps and that these brigades are already actively recruiting.[21] Izvestia reported that the new units will be comprised of assault troops intended to break through layered defenses and reconnaissance troops that will conduct reconnaissance at “tactical depth,” and noted that each brigade will receive tanks, light armored vehicles, artillery, and various drones.[22] Izvestia emphasized that these new brigades are meant to overcome pre-prepared Ukrainian defensive positions, particularly in areas of Donbas, where Ukrainian forces have been expanding and equipping fortifications since Russia’s first invasion in 2014. Colonel Valery Yuryev, chairman of the Russian Union of Paratroopers, told Izvestia that the war has stressed the “need to have specialized units for storming fortified areas” and that “separate assault units and formations are necessary.”[23]
- The Kremlin and the Armenian government continue to deflect blame onto one another over the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan amidst deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivered an address on September 24 in which he criticized Russia by stating that the Russian-led security structures of which Armenia is a part are ineffective and by questioning the motives of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh.[26] Pashinyan blamed Azerbaijan and Russian peacekeepers for the recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Pashinyan labeled as “a policy of ethnic cleansing.” The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to Pashinyan’s statement on September 25, blamed Pashinyan for avoiding personal responsibility for “failures in [Armenian] domestic and foreign policy,” and heavily criticized Pashinyan’s recent turn to the West.[27] Russian milbloggers have consistently focused on anti-Pashinyan protests in Yerevan since the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities accepted a Russian peacekeeper-mediated ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan on September 20.[28] ISW previously reported that the Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual on September 19 instructing Kremlin-affiliated media to blame the West and Pashinyan for recognizing Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh.[29] The initial protests in Armenia following the surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan appear to be skewing in the direction of the Kremlin’s preferred narrative, although it is unclear if the Kremlin will retain strong Armenian support for Russia in the long-term following the inaction of Russian peacekeeping forces.
25/9/23 Update #2.
ISW cont'd
- Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains.
- Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.
Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration amplified a report on September 25 that the Russian Ministry of Culture sent 90 children from occupied Kherson Oblast to Moscow and St. Petersburg for an unspecified amount of time.[57] The Russian Ministry of Culture will reportedly send another group of children of an unspecified size to Russia from occupied Kherson Oblast in October.[58]
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
A report by Poland-based open-source intelligence organization Rochan Consulting found that Russia’s Baltic Fleet has been substantially degraded due to the war in Ukraine. Rochan Consulting noted that the Baltic Sea Fleet has lost its ability to conduct large-scale amphibious offensive operations because its Ropucha-class landing ships and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade have been involved in combat in Ukraine.[53] The report stated that three of the Baltic Fleet’s landing ships deployed to the Black Sea and are now unable to deploy back to their home ports in Baltiysk and that the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade has suffered extensive losses in combat in Ukraine, which substantially limits the Baltic Fleet’s power projection capabilities in the Baltic.[54] ISW has previously observed the commitment of naval infantry assets of the Baltic, Pacific, and Northern Fleets to various axes in Ukraine, and the degradation of these elements is likely to further impede Russian naval capabilities in the Baltic, Arctic, and Pacific.[55]
-Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Rus-sian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Ukrainian partisan channel “Mariupol Sprotyv” reported on September 25 that Ukrainian partisans destroyed an electrical transformer installation near occupied Staryi Krym, Donetsk Oblast.[56]
-Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on September 25 that territorial defense units in Mogilev Oblast held staff training and anti-sabotage and search exercises.[59] The Belarusian MoD announced that Belarusian territorial defense established a volunteer people’s militia detachment in Vyazevsky, Osipovichy Raion, Mogilev Oblast.[60]
Two Ukrainian reports. The usual caveats apply.
ISW cont'd
- Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains.
- Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.
Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration amplified a report on September 25 that the Russian Ministry of Culture sent 90 children from occupied Kherson Oblast to Moscow and St. Petersburg for an unspecified amount of time.[57] The Russian Ministry of Culture will reportedly send another group of children of an unspecified size to Russia from occupied Kherson Oblast in October.[58]
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
A report by Poland-based open-source intelligence organization Rochan Consulting found that Russia’s Baltic Fleet has been substantially degraded due to the war in Ukraine. Rochan Consulting noted that the Baltic Sea Fleet has lost its ability to conduct large-scale amphibious offensive operations because its Ropucha-class landing ships and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade have been involved in combat in Ukraine.[53] The report stated that three of the Baltic Fleet’s landing ships deployed to the Black Sea and are now unable to deploy back to their home ports in Baltiysk and that the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade has suffered extensive losses in combat in Ukraine, which substantially limits the Baltic Fleet’s power projection capabilities in the Baltic.[54] ISW has previously observed the commitment of naval infantry assets of the Baltic, Pacific, and Northern Fleets to various axes in Ukraine, and the degradation of these elements is likely to further impede Russian naval capabilities in the Baltic, Arctic, and Pacific.[55]
-Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Rus-sian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Ukrainian partisan channel “Mariupol Sprotyv” reported on September 25 that Ukrainian partisans destroyed an electrical transformer installation near occupied Staryi Krym, Donetsk Oblast.[56]
-Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on September 25 that territorial defense units in Mogilev Oblast held staff training and anti-sabotage and search exercises.[59] The Belarusian MoD announced that Belarusian territorial defense established a volunteer people’s militia detachment in Vyazevsky, Osipovichy Raion, Mogilev Oblast.[60]
Two Ukrainian reports. The usual caveats apply.
26/9/23 Update #1.
ISW
- The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[2] Russian sources have still not directly addressed a claim from a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces that Ukrainian forces control half of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) as of September 24.[3] ISW has not observed evidence of such a Ukrainian advance, and the source reporting it has a very small following. It is still noteworthy that other VDV-connected sources have not responded to these claims.
Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) the “Guards” honorific on September 26.[4] The Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District) has been responsible for the ongoing Russian defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.[5]
- Likely degraded elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are increasingly counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area, suggesting that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have degraded relatively more elite Russian Airborne (VDV) elements that were responsible for counterattacking in the area.
Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 70th and 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiments have increasingly engaged in limited counterattacks near Novoprokopivka in the past week, and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division pushed Ukrainian forces from positions near Novoprokopivka on September 25.[6] Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division's 70th, 71st, and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments routinely engaged in combat engagements and counterattacks against Ukrainian forces at the forwardmost Russian defensive positions in the Orikhiv area before withdrawing behind the Russian defensive layer between Verbove and Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) in mid-to-late August.[7] Russian forces laterally redeployed elements of the more elite 7th and 76th VDV Divisions to the Orikhiv direction in early-to-mid August to counterattack against a widening Ukrainian breach in the area, which may have provided these elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division respite from hostilities.[8] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment may have conducted one of the few unit rotations that ISW has observed on this sector of the front, possibly allowing these elements to partially reconstitute.[9]
The 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments’ involvement in counterattacks around Novoprokopivka suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have significantly degraded the combat capabilities of elements of the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions and that these VDV elements can no longer conduct all counterattacks along the entire Ukrainian breach in the Orikhiv direction. The Russian command may have committed the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments to defending and counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area to allow VDV elements to prioritize defensive operations on the western and eastern flanks of the Ukrainian salient in the Orikhiv direction.[10] It is also possible that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments have held positions near Novoprokopivka since withdrawing from positions further north and are now engaging Ukrainian forces because the Ukrainian advance has reached the outskirts of Novoprokopivka. Roughly a month of respite and possible reconstitution are unlikely to offset the significant degradation that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments suffered while defending earlier in the counteroffensive. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) similarly defended to hold forwardmost defensive positions earlier in the counteroffensive, and Ukrainian counteroffensive operations recently reportedly rendered these elements combat ineffective.[11] The Russian command risks rendering the already degraded elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments combat ineffective if they heavily commit these elements to counterattacking the Ukrainian advance near Novoprokopivka.
- Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly deployed as far back as Tokmak, continuing to suggest that the Russian command has not manned the multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine in depth.
Russian sources reported on September 25 and 26 that elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion were involved in an altercation with military police from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment in occupied Tokmak.[12] The presence of elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments in Tokmak suggests that Russian forces have deployed elements of these regiments throughout the multi-echeloned defense between the current frontline and Tokmak. Russian forces, however, appear to be continuing to deploy most of their combat power in western Zaporizhia Oblast to immediate frontline areas.[13] The deployment of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments as far back as Tokmak suggests that elements of the same Russian formations and units defending at forward positions are holding positions, likely in smaller numbers, in subsequent defensive layers. It is possible that unobserved elements of other Russian units and formations hold positions at rear defensive positions, although the current Russian manpower commitment to holding positions on the frontline indicates that this is unlikely.
- Interethnic tensions appear to be sowing division between elements of the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Arsen Temiraev, a mobilized serviceman from the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania serving with the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, posted a video on September 25 alleging that Russian military police of the 70th Regiment beat Temiraev and two other soldiers of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion in Tokmak on September 24.[14] Temiraev claimed that the military police asked about his ethnicity before telling Temiraev that “Russia is for Russians.” Temiraev claimed that the military police beat him and the other servicemen because a Tokmak local alleged that the soldiers had sexually assaulted children, a crime that Temiraev denied having committed. Temiraev complained that he thought the “Nazis were on the other [Ukrainian] side, [but] it turns out they [the Nazis] are among us.”[15] North Ossetian-Alanian Republic Head Sergey Menyailo responded on September 26, claiming that the elements of the “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions in the area verified the incident.[16] Menyailo reported the incident to the Southern Military District command, which informed the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army, and called the incident unacceptable towards any Russian soldier. Interethnic tensions between Russian units operating in the frontline and near the rear of western Zaporizhia Oblast may threaten the integrity of Russian defenses and unit cohesion amidst recent Ukrainian gains in the area.
- Interethnic tensions may also threaten Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s broader standing within the Russian political sphere amid an ongoing controversy surrounding Kadyrov’s son.
Kadyrov posted footage on September 25 of his son, Adam Kadyrov, beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, and Ramzan Kadyrov praised his son for the beating.[17] The incident prompted varied condemnation and calls for investigations from Russian officials. Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) Head Valery Fadeev stated that burning the Quran is a serious crime but that officials must follow rules for detaining suspects, while HRC member Eva Merkacheva called for an investigation and called the situation a “challenge to the entire legal system of Russia.”[18] Merkacheva levied a thinly veiled criticism of the Chechen Republic, claiming that “in a particular region [Chechen Republic] they [Chechen officials] have shown that they commit crimes and nothing will happen to them about it.”[19] Other Russian officials, including Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova, called for Adam Kadyrov to answer for his crime in a Russian court.[20] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly responded to a journalist’s request for a follow up and reportedly claimed that he had not witnessed the attack and that Adam Kadyrov is “independent and temperamental.”[21] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly praised Adam Kadyrov’s behavior and stated he did not punish his son, but said that Adam Kadyrov will be punished to the fullest extent of Russian law if a Russian court convicts him.[22] ISW has long observed tensions between Chechen and non-Chechen officials and military units, and senior Russian officials’ emotional reactions suggest that Kadyrov’s political standing may be insufficient to protect his son from the consequences of this situation.[23]
ISW
- The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[2] Russian sources have still not directly addressed a claim from a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces that Ukrainian forces control half of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) as of September 24.[3] ISW has not observed evidence of such a Ukrainian advance, and the source reporting it has a very small following. It is still noteworthy that other VDV-connected sources have not responded to these claims.
Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) the “Guards” honorific on September 26.[4] The Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District) has been responsible for the ongoing Russian defense against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.[5]
- Likely degraded elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are increasingly counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area, suggesting that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have degraded relatively more elite Russian Airborne (VDV) elements that were responsible for counterattacking in the area.
Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 70th and 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiments have increasingly engaged in limited counterattacks near Novoprokopivka in the past week, and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division pushed Ukrainian forces from positions near Novoprokopivka on September 25.[6] Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division's 70th, 71st, and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments routinely engaged in combat engagements and counterattacks against Ukrainian forces at the forwardmost Russian defensive positions in the Orikhiv area before withdrawing behind the Russian defensive layer between Verbove and Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) in mid-to-late August.[7] Russian forces laterally redeployed elements of the more elite 7th and 76th VDV Divisions to the Orikhiv direction in early-to-mid August to counterattack against a widening Ukrainian breach in the area, which may have provided these elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division respite from hostilities.[8] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment may have conducted one of the few unit rotations that ISW has observed on this sector of the front, possibly allowing these elements to partially reconstitute.[9]
The 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments’ involvement in counterattacks around Novoprokopivka suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may have significantly degraded the combat capabilities of elements of the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions and that these VDV elements can no longer conduct all counterattacks along the entire Ukrainian breach in the Orikhiv direction. The Russian command may have committed the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments to defending and counterattacking in the Novoprokopivka area to allow VDV elements to prioritize defensive operations on the western and eastern flanks of the Ukrainian salient in the Orikhiv direction.[10] It is also possible that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments have held positions near Novoprokopivka since withdrawing from positions further north and are now engaging Ukrainian forces because the Ukrainian advance has reached the outskirts of Novoprokopivka. Roughly a month of respite and possible reconstitution are unlikely to offset the significant degradation that elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments suffered while defending earlier in the counteroffensive. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) similarly defended to hold forwardmost defensive positions earlier in the counteroffensive, and Ukrainian counteroffensive operations recently reportedly rendered these elements combat ineffective.[11] The Russian command risks rendering the already degraded elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments combat ineffective if they heavily commit these elements to counterattacking the Ukrainian advance near Novoprokopivka.
- Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly deployed as far back as Tokmak, continuing to suggest that the Russian command has not manned the multi-echeloned defense in southern Ukraine in depth.
Russian sources reported on September 25 and 26 that elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion were involved in an altercation with military police from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment in occupied Tokmak.[12] The presence of elements of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments in Tokmak suggests that Russian forces have deployed elements of these regiments throughout the multi-echeloned defense between the current frontline and Tokmak. Russian forces, however, appear to be continuing to deploy most of their combat power in western Zaporizhia Oblast to immediate frontline areas.[13] The deployment of the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments as far back as Tokmak suggests that elements of the same Russian formations and units defending at forward positions are holding positions, likely in smaller numbers, in subsequent defensive layers. It is possible that unobserved elements of other Russian units and formations hold positions at rear defensive positions, although the current Russian manpower commitment to holding positions on the frontline indicates that this is unlikely.
- Interethnic tensions appear to be sowing division between elements of the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Arsen Temiraev, a mobilized serviceman from the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania serving with the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, posted a video on September 25 alleging that Russian military police of the 70th Regiment beat Temiraev and two other soldiers of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion in Tokmak on September 24.[14] Temiraev claimed that the military police asked about his ethnicity before telling Temiraev that “Russia is for Russians.” Temiraev claimed that the military police beat him and the other servicemen because a Tokmak local alleged that the soldiers had sexually assaulted children, a crime that Temiraev denied having committed. Temiraev complained that he thought the “Nazis were on the other [Ukrainian] side, [but] it turns out they [the Nazis] are among us.”[15] North Ossetian-Alanian Republic Head Sergey Menyailo responded on September 26, claiming that the elements of the “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions in the area verified the incident.[16] Menyailo reported the incident to the Southern Military District command, which informed the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army, and called the incident unacceptable towards any Russian soldier. Interethnic tensions between Russian units operating in the frontline and near the rear of western Zaporizhia Oblast may threaten the integrity of Russian defenses and unit cohesion amidst recent Ukrainian gains in the area.
- Interethnic tensions may also threaten Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s broader standing within the Russian political sphere amid an ongoing controversy surrounding Kadyrov’s son.
Kadyrov posted footage on September 25 of his son, Adam Kadyrov, beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, and Ramzan Kadyrov praised his son for the beating.[17] The incident prompted varied condemnation and calls for investigations from Russian officials. Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) Head Valery Fadeev stated that burning the Quran is a serious crime but that officials must follow rules for detaining suspects, while HRC member Eva Merkacheva called for an investigation and called the situation a “challenge to the entire legal system of Russia.”[18] Merkacheva levied a thinly veiled criticism of the Chechen Republic, claiming that “in a particular region [Chechen Republic] they [Chechen officials] have shown that they commit crimes and nothing will happen to them about it.”[19] Other Russian officials, including Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova, called for Adam Kadyrov to answer for his crime in a Russian court.[20] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly responded to a journalist’s request for a follow up and reportedly claimed that he had not witnessed the attack and that Adam Kadyrov is “independent and temperamental.”[21] Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly praised Adam Kadyrov’s behavior and stated he did not punish his son, but said that Adam Kadyrov will be punished to the fullest extent of Russian law if a Russian court convicts him.[22] ISW has long observed tensions between Chechen and non-Chechen officials and military units, and senior Russian officials’ emotional reactions suggest that Kadyrov’s political standing may be insufficient to protect his son from the consequences of this situation.[23]
26/9/23 Update #2.
ISW cont'd.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to increase Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces’ combat capabilities and add elements similar to those normally found in motorized rifle units to the VDV, likely to better align VDV elements with their current combat roles in Ukraine.
Shoigu stated during a speech to the Russian Defense Ministry Board on September 26 that the Russian MoD is implementing measures to increase the Russian VDV’s combat potential by creating new airborne assault formations and increasing the VDV’s reconnaissance, strike, and fire capabilities.[24] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD has nearly finished forming a fifth Russian VDV division, the 104th Airborne Assault (VDV) Division, and an additional parachute regiment subordinate to the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division.[25] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD plans for all Russian VDV divisions to have a logistics brigade and repair and restoration battalions by the end of 2023.[26] Shoigu stated that Russian VDV divisions will be “completed” with an artillery brigade but did not specify a time frame for this addition.[27] These additional elements will bring Russian VDV divisions into closer alignment with the force composition of a typical Russian motorized rifle division.[28] Shoigu did not state that Russian VDV divisions would receive tank regiments, which are common in Russian motorized rifle divisions.[29] These additional units will likely allow the Russian military to use Russian VDV divisions almost interchangeably with motorized rifle divisions in the future, and VDV elements in Ukraine have been increasingly operating as combat infantry similar to motorized rifle divisions.[30] The Russian MoD’s provision of additional elements to Russian VDV units and formations serving in Ukraine is a recognition of the role Russian VDV forces are currently playing in Ukraine and highlights the non-standard way in which the Russian military is using these forces. These Russian formations have become “airborne” in name only, and it is not clear when the Russian MoD intends for them to take to the skies again.
- Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes on port and military targets in Ukraine on the night of September 25-26.
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 38 drones from Krasnodar Krai and Cape Chauda, Crimea, targeting Ukrainian port and border infrastructure and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 26 drones.[31] Russian forces hit the Orlivka-Isaccea ferry crossing that connects Odesa Oblast and Romania, and Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk denied speculations that the Russian drones crossed into Romanian territory.[32] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft at the Kulbakino airfield in Mykolaiv Oblast.[33]
- Russian and Western sources largely claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov is alive after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of Sokolov allegedly attending a meeting on September 26, although the situation remains unclear at this time.
Russian and Western sources largely speculated that footage posted by the Russian MoD on September 26 of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s remarks at the Russian MoD Board meeting purportedly shows Sokolov attending via teleconference.[34] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces previously reported on September 25 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22 killed Sokolov, and Russian officials have not yet issued a response confirming or denying reports of Sokolov’s death.[35] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces stated on September 26 that it was clarifying information about Sokolov’s possible death but that available sources indicate that he is dead.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 26 that he had not received any information from the Russian MoD about the matter and that the Kremlin had nothing to say as this is “solely [the Russian MoD’s] prerogative.”[37] ISW is unprepared at this time to make an assessment about the authenticity of the Russian MoD’s footage of Sokolov or about Sokolov’s status on Earth.
The Russian MoD has reportedly recruited some former Wagner Group personnel for MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs) fighting in Ukraine, while negotiations between the reported Wagner leadership and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) have allegedly stalled over disagreements concerning Wagner’s independence and cohesion.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on September 26.
A reported Wagner-affiliated source claimed on September 26 that the Wagner Group is still operating in Africa and Belarus and that there are no plans to close the organization.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that former Wagner personnel that left the organization with Andrey Troshev (known under the callsign “Sedoy”) after Prigozhin’s rebellion have joined the MoD-affiliated “Redut” and “Volunteer Corps” PMCs and have begun to redeploy to the Bakhmut area in Ukraine.[39] The milblogger claimed that Troshev is trying to recruit Wagner personnel who are currently operating in Belarus, Africa, and the Middle East for Russian MoD-affiliated PMCs. The milblogger also claimed that Anton Yelizarov (known as “Lotos”) is now the head of Wagner and is negotiating with Rosgvardia about the inclusion of Wagner units within Rosgvardia. Yelizarov is reportedly resisting Rosgvardia’s condition that Wagner personnel sign individual contracts, which the milblogger complained would allow Rosgvardia to divide the Wagner units and send them to various areas. ISW previously reported that Russian State Duma deputies will reportedly propose a bill allowing Rosgvardia to include volunteer formations, and Yelizarov is likely pushing for Wagner personnel to be considered a distinct Rosgvardia volunteer formation.[40][/I]
www.understandingwar.org
Video of Storm Shadow strike on Russian Black Sea Fleet Naval HQ in Sebastapol.
Commentary of current effectivness of the Russian Black Sea Fleet
Two Ukrainian reports. The usual caveats apply.
ISW cont'd.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu discussed ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to increase Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces’ combat capabilities and add elements similar to those normally found in motorized rifle units to the VDV, likely to better align VDV elements with their current combat roles in Ukraine.
Shoigu stated during a speech to the Russian Defense Ministry Board on September 26 that the Russian MoD is implementing measures to increase the Russian VDV’s combat potential by creating new airborne assault formations and increasing the VDV’s reconnaissance, strike, and fire capabilities.[24] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD has nearly finished forming a fifth Russian VDV division, the 104th Airborne Assault (VDV) Division, and an additional parachute regiment subordinate to the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division.[25] Shoigu stated that the Russian MoD plans for all Russian VDV divisions to have a logistics brigade and repair and restoration battalions by the end of 2023.[26] Shoigu stated that Russian VDV divisions will be “completed” with an artillery brigade but did not specify a time frame for this addition.[27] These additional elements will bring Russian VDV divisions into closer alignment with the force composition of a typical Russian motorized rifle division.[28] Shoigu did not state that Russian VDV divisions would receive tank regiments, which are common in Russian motorized rifle divisions.[29] These additional units will likely allow the Russian military to use Russian VDV divisions almost interchangeably with motorized rifle divisions in the future, and VDV elements in Ukraine have been increasingly operating as combat infantry similar to motorized rifle divisions.[30] The Russian MoD’s provision of additional elements to Russian VDV units and formations serving in Ukraine is a recognition of the role Russian VDV forces are currently playing in Ukraine and highlights the non-standard way in which the Russian military is using these forces. These Russian formations have become “airborne” in name only, and it is not clear when the Russian MoD intends for them to take to the skies again.
- Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes on port and military targets in Ukraine on the night of September 25-26.
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 38 drones from Krasnodar Krai and Cape Chauda, Crimea, targeting Ukrainian port and border infrastructure and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 26 drones.[31] Russian forces hit the Orlivka-Isaccea ferry crossing that connects Odesa Oblast and Romania, and Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk denied speculations that the Russian drones crossed into Romanian territory.[32] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft at the Kulbakino airfield in Mykolaiv Oblast.[33]
- Russian and Western sources largely claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov is alive after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of Sokolov allegedly attending a meeting on September 26, although the situation remains unclear at this time.
Russian and Western sources largely speculated that footage posted by the Russian MoD on September 26 of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s remarks at the Russian MoD Board meeting purportedly shows Sokolov attending via teleconference.[34] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces previously reported on September 25 that the Ukrainian strike on the BSF headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22 killed Sokolov, and Russian officials have not yet issued a response confirming or denying reports of Sokolov’s death.[35] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces stated on September 26 that it was clarifying information about Sokolov’s possible death but that available sources indicate that he is dead.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 26 that he had not received any information from the Russian MoD about the matter and that the Kremlin had nothing to say as this is “solely [the Russian MoD’s] prerogative.”[37] ISW is unprepared at this time to make an assessment about the authenticity of the Russian MoD’s footage of Sokolov or about Sokolov’s status on Earth.
The Russian MoD has reportedly recruited some former Wagner Group personnel for MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs) fighting in Ukraine, while negotiations between the reported Wagner leadership and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) have allegedly stalled over disagreements concerning Wagner’s independence and cohesion.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on September 26.
A reported Wagner-affiliated source claimed on September 26 that the Wagner Group is still operating in Africa and Belarus and that there are no plans to close the organization.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that former Wagner personnel that left the organization with Andrey Troshev (known under the callsign “Sedoy”) after Prigozhin’s rebellion have joined the MoD-affiliated “Redut” and “Volunteer Corps” PMCs and have begun to redeploy to the Bakhmut area in Ukraine.[39] The milblogger claimed that Troshev is trying to recruit Wagner personnel who are currently operating in Belarus, Africa, and the Middle East for Russian MoD-affiliated PMCs. The milblogger also claimed that Anton Yelizarov (known as “Lotos”) is now the head of Wagner and is negotiating with Rosgvardia about the inclusion of Wagner units within Rosgvardia. Yelizarov is reportedly resisting Rosgvardia’s condition that Wagner personnel sign individual contracts, which the milblogger complained would allow Rosgvardia to divide the Wagner units and send them to various areas. ISW previously reported that Russian State Duma deputies will reportedly propose a bill allowing Rosgvardia to include volunteer formations, and Yelizarov is likely pushing for Wagner personnel to be considered a distinct Rosgvardia volunteer formation.[40][/I]
Institute for the Study of War
The tactical situation in Verbove remains unclear as Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol
Video of Storm Shadow strike on Russian Black Sea Fleet Naval HQ in Sebastapol.
Commentary of current effectivness of the Russian Black Sea Fleet
Two Ukrainian reports. The usual caveats apply.
War isn't just a ground only activity. It occurs in multiple domains:
- Ground.
- Air.
- Maritime.
- Space.
- Information.
- Economic.
- Political.
Hence an overall national war strategy has to cover all of these domains and each domain has a relationship with all the others.
The Ukrainian navy isn't the largest navy in the Black Sea, far from it, but the Ukrainians have to protect their interests in the maritime domain, because if they don't they stand to lose control of maritime access to their nation. That access is important especially considering that the Ukrainian grain exports is a substantial portion of their economy. It is also political because if a nation sees that it is being blockaded and there is no or little adequate response, then the ability to prosecute the war can severely impacted and that affects general morale and the will to fight. Some classics cases are:
- The WW2 Battle of the Atlantic where Germany attempted a maritime blockade of the UK. They were close to achieving their goal.
- The WW2 USN submarine blockade of the Japanese Home Islands. The USN submarine force sank the entire Japanese merchant marine, and that cut the Japanese off from their oil, mineral, rubber supplies etc., in South East Asia. It also made difficult the movement of reinforcements to the battlefront.
- The Falklands War where the RN sank the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano, which resulted in the Argentinian military junta, order their sole aircraft carrier and other fleet units back to the Argentinian mainland, resulting in them having no further involvement in the war. The British also sank an Argentinian submarine as well.
My apologies for being so sloppy -- I should have written "soldiers from the Russian empire at the time (USSR)".
You may disagree that USSR was basically the Russian empire "in disguise". However that is my honest opinion. Putin, Pushkin and the decline of the Russian empire | Financial Times
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #8,759
According to a Russian military source, the situation is currently quiet. In my opinion it's likely Ukraine is regrouping for the next attack. Ukrainian forces involved currently are not spent and we don't have much footage or reports of attacks.
АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА Z
Обстановка на Запорожском направление на 10:00. Вчера кто то не из умных начал разгонять панику о каком то накате и наступательных действий ВСУ и сразу же это все подхватили. Мы вчера летали на БЛА (скрины предоставляли) и была тишина, артиллерия только работало с нашей и со стороны противника...
t.me
You are correct. I disagree quiet strongly. The two are extremely different. We can discuss this in the Russian General Discussion thread if you like.
Huge blunder by Russia: Claims to have shot down a Storm Shadow missile 'With a British crew Inside'
Russia claims to have shot down a Storm Shadow missile 'With a British crew Inside'
www.dagens.com
I dont know if this has been posted before if so I am sorry for the double but this sounded so stupid I had to post on the off chance its the first time.
Sometimes when the news media be it Russian or Ukrainian make statements they boarders on idiotic. Russian news outlet stated a British Storm shadow cruise missile was shot down and there was a British crew inside it. Me thinks the person who wrote that is practicing for the local comedy festival.