Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[knightrider4]

Well it's about what a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit has been deploying for decades (up until recently with some cuts to their forces).

Just be a little more openminded to possibilities. Maybe one of those small island states in our neighbourhood has a coup, maybe with some foreign national involvement. Armour would help overmatch any opposition.

By the way, don't forget we're talking about a force multiplier here, it would be in addition to a Pre Landing Force and an infantry battalion.

Ah yes but here is the rub the MEU has back up on call if needed we however do not. This talk of the Australian Army becoming a pseudo USMC is very dangerous. We have nowhere near the capability of the USMC whose Force 2030 is not getting alot of rave reviews by current and former members.

 

[Volkodav]

Thanks for the input. I'm not looking at fighting a COIN type conflict. I'm thinking of a scenario where we may have to fight a peer enemy.

By its very definition a peer enemy wouldn't have multiple, modern armoured brigades.

Also, any conflict requiring armoured brigades likely would not require them to be rotated out six or twelve monthly with an identical brigade.

It would be nice to have more than one brigade but if it was to be at the expense of the new capabilities it probably wouldn't be worth it.

Opportunity cost is a thing.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Ah yes but here is the rub the MEU has back up on call if needed we however do not. This talk of the Australian Army becoming a pseudo USMC is very dangerous. We have nowhere near the capability of the USMC whose Force 2030 is not getting alot of rave reviews by current and former members.

I'd be very confident in saying the US Army wouldn't envision sending "heavy" divisions to the South Pacific / South-East Asia, just as they didn't in WW2. They have light infantry, airborne, air assault forces that would "back up" the USMC.

Either way though, we're very unlikely to be fighting without them.

 

[knightrider4]

By its very definition a peer enemy wouldn't have multiple, modern armoured brigades.

Also, any conflict requiring armoured brigades likely would not require them to be rotated out six or twelve monthly with an identical brigade.

It would be nice to have more than one brigade but if it was to be at the expense of the new capabilities it probably wouldn't be worth it.

Opportunity cost is a thing.

My bad I'm struggling to think what a peer enemy of the Australian Army would be. We are pretty much overmatched by everyone in the region, maybe Fiji, Samoa unlikely enemies I know. I'm thinking more along the lines of China say for example under the guise of civil disturbance stationing forces there that arent exactly of the composition for a simple civil disturbance.

 

[Volkodav]

My bad I'm struggling to think what a peer enemy of the Australian Army would be. We are pretty much overmatched by everyone in the region, maybe Fiji, Samoa unlikely enemies I know. I'm thinking more along the lines of China say for example under the guise of civil disturbance stationing forces there that arent exactly of the composition for a simple civil disturbance.

Russia completely over matches Ukraine. Multiple Arab states over match Israel.

The Commonwealth forces in Malaya before the fall of Singapore out matched the available Japanese forces.

The French alone had a larger number of more modern tanks than Germany in 1940. In 1991 there was doom and gloom about what Saddam's battle hardened army was going to do to opposing forces.

Paper comparisons of one force against another often wildly inaccurate.

Read up on the Battle of 73 Easting, there was an entire armoured corps following the units directly involved, but the fighting was done by ten M-1A1 Abrams, 13 M-3 Bradley's and a small number of support vehicles. Look at what happened to the Iraqi brigade they hit.

 

[knightrider4]

Well it's about what a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit has been deploying for decades (up until recently with some cuts to their forces).

Just be a little more openminded to possibilities. Maybe one of those small island states in our neighbourhood has a coup, maybe with some foreign national involvement. Armour would help overmatch any opposition.

By the way, don't forget we're talking about a force multiplier here, it would be in addition to a Pre Landing Force and an infantry battalion.

The MEU is the most basic USMC building block. An MEU will never fight alone.

Russia completely over matches Ukraine. Multiple Arab states over match Israel.

The Commonwealth forces in Malaya before the fall of Singapore out matched the available Japanese forces.

The French alone had a larger number of more modern tanks than Germany in 1940. In 1991 there was doom and gloom about what Saddam's battle hardened army was going to do to opposing forces.

Paper comparisons of one force against another often wildly inaccurate.

Read up on the Battle of 73 Easting, there was an entire armoured corps following the units directly involved, but the fighting was done by ten M-1A1 Abrams, 13 M-3 Bradley's and a small number of support vehicles. Look at what happened to the Iraqi brigade they hit.

Yes but Volk does Russia completely overmatch Ukraine? The stalemate would indicate no. The commonwealth in Malaya certainly did in some areas others woefully deficient especially air power and the strategy deplorable. Yes some French tanks not all mind you were far superior to what the Germans had but again poorly used in penny packets and not massed correctly at the point of impact and essentially used as infantry support not massed to achieve a penetrating breakthrough. I have read a book from an American service man about Gulf War 1 and they were not terribly bothered at all by the Iraqi Army once the shooting started. 73 Easting is good reading but lets just remember as the latest Russian adventure has proven that soviet era technology and doctrine is simply outmatched by their western equivalents. Besides the fact the US enjoyed unfettered air dominance and ISR.

 

[knightrider4]

I'd be very confident in saying the US Army wouldn't envision sending "heavy" divisions to the South Pacific / South-East Asia, just as they didn't in WW2. They have light infantry, airborne, air assault forces that would "back up" the USMC.

Either way though, we're very unlikely to be fighting without them.

The USMC has not divested itself of the requirement for heavy armoured capability, it has simply divested itself of their organic armour, it is now the role of the US Army to provide it when required. Who is going to provide ours?

 

[swerve]

... Yes some French tanks not all mind you were far superior to what the Germans had but again poorly used in penny packets and not massed correctly at the point of impact and essentially used as infantry support not massed to achieve a penetrating breakthrough. ...

The first battle between tank divisions took place at Hannut, in Belgium in May 1940. Two French tank divisions took on two panzer divisions & stopped them dead, with the French left in control of the battlefield. Unfortunately, events elsewhere forced the French to retreat, & they didn't have time to recover all their damaged & broken-down tanks, or even destroy the repairable German tanks in their hands.

The idea that all French tanks were used in penny packets is one of many myths. Even pre-war the French had a couple of tank divisions, & plans for using them as divisions, & after seeing what the Germans did in Poland, they hurriedly started reorganising their tank units. They had six tank divisions by May 1940, & were trying to form more.

They classed tanks as "infantry" & "cavalry", & only the infantry tanks were, as the name suggests, devoted to infantry support. By May 1940 even they were starting to be massed. The cavalry tanks were always meant to be used en masse, though pre-war not on the same scale as the Germans.

 

[ASSAIL]

The DSR has bought out the best of defencetalk in this thread.
For 3 x pages there’s been a civil, informative discussion on armour that’s proven to be very beneficial to this ex sailor who knows nothing of this topic, thanks.

 

[old faithful]

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/urgent-longrange-missile-orders-and-domestic-guided-weapons-industry-delayed-for-defence-review/news-story/963872015b43f4063661542f203792f2

Behind a pay wall, sorry.
But after all that waiting for the release of the DSR, we have another delay for the "urgent" missile capability, and another 12 month review.
I was dissapointed, but not surprised with the DSR, and now a day later, I am reminded of the Keating years of defence.

 

[Reptilia]

A doubling of the HIMARS order announced earlier this year says Marles on Sky this morning. Also says missile manufacturing potentially in 2025 over the previous governments proposed 2027.

 

[Volkodav]

The MEU is the most basic USMC building block. An MEU will never fight alone.

Yes but Volk does Russia completely overmatch Ukraine? The stalemate would indicate no. The commonwealth in Malaya certainly did in some areas others woefully deficient especially air power and the strategy deplorable. Yes some French tanks not all mind you were far superior to what the Germans had but again poorly used in penny packets and not massed correctly at the point of impact and essentially used as infantry support not massed to achieve a penetrating breakthrough. I have read a book from an American service man about Gulf War 1 and they were not terribly bothered at all by the Iraqi Army once the shooting started. 73 Easting is good reading but lets just remember as the latest Russian adventure has proven that soviet era technology and doctrine is simply outmatched by their western equivalents. Besides the fact the US enjoyed unfettered air dominance and ISR.

The examples I brought up were to illustrate that there is far more to it than just numbers or types of equipment.

In fact, while you are working out what to do and how to do it, it is often smarter not to make major acquisition decisions based on assumptions.

 

[Stampede]

It is if you don't deploy it as a single entity. For example, a battlegroup with a mechanised company, maybe a tank squadron, and a cavalry squadron, plus supporting sub-units, including an SPH battery. You could - when all equipment is in service - deploy such a force for three rotations. Another example would be an amphibious operation in our region. You might reinforce the force with an armoured combat team, with, say, a troop of tanks and two mechanised platoons. Five tanks, a Hercules ARV, and maybe 10 IFVs, would take a few lifts to get ashore but would be a good force multiplier, especially if your opponent lacked armour.

I think there is a lot of credibility in these numbers.
One tank SQN / Mech Coy / a Cav Sqn or two, plus a SPH battery.
This is the heavy stuff we could have available to both deploy and sustain for a period of time.
This does not include a range of other options from PMV's to special forces and our enabling capabilities.


I disagree agree with the one off scenario of deploy, job done and home for Christmas.
In some cases it may work out that way, but generally it will not and importantly we must have the option to both commit and stay the distance.
An adversary we know our strengths and level of capability and commitment.
It will part of their preparedness and risk assessment.

An advertised doctrine reflected in training and structure of limited short term deployable capability is in my opinion, not healthy.
Have we not being engaged in enough long term conflicts to not have learnt the necessity of back up and rotation.
Be it HADR to high end war fighting and everything in between.
Be it a force of platoon size or battalion size we must have a rule of three at the minimum.

Now as to 129 IFV's. What does that look like
When they are introduced and working with the premise that there are no further orders we will have around 80 on line.

I don't know what the future Mech Section / Troop / Coy / Sqn composition will look like, or how many dismounts they will carry, or for that matter which of the two contenders will get the gig.

But what ever the combination I trust we work on the premises that about a third of the 80 we have online is what we can realistically deploy.
More a Mech Coy / Sqn rather than a battalion.

That needs to be the headspace.

Not oh, we have a Mech Battalion!..................lets deploy it!
It will not happen.


As to small sectional / troop commitments of IFV's , Boxer and MBTs.
Yep I can envisage some such scenarios where over match will be necessary.
I would not dismiss this when we need something more than a Bushmaster or Hawkei.

The futures script is unpredictable.
Having a range of options = capability and response.
Having rotational forces = capability and long term response. The adversary needs to know this.

Maybe in time those IFV's numbers will grow as will our mechanised capability

Cheers S

 

[buffy9]

Not a brigade; a battalion within the brigade, and some supporting sub-units perhaps. 9th Brigade has 5RAR(Mech) and 1st Armoured as its maneouvre elements. The latter has a squadron of Abrams and two will have Boxers. I could see 1st Armoured getting more of the Abrams. It depends how far they take the "single armoured combined-arms brigade".

You could see 9th Brigade having, effectively, a tank regiment, a cavalry regiment, and the mechanised battalion, plus a SPG artillery regiment, an armoured engineering capability and other CS and CSS elements.

To my mind, it makes sense, but I can see how and why many are disappointed. It is a shift away from the thinking we've had in recent years.

Not to be pedantic, but it is 7RAR under the 9th Brigade. 5RAR is remaining under 1st Brigade for littoral manoeuvre - though like discussions about having only one IFV battalion, there is only one infantry littoral battalion currently planned (plus 2RAR, which is unique in that it supports the AAF).

The DSR recommends* we be capable of deploying a combined-arms, armoured brigade into the region, though a brigade that is effective** in close combat (which every modern conflict as far as I'm aware has involved, intimately) requires far greater numbers than what we are acquiring. If we are committed to a strategy of denial, through deterrence and resilience, then we need numbers to make that work. Is necessary that this occur in the "Enhanced Force-In-Being?" Perhaps not. We can expand in future - but if the GOTD is serious about what the DSR recommends and achieving resilience, as it details it, then numbers will be necessary.

* I don't believe it was one of the formal recommendations, as it is, only outlined in the DSR which government has agreed to in whole (mostly).

** Takao's numbers series is probably accurate if you are expecting losses, or seek to hold advantage over competent adversary. It seems as if necessary numbers are presented as something that we need for a brigade, which are taken as ideal numbers, which are then subsequently cut by priorities.

On getting rid of M777s, they are in the same league as the M113s - though we will have to continue using them. A HIMARS shot is closer to an Excalibur round than it is regular artillery rounds, so I don't see it replacing regular artillery, whereas Army being supported by a single SPH regiment appears absurd. The M777s are probably here to stay.

 

[Redlands18]

Not to be pedantic, but it is 7RAR under the 9th Brigade. 5RAR is remaining under 1st Brigade for littoral manoeuvre - though like discussions about having only one IFV battalion, there is only one infantry littoral battalion currently planned (plus 2RAR, which is unique in that it supports the AAF).

The DSR recommends* we be capable of deploying a combined-arms, armoured brigade into the region, though a brigade that is effective** in close combat (which every modern conflict as far as I'm aware has involved, intimately) requires far greater numbers than what we are acquiring. If we are committed to a strategy of denial, through deterrence and resilience, then we need numbers to make that work. Is necessary that this occur in the "Enhanced Force-In-Being?" Perhaps not. We can expand in future - but if the GOTD is serious about what the DSR recommends and achieving resilience, as it details it, then numbers will be necessary.

* I don't believe it was one of the formal recommendations, as it is, only outlined in the DSR which government has agreed to in whole (mostly).

** Takao's numbers series is probably accurate if you are expecting losses, or seek to hold advantage over competent adversary. It seems as if necessary numbers are presented as something that we need for a brigade, which are taken as ideal numbers, which are then subsequently cut by priorities.

On getting rid of M777s, they are in the same league as the M113s - though we will have to continue using them. A HIMARS shot is closer to an Excalibur round than it is regular artillery rounds, so I don't see it replacing regular artillery, whereas Army being supported by a single SPH regiment appears absurd. The M777s are probably here to stay.

The Army has to raise, train sustain 2 HIMARS Regts (or the equiv off), the M777s are currently in 3 seperate Regts, to retain the M777 means the Army will have to raise a 4th Regt. That will mean 4 regts with 3 completely different systems with 3 completely different trg streams in place. The 4th Regt would need a new home built. Lets also not forget that the RAA is being totally rebuilt from the ground up, it has zero experience in operating Tracked vehicles, zero experience in operating MRLs and at the same time introducing a new more capable SR to MR AD system. It has a very steep learning curve in front of it, second only to that facing the Submariners.

 

[buffy9]

The Army has to raise, train sustain 2 HIMARS Regts (or the equiv off), the M777s are currently in 3 seperate Regts, to retain the M777 means the Army will have to raise a 4th Regt. That will mean 4 regts with 3 completely different systems with 3 completely different trg streams in place. The 4th Regt would need a new home built. Lets also not forget that the RAA is being totally rebuilt from the ground up, it has zero experience in operating Tracked vehicles, zero experience in operating MRLs and at the same time introducing a new more capable SR to MR AD system. It has a very steep learning curve in front of it, second only to that facing the Submariners.

I agree, but divesting ourselves of M777 leaves us (per the DSR) with one gun regiment planned. That is twelve howitzers for four full-time combat brigades. HIMARS is a different system with different roles intended - it can perform precision strike, counter fires, long-range strike, etc, but it is not the same as cannon artillery. Concentration of force is lost, and with it your flexibility to engage targets (authority will likely be delegated higher with HIMARS, considering cost, stocks and deep need for GMLRS/PrSM) as well as your ability to achieve key effects, like suppression.

RAA is on a challenging path - but can Army afford to divest itself of all but one gun regiment?

I haven't seen anything beyond speculation on the M777, to be clear. I'm just trying to say that retiring them will leave a major gap in land capability, which one SPH regt and two HIMARS regt cannot fill.

Also, on a fourth home, that is already the case for SPH in Adelaide and HIMARS. It is true for basically all systems we intend to acquire, much of the enterprise doesn't exist.

 

[Milne Bay]

Surely in these days of counter battery fire, UAV's, loitering munitions and the like, mean that M777 is little more than a target, and the artillerymen very high chances of becoming casualties.
This is not a career path that will appeal to anyone, and to be posted and ordered to M777's - little more than criminal.
MB

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Not to be pedantic, but it is 7RAR under the 9th Brigade. 5RAR is remaining under 1st Brigade for littoral manoeuvre - though like discussions about having only one IFV battalion, there is only one infantry littoral battalion currently planned (plus 2RAR, which is unique in that it supports the AAF).

The DSR recommends* we be capable of deploying a combined-arms, armoured brigade into the region, though a brigade that is effective** in close combat (which every modern conflict as far as I'm aware has involved, intimately) requires far greater numbers than what we are acquiring. If we are committed to a strategy of denial, through deterrence and resilience, then we need numbers to make that work. Is necessary that this occur in the "Enhanced Force-In-Being?" Perhaps not. We can expand in future - but if the GOTD is serious about what the DSR recommends and achieving resilience, as it details it, then numbers will be necessary.

* I don't believe it was one of the formal recommendations, as it is, only outlined in the DSR which government has agreed to in whole (mostly).

** Takao's numbers series is probably accurate if you are expecting losses, or seek to hold advantage over competent adversary. It seems as if necessary numbers are presented as something that we need for a brigade, which are taken as ideal numbers, which are then subsequently cut by priorities.

On getting rid of M777s, they are in the same league as the M113s - though we will have to continue using them. A HIMARS shot is closer to an Excalibur round than it is regular artillery rounds, so I don't see it replacing regular artillery, whereas Army being supported by a single SPH regiment appears absurd. The M777s are probably here to stay.

Not pedantic at all. Important to get these things right, and I was wrong. I meant to go back and edit, but thank you for correcting me anyway.

From what was discussed previously, and what Raven shared a while ago, I think the plan for 1st Brigade is a standard infantry battalion plus a Pre Landing Force battalion - same as 2RAR.

 

[Stampede]

Surely in these days of counter battery fire, UAV's, loitering munitions and the like, mean that M777 is little more than a target, and the artillerymen very high chances of becoming casualties.
This is not a career path that will appeal to anyone, and to be posted and ordered to M777's - little more than criminal.
MB

An article of interest on the ABC re the use of 155mm rounds in the Ukraine / Russia conflict.

The fate of Ukraine's spring offensive could rest on this 'highly lethal' artillery round

Ukraine is pleading for more 155mm howitzer rounds to help fight Russia as the conflict between the two countries continues. But why is this artillery shell so important?

www.abc.net.au

M777's may not be your first choice but the round certainly has a place in 2023.


Cheers S

 

[Takao]

I agree, but divesting ourselves of M777 leaves us (per the DSR) with one gun regiment planned. That is twelve howitzers for four full-time combat brigades. HIMARS is a different system with different roles intended - it can perform precision strike, counter fires, long-range strike, etc, but it is not the same as cannon artillery. Concentration of force is lost, and with it your flexibility to engage targets (authority will likely be delegated higher with HIMARS, considering cost, stocks and deep need for GMLRS/PrSM) as well as your ability to achieve key effects, like suppression.

RAA is on a challenging path - but can Army afford to divest itself of all but one gun regiment?

I haven't seen anything beyond speculation on the M777, to be clear. I'm just trying to say that retiring them will leave a major gap in land capability, which one SPH regt and two HIMARS regt cannot fill.

Also, on a fourth home, that is already the case for SPH in Adelaide and HIMARS. It is true for basically all systems we intend to acquire, much of the enterprise doesn't exist.

When the DSR says this:



you have to assume that is direction to get rid of the M777. After all, SPH is significantly better in range and lethality (as well as every other factor)

I think AHQ and RAA have completely dropped the ball on SPH. Ack, we will have the factory which hopefully will allow a second batch to be ordered, but to have a single Regt of artillery for an entire Army is.... well, lots of bad words the moderators won't let me say.